My above post is the most substantive thing I can push on you. The definition of "possible" you use must be exactly the same concept throughout the argument or its invalid. People are conflating metaphysical possibility (the type required for this argument to be valid) with epistemological possibility ("...it could be true/correct") therefore grant P1 far too freely.
To give the reverse argument:
1. It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great does not exist in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world, then it does not exist in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great does not exist in the actual world, then a maximally great being does not exist.
6. Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist
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Just to explain P3, as you stated in your original argument, if god exists in 44 out of 100 worlds, then it would be greater if it existed in 60 of 100, and so on. Therefore, either god exists in 100/100 worlds, or he exists in none, there is no in between. Thus if there exists one world where a MGB does not exist, then none of the worlds contain a MGB whatsoever.
Thus we are left with opposite conclusions form two "possible" premises
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
or
1. It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist.
Thus why I asked you to prove your P1.