Free will exists.

M) The will is from the essence of the soul, following upon the intellect, seeking what the intellect apprehends and proposes.

m) Now the intellect proposes universal good as necessary and particular goods as pursuable.

cl) The will seeks necessarily universal good but not necessarily particular good.

To the Major (M) premise: Soul here simply means our principle of life. What makes our life different from the animals is our rationality and volition. It has nothing to do with ghosts, spirits or any other wacko ideas people have come up with. "Following upon the intellect" means it is an appetite that tends toward what the intellect presents. The intellect presents knowledge by the way. 

You cannot not want goodness. BUT the intellect also presents to us a particular good (in which this goodness resides to a specific degree but is not goodness itself) which it knows can be reached in several different ways. For example, I can walk this way or that way to go to the same store. Because the intellect presents these multiple means to the same end the will can tend to one or the other. I as a person, by exercising my will, choose which. Said simply: because I know many ways to do something, I have the ability to choose one, because the will by nature is an appetite. 

In order for there to be a true "free" We need both objective and subjective indifference. Proofs:

"free" requires objective indifference

M "free" requires that the will not will of necessity

m but where there is no objective indifference (multiple means presented by the intellect) the will wills of necessity.

cl "free" requires objective indifference

The first syllogism shows that we need MEANS to an END in order to choose. By the very fact of the existence of multiple means to the same end (which to deny is absurd) means we have a choice to that end. The power of the will is to choose one. This is the objective indifference and it proves we are free in this sense.

The second syllogism shows that two ENDS are always presented. To act or not. "free" implies we must be able to choose action or no action. THIS FORMALLY CONSTITUTES OUR FREEDOM OF WILL. And it is because the intellect always presents the option to act or not. Thus in every court of law, for every convicted criminal that is actually guilty we say that he should have chosen not to do the action that is the crime.

Premise 1: All humans are made up of things without free will

Premise 2: Things without free will cannot create something with free will

Conclusion: Humans cannot have free will.

Premise 1: All humans are made up of things without free will

Premise 2: Things without free will cannot create something with free will

Conclusion: Humans cannot have free will

 I feel that Premise 1 is circular reasoning. If I understand your argument right, you are saying that intellect perceives the world, and will acts on that perception. Intellect perceives what is good and bad, and will follows the good. I agree that if this is true, then free will exists, yet Premise 1 relies on the assumption that free will already exists. To expand it out, Premise 1 is basically saying that "If free will exists, then it is from the essence of the soul...". I may be misunderstanding your argument, but it seems a lot like circular reasoning to me at first glance.

Okay, so this makes me think I interpreted correctly about the intellect part. You're also saying that free will comes from our unique ability as humans to reason. I disagree, and once again I think you already make the assumption that free will exists when creating these syllogisms. Like I said before, It is irrational to assume that we as humans magically have free will by some special ability to reason when all the things that make us up are purely deterministic.

Again, this feels a bit like you're just explaining how you think free will works, and not why it must exist. This is a good definition for free will, and if It is real then I would say this is probably how it works, but you still have yet to say why it is real. Or maybe you did and I missed it, sorry if that's what happened.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but my interpretation of this is that free will is necessary whenever there are multiple means to an end. The will wants the end, and it relies on free will to choose which path. I disagree though, seeing as I had problems with your first syllogism, and so I'm not inclined to believe in a will. Additionally, you could easily be making choices about which means to an end without the existence of free will. The fact that you are making choices doesn’t necessitate that they must be free choices. As I suggested before, your brain could be making predetermined choices without you knowing.

I’ll accept that we have to make choices in our lives, but again, that doesn’t make it so that those choices must be freely made by ourselves. The option to choose doesn’t come in a package with the ability to choose. For all we know, choices are being made, but not by us, or choices are an illusion, and everything has been determined. Point is, existence of a choice does not equal ability to make that choice.

In philosophy we speak of what things are made of. We call this the material cause. This is what Con addresses here only in his first premise. All things also have what is called a form. The form is the way the matter is organized. We can take the same matter and make different things. For example ice, steam and water are all made of H2O. But those are three different things that act differently under the same circumstances. Science has a theory right now called the emergence theory( Emergence - Wikipedia). This theory essentially says that basic matter acts very differently when organized a certain way. For example: Hydrogen is flammable. Oxygen is flammable. But try lighting an oxygen and 2 hydrogen combined on fire. In other words, try lighting pure water on fire. I don't think you can.

