The Ontological Argument is Sound

Author: Dr.Franklin

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#151
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@Athias
I am not the OP of the post you responded to, but I am also bored so, whatever.

"There is no contradiction in the argument you reference. The contradiction is actually in your response, "it is also possible to think of a world where the MGB doesn't exist." It begs the question: how do you think about something that doesn't exist if it doesn't exist? How do you conceive a world where you acknowledge the nonexistence of the MGB, when nonexistence cannot be perceived? Existence is epistemologically rational; nonexistence is not."

You are conflating "conjuring mental images of a scenario/world" with coming up with a logically consistent scenario/world. The latter is closer to what is required for the modal ontological argument to work, which uses metaphysically possible world semantics.

It might not make sense to you to not be able to conjure mental images of the absence of something, but it makes perfect sense to create a logically consistent scenario where something is absent. I can conceive of a cupboard that is empty, and one that contains a broom. I can even go as far as to conjure mental images of exactly that, too, of an empty cupboard, and of an occupied one. The statement "Existence is epistemologically rational; nonexistence is not" is one of the most absurd things I have ever read, and I have never seen a single philosopher, theist or otherwise that has ever asserted that on any level, and I have ready plenty of their papers.
#152
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@Envisage
You are conflating "conjuring mental images of a scenario/world" with coming up with a logically consistent scenario/world.
No, I am not. I'm well aware of that which PressF4Respect is attempting to argue.

The latter is closer to what is required for the modal ontological argument to work, which uses metaphysically possible world semantics.
I know.

It might not make sense to you to not be able to conjure mental images of the absence of something, but it makes perfect sense to create a logically consistent scenario where something is absent.
If you're using the term "absent" in a context where its synonymous with nonexistent, then no you have not. You can neither perceive nor interact with the absent.

I can conceive of a cupboard that is empty, and one that contains a broom.
This example doesn't inform existence; this example informs location. Pick a description of absent, and stick to it.

I can even go as far as to conjure mental images of exactly that, too.
Yes, because your experience informs images of displaced objects. That does not mean that their displacement informs their nonexistence.

The statement "Existence is epistemologically rational; nonexistence is not" is one of the most absurd things I have ever read, and I have never seen a single philosopher, theist or otherwise that has ever asserted that on any level, and I have ready plenty of their papers.
Elaborate on your claim of absurdity.






#153
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Thank you. Imagination is one of the greatest skill imo. Einstein too said that imagination is more important than knowledge. Moreover imagination is at the heart of breakthrough.
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"If you're using the term "absent" in a context where its synonymous with non-existent, then no you have not. You can neither perceive nor interact with the absent."

Luckily "perception" (whhich I take to be just conjuring mental images) and "interaction" are not prerequisites of conceiving a logically consistent world with something absent.


I can even go as far as to conjure mental images of exactly that, too.
"Yes, because your experience informs images of displaced objects. That does not mean that their displacement informs their nonexistence. "

Their non-existence in the cupboard, yes it does.

---

In the context of the modal ontological argument, I can easily conceive of the following worlds:

1. A world that contains nothing, zilch, zero.

Or more compellingly:

2. A world that contains a single particle, that just exists as is, and does nothing. You can even go a step further and have a particle that exists eternally in one spacial dimension that simply evolves over time with De Broglie motion. That way you have a complete world that can be described with a single mathematical equation, perfectly logically consistent, and it's logical consistency isn't broken by the absence of a maximally great being.

I can readily conceive mathematically of these self-contained worlds. I can even conjure mental images of each, but again this isn't a requirement for something to be logically or metaphysically possible.
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@Envisage
Luckily "perception" (whhich I take to be just conjuring mental images) and "interaction" are not prerequisites of conceiving a logically consistent world with something absent.
Yes they are. Because you would have to acknowledge (perceive) the absence of that something with no experience or data to inform its placement or displacement, its form or its being, because as that which is characterized as "absent," it does not exist.

Their non-existence in the cupboard, yes it does.
Once again, you're attempting to inform location, not existence.

1. A world that contains nothing, zilch, zero.
Then it isn't a world if it contains "nothing." Remember you stated, "The latter is closer to what is required for the modal ontological argument to work, which uses metaphysically possible world semantics."

