Instigator / Con
1514
rating
6
debates
58.33%
won
Topic
#5770
Traditional Knowledge & Justifiable Obtainability
Status
Debating
Waiting for the next argument from the contender.
Round will be automatically forfeited in:
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Parameters
- Publication date
- Last updated date
- Type
- Rated
- Number of rounds
- 5
- Time for argument
- One week
- Max argument characters
- 10,000
- Voting period
- Two months
- Point system
- Multiple criterions
- Voting system
- Open
- Minimal rating
- None
Contender / Pro
1890
rating
98
debates
93.37%
won
Description
PRO's claim: All traditional knowledge is a justifiably obtainable thing or some traditional knowledge is a justifiably obtainable thing.
CON's claim: No traditional knowledge is a justifiably obtainable thing.
Stipulations:
1) All traditional knowledge is a justified true belief.
2) When mentioning knowledge without "traditional," it is assumed that "traditional knowledge" is meant.
3) Although laws of logic are not necessarily propositions, they can become propositions or claims. For example, "no existence is contradicting" is the law of contradiction (LNC), and the format given is a proposition. That is the treatment of the laws of logic within this debate.
Please see my three recent debates to understand how CON constructs their opening statement.
Round 1
1 LAWS OF LOGIC & JUSTIFICATION
1.1 Definition
1. Every begging the question is fallacy of unwarranted assumption that either assumes the truth of a conclusion in the course of trying to prove it or assumes the truth of a contentious claim.
2. Every fallacy is a poor form of reasoning.
3. Every justification is a good reason for a belief.
4. Every law of logic is a rule that underlies thinking itself.
1.2 Postulates
1. Everything inherent to justification is a thing that necessitates it as a presupposition to be justified.
Explanation. For a simple example: “The bible states that god exists, moreover, the bible is true because it is divinely inspired; therefore, god exists.” The quote showcases begging the question, since being “divinely inspired” is to say it is the word of god—which means it presupposes god’s existence. Within the scope of this argument, god’s existence is a “...thing inherent to justification [which] is a thing that necessitates [god’s existence] as a presupposition”. In the same way, this postulate just points to whatever is inherent to all justifications—which means (in the same way as the example) that whatever that is necessitates it as a presupposition.
2. Everything that necessitates its presupposition to be justified is a thing that justifies itself
Explanation. From the explanation before, it is essentially saying those types of arguments use the conclusion to justify itself.
1.3 Propositions 1-7
Proposition 1.1. NO FALLACY IS JUSTIFIED.
No poor reasoning is justified [Def 1.3], moreover, every fallacy is poor reasoning [Def 1.2]; therefore,no fallacy is justified.
Proposition 1.2. NO BEGGING THE QUESTION IS JUSTIFIED.
No fallacy is justified [1.1], moreover, every begging the question is a fallacy [Def 1.1]; therefore, no begging the question is justified.
Proposition 1.3. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS A THING INHERENT TO JUSTIFICATION.
Everything that underlies good reason is a thing inherent to justification [Def 1.3], moreover, every law of logic is a thing that underlies good reason [Def 1.4]; therefore, every law of logic is a thing inherent to justification.
Proposition 1.4. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS A THING THAT NECESSITATES ITS PRESUPPOSITION TO BE JUSTIFIED.
Everything inherent to justification is a thing that necessitates it as a presupposition to be justified [Postulation 1.1], moreover, every law of logic is a thing inherent to justification [1.3]; therefore, every law of logic is a thing that necessitates its presupposition to be justified.
Proposition 1.5. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS A THING THAT JUSTIFIES ITSELF.
Everything that necessitates its presupposition to be justified is a thing that justifies itself [Postulation 1.2], moreover, every law of logic is a thing that necessitates its presupposition to be justified [1.4]; therefore, every law of logic is a thing that justifies itself.
Proposition 1.6. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS BEGGING THE QUESTION.
Everything that justifies itself is begging the question [Def 1.3], moreover, every law of logic is a thing that justifies itself [1.5]; therefore, every law of logic is begging the question.
Proposition 1.7. NO LAW OF LOGIC IS JUSTIFIED.
No begging the question is justified [1.2], moreover, every law of logic is begging the question [1.6]; therefore, no law of logic is justified.
2 TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE & JUSTIFIABLE OBTAINABILITY
2.1 Definition
- All traditional knowledge is a justified true belief.
