Instigator / Con
4
1504
rating
10
debates
65.0%
won
Topic
#5805
We ought to do and/or not do something(s).
Status
Finished
The debate is finished. The distribution of the voting points and the winner are presented below.
Winner & statistics
Better arguments
0
3
Better sources
2
2
Better legibility
1
1
Better conduct
1
0
After 1 vote and with 2 points ahead, the winner is...
Novice_II
Tags
Parameters
- Publication date
- Last updated date
- Type
- Rated
- Number of rounds
- 3
- Time for argument
- One week
- Max argument characters
- 5,000
- Voting period
- Two weeks
- Point system
- Multiple criterions
- Voting system
- Open
- Minimal rating
- 1,800
Contender / Pro
6
1896
rating
100
debates
93.5%
won
Description
I'm defining "ought" in the same way it's usually defined in the "is-ought gap".
In other words: a non-descriptive, prescriptive obligation to do something(s).
For PRO to win the debate, they need only demonstrate that the resolution is *probably* (>50% likely) true.
For CON to win the debate, they need only demonstrate that the resolution is not probably true (≤50% likely).
Round 1
Con
#1
As outlined in the debate description, the BoP is on PRO to demonstrate that we probably (>50% likely) ought to do (or ought not to do) something.
"Ought" being defined as it is usually defined in the context of the is-ought gap.
I will begin arguing against the resolution using two ideas, the is-ought gap and Occam's Razor.
1. The is-ought gap.
The is-ought gap is the idea that there doesn't appear to be a justifiable method to justify "oughts" (statements about what axiologically or morally ought to be) using only "is" statements (statements that are merely descriptive.)
- A good example of an "ought" would be the statement "It was wrong of John to murder Mary." Regardless of whether the statement is true or not, under ordinary circumstances such a statement would be interpreted as prescriptive, a statement about what should be rather than what merely is.
- A good example of an "is" statement would be the statement "John murdered Mary." Again, regardless of whether the statement is true or not, under the aforementioned context we are obligated to interpret this as a merely descriptive statement, talking about what is and not describing what should be.
An "ought" is often regarded as a type of "is" statement, a statement describing something that just so happens to be moral/axiological. However using the common definitions under the context of the is-ought gap, this is an incorrect way to view the matter. In this context, "is" statements are exclusively statements that do not describe anything moral/axiological, and "oughts" are statements that do describe something moral/axiological.
My main point: In order for PRO to demonstrate that we probably ought to do (or ought not to do) something using only common "is" axioms, they will need to demonstrate that this gap can at least probably be bridged.
2. Occam's Razor.
Occam's Razor is the problem-solving principle that recommends searching for explanations constructed with the smallest possible set of elements.
In other words, according to this principle, we should assume that simpler hypotheses are more likely until we have sufficient evidence to justify more specific hypotheses.
My main point: Our default should be to assume that there is nothing that we ought to do, since this hypothesis requires less elements to justify. In order for PRO to demonstrate that we probably ought to do (or ought not to do) something, they need to give enough evidence for ought(s) to outweigh this principle.
Pro
#2
What are "oughts"
Like Con says, an ought is roughly a non-descriptive, prescriptive obligation to do something(s). Ought statements like "John ought not kill others" are a subset of normative statements—statements that are based on values.
Examples of normative statements are statements in the form:
x is good, x is bad, x is right, x is wrong, permissible, impermissible, virtuous, cruel, evil, great, terrible, and so on.
Normative ethics vs meta ethics
There is an important philosophical distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics. Normative ethics is a "systematic attempt to capture which actions are right and wrong and why, whereas metaethicists usually investigate the meaning of moral terms and the nature of moral judgments and properties." Both are important for this debate. When considering whether we ought to do certain things (and why we ought to do them) we are investigating normative ethics, but it is also helpful to have an idea of the meaning of moral terms, how they behave, and what makes them true or false. Having this allows us to generate predictive expectations for the conditions under which we may have obligations vs not.
