Instigator / Pro
Ferbalot's avatar
12
Ferbalot
1517
rating
8
debates
68.75%
won
Topic
#5842

Suicide is never justified.

Status
Voting

The participant that receives the most points from the voters is declared a winner.

Voting will end in:

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Tags
Ethics
Philosophy
axiology
suicide
Parameters
Publication date
Last updated date
Type
Rated
Number of rounds
4
Time for argument
Three days
Max argument characters
4,096
Voting period
Two months
Point system
Multiple criterions
Voting system
Open
Minimal rating
1,500
Contender / Con
Moozer325's avatar
21
Moozer325
1600
rating
24
debates
72.92%
won
Description

Suicide: The deliberate self-inflicted ending of one's own life. Can include indirect means, as long as it is primarily intended to end one's own life above all else except fundamental ethical/axiological goals.

Never: In no cases whatsoever.

Justified: Objectively ethically and/or axiologically warranted. Objectively preferable (or at least equal to alternative(s)) given what is objectively ethical/unethical and/or valuable/"unvaluable".

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Note: Con automatically loses the debate if they purposefully copy the arguments I use in my other suicide debate.

Round 1
Ferbalot's avatar
Ferbalot
Pro
#1
This is a complex argument, it is virtually inevitable that I've made several errors that at least technically invalidate it. I will be fixing those in the following rounds as they are pointed out by Con.

  • P1. We don't have any clue about what irreducible axiological/ethical objectives we ought to pursue (aside from "we ought to do what we ought to do" and "we ought to try to do what we ought to do", because x = x is an axiom and "ought" in this context is defined such that we should try to do it. (From now on, any time a term like "irreducible axiological/ethical objectives" is written, it's to be read with these caveats.)) because of the is-ought gap.
  • P2. All irreducible axiological/ethical objectives have a logical opposite. (It is justified to do x, it is not justified to do x.)
  • P3. If we currently have no clue what irreducible axiological/ethical objectives are more likely than others (P1), and every irreducible axiological/ethical objective has an opposite (P2), then currently no irreducible axiological/ethical objective is more epistemically justified than any others.
  • P4. That it's best to pursue any particular irreducible axiological/ethical objective is currently unfounded. (P1, P2, P3)

  • P5. If one can discover what specific irreducible axiological/ethical objective(s) they ought to pursue, then it is more probable (given our limited knowledge, not necessarily literally objectively more likely. "Probability" and similar terms will henceforth be used this way.) that they would pursue it.
  • P6. Increasing/lowering the probability of discovering what is justified increases/lowers (respectively) the probability of one pursuing and succeeding at it/them. (Supported by P5)

  • P7. It is virtually impossible that the exact moment we would commit suicide, we would otherwise die from something else.
  • P8. If we would die from something other than suicide before we commit suicide, we cannot successfully commit suicide.
  • P9. If an event occurs but does not occur before or during another event, it must occur after.
  • P10. If we are able to commit suicide, our life would always end later if we don't commit suicide than if we do. (Supported by P7, P8, P9)

  • P11. Every event which is logically possible to occur in every instant has, in every instant, at least a very small chance of occurring.
  • P12. There is at least a very small chance in every moment that we live that we will discover what specific thing is justified for us to do. (Supported by P11)

  • P13. Occam's Razor suggests that hypotheses with less unknown elements are more likely.
  • P14. There is no afterlife or reincarnation. (Supported by P13)
  • P15. If one is dead, they don't exist. (Supported by P14)

  • P16. Even if we manage to recreate one's brain, it would only be a clone, the consciousness who died would not resume experiencing things from the clone's perspective. (Supported by P13)
  • P17. It is currently very unlikely that we would be able to bring back the dead in a way that isn't essentially equivalent to cloning. (Supported by P13)
  • P18. If one doesn't exist, they won't exist. (P16, P17)
  • P19. If one is dead, they won't exist. (P15, P18)

  • P20. When one dies, they will stop existing and will never exist again. (P15, P19)
  • P21. It is logically impossible that one discovers what specific thing(s) is/are justified for them to do if they don't and won't exist.
  • P22. Dying makes it logically impossible to discover what specific thing(s) is/are justified to do. (P20, P21)

