Instigator / Pro
Ferbalot's avatar
Ferbalot
1514
rating
6
debates
75.0%
won
Topic
#5842

Suicide is never justified.

Status
Debating

Waiting for the next argument from the contender.

Round will be automatically forfeited in:

00
DD
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00
HH
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00
MM
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SS
Tags
Ethics
Philosophy
axiology
suicide
Parameters
Publication date
Last updated date
Type
Rated
Number of rounds
4
Time for argument
Three days
Max argument characters
4,096
Voting period
Two months
Point system
Multiple criterions
Voting system
Open
Minimal rating
1,500
Contender / Con
Moozer325's avatar
Moozer325
1600
rating
24
debates
72.92%
won
Description

Suicide: The deliberate self-inflicted ending of one's own life. Can include indirect means, as long as it is primarily intended to end one's own life above all else except fundamental ethical/axiological goals.

Never: In no cases whatsoever.

Justified: Objectively ethically and/or axiologically warranted. Objectively preferable (or at least equal to alternative(s)) given what is objectively ethical/unethical and/or valuable/"unvaluable".

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Note: Con automatically loses the debate if they purposefully copy the arguments I use in my other suicide debate.

Round 1
Ferbalot's avatar
Ferbalot
Pro
#1
This is a complex argument, it is virtually inevitable that I've made several errors that at least technically invalidate it. I will be fixing those in the following rounds as they are pointed out by Con.

  • P1. We don't have any clue about what irreducible axiological/ethical objectives we ought to pursue (aside from "we ought to do what we ought to do" and "we ought to try to do what we ought to do", because x = x is an axiom and "ought" in this context is defined such that we should try to do it. (From now on, any time a term like "irreducible axiological/ethical objectives" is written, it's to be read with these caveats.)) because of the is-ought gap.
  • P2. All irreducible axiological/ethical objectives have a logical opposite. (It is justified to do x, it is not justified to do x.)
  • P3. If we currently have no clue what irreducible axiological/ethical objectives are more likely than others (P1), and every irreducible axiological/ethical objective has an opposite (P2), then currently no irreducible axiological/ethical objective is more epistemically justified than any others.
  • P4. That it's best to pursue any particular irreducible axiological/ethical objective is currently unfounded. (P1, P2, P3)

  • P5. If one can discover what specific irreducible axiological/ethical objective(s) they ought to pursue, then it is more probable (given our limited knowledge, not necessarily literally objectively more likely. "Probability" and similar terms will henceforth be used this way.) that they would pursue it.
  • P6. Increasing/lowering the probability of discovering what is justified increases/lowers (respectively) the probability of one pursuing and succeeding at it/them. (Supported by P5)

  • P7. It is virtually impossible that the exact moment we would commit suicide, we would otherwise die from something else.
  • P8. If we would die from something other than suicide before we commit suicide, we cannot successfully commit suicide.
  • P9. If an event occurs but does not occur before or during another event, it must occur after.
  • P10. If we are able to commit suicide, our life would always end later if we don't commit suicide than if we do. (Supported by P7, P8, P9)

  • P11. Every event which is logically possible to occur in every instant has, in every instant, at least a very small chance of occurring.
  • P12. There is at least a very small chance in every moment that we live that we will discover what specific thing is justified for us to do. (Supported by P11)

  • P13. Occam's Razor suggests that hypotheses with less unknown elements are more likely.
  • P14. There is no afterlife or reincarnation. (Supported by P13)
  • P15. If one is dead, they don't exist. (Supported by P14)

  • P16. Even if we manage to recreate one's brain, it would only be a clone, the consciousness who died would not resume experiencing things from the clone's perspective. (Supported by P13)
  • P17. It is currently very unlikely that we would be able to bring back the dead in a way that isn't essentially equivalent to cloning. (Supported by P13)
  • P18. If one doesn't exist, they won't exist. (P16, P17)
  • P19. If one is dead, they won't exist. (P15, P18)

  • P20. When one dies, they will stop existing and will never exist again. (P15, P19)
  • P21. It is logically impossible that one discovers what specific thing(s) is/are justified for them to do if they don't and won't exist.
  • P22. Dying makes it logically impossible to discover what specific thing(s) is/are justified to do. (P20, P21)

  • P23. A very small chance is more probable than something that is logically possible.
  • P24. Suicide lowers the probability of doing what is justified. (P12, P22, P23)
  • P25. Suicide does not increase the probability of doing what is justified to an extent that outweighs the lowered probability of discovering that is justified. (Supported by P6)
  • P26. Lowering the probability of us doing what is justified (without increasing the probability of doing what is justified in other areas to an extent that outweighs the lowered probability) is never epistemically justified given only common axioms.
  • C. Suicide is never justified. (Supported by P24, P25, P26)

Moozer325's avatar
Moozer325
Con
#2
I'm pretty sure you made a typo for 23, it says "logically possible" but it seems like you meant to say "impossible". Just to cover all my bases, I accept premise 23 if you truly did mean to say impossible, but I would not accept it if it means exactly what it says. I accept premise 24&26 and all that come before it to support those. However I deny premise 25, and I'll be basing just about my whole argument on that one premise. 