Or more compellingly:

2. A world that contains a single particle, that just exists as is, and does nothing. You can even go a step further and have a particle that exists eternally in one spacial dimension that simply evolves over time with De Broglie motion. That way you have a complete world that can be described with a single mathematical equation, perfectly logically consistent, and it's logical consistency isn't broken by the absence of a maximally great being.

I can readily conceive mathematically of these self-contained worlds. I can even conjure mental images of each, but again this isn't a requirement for something to be logically or metaphysically possible.
How do you acknowledge the absence of the MBG if it is in fact absent?




#156
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@Athias
Your second premise is erroneous. Since your second premise operates on applying superlatives to the qualifiers, "greater," and "more" from the first premise, then the second premise should read as such: "Since the MGB is the greatest being, it would convince the most that it exists." Using your revised premise, your third premise is no longer substantiated since the second premise no longer requires that you be convinced that the MGB exists. Given that your second premise has been revised, and your third premise has been rendered unsubstantiated, your conclusion is nullified.
Do you agree that a being that can convince X people is greater than one that can convince X - 1 people?

Furthermore, C2 is also unsubstantiated even if your second premise was valid. The MGB exists as outlined by the parameters of your first premise. You can argue that the subject doesn't meet those parameters, but that does not permit you to posit that the MGB doesn't exist without undermining your first premise.
If nothing that exists can possibly fit the criteria of X, then X doesn't exist.

There is no contradiction in the argument you reference. The contradiction is actually in your response, "it is also possible to think of a world where the MGB doesn't exist." It begs the question: how do you think about something that doesn't exist if it doesn't exist? How do you conceive a world where you acknowledge the nonexistence of the MGB, when nonexistence cannot be perceived? Existence is epistemologically rational; nonexistence is not.
I never said one could conceive of a world where everyone acknowledges the nonexistence of the MGB. I said that one could conceive of a world where the MGB doesn't exist (as P1 states). It isn't anymore nonsensical to conceive of a world where the MGB doesn't exist then it is to conceive of a world where cellphones don't exist. All that my argument says is that it states there is possible to conceive of a world where X doesn't exist, which is completely in line with P1.
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#157
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@Shamayita
yeah ok
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#158
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@Athias
nope, you go athias
#159
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@PressF4Respect
Do you agree that a being that can convince X people is greater than one that can convince X - 1 people?
Greater in which context?

If nothing that exists can possibly fit the criteria of X, then X doesn't exist.
How do you know that nothing that exists can possibly fit the criteria of X? Was your argument not extending the first premise which focused on a single being?

I never said one could conceive of a world where everyone acknowledges the nonexistence of the MGB. I said that one could conceive of a world where the MGB doesn't exist (as P1 states).
Acknowledging nonexistence is paradoxical. How can one then conceive a world in which something does not exist, if it does not exist? That is, in this world you've conceived, how is one able to qualify this world with the description, "MGB does not exist," if one cannot acknowledge its nonexistence? So even in a world you conceive where the MGB is displaced  (not nonexistent) you are acknowledging MGB in your posit of its "absence."

It isn't anymore nonsensical to conceive of a world where the MGB doesn't exist then it is to conceive of a world where cellphones don't exist.
You can't conceive a world where cellphones don't exist. You can conceive their displacement and lack of use, using your own experience as information. But you have no experience with the nonexistence of cell phones; therefore, you cannot conceive a world in which they do not exist.

All that my argument says is that it states there is possible to conceive of a world where X doesn't exist, which is completely in line with P1.
And my argument claims that this is impossible because perceiving--even conceiving--nonexistence is epistemologically irrational.

#160
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@Athias
Greater in which context?
Greater in the context of the MGB.

How do you know that nothing that exists can possibly fit the criteria of X? Was your argument not extending the first premise which focused on a single being?
C1: Since there is at least one person that is not convinced of the MGB's existence (me), it cannot be the MGB.

If P2 is valid, then P3 is too. C1 states that since the MGB (as defined in P1 and P2) cannot fulfill its "maximal greatness" (it would be required to in order to be the MGB), it isn't the MGB. Since nothing that exists can fit the definition of MGB (as shown in P3 in contrast to the definitions of P1 and P2), the MGB would not exist.

Acknowledging nonexistence is paradoxical. How can one then conceive a world in which something does not exist, if it does not exist? That is, in this world you've conceived, how is one able to qualify this world with the description, "MGB does not exist," if one cannot acknowledge its nonexistence? So even in a world you conceive where the MGB is displaced  (not nonexistent) you are acknowledging MGB in your posit of its "absence."
I will illustrate my point in the example below.

