Abortion and human rights

It's possible to avoid murdering ANYONE - especially for society at large.

There is no shortage of methods a woman can use to end a pregnancy without the assistance of a doctor.

In the United States, the withholding and withdrawal of life support is legally justified primarily by the principles of informed consent and informed refusal, both of which have strong roots in the common law. The principles hold that treatment may not be initiated without the approval of patients or their surrogates excepting in emergency situations, and that patients or surrogates may refuse any or all therapies. The application of these principles to the care of the critically ill began in the Quinlan case (6), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a patient had the right to refuse mechanical ventilation, and that, because she was vegetative and could not exercise that right directly, her parents could act as surrogates for her. The California Court of Appeals took a similar approach in the Barber case (7), in which it held that physicians charged with murder had not committed an unlawful act when, with permission from a patient's family, they removed nutrition and hydration from a comatose patient. [**]

Ok, think about this,

If you purchased a product that was made by a company that knowingly worked with suppliers that murdered union organizers, are you maybe just a little bit guilty of murder?

Your example is completely different. Planned Parenthood is an organization that profits from the killing of humans, as has been clearly proven.

Making the organization illegal would not be hard. Maybe turning it into a medical center for HEALTH would be an idea? Regardless, the organization undermines human rights.

Doesn't this "rule" violate medical privacy laws?

Are politicians qualified to tell doctors how to do their jobs?

Benjamin:

3RU7AL:

No no no, you’re strawmanning him!

He’s saying that pregnant women will be surveilled too incase they try anything. 

I’ll set aside the issues I have with determining that someone gets rights because they have some chance at becoming an adult, though I have those as well. Mainly, I’m just confused about why you’d set apart adults from other stages of development in this respect, and then turn around and say that all stages of development are equally worthy of the rights they are responsible for founding. It strikes me as odd that you would both set this stage of development apart and treat them all as equally valuable. If I might streamline this, what you seem to be arguing is that self-preservation is the reason human rights apply further back than an adult. The input (at least for you) is the zygote, the output is the adult, and disrupting any part of that development chain should be treated in the same light.
 
"So regardless of "when” a cell becomes a human - abortion is already immoral."
 
I’m not so sure that my point buys into this. I’m arguing that any arbitrary selection is problematic, but that means if I can present reasons why the zygote is similarly an arbitrary selection, then any stage of gestational development could be viewed as similarly justified as the point at which it “becomes a human”. Not really the argument I’m focused on, but we can delve further into this if you want.
 
“Any differentiation of post-fusion is arbitrary and has no real weight.”
 
Alright, though I’d say that fusion itself is an arbitrary selection.
 
“I am not claiming that a fetus "has the potential to become a human"”
 
I never said that’s what you were claiming. If you look back at what you said regarding potential, you said:
 
“A sperm cell and an egg cell cannot become a human on their own - this combination is simply a "potential" human being”
 
So what you’ve done here is afford the “potential” label to the individual gametes (though even that’s not entirely true, because that “potential” exists whether they’re entirely separate or right next to each other). You’re drawing a line (fusion) and saying that crossing that line turns one into a human. I’m challenging that supposition, largely because the argument you’re using – that potential to become an adult makes one valuable – applies just as strongly to these “potential” human beings as it does to any subsequent step. You talk a lot about the difference between a qualitative change and a quantitative change, but if we’re going to play that game, then we should do so consistently. The only difference between the potentials of individual gametes and a zygote is quantitative: the latter is far more likely to eventually become an adult than the former. The tacit implication of your points is that we should never base our assessment of whether a stage of development is or is not human on a quantitative measure, yet you appear to be doing just that here. Your split between a “potential” human and an actual human is built on a quantitative evaluation.
 
As for examining why this line isn’t arbitrary, let’s get into that.
 
