free will

The ability to take a different course of action.

If their is a difference between brain and mind then both are still either causal or indeterminate. This does not magically make freewill logically coherent.

How on earth could we know if we can take a different course of action than we actually take? We will only take the course of action we do take after all.

'Many people' would say a leaf blowing in the wind does not have free will because it has no preferences or desires.

Give me an example of a non-causal variable.

Also, how can you make the leap to call chaos "random"?

Also, maybe it would be a good thing for you to clarify what it is that you mean by determinism, because I don't see how random variables can exist if everything that ever happened and ever will happened has been determined. Determinism usually actually means "pre-determinism" or that the future has already been determined.

I also don't see how you could flat out reject freewill as being illogical when a concept such as "non-causal variable" seems like an opening for free will to be snuck in.

Our inability to turn the clock back is independent of whether free will exists or not.   seems like a red herrring to me.

One is real, the action we actually take, and the other is imaginary, the action we imagine we "could have taken".

We intuitively imagine that "the road not taken" is somehow "just as real" as our actual action.

This conflates what is real with what is imaginary

Snow leopards can't exist because you can't make a leopard from snow!

The classic example is quantum flux.  Historically it has been referred to as an "uncaused cause" or "first cause" or "causa sui".

I understand that "chaos" is generally "overwhelming complexity" and not necessarily "random".

If an event is "uncaused" then it is 100% divorced from the previous chain of causes and events and as such could not be context sensitive, and would therefore be essentially random.

Determinism is the foundation of science and thought.  Without cause-and-effect, all logic goes completely out the window.

However, there are unknown variables, and whether or not they are "random" is an open question, so in order to be perfectly comprehensive, I trade the term "determinism" for the more comprehensive "indeterminism" (which includes all possible caused (known) and uncaused (unknown) variables).

Think about it.  How does a random impulse = human will?  Is your will random?

Think about it.  How does a random impulse = freedom?  Is your freedom random?

"Our inability to turn the clock back is independent of whether free will exists or not. seems like a red herrring to me"

I agree.

The classic example is quantum flux.  Historically it has been referred to as an "uncaused cause" or "first cause" or "causa sui".

Sounds like God, even related to our essence/energies in Orthodox theology. 

Determinism is the foundation of science and thought.  Without cause-and-effect, all logic goes completely out the window.

However, there are unknown variables, and whether or not they are "random" is an open question, so in order to be perfectly comprehensive, I trade the term "determinism" for the more comprehensive "indeterminism" (which includes all possible caused (known) and uncaused (unknown) variables).

I would like to kind of make an observation concerning the identifying of unknown variables as uncaused variables. Not so much an argument, but an observation to give an idea of what this kind of looks like.

I think it is a reflection of your worldview, which from my perspective exalts science or knowledge in such a way that is not truly reasonable, that you would call unknown variables "uncaused". I noticed this also earlier when you interpreted me saying that you could not conclusively prove anything as being random as an indication that random does not exist. 

I do not believe that something exists because it is known.

I do not believe that something exists by being known. In fact, I don't truly believe that anything in the universe is actually random. I do believe in chaos.

I do however believe that God fulfills the essence of what an uncaused variable is, but I do not take God as a placeholder for anything outside our knowing, as sometimes it seems that you do when you use words like noumenon.

I am not really debating you here. I get that you are saying the question of random variables is an open question. I'm just giving you an idea of how I am interpreting what you are saying.

Think about it.  How does a random impulse = human will?  Is your will random?

Think about it.  How does a random impulse = freedom?  Is your freedom random?

I wouldn't use the word random, I don't truly believe in the existence of random. I would perhaps say that there is an aspect of our will that is free. I say aspect, because it should be apparent that our will is tempered by our flesh, the world, etc.

It has been referred to in the writings of the church as a "divine spark". So while we are indeed subject to causality, there is still something in us that allows us to defy predictability. We can choose to make decisions that go against what is expected.

And it appears to me that the idea you have of uncaused variables in an indeterminate universe makes room for this possibility.

And so, you may be thinking in such a way that perhaps will lead to the reconciliation of these concepts that seem mutually exclusive.That is what it looks like to me.

We understand that part of what it means to be made in the image of God is to have free will.

So it is really quite the opposite of being a God puppet. Part of what makes us human is the ability to reject God and the grace that is freely offered to us.

And I don't see how this couldn't fit into what you call an "indeterminate framework".