You can't conceive a world where cellphones don't exist. You can conceive their displacement and lack of use, using your own experience as information. But you have no experience with the nonexistence of cell phones; therefore, you cannot conceive a world in which they do not exist.
The first cellphone came into existence in 1983. Before then, cellphones didn't exist. So, if one can conceive of a world before 1983 (which is entirely possible), then one can conceive of a world where cellphones don't exist.

And my argument claims that this is impossible because perceiving--even conceiving--nonexistence is epistemologically irrational.
I have just shown with my example above that it is possible.



#161
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@PressF4Respect
Greater in the context of the MGB.
Then by your stipulation, my agreement would be irrelevant.

C1: Since there is at least one person that is not convinced of the MGB's existence (me), it cannot be the MGB.

If P2 is valid, then P3 is too. C1 states that since the MGB (as defined in P1 and P2) cannot fulfill its "maximal greatness" (it would be required to in order to be the MGB), it isn't the MGB. Since nothing that exists can fit the definition of MGB (as shown in P3 in contrast to the definitions of P1 and P2), the MGB would not exist.
Yes, but P3 does not allow you to infer that "nothing that exists can fit the definition of MGB." It only stipulates that you be convinced.

The first cellphone came into existence in 1983. Before then, cellphones didn't exist. So, if one can conceive of a world before 1983 (which is entirely possible), then one can conceive of a world where cellphones don't exist.
Before 1983, no one knew cellphones didn't exist because cellphones didn't exist. Any retrospective analysis which seeks to relate experiences before and after the creation of cellphones would not be a conception void of their existence because the analysis itself is fundamentally based on the fact that cellphones do exist.

I have just shown with my example above that it is possible.
No you didn't.

#162
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@Athias
Then by your stipulation, my agreement would be irrelevant.
It was a rhetorical question. I used it to show that "the most" people = everyone. Unless you can show how this is impossible, that would be the case.

Yes, but P3 does not allow you to infer that "nothing that exists can fit the definition of MGB." It only stipulates that you be convinced.
There would only be a being called MGB (as defined in P1 and P2) if it can convince everyone (as demonstrated by above) of its existence. Since I am part of the group called "everyone", and it hasn't convinced me of its existence, the "MGB" fails to be the MGB, because it hasn't met the condition to be the MGB.

Before 1983, no one knew cellphones didn't exist because cellphones didn't exist. Any retrospective analysis which seeks to relate experiences before and after the creation of cellphones would not be a conception void of their existence because the analysis itself is fundamentally based on the fact that cellphones do exist.
I didn't say one could conceive of a world where people knew of the nonexistence of cellphones, I said that one could conceive of a world where they don't exist, period. Also, how is conceiving of a world without cellphones necessarily relating the experiences before and after the creation of cellphones?

This example can be more generally described in the following syllogism:

P1: Entity X comes into existence in time Y. 
P2: Before time Y, X did not exist (restatement of P1). Let's call this time Z.
P3: X does not exist in time Z. (restatement of P2)
P4: It is possible to conceive of a world as it was during time Z.
C1: Therefore, it is possible to conceive of a world where X does not exist.
#163
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@PressF4Respect
It was a rhetorical question. I used it to show that "the most" people = everyone. Unless you can show how this is impossible, that would be the case.
Non sequitur. I did not argue that it was impossible for most to reflect everyone. Most however does not require everyone. It's a relative superlative. And given that your first premise stipulates that the MGB's greatness is contingent on its capacity to convince more people than the the next being, then it need only convince more people than every other being.

There would only be a being called MGB (as defined in P1 and P2) if it can convince everyone (as demonstrated by above)
You didn't demonstrate anything.

Since I am part of the group called "everyone", and it hasn't convinced me of its existence, the "MGB" fails to be the MGB, because it hasn't met the condition to be the MGB.
Only if the superlative necessarily reflects everyone. And it doesn't. Your second premise is invalid.

I didn't say one could conceive of a world where people knew of the nonexistence of cellphones, I said that one could conceive of a world where they don't exist, period.
How? If the world which they conceive is one in which cellphones don't exist, they cannot know this because they don't exist. So then how can one conceive this world and apply the description, "cellphones don't exist," if they can't know that cellphones don't exist given that they don't exist?