What is the right theory of morality?
This is to address the meta-ethical concern. I won't give an all-encompassing explanation of all the relevant moral phenomena, but I will outline several important truths about morality and obligations.
[1] Morals are subjective
There is very good reason to think this.
For one, every other area of normativity is subjective. Take gastro-normativity (normativity about which foods are good or bad). If person A says that ice cream is good and person B says that ice cream is terrible, both people can be correct because statements about the goodness or badness of ice cream are subjective. Same with normativity with what movies are good, what video games are good, what countries are good, what vacation spots are good, what plays a sports team should use etc.
In all these domains, if person A says x is good, or x should happen, and B says x is bad and should not, both can be right, so, we should think that moral statements behave the same way, including statements about obligations.
Morality also appears to be dependent on our goals, desires, and attitudes. The wrongness of certain actions like theft or killing is clearly explained by our desires for people to be happy, to have ownership of property to varying degrees, to experience well-being, not to suffer, etc.
[2] Moral truths are made true by the values of agents
Consider person A who says abortion is wrong and person B says that abortion is morally permissible. Given that morals are subjective, we know that both people can be right, but what makes those statements true as opposed to false? We can once again consider other normative statements.
If person A says that a movie is good and person B says the same move is horrible, plausibly, what makes it the case that A or B is correct about his or her judgment are their values. If the movie is in line with the values of A, the statement is true indexed to A. If the movie is out of accord with the values of B, then the movie is terrible for B. The same analysis generalizes to the other cases of normativity mentioned earlier, so we have extremely good reason to think it applies to moral normativity.
The simple case
We now have very good reason to think that moral statements are subjective, and are dependent on the values of agents. Statements about obligations fit the same build, for person A, it may be true that we are obligated to donate to charity, but false for person B.
First, if we have obligations from at least one person's perspective, we would expect people to have strong psychological affective attitudes towards moral issues. This undeniably is the case. People scream in protest for political and social issues on their respective sides etc.
We would also expect the statements people make about obligations to have a strong correlation with their values if they were true, this we also see. So there is strong evidence in favor of the idea that there at at least some obligations given the nature of obligations themselves.
The prior probability
Statements about obligations are extremely widespread and pervasive throughout speech literature etc. We make these claims very frequently and genuinely believe there are oughts. For con to be right, all these claims must be false or seriously confused in some way. For me, just one of them has to be true. So, con's view is far more immodest than mine and much less likely to be true antecedently.
Rebuttals
Is-ought gap
There is no need to bridge the is-ought gap to show that we ought to do certain things. My case certainly does not require this.
Occam's Razor
Addressed in the prior probability section.
Like Con says, an ought is roughly a non-descriptive, prescriptive obligation to do something(s). Ought statements like "John ought not kill others" are a subset of normative statements—statements that are based on values.
Examples of normative statements are statements in the form:
x is good, x is bad, x is right, x is wrong, permissible, impermissible, virtuous, cruel, evil, great, terrible, and so on.
Normative ethics vs meta ethics
There is an important philosophical distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics. Normative ethics is a "systematic attempt to capture which actions are right and wrong and why, whereas metaethicists usually investigate the meaning of moral terms and the nature of moral judgments and properties." Both are important for this debate. When considering whether we ought to do certain things (and why we ought to do them) we are investigating normative ethics, but it is also helpful to have an idea of the meaning of moral terms, how they behave, and what makes them true or false. Having this allows us to generate predictive expectations for the conditions under which we may have obligations vs not.
What is the right theory of morality?
This is to address the meta-ethical concern. I won't give an all-encompassing explanation of all the relevant moral phenomena, but I will outline several important truths about morality and obligations.
[1] Morals are subjective
There is very good reason to think this.
For one, every other area of normativity is subjective. Take gastro-normativity (normativity about which foods are good or bad). If person A says that ice cream is good and person B says that ice cream is terrible, both people can be correct because statements about the goodness or badness of ice cream are subjective. Same with normativity with what movies are good, what video games are good, what countries are good, what vacation spots are good, what plays a sports team should use etc.
