Suicide is never justified.
The debate is finished. The distribution of the voting points and the winner are presented below.
After 3 votes and with 9 points ahead, the winner is...
- Publication date
- Last updated date
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- Rated
- Number of rounds
- 4
- Time for argument
- Three days
- Max argument characters
- 4,096
- Voting period
- Two months
- Point system
- Multiple criterions
- Voting system
- Open
- Minimal rating
- 1,500
Suicide: The deliberate self-inflicted ending of one's own life. Can include indirect means, as long as it is primarily intended to end one's own life above all else except fundamental ethical/axiological goals.
Never: In no cases whatsoever.
Justified: Objectively ethically and/or axiologically warranted. Objectively preferable (or at least equal to alternative(s)) given what is objectively ethical/unethical and/or valuable/"unvaluable".
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Note: Con automatically loses the debate if they purposefully copy the arguments I use in my other suicide debate.
- P1. We don't have any clue about what irreducible axiological/ethical objectives we ought to pursue (aside from "we ought to do what we ought to do" and "we ought to try to do what we ought to do", because x = x is an axiom and "ought" in this context is defined such that we should try to do it. (From now on, any time a term like "irreducible axiological/ethical objectives" is written, it's to be read with these caveats.)) because of the is-ought gap.
- P2. All irreducible axiological/ethical objectives have a logical opposite. (It is justified to do x, it is not justified to do x.)
- P3. If we currently have no clue what irreducible axiological/ethical objectives are more likely than others (P1), and every irreducible axiological/ethical objective has an opposite (P2), then currently no irreducible axiological/ethical objective is more epistemically justified than any others.
- P4. That it's best to pursue any particular irreducible axiological/ethical objective is currently unfounded. (P1, P2, P3)
- P5. If one can discover what specific irreducible axiological/ethical objective(s) they ought to pursue, then it is more probable (given our limited knowledge, not necessarily literally objectively more likely. "Probability" and similar terms will henceforth be used this way.) that they would pursue it.
- P6. Increasing/lowering the probability of discovering what is justified increases/lowers (respectively) the probability of one pursuing and succeeding at it/them. (Supported by P5)
- P7. It is virtually impossible that the exact moment we would commit suicide, we would otherwise die from something else.
- P8. If we would die from something other than suicide before we commit suicide, we cannot successfully commit suicide.
- P9. If an event occurs but does not occur before or during another event, it must occur after.
- P10. If we are able to commit suicide, our life would always end later if we don't commit suicide than if we do. (Supported by P7, P8, P9)
- P11. Every event which is logically possible to occur in every instant has, in every instant, at least a very small chance of occurring.
- P12. There is at least a very small chance in every moment that we live that we will discover what specific thing is justified for us to do. (Supported by P11)
- P13. Occam's Razor suggests that hypotheses with less unknown elements are more likely.
- P14. There is no afterlife or reincarnation. (Supported by P13)
- P15. If one is dead, they don't exist. (Supported by P14)
- P16. Even if we manage to recreate one's brain, it would only be a clone, the consciousness who died would not resume experiencing things from the clone's perspective. (Supported by P13)
- P17. It is currently very unlikely that we would be able to bring back the dead in a way that isn't essentially equivalent to cloning. (Supported by P13)
- P18. If one doesn't exist, they won't exist. (P16, P17)
- P19. If one is dead, they won't exist. (P15, P18)
- P20. When one dies, they will stop existing and will never exist again. (P15, P19)
- P21. It is logically impossible that one discovers what specific thing(s) is/are justified for them to do if they don't and won't exist.
- P22. Dying makes it logically impossible to discover what specific thing(s) is/are justified to do. (P20, P21)
- P23. A very small chance is more probable than something that is logically possible.
- P24. Suicide lowers the probability of doing what is justified. (P12, P22, P23)
- P25. Suicide does not increase the probability of doing what is justified to an extent that outweighs the lowered probability of discovering that is justified. (Supported by P6)
- P26. Lowering the probability of us doing what is justified (without increasing the probability of doing what is justified in other areas to an extent that outweighs the lowered probability) is never epistemically justified given only common axioms.
- C. Suicide is never justified. (Supported by P24, P25, P26)
P25. Suicide does not increase the probability of doing what is justified to an extent that outweighs the lowered probability of discovering that is justified. (Supported by P6)
- P5. If one can discover what specific irreducible axiological/ethical objective(s) they ought to pursue, then it is more probable (given our limited knowledge, not necessarily literally objectively more likely. "Probability" and similar terms will henceforth be used this way.) that they would pursue it.
- P6. Increasing/lowering the probability of discovering what is justified increases/lowers (respectively) the probability of one pursuing and succeeding at it/them. (Supported by P5)
I'm pretty sure you made a typo for 23 [...]
[Death] does take away the possibility for good, but it is essentially a perfect neutral, as it takes away the possibility for bad too.