P1: Entity X comes into existence in time Y. 
P2: Before time Y, X did not exist (restatement of P1). Let's call this time Z.
P3: X does not exist in time Z. (restatement of P2)
P4: It is possible to conceive of a world as it was during time Z.
C1: Therefore, it is possible to conceive of a world where X does not exist.
P1: Entity X is created in time Y.
P2: Before time Y, Entity X wasn't created. This will be called time Z.
P3: Entity X was not created in time Z.
P4: Conception is current.
P5: Conception (retrospective analysis) of a world during time Z will occur in and with respect to time Y (presuming Y constitutes all time since the cellphone was created.)
P6: Conception of the World at time Z, during time Z, is not possible. (Z is past, Conception is current.)
C: Therefore, conception of a world where Entity X did not exist is impossible.



#164
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@Athias
Non sequitur. I did not argue that it was impossible for most to reflect everyone. Most however does not require everyone. It's a relative superlative.
My argument stated, that in the context of the MGB, a being is greater than another if it can convince more people of its existence. If a being can convince X + 1 people of its existence, then it is greater, by definition. A maximally great being would thus have to be maximally great in this regard, meaning that it is not possible to be any greater than it, by definition. The only way for it to be impossible for another being to convince X + 1 people of its existence is if X already contains the entire set of the population since it is impossible to have an attribute (such as being convinced) apply to more items than there are items entire set. 

And given that your first premise stipulates that the MGB's greatness is contingent on its capacity to convince more people than the the next being, then it need only convince more people than every other being.
No. Since the MGB is the "Maximally Great Being", it would have to convince the maximum number of beings of its existence. Unless you can show how it is impossible for the maximum number of beings to mean every being, then it would have to mean every being, since if it doesn't, then there would be more beings that could be convinced.

You didn't demonstrate anything.
See points 1 and 2 of this post.

Only if the superlative necessarily reflects everyone. And it doesn't. Your second premise is invalid.
See points 1 and 2 of this post.

How? If the world which they conceive is one in which cellphones don't exist, they cannot know this because they don't exist. So then how can one conceive this world and apply the description, "cellphones don't exist," if they can't know that cellphones don't exist given that they don't exist?
Why does the conceiving of a world where X doesn't exist mean that the beings in that world acknowledge its non-existence?

P1: Entity X is created in time Y.
P2: Before time Y, Entity X wasn't created. This will be called time Z.
P3: Entity X was not created in time Z.
P4: Conception is current.
P5: Conception (retrospective analysis) of a world during time Z will occur in and with respect to time Y (presuming Y constitutes all time since the cellphone was created.)
P6: Conception of the World at time Z, during time Z, is not possible. (Z is past, Conception is current.)
C: Therefore, conception of a world where Entity X did not exist is impossible.
P5 is faulty. The act of conception happens in the current time (and thus would be in respect to time Y), but the subject that is being conceived isn't in current time. The conception of Z occurs in time Y, but since it has it's own setting, the subject matter itself wouldn't be in respect to time Y. The timeline of the world at time Z would also follow the timeline of Z, not of Y.

#165
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Luckily "perception" (which I take to be just conjuring mental images) and "interaction" are not prerequisites of conceiving a logically consistent world with something absent.
Yes they are. Because you would have to acknowledge (perceive) the absence of that something with no experience or data to inform its placement or displacement, its form or its being, because as that which is characterized as "absent," it does not exist.
No you don't. Please prove that rather than just asserting it. This is a ridiculous argument.

This is trivial in set theory, it's used all the time in math. I can create a set containing only elements A, B and C, I do not be able to perceive an imaginary element D to state that this set contains only the elements A,B and C. Here is the description of "Set X"

Definition:
Set X: 1. Contains only A, B, C

Definition: Set Y:
Contains D

Set Y =/= Set X. Neither does set Y contain set X.

So you can assert that something exists (D) in a set containing the elements A, C and C but then you are no longer talking about Set X, you are talking about Set Y, which does not contain set X. You have just created a new set instead.

To continue this, we can make another set:

Set Z: Contains A, B. C, D

What can we say about Set Z? Well set Z is a subset of set Y. It is not a subset of set X though.


Their non-existence in the cupboard, yes it does.
Once again, you're attempting to inform location, not existence.