An ability is determined and specified by its object. If there is an ability to choose then there must be several choices. If there exists choice, then there is an ability to choose. How do you say "choice exists" if there are no other choices? 

I do hate getting bogged down in semantics, but this is kind of critical to the argument. If we posit that "choice" means simply multiple ways for something to be accomplished and then posit there is no "to be accomplished" we are missing the entire point. If we simply posit "choice" to mean "multiple ways" then we deny the very definition of the word we are trying to use.

To choose by definition means there must be a choice.

Choice by definition means there must be a way to choose. 

This is how we define things. Without them we end in contradiction and absurdity. At best we would end in incomplete ideas making argument stupid.

I will disagree with your idea of what "choice" means. By definition choice means there are other options. If there is no way to obtain any of the choices except one, then there is no choice and then you break the definition of the word you are trying to use. I am actually surprised you used this argument as it defies basic significatio rules of logic. 

You break the definition by denying an essential part to the word. I don't know how else to answer that.

I'd say this is a false comparison. You make the analogy of water, which obviously is not flammable being made of things that are flammable. While at first glance, there does seem to be a connection, I disagree. With free will, you can't possibly having a being with it made of things that don't have it. The particles absent of free will are following specific "if-then" instructions when interacting with other particles, thus causing things in the wider world to happen. If I have free will and I'm controlling the particles I'm made out of, then they have free will by extension, because they are following instructions coming from me, not from how they are made. They either do what they are destined to do, or they do what I tell them, there isn't really a possibility where both happen.

However, you've conceded the point that the particles that make me up are devoid of free will regardless the order they are in.

 ...those particles are deterministic no matter what order you put them in

To me, choice is really an illusion. There may be two paths on a trail that lead to the same place, but even though we theoretically could go either way, we will always choose whichever one our brain determine is the best one. For whatever reason it decides, our computer brains will pick a way to get to the end. 

There may be multiple conceivable paths, but we are ultimately just going to choose one, and that's the one that has been determined for us since the beginning of the universe.

Forgive me for not explaining this in the last round. When I spoke of form, I continued with a conclusion drawn from the existence of form and what would in this argument become a principle. I am not making a comparison to water. I used the example of water to show the principle in philosophy that matter organized a certain way gives rise to properties that the whole contains, but not the parts individually. I brought in the Emergence Theory to show that even science demonstrates this principle of philosophy. I am applying this principle to the concept of free will because I am positing that free will is of the whole, not of the parts. We must look at the whole to demonstrate what is of the whole.

Free will is not in the individual particles by themselves. Free will is in the whole person. This is a conclusion we draw from the application of the principle that matter organized a certain way gives rise to properties that are of the whole, and not of the parts. To say that because the whole does it, so also, by extension must the parts is a composition fallacy.

 While self-movement may be a characteristic of particles, I do not know, it is irrelevant to the point since we are here talking about the action of a whole thing. Based on the principle above, we can see that parts do not need, of themselves, the characteristics of the whole. This is a principle easily demonstrated in many realms. I, by myself cannot make any laws. But with other Representatives, we can collectively make laws. The action of the whole is not necessarily the action of every part. This comes from the axiom: The whole is greater than the part. That does not mean just physically. It also means in actions, in abilities and in potencies.

definition of illusion: a thing that is or is likely to be wrongly perceived or interpreted by the senses.

If Con disagrees with this definition, that is fine but in that case I would like a definition.

Logically speaking, we must be able to show that something is illusory by showing the opposite or a contrary to be real or there is no way to actually determine if what is perceived is actually an illusion. So, in light of the above principle in bold which disproves Con's argument against free will, and which I assume would be the real thing he would point to demonstrate free will as an illusion, what does Con say is the real thing which proves the illusion? The above principle demonstrates that particles taken together as a whole carry greater characteristics than the particles themselves. So what is it that is real, that demonstrates free will to be the illusion?

What exactly do you mean when you say that free will is of the whole, not the parts?

There is no actual whole

 If you accept that the particles have no free will, then you accept that the computer doesn't, because the computer is the particles.