Just to recap, premise 25 reads: 
P25. Suicide does not increase the probability of doing what is justified to an extent that outweighs the lowered probability of discovering that is justified. (Supported by P6)
And it's supporting premises are:
  • P5. If one can discover what specific irreducible axiological/ethical objective(s) they ought to pursue, then it is more probable (given our limited knowledge, not necessarily literally objectively more likely. "Probability" and similar terms will henceforth be used this way.) that they would pursue it.
  • P6. Increasing/lowering the probability of discovering what is justified increases/lowers (respectively) the probability of one pursuing and succeeding at it/them. (Supported by P5)

I agree with these two, so we can move on to P25 itself, I just figured I'd include them.

The problem with P25 as I see it isn't that it did something wrong, it just ignores a few major things. Because death is essentially the philosophical end-all, yes it does take away the possibility for good, but it is essentially a perfect neutral, as it takes away the possibility for bad too. This premise relies on the assumption that the person who may or may not discover a perfect moral truth is motivated to act on this perfect moral truth. As you said yourself in premise 2, all ethical actions have an ethical opposite. Suicide takes away your chances of finding perfect moral truth, but it also takes away your chances of finding a fake moral truth that you believe to be correct, or the chances of you acting against your moral truth.  Suicide would be unjust if perhaps Gandhi had committed it, but not if Hitler had killed himself (earlier on that is).

To better illustrate my point, I'll radically simplify your argument:

Premise 1: If you are dead, you can no longer feel warmth
Premise 2: If you lose the possibility to feel warmth, then you are bringing more cold into your life
Conclusion: Suicide results in you being colder

Now I'm obviously not saying that this is the same thing, but you see the point. I took a random metric other than good/bad. Obviously, suicide would result in neither a warmer life nor a colder one since you are removing the possibility of either. Suicide removes the possibility for good, yes. However it also removes the possibility of being bad, so you can't argue on those grounds.
Round 2
Ferbalot's avatar
Ferbalot
Pro
#3
Agreements.

I'm pretty sure you made a typo for 23 [...]
You're correct, I did mean "logically impossible" in premise 23.

[Death] does take away the possibility for good, but it is essentially a perfect neutral, as it takes away the possibility for bad too.
I concede that death is essentially perfectly axiologically/ethically neutral.



Motivation and safety from mistakes
This premise relies on the assumption that the person who may or may not discover a perfect moral truth is motivated to act on this perfect moral truth.
Suicide takes away your chances of finding perfect moral truth, but it also takes away your chances of finding a fake moral truth that you believe to be correct, or the chances of you acting against your moral truth.
This (especially the beginning) (and the later radical simplification that isn't quoted) sounds like an objection to premise 6:
P6. Increasing/lowering the probability of discovering what is justified increases/lowers (respectively) the probability of one pursuing and succeeding at it/them.
"Pursue" here being used synonymously with "act on". I definitely should have originally made this clearer.

From premise 6, I would argue that we can implicitly conclude:
if          x has a higher probability than y of leading to us discovering what is justified,
then   we are more likely to succeed at doing what is justified with x than with y.

Due to premise 12 and 22, living always has a higher probability of discovering what is justified than suicide:
P12. There is at least a very small chance in every moment that we live that we will discover what specific thing is justified for us to do.
P22. Dying makes it logically impossible to discover what specific thing(s) is/are justified to do.
Therefore, following the conclusion we derived from the argument that used premise 6,
We are more likely to succeed at doing what is justified with living than with suicide.

Intuitively it might seem like this doesn't matter, since suicide also seems to lower the probability of doing what is unjustified to an equal degree.
However justified was defined as:
Objectively preferable (or at least equal to alternative(s)) given what is objectively ethical/unethical and/or valuable/"unvaluable".
Thus, we are more likely to succeed at doing what is objectively preferable/equal to all alternatives (including suicide) with living than with suicide.
In other words, living is more likely than suicide to lead to us doing what is best, even accounting for suicide lowering the probability of doing what is unjustified (whether accidentally or intentionally).
Thus, given these premises, living is more likely to be best than suicide.



Hitler should have killed himself earlier
Suicide would be unjust if perhaps Gandhi had committed it, but not if Hitler had killed himself (earlier on that is).
This seems to implicitly deny premise 4:
P4. That it's best to pursue any particular irreducible axiological/ethical objective is currently unfounded.
  • Because if Hitler was justified to commit suicide, it must (by the definition of justified given) be objectively axiologically/ethically preferable (or equal) for him to commit suicide.
  • If it's preferable, the axiological/ethical objective(s) that make(s) it preferable must be reducible to irreducible axiological/ethical objective(s), if it/they is/are not itself/themselves (an) irreducible one(s).
  • If it's preferable, whatever irreducible axiological/ethical objectives are justifying it cannot be founded given premise 4 (of the original argument). (Unless they are merely "we ought to do what we ought to do" and/or "we ought to try to do what we ought to do", but I don't currently see how you can derive that Hitler should commit suicide given only these irreducible objectives, without denying other premises in the original argument. Either way, this should be demonstrated if argued for.)
  • If it was equally justified for Hitler to commit suicide or not, then this cannot be true unless my arguments given in the Motivation and safety from mistakes section do not work.
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Round 3
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Round 4
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