  • P23. A very small chance is more probable than something that is logically possible.
  • P24. Suicide lowers the probability of doing what is justified. (P12, P22, P23)
  • P25. Suicide does not increase the probability of doing what is justified to an extent that outweighs the lowered probability of discovering that is justified. (Supported by P6)
  • P26. Lowering the probability of us doing what is justified (without increasing the probability of doing what is justified in other areas to an extent that outweighs the lowered probability) is never epistemically justified given only common axioms.
  • C. Suicide is never justified. (Supported by P24, P25, P26)

Moozer325's avatar
Moozer325
Con
#2
I'm pretty sure you made a typo for 23, it says "logically possible" but it seems like you meant to say "impossible". Just to cover all my bases, I accept premise 23 if you truly did mean to say impossible, but I would not accept it if it means exactly what it says. I accept premise 24&26 and all that come before it to support those. However I deny premise 25, and I'll be basing just about my whole argument on that one premise. 

Just to recap, premise 25 reads: 
P25. Suicide does not increase the probability of doing what is justified to an extent that outweighs the lowered probability of discovering that is justified. (Supported by P6)
And it's supporting premises are:
  • P5. If one can discover what specific irreducible axiological/ethical objective(s) they ought to pursue, then it is more probable (given our limited knowledge, not necessarily literally objectively more likely. "Probability" and similar terms will henceforth be used this way.) that they would pursue it.
  • P6. Increasing/lowering the probability of discovering what is justified increases/lowers (respectively) the probability of one pursuing and succeeding at it/them. (Supported by P5)

I agree with these two, so we can move on to P25 itself, I just figured I'd include them.

The problem with P25 as I see it isn't that it did something wrong, it just ignores a few major things. Because death is essentially the philosophical end-all, yes it does take away the possibility for good, but it is essentially a perfect neutral, as it takes away the possibility for bad too. This premise relies on the assumption that the person who may or may not discover a perfect moral truth is motivated to act on this perfect moral truth. As you said yourself in premise 2, all ethical actions have an ethical opposite. Suicide takes away your chances of finding perfect moral truth, but it also takes away your chances of finding a fake moral truth that you believe to be correct, or the chances of you acting against your moral truth.  Suicide would be unjust if perhaps Gandhi had committed it, but not if Hitler had killed himself (earlier on that is).

To better illustrate my point, I'll radically simplify your argument:

Premise 1: If you are dead, you can no longer feel warmth
Premise 2: If you lose the possibility to feel warmth, then you are bringing more cold into your life
Conclusion: Suicide results in you being colder

Now I'm obviously not saying that this is the same thing, but you see the point. I took a random metric other than good/bad. Obviously, suicide would result in neither a warmer life nor a colder one since you are removing the possibility of either. Suicide removes the possibility for good, yes. However it also removes the possibility of being bad, so you can't argue on those grounds.
Round 2
Ferbalot's avatar
Ferbalot
Pro
#3
Agreements.

I'm pretty sure you made a typo for 23 [...]
You're correct, I did mean "logically impossible" in premise 23.

[Death] does take away the possibility for good, but it is essentially a perfect neutral, as it takes away the possibility for bad too.
I concede that death is essentially perfectly axiologically/ethically neutral.



Motivation and safety from mistakes
This premise relies on the assumption that the person who may or may not discover a perfect moral truth is motivated to act on this perfect moral truth.
Suicide takes away your chances of finding perfect moral truth, but it also takes away your chances of finding a fake moral truth that you believe to be correct, or the chances of you acting against your moral truth.
This (especially the beginning) (and the later radical simplification that isn't quoted) sounds like an objection to premise 6:
P6. Increasing/lowering the probability of discovering what is justified increases/lowers (respectively) the probability of one pursuing and succeeding at it/them.
"Pursue" here being used synonymously with "act on". I definitely should have originally made this clearer.

From premise 6, I would argue that we can implicitly conclude:
if          x has a higher probability than y of leading to us discovering what is justified,
then   we are more likely to succeed at doing what is justified with x than with y.