In all these domains, if person A says x is good, or x should happen, and B says x is bad and should not, both can be right, so, we should think that moral statements behave the same way, including statements about obligations.
Morality also appears to be dependent on our goals, desires, and attitudes. The wrongness of certain actions like theft or killing is clearly explained by our desires for people to be happy, to have ownership of property to varying degrees, to experience well-being, not to suffer, etc.
[2] Moral truths are made true by the values of agents
Consider person A who says abortion is wrong and person B says that abortion is morally permissible. Given that morals are subjective, we know that both people can be right, but what makes those statements true as opposed to false? We can once again consider other normative statements.
If person A says that a movie is good and person B says the same move is horrible, plausibly, what makes it the case that A or B is correct about his or her judgment are their values. If the movie is in line with the values of A, the statement is true indexed to A. If the movie is out of accord with the values of B, then the movie is terrible for B. The same analysis generalizes to the other cases of normativity mentioned earlier, so we have extremely good reason to think it applies to moral normativity.
The simple case
We now have very good reason to think that moral statements are subjective, and are dependent on the values of agents. Statements about obligations fit the same build, for person A, it may be true that we are obligated to donate to charity, but false for person B.
First, if we have obligations from at least one person's perspective, we would expect people to have strong psychological affective attitudes towards moral issues. This undeniably is the case. People scream in protest for political and social issues on their respective sides etc.
We would also expect the statements people make about obligations to have a strong correlation with their values if they were true, this we also see. So there is strong evidence in favor of the idea that there at at least some obligations given the nature of obligations themselves.
The prior probability
Statements about obligations are extremely widespread and pervasive throughout speech literature etc. We make these claims very frequently and genuinely believe there are oughts. For con to be right, all these claims must be false or seriously confused in some way. For me, just one of them has to be true. So, con's view is far more immodest than mine and much less likely to be true antecedently.
Rebuttals
Is-ought gap
There is no need to bridge the is-ought gap to show that we ought to do certain things. My case certainly does not require this.
Occam's Razor
Addressed in the prior probability section.
Round 2
Con
#3
Moral subjectivism and the definition of "ought"
I'm entirely fine with conceding that morals are subjective. I'm even fine with conceding that oughts, in the usual sense, are subjective, and that we use seemingly evaluative terms in many other areas in an almost exclusively subjective way. However oughts are not defined in a way that is compatible with moral subjectivism, at least in the context of the is-ought gap.
I'm entirely fine with conceding that morals are subjective. I'm even fine with conceding that oughts, in the usual sense, are subjective, and that we use seemingly evaluative terms in many other areas in an almost exclusively subjective way. However oughts are not defined in a way that is compatible with moral subjectivism, at least in the context of the is-ought gap.
1.
Under moral subjectivism, every obligation is descriptive because it describes peoples' moral attitudes (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Descriptive_ethics).
Note that I'm not arguing that moral subjectivist obligations aren't prescriptive. I'm fine with conceding that they are both descriptive and prescriptive.
This is a problem because the debate description defines ought as:
"a non-descriptive, prescriptive obligation to do something(s)."
Thus moral subjectivism does not seem sufficient to tell us anything about "oughts" as the description defines them.
2.
The way Hume describes it practically precludes a moral subjectivist interpretation:
The way Hume describes it practically precludes a moral subjectivist interpretation:
[...] For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it's necessary that it should be observed and explained; [...]
- A Treatise of Human Nature Book 3 part 1 section 1
If Hume was defining "ought" in a way that is compatible with moral subjectivism, it would be painfully obvious that we do observe "oughts". We observe desires, preferences, goals and attitudes. We frequently and clearly observe everything moral subjectivists tend to define "ought" to mean. Clearly, Hume was referring to an objective prescriptive statement, for which it's much less clear if we've observed or even can observe it.
3.