2.2 Postulates
1. If no law of logic is justified, then no thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity is justified.
Explanation. In a normal argument the premises lead to the conclusion. The truth of the conclusion depends on the validity and the truth of the premises, which make up the justification. However, if it is known that one of the premises cannot be justified then it follows that the conclusion is not justified from that premise. Laws of logic are implicit necessary premises that support all conclusions, and since they are unjustified [1.7], it follows that the conclusion is unjustified. “Necessity” in the postulate refers to a justification necessarily using laws of logic. When the word "presume" is used here, I mean the justification of a thing uses the law of logic as an implicit premise.
2. Every justifiably obtainable thing is justified.
3. Every justified true belief is justified.
2.3 Propositions 8-12
Proposition 2.1. NO THING THAT PRESUMES THE TRUTH OF THE LAWS OF LOGIC AS A NECESSITY IS JUSTIFIED.
If no law of logic is justified, then no thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity is justified [Postulate 2.1], moreover, no law of logic is justified [1.7]; therefore, no thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity is justified.
Proposition 2.2. NO THING THAT PRESUMES THE TRUTH OF THE LAWS OF LOGIC AS A NECESSITY IS JUSTIFIABLY OBTAINABLE.
Every justifiably obtainable thing is justified [Postulate 2.2], moreover, no thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity is justified [2.1]; therefore, no thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity is justifiably obtainable.
Proposition 2.3. EVERY JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF IS A THING THAT PRESUMES THE TRUTH OF THE LAWS OF LOGIC AS A NECESSITY.
Every justified thing is a thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity [1.3], moreover, every justified true belief is justified [Postulate 2.3]; therefore, every justified true belief is a thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity.
Proposition 2.4. NO JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF IS A JUSTIFIABLY OBTAINABLE THING.
No thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity is a justifiably obtainable thing [2.2], moreover, every justified true belief is a thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity [2.3]; therefore, no justified true belief is a justifiably obtainable thing.
Proposition 2.5. NO TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IS A JUSTIFIABLY OBTAINABLE THING.
No justified true belief is a justifiably obtainable thing [2.4], moreover, all traditional knowledge is justified true belief [Def 1.1]; therefore, no traditional knowledge is a justifiably obtainable thing.
The stances here are relatively straightforward. I am to make the case that at least some traditional knowledge is justifiably obtainable.
Knowledge
First what is knowledge? Con stipulates that all knowledge is "a justified true belief." This is correct. Minimally, to know is to have a belief, that is true, and that is held with good reason (justified). I will abbreviate "justified true belief" as JTB.
As JTB is a necessary condition for knowledge, all knowledge is JTB, but JTB is not sufficient for knowledge; more is needed. To show this, consider the Gettier problem in epistemology, where a range of counterexamples demonstrate cases where we have JTB but not knowledge.
The sheep in the field (Chisholm 1966/1977/1989). Imagine that you are standing outside a field. You see, within it, what looks exactly like a sheep. What belief instantly occurs to you? Among the many that could have done so, it happens to be the belief that there is a sheep in the field. And in fact, you are right, because there is a sheep behind the hill in the middle of the field. You cannot see that sheep, though, and you have no direct evidence of its existence. Moreover, what you are seeing is a dog, disguised as a sheep. Hence, you have a well-justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field. But is that belief knowledge?
Knowledge is more like JTB that was not formed by "accident" in some way, or non-Gettiered justified true belief. Thus the conditions for knowledge are:
(1) Person S believes that P
(2) P is true
(3) S is justified in believing that P
(4) S's belief that P is not vulnerable to a Gettier case
My case
I am tasked with the simple burden of showing that some, at least one, case of traditional knowledge is justifiably obtainable. Now that we have conditions for knowledge, the simple procedure shows that each condition is satisfied.
Paradigmatic cases
I believe that bachelors are unmarried men as many do, so the belief condition is satisfied. It is also true that bachelors are unmarried men, by definition. I also have good reason to think this is true, namely, that I can directly apprehend the meanings of the terms I use because meanings are determined by the intentions of speakers. Lastly, this is not a Gettier case. My belief was not formed or justified by accident, hence, I know that bachelors are unmarried men. This argument generalizes to truths like "2+2=4" and "a tiger is a tiger."
My argument did not depend on the law of noncontradiction or the law of excluded middle. In fact, these principles are on shaky ground as I will explain.