Due to premise 12 and 22, living always has a higher probability of discovering what is justified than suicide:
P12. There is at least a very small chance in every moment that we live that we will discover what specific thing is justified for us to do.
P22. Dying makes it logically impossible to discover what specific thing(s) is/are justified to do.
Therefore, following the conclusion we derived from the argument that used premise 6,
We are more likely to succeed at doing what is justified with living than with suicide.

Intuitively it might seem like this doesn't matter, since suicide also seems to lower the probability of doing what is unjustified to an equal degree.
However justified was defined as:
Objectively preferable (or at least equal to alternative(s)) given what is objectively ethical/unethical and/or valuable/"unvaluable".
Thus, we are more likely to succeed at doing what is objectively preferable/equal to all alternatives (including suicide) with living than with suicide.
In other words, living is more likely than suicide to lead to us doing what is best, even accounting for suicide lowering the probability of doing what is unjustified (whether accidentally or intentionally).
Thus, given these premises, living is more likely to be best than suicide.



Hitler should have killed himself earlier
Suicide would be unjust if perhaps Gandhi had committed it, but not if Hitler had killed himself (earlier on that is).
This seems to implicitly deny premise 4:
P4. That it's best to pursue any particular irreducible axiological/ethical objective is currently unfounded.
  • Because if Hitler was justified to commit suicide, it must (by the definition of justified given) be objectively axiologically/ethically preferable (or equal) for him to commit suicide.
  • If it's preferable, the axiological/ethical objective(s) that make(s) it preferable must be reducible to irreducible axiological/ethical objective(s), if it/they is/are not itself/themselves (an) irreducible one(s).
  • If it's preferable, whatever irreducible axiological/ethical objectives are justifying it cannot be founded given premise 4 (of the original argument). (Unless they are merely "we ought to do what we ought to do" and/or "we ought to try to do what we ought to do", but I don't currently see how you can derive that Hitler should commit suicide given only these irreducible objectives, without denying other premises in the original argument. Either way, this should be demonstrated if argued for.)
  • If it was equally justified for Hitler to commit suicide or not, then this cannot be true unless my arguments given in the Motivation and safety from mistakes section do not work.
Moozer325's avatar
Moozer325
Con
#4
From premise 6, I would argue that we can implicitly conclude:
if          x has a higher probability than y of leading to us discovering what is justified,
then   we are more likely to succeed at doing what is justified with x than with y.

Due to premise 12 and 22, living always has a higher probability of discovering what is justified than suicide:

Therefore, following the conclusion we derived from the argument that used premise 6,
We are more likely to succeed at doing what is justified with living than with suicide.
I know you go on to address my point later on, but I figured I'd pause here for a second just to restate my point. I agree with all of these premises, but the conclusion doesn't necessarily follow from them, because it ignores the possibility for bad. While X (living) does provide a better chance for doing good than Y (dying), X also provides the same chance for bad than Y, so it negates itself.

Intuitively it might seem like this doesn't matter, since suicide also seems to lower the probability of doing what is unjustified to an equal degree.
However justified was defined as:
Objectively preferable (or at least equal to alternative(s)) given what is objectively ethical/unethical and/or valuable/"unvaluable".
Thus, we are more likely to succeed at doing what is objectively preferable/equal to all alternatives (including suicide) with living than with suicide.
In other words, living is more likely than suicide to lead to us doing what is best, even accounting for suicide lowering the probability of doing what is unjustified (whether accidentally or intentionally).
Thus, given these premises, living is more likely to be best than suicide.
In my opinion this is ignoring a variable, and so even though your premises are technically logically sound, that's only if you discount the probability for bad. When you put that into the equation, it changes it. This is an argument from ignorance. For example, by this kind of logic I could claim that the act of keeping a coin in my pocket will result in it flipping on heads.

Premise 1: Coins have the possibility to be flipped on heads
Premise 2: By getting rid of a Coin, you remove all possibility of it landing on heads
Conclusion: If I keep the Coin, I will get  heads flipped

Now, I understand that you counter this in premises 24,23,22, and 12 of your initial argument, but I don't think that really works. Yes, by living you are technically more likely to do what is good than if you died, but that doesn't mean that you will. A person could live their entire life only doing bad, and then the outcomes would be equal in terms of good. The probability of doing good counts for nothing if that probability isn't actually realized.