If "ought" wasn't defined in such a way in this context, it's implausible that such a large ratio of people (even among non ethical subjectivists) would take the is-ought gap seriously to any degree, because the solution would be as simple and obvious as "an ought can just be a particular kind of is statement". Yet, any brief search will reveal that it is taken seriously and that there is no nearly unanimous rejection based on such a simple counterargument.
The prior probability
Argument reversal
For con to be right, all these claims must be false or seriously confused in some way. For me, just one of them has to be true. So, con's view is far more immodest than mine and much less likely to be true antecedently.
For Pro to be right, all claims against the existence of oughts (as defined in the description) must be false or seriously confused in some way. While for me, only one has to be true.
So we see that this kind of argument which Pro provided can work both ways, and is thus misleading and uninformative when presented on its own.
Obligations vs oughts in this debate
While the people who accept some kind of moral obligation far outnumber those who reject it, as argued for above, this debate is only about the existence of a specific kind of ought that all moral nihilists and moral subjectivists reject. This makes the ratio of people who would accept the resolution vs the number who would reject it much less one-sided than Pro insinuated. However I will concede that I'm still taking the side of the minority here.
So assuming the resolution is incorrect, why haven't the majority recognized it?
1. Evolution
We evolved to have very strong emotional intuitions about what's right and wrong that heavily influence our behavior, thinking patterns and beliefs.
We also have a part of the brain that gives post hoc explanations for what we do [1][2]. The result is a need to explain these moral intuitions and emotions that so heavily influence our actions, and a belief in oughts (as defined in the description) usually seems to fulfill this need very well compared to other things.
2. Irrationality
The majority of people are close minded and uncritical when it comes to emotionally-charged topics for which they haven't learned good habits to navigate. Topics such as politics, ethics and religion. The resolution is a claim about ethics.
3. Ideological momentum
The seemingly 'bad' people and ideologies associated with rejecting the existence of oughts (as defined in the description) make it very unappealing for most people. And the fact that it's so unappealing makes it very difficult to make it much more appealing to most people.
Think of slavery, why was it accepted and slaves dehumanized by so many for so long? Because of very big illogical ideologies justifying and giving false notions of slaves and slavery. It took a long time to overcome the ideological momentum built up in favor of it.
4. Theism
Until recently, theism was practically unanimously accepted all around the world, and that almost always reinforced an acceptance of moral realism. Lately there have been more atheists and agnostics, but theism is still the dominant ideology, and the most popular forms heavily support accepting the resolution.
Round 3
Con
#5
Pro's forfeiture and my decision to continue.
I hate to take advantage of Pro's evidently busy schedule, but there are a few factors that lead me to ultimately make the call to continue:
- We restarted this debate twice before because Pro did not provide an argument in time.
- Pro had 7 days to put together an argument in this debate.
- Pro appears to have wanted to do this debate even though they're doing another debate at the same time.
- I asked if Pro wanted any term and/or rule changes and they said they only wanted more time. I gave them the maximum allowed time for a rated debate, a week per argument.
- This is the final round. We're already deep into the debate and I won't have another opportunity to argue here, Pro will have the last word if he doesn't forfeit the last round.
So Pro appears to have had every opportunity to:
- request that we do the debate when they're less busy (particularly with the other debate).
- decide not to do the debate.
- ask for term or rule changes to increase the number of rounds or make forfeiture more forgiveable.
So, I extend all of my arguments.
My arguments
- Moral subjectivism only involves descriptive obligations, not non-descriptive obligations.
- Hume's usage of ought (which should be the same as the one used in the is-ought gap, since Hume was the main original guy behind it) appears to preclude a moral subjectivist interpretation.
- If "ought" was defined as Pro suggests in the is-ought gap, it's implausible that people would take it seriously. (Even given peoples' irrationality, because they're almost always biased in favor of oughts.)
- I reversed the prior probability argument that Pro gave and showed how it's misleading and uninformative.