There is no broom in the cupboard... No broom exists in the cupboard. 


1. A world that contains nothing, zilch, zero.
Then it isn't a world if it contains "nothing." Remember you stated, "The latter is closer to what is required for the modal ontological argument to work, which uses metaphysically possible world semantics."
Really? And in what philosophical journal have you read that? If the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" is to make sense then it must be possible for there to be a universe in which nothing exists. There is nothing logically inconsistent a priori with that. That's the reason why both theologians and physicists pose that question in the first place.

It certainly is a far more well-accepted state of affairs than a metaphysically possible world containing a metaphysically necessary being in it. The former is largely accepted by atheists and theologians, the latter is only accepted by a small fraction of theologians.

Or more compellingly:

2. A world that contains a single particle, that just exists as is, and does nothing. You can even go a step further and have a particle that exists eternally in one spacial dimension that simply evolves over time with De Broglie motion. That way you have a complete world that can be described with a single mathematical equation, perfectly logically consistent, and it's logical consistency isn't broken by the absence of a maximally great being.

I can readily conceive mathematically of these self-contained worlds. I can even conjure mental images of each, but again this isn't a requirement for something to be logically or metaphysically possible.
How do you acknowledge the absence of the MBG if it is in fact absent?
Because you have a complete and consistent description of a logically possible world without a MGB being in it...

You would need to show that such a world is inconsistent for it not to be a logically possible world.
#166
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@PressF4Respect
in the context of the MGB, a being is greater than another if it can convince more people of its existence.

Since the MGB is the "Maximally Great Being", it would have to convince the maximum number of beings of its existence.

This would imply that the objective is to convince people of the existence of a MGB, rather than the objective of the person to discover or yet even the intent of the person to want to discover such a Being. If no such objective exists then the point is moot of course and this is what happens when we begin to force objectives, terms and attributes on something where they have no real place in reality.
If a person has no interested in discovering the existence of a MGB and all that pertains to such an interest (spirituality) trying to convince people becomes a futile exercise of such a great Being. So, rather a MGB would want to confirm It's existence with those who desire such a relation and is then worth pursuing. 

I would make the suggestion that there's enough clues and sufficient evidence to warrant such an interest and would also show why it seems only Theists (those who desire to know) have various experiences with such a Being.
However, assuming there's people who might want to know but upon knowing have no real desire to connect with spirituality or a MGB the same would apply because "knowing" would also be futile without the desire to want what follows with such knowledge. What's the point in being "convinced" without a desire to extend beyond just head knowledge?


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@PressF4Respect
Do you agree that a being that can convince X people is greater than one that can convince X - 1 people?

In relation to what I said above....what if part of the beauty was in discovering God, kind of like being surprised or opening an awaited gift...what if that anticipation (element of surprise) was what makes the discovery more unique? rather than such knowledge being automatically known by everyone to no real avail?
To "seek" God implies that you desire God, and to "find" God implies that you sought after such a Being and such a Being exists.
If we're going by the Bible....
Matthew 7
7 “Ask, and it will be given to you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you. 8 For everyone who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it will be opened.
Matthew 6
33 But seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added to you.

#168
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@PressF4Respect
My argument stated, that in the context of the MGB, a being is greater than another if it can convince more people of its existence. If a being can convince X + 1 people of its existence, then it is greater, by definition. A maximally great being would thus have to be maximally great in this regard, meaning that it is not possible to be any greater than it, by definition. The only way for it to be impossible for another being to convince X + 1 people of its existence is if X already contains the entire set of the population since it is impossible to have an attribute (such as being convinced) apply to more items than there are items entire set. 
Then X+1 would be irrelevant. The criteria for being a maximally great being would be to convince X, which contains everyone. But that was NOT your premise. You sought to relate the greatness of beings by stipulating their capacity to convince a number of people with respect to the other. So let's use this as an example: Being 1, Being 2, and Being 3 are part of a universe which contains seven billion people. Being 1 convinces five billion people; Being 2 convinces 1.9 billion people; Being 3 convinces 100 million people. It is impossible for 1.9 billion to be "greater" than five billion; it is impossible for 100 million to be "greater" than five billion. Being 1 according to your premise is the maximally great being. Now, let's use your numbers: Being 1 convinces seven billion people; Being 2 convinces no one; Being 3 convinces no one. Being 1 is still the maximally great being because it is impossible for 0 to be greater than seven billion.

