My argument is that reductive physicalism is almost certainly correct,
I agree.
...but we have no adequate theory to account for subjective experience.
Forget about "no adequate hypothesis" - we don't even have a rigorous DEFINITION.
I cannot deny that pink things look pink - I wish i could!
Behavioral analysis of poultry has shown that the color, just a colored tile, that approximates the reddish brown of a fox pelt, will induce Quantifiable symptoms of anxiety in chickens.
This strongly implies that the chickens have evolved some ancillary automatic mechanism that takes the color input and triggers cortisol and adrenal injections into the chicken physiology.
This is all a simple case of cause-and-effect.
If you could talk to a chicken, they'd probably say they "hate" that color.
Any "emotional" response you have to color or sound is very likely of similar origin.
I feel that a theory of consciousness that glosses over the problem of qualia is unsatisfactory.
Please convince me there is a "problem of Qualia".
A self-driving car is given a destination, but there are many options. The self-driving car (EITHER) picks the first solution it discovers (OR) runs a subroutine that narrows down the possible routes based on time of day and traffic and weather data.
The self-driving car makes a choice but it is reasonable to assume that it is not aware of its own underlying (subconscious, instinctive) programming.
If you could ask the car why it chose that particular route, it would likely respond with "it just felt like the right thing to do".
In the same way humans are not generally cognizant of their own hippocampus. Our conscious human "explanation" for our actions is purely incidental. It is merely a dumbed-down, post-hoc abbreviation of what we don't have direct access to (subconscious, chemical, physiological causal factors).
It might be a good partial theory, but it leaves the door wide open to dualism.
Nothing "leaves the door open to dualism" because dualism is LOGICALLY INCOHERENT.
Things either affect each other or they don't.
If they don't affect each other, then they can safely be ignored and treated as de facto non-existent.
If things (ghosts and gods, spirits and souls) DO affect the "material world" then they are NECESSARILY - part of - the material world (or vice versa), ipso facto - MONISM.