- We evolved with very strong emotional intuitions and a desire to explain ourselves and a strong impulse to defend such deep beliefs even when it's irrational.
- People are irrational about emotionally charged topics, and whether or not anything is right or wrong is certainly emotionally charged.
- It's very difficult to overcome the momentum that some ideologies carry, even when they are absurd. The belief in non-descriptive, prescriptive obligations seems like it would have a lot of ideological momentum behind it.
- Theism is massive and the most popular forms of it all seem to support believing in non-descriptive, prescriptive obligations. A massive number of theists presuppose or knowingly accept their religion without adequate evidence. And it is another emotionally charged ideology with massive ideological momentum. So whether it's true or not, people very often believe in it for irrational reasons.
Final round Blitzkrieg
Pro can attempt to counter all of the crucial points I made in R2 and/or make new arguments.
In the event that Pro attempts to make new arguments, voters should be aware that the voting policy discourages "final round Blitzkriegs", or the bringing up of entirely new arguments in the final round when the other side cannot respond.
Note that I am not providing new arguments here except to justify my argument extensions, remind voters of the unaddressed arguments and warn them of a possible final round Blitzkrieg. Pro should be able to focus entirely on responding to R2 as if this R3 argument doesn't exist, and if my arguments there don't work, that should be able to be sufficient.
Pro
#6
While the condescension is appreciated my forfeiture was due to an unexpected technological issue.
My Case
I made a simple case. First I argue for a form of subjectivism as a broadly accurate meta-ethical theory, which con conceded completely.
Next, I show my position has a much higher prior probability and is strongly evidenced by psychological affective attitudes toward moral issues and strong correlations with moral judgments of agents and their indexed values.
Both arguments remain successful.
Prior Probability
Let's talk about this first. Con tries to parody my argument—unsuccessfully.
My Case
I made a simple case. First I argue for a form of subjectivism as a broadly accurate meta-ethical theory, which con conceded completely.
Next, I show my position has a much higher prior probability and is strongly evidenced by psychological affective attitudes toward moral issues and strong correlations with moral judgments of agents and their indexed values.
Both arguments remain successful.
Prior Probability
Let's talk about this first. Con tries to parody my argument—unsuccessfully.
For Pro to be right, all claims against the existence of oughts (as defined in the description) must be false or seriously confused in some way. While for me, only one has to be true.
This is flat-out wrong. My position is that we ought to do something(s), and is thus compatible with a range of claims against the existence of oughts being true. It only requires that at least one of them is false.
Con's position is that there is nothing we ought to do. To be right, every ought claim would have to be false as explained, so this "rebuttal" is just a misunderstanding of the argument.
Subjectivism
Con claims that my theory does not meet the definition of "oughts." This is completely false as I will show, but con misconstrues various sources to make this point. For one, in the source con used to label my view as "descriptive," his own citation distinguishes:
Con's position is that there is nothing we ought to do. To be right, every ought claim would have to be false as explained, so this "rebuttal" is just a misunderstanding of the argument.
Subjectivism
Con claims that my theory does not meet the definition of "oughts." This is completely false as I will show, but con misconstrues various sources to make this point. For one, in the source con used to label my view as "descriptive," his own citation distinguishes:
Descriptive ethics, also known as comparative ethics, is the study of people's beliefs about morality.[1] It contrasts with prescriptive or normative ethics, which is the study of ethical theories that prescribe how people ought to act, and with meta-ethics, which is the study of what ethical terms and theories actually refer to.
Moral subjectivism is a meta-ethical theory—as said in the first sentence of the link con posted just before—not a descriptive ethics theory so posting this was deliberately misleading or a misunderstanding. I'll charitably assume the best.
Con says:
Under moral subjectivism, every obligation is descriptive because it describes peoples' moral attitudes
This is false. Moral subjectivism can maintain that obligations are prescriptive as opposed to descriptive, they are just subjective, viz. they depend on the attitudes of agents. Con gave no argument whatsoever that this feature of the view somehow makes oughts descriptive, this was merely asserted, completely begging the question.