“1. All humans have equal value - therefore we must choose a single event that makes a human a human (or dismiss human rights as subjective)”
 
At best, this establishes why there’s a need to know that a single event results in humanity – it doesn’t tell us what that event should be. Still, I disagree for multiple reasons. First, if we must know of a single event, then I would argue that we must also know of a single moment. The problem is that fusion is a series of moments. Calling attention to any one is arbitrary, yet entirely necessary based on your reasoning. Second, I don’t see a problem with having some subjectivity in human rights, particularly as they apply to the unborn. I’ve heard this argument before, but I’m unclear on why saying that there is uncertainty in when a human life begins inherently messes with all human rights. Third, if anything, I’d say that the arbitrary selection of a single event does more to harm human rights because it automatically sets groups apart. The sperm and ovum aren’t deserving of rights because they don’t meet this threshold. If, at some future stage, we can generate new embryos or blastocysts without fusion, this would exclude them as well. It automatically otherizes, whereas saying that uncertainty exists recognizes the blurred lines between what is and is not human, allowing us to confer human rights without such constraints.
 
“2. Conception is the single QUALITATIVE change that happens. (pregnancy starts de facto with conception)”
 
Two problems. First, on a fundamental level, I disagree with the characterization that conception is purely qualitative. I can reduce conception to entirely quantitative aspects, if you wish. In fact, every stage of development could be viewed in a similar light. Simply because I can make statements like “we define the start of pregnancy as conception” doesn’t mean that the change itself is qualitative, only that our perception of it is. Second, if a qualitative change is all we need, then I don’t see why I can’t apply this to any other stage of development. Insemination is a qualitative change. Sex is a qualitative change. A beating heart is a qualitative change. A working nervous system is a qualitative change. Independent viability is a qualitative change. Yes, I can reduce every single one of these to quantitative changes, but by your metric, they all yield a qualitative shift. Conception is not the sole qualitative change that occurs, so why should it get preference?
 
“I also want to point out that the difference between a gamete and a zygote is qualitative, not quantitive.”
 
You don’t really justify this. I’m sincerely trying to find the argument that supports this, but your only arguments focus on DNA, which both gametes and zygotes have. You also tie yourself in a bit of a knot here, so I’ll give you the opportunity to untangle it. You argue here that “DNA in itself does not grant you human rights – your own DNA only grants you the status of being a human.” Three sentences later, you argue “Therefore, what has human DNA has rights if humans have value.” The logical progression, therefore, is that DNA confers humanity, humanity confers human rights, ergo DNA confers human rights. Maybe I’m missing something, and I’d appreciate if you could clarify what you meant. Several times, you also say some variant of “killing of all the cells with the same full set of human DNA is murder”, though even this seems somewhat problematic. Henrietta Lacks is most certainly dead, yet her cells live on in HeLa cells grown in labs across the country. If she was killed by someone else, by your view, that would not be murder. Similarly, if we grow artificial human cells in a lab and modify the DNA, we are technically committing murder by getting rid of all the original cells. Maybe this is just me being technical, but your definition of murder still seems sketchy to me.
 
“Human DNA is innately valuable. No, it merely identifies a cell as being human. This means that DNA only tells us WHO are humans. Killing all cells with the same DNA is murder.”
 
Yet your argument is that the quality of being human is innately valuable. If having human DNA makes you human, and humanity is innately valuable, then it stands to reason that human DNA is innately valuable. I don’t see how I’m misrepresenting your argument here, I’m just pulling the pieces of your argument together.
 
“"Potential" for becoming a human gives one value. No. But the potential for becoming an adult gives you the same value as an adult. Killing a child is equal to killing an adult.”
 
I think you mean “Yes” because your explanation confirms the statement is true about your perspective. If the potential for becoming an adult gives the unborn the same value as an adult and adults are due human rights, then yes, the potential of the unborn to become an adult affords them human rights. I’m not sure why you view this as a misrepresentation of your argument when it is literally the argument you’re giving me here, again.
 
“Value is inherent in the traits. No - that would be discrimination and a violation of human rights. The only trait that matters is the fact that I am a human.”
 