Another argument is that my position is more modest. I claim that at least one belief has certain properties and con denies that any belief does. Without considering anything the prior probability of my thesis is much higher, for it is much more modest. If a hundred coins are being flipped, if person A claims they will all land on heads, and B claims that at least one will be tails we would all believe B because his theory is more modest and far more likely to be true. The same applies here.
Rebuttals
Pro starts with four claims:
(1) Person S believes that P
(2) P is true
(3) S is justified in believing that P
(4) S's belief that P is not vulnerable to a Gettier case
My case
I am tasked with the simple burden of showing that some, at least one, case of traditional knowledge is justifiably obtainable. Now that we have conditions for knowledge, the simple procedure shows that each condition is satisfied.
Paradigmatic cases
I believe that bachelors are unmarried men as many do, so the belief condition is satisfied. It is also true that bachelors are unmarried men, by definition. I also have good reason to think this is true, namely, that I can directly apprehend the meanings of the terms I use because meanings are determined by the intentions of speakers. Lastly, this is not a Gettier case. My belief was not formed or justified by accident, hence, I know that bachelors are unmarried men. This argument generalizes to truths like "2+2=4" and "a tiger is a tiger."
My argument did not depend on the law of noncontradiction or the law of excluded middle. In fact, these principles are on shaky ground as I will explain.
Another argument is that my position is more modest. I claim that at least one belief has certain properties and con denies that any belief does. Without considering anything the prior probability of my thesis is much higher, for it is much more modest. If a hundred coins are being flipped, if person A claims they will all land on heads, and B claims that at least one will be tails we would all believe B because his theory is more modest and far more likely to be true. The same applies here.
Rebuttals
Pro starts with four claims:
1. Every begging question is the fallacy of unwarranted assumption that either assumes the truth of a conclusion in the course of trying to prove it or assumes the truth of a contentious claim.2. Every fallacy is a poor form of reasoning.3. Every justification is a good reason for a belief.4. Every law of logic is a rule that underlies thinking itself.
I'll grant 1 and 3, and reject 2 and 4.
We should be cautious about 2 because there are many "informal fallacies" that may not necessarily be cases of poor reasoning at all, and many different references have different lists of which fallacies there are. As I will go on to argue, begging the question may not always be unjustified, and plausibly is in some cases.
4 is just unsupported. Laws of logic like the law of non-contradiction (no proposition is both true and false) and the excluded middle (every proposition is either true or false) aren't presupposed in ordinary reasoning. For instance, we often don't think that propositions like "John is bald" or "It is noonish" are only possibly either true or false as they are cases of semantic vagueness, and may have indeterminate truth values.
Many semantic paradoxes plausibly violate the law of noncontradiction. Consider the following:
We should be cautious about 2 because there are many "informal fallacies" that may not necessarily be cases of poor reasoning at all, and many different references have different lists of which fallacies there are. As I will go on to argue, begging the question may not always be unjustified, and plausibly is in some cases.
4 is just unsupported. Laws of logic like the law of non-contradiction (no proposition is both true and false) and the excluded middle (every proposition is either true or false) aren't presupposed in ordinary reasoning. For instance, we often don't think that propositions like "John is bald" or "It is noonish" are only possibly either true or false as they are cases of semantic vagueness, and may have indeterminate truth values.
Many semantic paradoxes plausibly violate the law of noncontradiction. Consider the following:
Consider the sentence: ‘This sentence is not true’. There are two options: either the sentence is true or it is not. Suppose it is true. Then what it says is the case. Hence the sentence is not true. Suppose, on the other hand, it is not true. This is what it says. Hence the sentence is true. In either case it is both true and not true.
There are a host of formal systems that don't validate these principles such as para-complete, paraconsistent, relevant logics, etc. Furthermore, there is an even split among philosophers of logic on the classical vs nonclassical divide. It is not some general truth that we reason assuming all these classical principles, nor were they all assumed in any of my arguments, but con seems to assert the former as a fact without any evidence.
From this, these statement of cons:
From this, these statement of cons:
Proposition 2.3. EVERY JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF IS A THING THAT PRESUMES THE TRUTH OF THE LAWS OF LOGIC AS A NECESSITY.Proposition 2.3. EVERY JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF IS A THING THAT PRESUMES THE TRUTH OF THE LAWS OF LOGIC AS A NECESSITY.
Are to be soundly rejected. But it get's worse. His argument for:
Proposition 1.5. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS A THING THAT JUSTIFIES ITSELF.