Given that I have proposed a consistent and explanatory theory that has this feature, it stands to reason that my burden has been satisfied on the matter, but con's has not with regards to his claims here.
Con also says that the way Hume defines oughts precludes moral subjectivism, but the quote is seemingly dishonestly used. I provide the full quote, but even in the snip provided it is seen that Hume does not define ought whatsoever—Hume isn't even talking about anything related to oughts being objective or subjective, he is talking about the is/ought gap, arguing that you can't derive oughts from is statements alone an entirely separate issue having to do with the non-ampliative nature of deductive logic, a completely separate issue.
I am beginning to see a pattern here of misrepresented sources, and when con says:
Given that I have proposed a consistent and explanatory theory that has this feature, it stands to reason that my burden has been satisfied on the matter, but con's has not with regards to his claims here.
Con also says that the way Hume defines oughts precludes moral subjectivism, but the quote is seemingly dishonestly used. I provide the full quote, but even in the snip provided it is seen that Hume does not define ought whatsoever—Hume isn't even talking about anything related to oughts being objective or subjective, he is talking about the is/ought gap, arguing that you can't derive oughts from is statements alone an entirely separate issue having to do with the non-ampliative nature of deductive logic, a completely separate issue.
I am beginning to see a pattern here of misrepresented sources, and when con says:
If "ought" wasn't defined in such a way in this context, it's implausible that such a large ratio of people...would take the is-ought gap seriously
There is serious confusion about why the is-ought gap is a problem. It has nothing to do with whether morality is objective or subjective, but with the fact that ought claims do not deductively follow from purely descriptive premises, a basic result of deductive logic.
This brings us to the end of con's main rebuttals only observing misunderstanding of the argument from probability and a series of misrepresented sources and unsupported assertions. On the other hand, my arguments remain largely unaffected.
Other
Con tries to explain why people believe in obligations in a largely irrelevant but very bizarre way in that he does nothing to show that all of the explanations are defeating in any way.
Evolution if anything bolsters my case, providing a partial causal explanation for our moral behavior, which in no way undermines the truth of ought statements as ideological momentum, explaining why people make ought claims to condemn certain practices, doing nothing to show they are false.
Asserting that the irrational position to believe is contrary to con's view is just begging the question, and Theism is compatible with both realism and anti-realism, and no evidence was provided that Theism is "almost always reinforced an acceptance of moral realism."
Conclusion
Presenting a theory of the oughts, defending it, and showing my view as much more likely via simple probabilistic reasoning easily satisfies my >50% burden that con has not come close to satisfying on their end.
This brings us to the end of con's main rebuttals only observing misunderstanding of the argument from probability and a series of misrepresented sources and unsupported assertions. On the other hand, my arguments remain largely unaffected.
Other
Con tries to explain why people believe in obligations in a largely irrelevant but very bizarre way in that he does nothing to show that all of the explanations are defeating in any way.
Evolution if anything bolsters my case, providing a partial causal explanation for our moral behavior, which in no way undermines the truth of ought statements as ideological momentum, explaining why people make ought claims to condemn certain practices, doing nothing to show they are false.
Asserting that the irrational position to believe is contrary to con's view is just begging the question, and Theism is compatible with both realism and anti-realism, and no evidence was provided that Theism is "almost always reinforced an acceptance of moral realism."
Conclusion
Presenting a theory of the oughts, defending it, and showing my view as much more likely via simple probabilistic reasoning easily satisfies my >50% burden that con has not come close to satisfying on their end.
Criterion
Con
Tie
Pro
Points
Better arguments
3 point(s)
Better sources
2 point(s)
Better legibility
1 point(s)
Better conduct
1 point(s)
Reason:
I don't love that Pro won this late with a round Con couldn't respond to, but tech issues happen, and I'm already penalizing Pro for forfeiting the second round with a conduct point.