I’m also not sure why you’re pushing back so hard on this one. You’re saying that a zygote has distinguishing characteristics from gametes, and that those differences are sufficient to grant the former human rights and exclude the latter. That’s putting value on a set of traits, plain and simple. Maybe you’ll argue that it’s putting value on the qualitative change itself (i.e. fusion), but if I extracted zygote and put it side-by-side with a set of gametes, you’d still say that the latter is due human rights while the former is not, correct? You don’t have to know that the zygote has been through fusion to grant it those rights? Then it is inherently a separation based on traits. 

Well, miscarriage is not intentional and thus cannot be classified as immoral. 

You miss my point. We do not call all accidental deaths immoral!

I like where you're going with this.

Mice and men share about 97.5 per cent of their working DNA, just one per cent less than chimps and humans. The new estimate is based on the comparison of mouse chromosome 16 with human DNA. [LINK]

Does this mean that mice have 97.5% human rights?

Are you familiar with the concept of, "criminal negligence"?

In general, I'm not a fan of the "DNA gives us natural rights" stance, though I don't think it's hard for someone to argue that even differences of that level in our DNA should lead to substantial differences in the allocation of rights. The difficulty for them is in arguing where that stops. Humans are very similar genetically, but assuming a subset of us accumulated sufficient mutations to remain human taxonomically, but to be different from the rest of humanity by, say, 0.5% of the genome. Are they still due the same rights? If we were to classify them as non-human at that stage, would they still be due those rights? It's more of a theoretical issue at this stage, but basing our humanity on a set of conserved genes, no matter how large, yields some potential problems that we'd have to grapple with at some stage.

That concept only applies when you have agreed to some terms - like driving a car or taking an important job.

Brilliant point. I will answer later.

Why does "criminal negligence" NOT apply to a miscarriage?

I agree.

Linking DNA and "human rights" seems to be a double-edged-sword.

Great point.

The egg cells have literally existed for years - and the sperm cells die naturally all the time. When they fuse, it's only a matter of months before a human is born.

You cannot compare ANY change, nowhere, to conception.

So when does a cell become a human? You have not provided any time when a human can objectively be confirmed as being so.

I disagree. Are you telling me that a fetus is some % human? Doesn't it then deserve some % of human rights? Like, maybe only the first - right to life?

I will like to present my argument again:

So unless human rights are to be "measured" based on each humans traits, abortion is just as bad as killing a grown-up.

Human rights were not founded upon naturalism but rather theism. That's why this question is so prevalent. It's hard to transfer ideas between contradictory worldviews,

3RU7AL said:

You mean that humans have different value based on their traits. You have admitted that you consider human rights immoral (as their implications you call immoral)

Only if rights are argued as functions of DNA. And this is typically in response to arguments which suggest that a zygote/embryo/fetus isn't human--a statement, by definition, that's not true. When this argument--the one over abortion, that is--reduces to scientific scrutiny, then the discussion naturally becomes subjected to arbitration over certain scientific metrics. So, indeed, it becomes problematic when "rights"--value statements--become linked withed DNA--(scientifically) empirical statements.

I'll ask you this, assuming of course you subscribe to and/or adopted a system of "rights." What would you argue ought to be a/the premise for a "right"?

Being "comprised of cells that contain human DNA" does not make something "a human".

Cancerous tumors are "comprised of cells that contain human DNA" and this does not make cancerous tumors "a human".

Citation please.

In other words, you want human rights not to apply to all humans. You want peoples traits, not their humanity, define their moral worth.

I would love to live in a world where "everybody is warm and safe and fed and clothed and sheltered".

I would love it.

Love it.

The point is that a person, as in, a human - does not have inherent value. There must be something that gives it value, something which we can form, hence my argument. My argument gives value in the form of personhood. Therefore, if something does not have personhood it does not have value, which in this case refers to moral value. Human rights are given to those with personhood. 

You seem to have the axiom that humans are inherently valuable, I do not share that consideration.

You are very honest.

Well, technically that's correct, but in reality, a person has value.

"god" give people value, society does, ethics and philosophy do. There is no way to avoid this.