Decree 3

We believe the most good God to have from eternity predestinated unto glory those whom He has chosen, and to have consigned unto condemnation those whom He has rejected; but not so that He would justify the one, and consign and condemn the other without cause. For that would be contrary to the nature of God, who is the common Father of all, and no respecter of persons, and would have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth {1 Timothy 2:4}. But since He foreknew the one would make a right use of their free-will, and the other a wrong, He predestinated the one, or condemned the other. And we understand the use of free-will thus, that the Divine and illuminating grace, and which we call preventing [or, prevenient] grace, being, as a light to those in darkness, by the Divine goodness imparted to all, to those that are willing to obey this — for it is of use only to the willing, not to the unwilling — and co-operate with it, in what it requires as necessary to salvation, there is consequently granted particular grace. This grace co-operates with us, and enables us, and makes us to persevere in the love of God, that is to say, in performing those good things that God would have us to do, and which His preventing grace admonishes us that we should do, justifies us, and makes us predestinated. But those who will not obey, and co-operate with grace; and, therefore, will not observe those things that God would have us perform, and that abuse in the service of Satan the free-will, which they have received of God to perform voluntarily what is good, are consigned to eternal condemnation.

But to say, as the most wicked heretics do and as is contained in the Chapter [of Cyril's' Confession] to which this answers — that God, in predestinating, or condemning, did not consider in any way the works of those predestinated, or condemned, we know to be profane and impious. For thus Scripture would be opposed to itself, since it promises the believer salvation through works, yet supposes God to be its sole author, by His sole illuminating grace, which He bestows without preceding works, to show to man the truth of divine things, and to teach him how he may co-operate with it, if he will, and do what is good and acceptable, and so obtain  salvation. He takes not away the power to will — to will to obey, or not obey him.

But than to affirm that the Divine Will is thus solely and without cause the author of their condemnation, what greater defamation can be fixed upon God? and what greater injury and blasphemy can be offered to the Most High?  We do know that the Deity is not tempted with evils, {cf. James 1:13} and that He equally wills the salvation of all, since there is no respect of persons with Him. we do confess that for those who through their own wicked choice, and their impenitent heart, have become vessels of dishonor, there is justly decreed condemnation.  But of eternal punishment, of cruelty, of pitilessness, and of inhumanity, we never, never say God is the author, who tells us that there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repents. {Luke 15:7} Far be it from us, while we have our senses, to believe or to think this; and we do subject to an eternal anathema those who say and think such things, and esteem them to be worse than any infidels.

Decree 3

We believe the most good God to have from eternity predestinated unto glory those whom He has chosen, and to have consigned unto condemnation those whom He has rejected; but not so that He would justify the one, and consign and condemn the other without cause.

For that would be contrary to the nature of God, who is the common Father of all, and no respecter of persons, and would have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth {1 Timothy 2:4}.

But since He foreknew the one would make a right use of their free-will, and the other a wrong, He predestinated the one, or condemned the other.

And we understand the use of free-will thus, that the Divine and illuminating grace, and which we call preventing [or, prevenient] grace, being, as a light to those in darkness, by the Divine goodness imparted to all, to those that are willing to obey this — for it is of use only to the willing, not to the unwilling — and co-operate with it, in what it requires as necessary to salvation, there is consequently granted particular grace.

This grace co-operates with us, and enables us, and makes us to persevere in the love of God, that is to say, in performing those good things that God would have us to do, and which His preventing grace admonishes us that we should do, justifies us, and makes us predestinated. But those who will not obey, and co-operate with grace; and, therefore, will not observe those things that God would have us perform, and that abuse in the service of Satan the free-will, which they have received of God to perform voluntarily what is good, are consigned to eternal condemnation.

But to say, as the most wicked heretics do and as is contained in the Chapter [of Cyril's' Confession] to which this answers — that God, in predestinating, or condemning, did not consider in any way the works of those predestinated, or condemned, we know to be profane and impious. For thus Scripture would be opposed to itself, since it promises the believer salvation through works, yet supposes God to be its sole author, by His sole illuminating grace, which He bestows without preceding works, to show to man the truth of divine things, and to teach him how he may co-operate with it, if he will, and do what is good and acceptable, and so obtain  salvation. He takes not away the power to will — to will to obey, or not obey him.

But than to affirm that the Divine Will is thus solely and without cause the author of their condemnation, what greater defamation can be fixed upon God? and what greater injury and blasphemy can be offered to the Most High? 

We do know that the Deity is not tempted with evils, {cf. James 1:13} and that He equally wills the salvation of all, since there is no respect of persons with Him. we do confess that for those who through their own wicked choice, and their impenitent heart, have become vessels of dishonor, there is justly decreed condemnation. 

But of eternal punishment, of cruelty, of pitilessness, and of inhumanity, we never, never say God is the author, who tells us that there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repents. {Luke 15:7} Far be it from us, while we have our senses, to believe or to think this; and we do subject to an eternal anathema those who say and think such things, and esteem them to be worse than any infidels.

I can see no good reason for you to reject free will at this point.