You're backpedaling in an attempt to retroactively revise the parameters of your first premise, so that your second premise won't be invalidated. But your first premise will always invalidate your second premise, because your second premise restricts to absolutes while your first premise is fundamentally comparative. This is just as much an issue of grammar as it is logic.

No. Since the MGB is the "Maximally Great Being", it would have to convince the maximum number of beings of its existence. Unless you can show how it is impossible for the maximum number of beings to mean every being, then it would have to mean every being, since if it doesn't, then there would be more beings that could be convinced.
Non sequitur. And your reasoning makes no sense. Using the numbers in my earlier examples, if there are seven billion people and Being 1 convinces five billion people, Being 2 convinces 1.9 billion people, Being 3 convinces 100 million people, how would it be possible to convince more people than Being 1?

See points 1 and 2 of this post.
Once again, you've not demonstrated anything.

Why does the conceiving of a world where X doesn't exist mean that the beings in that world acknowledge its non-existence?
They can't know it doesn't exist because it doesn't exist. The nonexistent doesn't provide any information on itself. It's imperceptible. But, I'll continue this below.

P5 is faulty. The act of conception happens in the current time (and thus would be in respect to time Y), but the subject that is being conceived isn't in current time. The conception of Z occurs in time Y, but since it has it's own setting, the subject matter itself wouldn't be in respect to time Y. The timeline of the world at time Z would also follow the timeline of Z, not of Y.
No it's not. Because in time Y, you know that cellphones exist. Therefore, any conception even in retrospect will contain this knowledge. Even if the subject is time Z, your conception will be a fabrication of it informed through the accumulation of knowledge in years current and previous. In other words, you'll never be able to conceive anything that isn't affected by that which you know now. Knowledge isn't piecewise, so to speak.
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Athias
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@Envisage
No you don't. Please prove that rather than just asserting it. This is a ridiculous argument.

This is trivial in set theory, it's used all the time in math. I can create a set containing only elements A, B and C, I do not be able to perceive an imaginary element D to state that this set contains only the elements A,B and C. Here is the description of "Set X"

Definition:
Set X: 1. Contains only A, B, C

Definition: Set Y:
Contains D

Set Y =/= Set X. Neither does set Y contain set X.

So you can assert that something exists (D) in a set containing the elements A, C and C but then you are no longer talking about Set X, you are talking about Set Y, which does not contain set X. You have just created a new set instead.

To continue this, we can make another set:

Set Z: Contains A, B. C, D

What can we say about Set Z? Well set Z is a subset of set Y. It is not a subset of set X though.

Once again, you are talking about location/placement. We are discussing existence.

There is no broom in the cupboard... No broom exists in the cupboard. 
Repetition doesn't change the subject about which we're discussing.

Really? And in what philosophical journal have you read that?
Why do you presume philosophical journals the barometer for valid philosophical rationalizations? (This is the second time you've insinuated this.)

If the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" is to make sense then it must be possible for there to be a universe in which nothing exists.
Because "nothing" is imperceptible; hence, epistemologically irrational. It's a logical placeholder to negate the presence of substance. However, it provides nothing of significance in our analyzing the nature of being.

There is nothing logically inconsistent a priori with that.
Non sequitur.

That's the reason why both theologians and physicists pose that question in the first place.
I'm not concerned with their reasons; only yours. I'm not having this discussion with them. So you can put the appeals to authority to rest (especially considering that this is a philosophical discussion) and provide your own rationalizations.

It certainly is a far more well-accepted state of affairs than a metaphysically possible world containing a metaphysically necessary being in it. The former is largely accepted by atheists and theologians, the latter is only accepted by a small fraction of theologians.
And the number of people inform its veracity/validity, then?

Because you have a complete and consistent description of a logically possible world without a MGB being in it...

You would need to show that such a world is inconsistent for it not to be a logically possible world.
You neglect to mention that logic is contained in that very world. If the world consist of that which we know, can know, and have yet to know, then it would stand to reason that anything beyond those parameters would not be subject to logic. You're assuming a metaphysically objective knowledge in which you're fallaciously claiming to have ascertained information you can't obtain.




#170
simplybeourselves
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simplybeourselves
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I don't accept premise 2 and I don't see how it's justified.