I'm running out of characters, so this next section is responding to your last few bullet points about my Hitler thing
Okay, I suppose I misspoke. I agree with the "is-ought" problem, and that it isn't really possible to derive that you should do anything. What I meant to say is that whoever chooses not to commit suicide might learn what is morally "correct" (as you stated in your premise 12). It is thus also possible that someone discovers what is justified for them to do, and they decide to do the opposite. I think that still works with my argument.
Round 3
Ferbalot's avatar
Ferbalot
Pro
#5
I concede the debate, I was not able to come up with sufficient counters to the last two quoted sections.

If you're curious, here's what I came up with before conceding:

I will make a series of claims (numbered as C1, C5, etc.) in this argument, please point out which claim(s) you disagree with, if any, and why.

C1. The definition of "justified" provided in the debate description is:
Justified: Objectively ethically and/or axiologically warranted. Objectively preferable (or at least equal to alternative(s)) given what is objectively ethical/unethical and/or valuable/"unvaluable".
C2. Something that is "justified" using this definition must be objectively preferable/equal even after accounting for the bad/lack of bad of the relevant options.

I agree with all of these premises, but the conclusion doesn't necessarily follow from them, because it ignores the possibility for bad.
C3. Either the possibility for bad can influence what is objectively preferable or it can't.
C4. If it can't, under any reasonable definition it isn't relevant to this debate.

So, assuming it can influence what is objectively preferable, let's take a look at the conclusion in question and plug in the more detailed variant of the definition provided in the description:
We are more likely to succeed at doing what is objectively preferable (or at least equal to alternatives(s)) given what is objectively ethical/unethical and/or valuable/"unvaluable" with living than with suicide.
C5. This accounts for what is objectively preferable,
C6. therefore it implicitly accounts for what influences what is objectively preferable.
C7. Therefore it accounts for the possibility of bad.

Now let's take a look at the premises that supported that conclusion, which you say you agree with:
if         x has a higher probability than y of leading to us discovering what is justified,
then  we are more likely to succeed at doing what is justified with x than with y.
C8. This must also account for the possibility of bad. (Supported by C2 and C5-7)

[...] living always has a higher probability of discovering what is justified than suicide
C9. This premise satisfies the requirements of the previous premise's if statement with x being "living" and y being "committing suicide". And if you agree with that premise, the conclusion in the then section follows.
C10. The aforementioned conclusion is what follows from this.

If you agree with all of the claims I've made so far, I don't see how there's a problem with this argument not accounting for the possibility of bad, or how the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.

Your coin example is good, I'll revise my R1 argument's conclusion to "Suicide is probably never justified."

The probability of doing good counts for nothing if that probability isn't actually realized.
This is BS that tries to dodge the main point:
C11. Agreed, but we don't know ahead of time whether or not the probability will actually be realized.
C12. So, in the interest of actually realizing a good outcome or avoiding a bad outcome in the future, we still try to maximize/minimize their probabilities.

It is [...] possible that someone discovers what is justified for them to do, and they decide to do the opposite.
I think this might work, but it would take way more characters to flesh out:
C??. When we say that someone decides to do something, we mean that they consciously decide to do it.

C??. The brain works by coming up with plans to achieve objectives (whether the objectives be known consciously or subconsciously).
C??. Everybody's ultimate goal is to do what they believe to be best.
C??. All things people decide to do are in the interest of doing what they believe to be best.

They could still discover and then forget/illogically act against it though.

C??. By the time we discover what is best, virtually everyone will be so much more open minded and critical that it would be implausible that anyone would irrationally act against it, and there would virtually certainly be AIs and people capable of recognizing and reminding, and it would probably be well known.
Moozer325's avatar
Moozer325
Con
#6
Okay then, thanks for participating with me. I had a lot of fun, hope you did too. 
Round 4
Ferbalot's avatar
Ferbalot
Pro
#7
Thank you as well, I had fun too.
Moozer325's avatar
Moozer325
Con
#8
Thanks!