There is no "whole", the whole is just the parts by another word.

The key thing I think you're missing is that in your analogy, you still contain part of the property possessed by the whole while with free will that is not the case. You hold a small amount of power in the legislative system, but it's still some, and it creates a whole when brought together with the small bit of power everyone else has. However with particles, none of them contain a little bit of free will, so they can't create free will by coming together.

In philosophy there is an axiom: The Whole is greater than the parts.

What this means is that there are things we can say of the whole but not of the parts. For example: atoms do not sing. But a person does sing. This is a question of predication. i.e. what we can say of something. A person is what we would call a whole. composed of parts. So when we say a person sings, we mean that the whole is involved. Now obviously we are speaking philosophically. I am not saying your foot sings. We are using the word "whole" here analogically meaning there are multiple ways to use the different senses of the word. For free will, I am saying it is an act of the person. Meaning no individual part has the power of free will, only the whole taken together.

Firstly, I totally disagree with this part of your statement. Do we not call the combination of wood and stone and metal in a certain order a "house"? The very word itself implies a whole. And I do live in an actual house. The word "whole" is analogical, meaning there are different senses to the word that all have a primary idea underlying it. It is not a univocal term.

Firstly, the "whole" is the parts taken together. Without the notion of "taken together" when referring to the whole, you can only logically refer to one part. Which would mean that we would be arguing whether or not an atom has free will. I already made it clear that is not my point, nor what I am arguing. Nor do I think it is the answer to this question. If that is what you are trying to argue than I would say again you are making a fallacy because we are talking about a whole. We are talking about parts taken together. Not individual parts by themselves. Secondly, to accept your quote above is to deny the axiom: The whole is greater than the parts. Which would be absurd.

I only contain power by virtue of the whole, meaning it is from the whole, not the parts. I by myself have no legislative power so it cannot come from me. What you are missing is that it is the whole that gives, not the parts. So it is with free will. it is from the whole, not the parts. Different source of the potency. Or in philosophical terms: different principle, ergo different potency. That logically follows from the Axiom I stated above in Italics.

There's one big difference between singing and free will that makes this analogy fail.

They don't contain the action of singing themselves, but they do have a small part of it.

There is a "whole" in the sense that we give names to certain collections of atoms, but that doesn't mean it magically becomes something.

If I took one atom out of my house, it wouldn't be my house anymore, it would be a different one. It would be a very similar, and indistinguishable house, yet still a different one. 

As shown above, there is more than matter. Something immaterial called the form. You cannot separate the form from the matter. Neither can a thing exist without a form.

The "whole" doesn't gain any special properties just because it is a collection of things, it retains the properties of the things it's made of.

However, the "whole" cannot have any properties that its parts cannot.

Sometimes it seems like the whole has qualities the parts do not, but that is always an illusion. 

Well you do have a little bit of legislative power in that you elected lawmakers. 

I would say it was a fail, because I did not make an analogy between free will and singing. I used the example of singing to demonstrate the principle derived from the axiom that I have stated several times. This principle also applies to free will. I was not comparing or making an analogy between free will and singing. I was demonstrating the application of a principle of reasoning. The principle applies to the two. That does not mean I am comparing them or making an analogy.

Atoms cannot sing by themselves as Con has said. This means they do not have the ability to sing. Yet a cluster of atoms does have the ability to sing. Con's statement contradicts itself at face value and even if Con could clarify exactly what he means by "have a small part" he would still have to demonstrate that part, either with a scientific experiment or from reason, which he has not done yet, nor has he given anything to back it up. I don't really see exactly what he means by that "have a small part". It seems at best ambiguous, and also a division fallacy. Also, I don't see how you can say that a simple action is dividable.  Perhaps singing is not the best example. Atoms do not see, but eyes, which is made up atoms do. Atoms do not smell, but a nose, which is made up of atoms, does. Simple abilities are not dividable. So, you can't really say that atoms each "have a small part".

There are different senses to the word "different". Something can become materially different while still being the same thing formally. Are you still Moozer325 after all your atoms have been replaced? Yes. You are still you. You are different materially but not formally. In the example above the house is different materially but not formally. If Con remembers I stated in one of my previous rounds:

So, a person singing is an illusion?