The reason Pro wins this in my opinion is that they were able to reaffirm their case without adding to it, mainly by showing how Con had made some assumptions that weren't very well supported by what Pro said. For example, much of Con's case relied on the premise that "Under moral subjectivism, every obligation is descriptive because it describes peoples' moral attitudes." But that's not subjective morality, or at least the version of subjective morality Pro is advocating; they're saying that ought statements do exist to the extent that they match someone's value (i.e. if I want to achieve well-being, I ought to do something that will achieve that). I do think Con had an opportunity to cast a wider net in responding to Pro's case if they weren't sure whether or not Pro was advocating descriptive ethics—and if they wanted to argue that subjective morality must be descriptive and cannot be prescriptive, they could have fleshed that out with more than a single sentence and even had an extra round to do so. There are also secondary points I haven't addressed here, but the debate really comes down to Pro not advocating descriptive ethics.
Given what Con says is allowed at the end, I don't think this is a final-round blitzkrieg, even if I would have liked more rounds to settle the dispute. Pro cites the source Con provides, and nothing at the end seems to come out of nowhere. It's mostly clarifying how Pro's first round case doesn't fall into the box Con puts it in.
Yeah, I think you did fine here for going against someone at the top of the leaderboard. Just with the format and Novice being unable to post in the second round, there wasn't much opportunity for a back-and-forth.
Thanks for the vote, I believe I meant to refer to this ("Ethical subjectivism stands in opposition to moral realism, which claims that moral propositions refer to objective facts, independent of human opinion;") in
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_subjectivism
The problem being that, if moral prepositions don't refer to objective facts independent of human opinion, they must be descriptive (describing something about human opinion that is not independent of it).
But I definitely should have dedicated more of my arguments to establishing that. I am much more accustomed to informal debates where it's virtually guaranteed that I can later fill in these sorts of gaps when necessary.
I would probably have used Novice's forfeiture as an opportunity to further establish arguments, but I genuinely thought he was too busy to give an argument in R2. I thought it would be unfair to have the opportunity to essentially get 10k more characters, and I underestimated how big the gaps that I left in my argument are.
This is debate is way too advanced for me.
That's right, "ought" is used differently colloquially vs in this context.
I believe I am essentially arguing against moral objectivism (or at least something very close to that, maybe there's a caveat I'm missing).
I believe that most people accept the existence of some kind of ought as I'm defining it, I believe I am arguing against the majority view here.
Saying 'people ought do X,
'Is descriptive though, isn't it?
As people, would have to be defined.
But I 'think, I get that you're trying to avoid,
A person who values kindness, ought be kind and encourage others to be kind.
A person who values pain, ought be in pain and encourage others to be pain.
Maybe what confused me is the is-ought gap,
You're 'not arguing that one can conclude what something ought do from what it is.
You're arguing that people don't have a singular ought?
Arguing against Moral Objectivism, such as people should be kind, or people should be evil?
That there is nothing ought-ing them to be either?
How does something 'ought though?
If something has a Creator, said Creator often has an expectation, whether as some believe God having some expectation for humans,
Or a human who designs a wood axe, it 'ought be used for wood, not human skulls.
. . .
But I imagine one would still expect that people ought to 'something,
Though, I suppose something just 'does, if it 'is something.
One doesn't say that fire has a moral obligation to burn stuff, it just does.
In casual language though, people might toss some wood into a fire, and say that ought burn nicely. But there's probably some specific philosophy terminology that is meant by ought.
I'm not sure what the best colloquial way to explain it is, I've tried and failed to explain it to many people before. But I'll give it my best shot.
I mean to omit definitions pertaining to things like moral subjectivism. I mean to refer to things that we "genuinely" ought to do, not something like "well I define what's ethical as what maximizes pleasure and minimizes suffering" or anything like that. It has to involve some "genuinely" good or bad thing, it can't just be some arbitrary aspect of reality that we have no reason to believe we actually genuinely ought to follow/maximize/minimize/etc.
What is,
"A non-descriptive, prescriptive obligation to do something"?