This premise relies on the assumption that the person who may or may not discover a perfect moral truth is motivated to act on this perfect moral truth.Suicide takes away your chances of finding perfect moral truth, but it also takes away your chances of finding a fake moral truth that you believe to be correct, or the chances of you acting against your moral truth.
P6. Increasing/lowering the probability of discovering what is justified increases/lowers (respectively) the probability of one pursuing and succeeding at it/them.
P12. There is at least a very small chance in every moment that we live that we will discover what specific thing is justified for us to do.P22. Dying makes it logically impossible to discover what specific thing(s) is/are justified to do.
Objectively preferable (or at least equal to alternative(s)) given what is objectively ethical/unethical and/or valuable/"unvaluable".
Suicide would be unjust if perhaps Gandhi had committed it, but not if Hitler had killed himself (earlier on that is).
P4. That it's best to pursue any particular irreducible axiological/ethical objective is currently unfounded.
- Because if Hitler was justified to commit suicide, it must (by the definition of justified given) be objectively axiologically/ethically preferable (or equal) for him to commit suicide.
- If it's preferable, the axiological/ethical objective(s) that make(s) it preferable must be reducible to irreducible axiological/ethical objective(s), if it/they is/are not itself/themselves (an) irreducible one(s).
- If it's preferable, whatever irreducible axiological/ethical objectives are justifying it cannot be founded given premise 4 (of the original argument). (Unless they are merely "we ought to do what we ought to do" and/or "we ought to try to do what we ought to do", but I don't currently see how you can derive that Hitler should commit suicide given only these irreducible objectives, without denying other premises in the original argument. Either way, this should be demonstrated if argued for.)
- If it was equally justified for Hitler to commit suicide or not, then this cannot be true unless my arguments given in the Motivation and safety from mistakes section do not work.
From premise 6, I would argue that we can implicitly conclude:if x has a higher probability than y of leading to us discovering what is justified,then we are more likely to succeed at doing what is justified with x than with y.Due to premise 12 and 22, living always has a higher probability of discovering what is justified than suicide:Therefore, following the conclusion we derived from the argument that used premise 6,We are more likely to succeed at doing what is justified with living than with suicide.
Intuitively it might seem like this doesn't matter, since suicide also seems to lower the probability of doing what is unjustified to an equal degree.However justified was defined as:Objectively preferable (or at least equal to alternative(s)) given what is objectively ethical/unethical and/or valuable/"unvaluable".Thus, we are more likely to succeed at doing what is objectively preferable/equal to all alternatives (including suicide) with living than with suicide.In other words, living is more likely than suicide to lead to us doing what is best, even accounting for suicide lowering the probability of doing what is unjustified (whether accidentally or intentionally).Thus, given these premises, living is more likely to be best than suicide.
I'm running out of characters, so this next section is responding to your last few bullet points about my Hitler thing
Justified: Objectively ethically and/or axiologically warranted. Objectively preferable (or at least equal to alternative(s)) given what is objectively ethical/unethical and/or valuable/"unvaluable".
I agree with all of these premises, but the conclusion doesn't necessarily follow from them, because it ignores the possibility for bad.
We are more likely to succeed at doing what is objectively preferable (or at least equal to alternatives(s)) given what is objectively ethical/unethical and/or valuable/"unvaluable" with living than with suicide.
if x has a higher probability than y of leading to us discovering what is justified,then we are more likely to succeed at doing what is justified with x than with y.
[...] living always has a higher probability of discovering what is justified than suicide
The probability of doing good counts for nothing if that probability isn't actually realized.
It is [...] possible that someone discovers what is justified for them to do, and they decide to do the opposite.
Pro concession.
Pro conceded
Concession
If you believe you could do much better with the same setup (can be (a) different R1 argument(s)), I would be elated to argue as Con against you.
I agree.
4,096 characters, 3 days, and as far as I know no good alternative except for a very complex argument with no previous formal representation. This made for a challenge I was not able to do very well at.
Omitting "(or at least equal to alternative(s))" from the definition of "justified" would have made it a lot easier, but I wanted to see if I could formalize my axiological position, and I underestimated the character requirement to do that well given my abilities.
This argument is terrible
I am actually black so pro is wrong
Who knows... Who knows what dreams you'll be having today at night and what decision you'd have to make :)
Btw, most people tend to save their life till the very end, hoping to the divine salvage. So, you can't be sure how you'd behave.
I 'might, but the possibility for failure and torture being high,
I'd might be tempted to save it for myself,
Hopefully I'll never have to know what I would decide.
Why wouldn't you try to kill one of cannibals using your gun? In that case they'll maybe decide that you're some magical divine creature, who can kill from distance :) I'm sure they know nothing about firearm.
Well, I'm pretty willful about living myself,
Even in theoretical circumstances.
But if I crashed on a desert island, and saw several other of my shipmates grilled alive over an open fire before being eaten alive (Just cooked a bit) by cannibals,
Then the cannibals are gesturing at me and the fire, and I happened to have a gun hidden, with one bullet,
Suicide 'might be tempting then.
I wont kill myself because I am a coward.