Requires that "every law of logic is a thing that necessitates its presupposition to be justified." This is false. There could be many reasons to believe that laws of logic are true that don't rely on assuming them. For one, we may think various laws of logic are true because their truth is the best explanation for a range of facts, namely the valid inferences and the success of various formal theories. We may think that they are true because they are in some way analytic facts that capture how we use the language of propositions and logical operators. None of these motivations merely assume them to be true. Next:
Proposition 1.6. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS BEGGING THE QUESTION.
is just confusion about begging the question which is a property of arguments, not propositions or sentences. An individual sentence like a law of logic cannot itself beg the question, but an argument for one could.
From this cons argument for:
From this cons argument for:
Proposition 1.7. NO LAW OF LOGIC IS JUSTIFIED.
Does not work because it relies on the same confusion. Even if he amended the argument to talk about arguments for the laws of logic I have already shown that many of the typically spoken-about laws of logic may not even be true and that it is far from clear that ordinary reasoning requires them. Furthermore, there are many possible arguments for the laws of logic that don't assume them as I have outlined.
Con's arguments require this idea that we somehow always assume the laws of logic that he identifies in our reasoning, and that these are unjustified. I have raised objections to both points, first that we make these presumptions, or that reasoning requires them, and second, that if these laws were true, we would have to beg the question to come to that conclusion.
Now on begging the question (BTQ), if BTQ is any form of circular inference, con bears the burden of showing that there is no plausible notion of virtuous epistemic circularity, on which a lot of philosophical work has been done in the field of epistemology. Epistemologist Ernest Sosa notes that the coherence of beliefs in webs of beliefs may have justification conferring properties even if they all depend on one another.
Con's arguments require this idea that we somehow always assume the laws of logic that he identifies in our reasoning, and that these are unjustified. I have raised objections to both points, first that we make these presumptions, or that reasoning requires them, and second, that if these laws were true, we would have to beg the question to come to that conclusion.
Now on begging the question (BTQ), if BTQ is any form of circular inference, con bears the burden of showing that there is no plausible notion of virtuous epistemic circularity, on which a lot of philosophical work has been done in the field of epistemology. Epistemologist Ernest Sosa notes that the coherence of beliefs in webs of beliefs may have justification conferring properties even if they all depend on one another.
One kind of justification-conferring coherence is among beliefs of the same order. For example, coherence among object-level beliefs, especially explanatory coherence, can boost one’s degree of justification for those beliefs. Another kind of justification-conferring coherence is among beliefs at different orders or levels. For example, one might have a coherent explanation regarding how one’s object-level belief is reliably formed, and hence likely to be true.
There are also coherentist theories of justification that argue that justification has such a structure. Sosa also talks about source and coverage circularity. As John Greco says on the former and latter in Sosa's view:
The first sort we might call “source circularity”: any fully general epistemology must investigate all of our knowledge-conferring sources. But then any such investigation will proceed by exploiting those very sources... As Sosa notes, this does not point to some weakness or defect in the human condition—it is rather the logical consequence of a fully general epistemology...A second kind of benign circularity might be called “coverage circularity”: Any fully general criterion for some epistemic status will cover itself, if it is supposed to itself have that epistemic status. For example, a general criterion might specify necessary and sufficient conditions for justification...But then a justified belief that the criterion is correct will also have to meet those very conditions.
For Con to claim that circularity is always unjustified he has the tall task of undermining every coherentist theory of justification and every motivation for nonvicious epistemic circularity that epistemologists have developed for years as an alternative is the view that begging the question isn't always unjustified.
Conclusion
My case is simple. There are paradigmatic cases of analytic truths that we know. I have shown how these satisfy all the relevant conditions for knowledge. I also appeal to the modest and antecedent likelihood of my position, which itself is a strong reason to vote in its favor. Lastly, I show the flaws in all of cons arguments.
Conclusion
My case is simple. There are paradigmatic cases of analytic truths that we know. I have shown how these satisfy all the relevant conditions for knowledge. I also appeal to the modest and antecedent likelihood of my position, which itself is a strong reason to vote in its favor. Lastly, I show the flaws in all of cons arguments.
Round 2
CON thanks PRO's for their R1 argument.
1 Agreements
As JTB is a necessary condition for knowledge, all knowledge is JTB, but JTB is not sufficient for knowledge; more is needed. To show this, consider the Gettier problem in epistemology, where a range of counterexamples demonstrate cases where we have JTB but not knowledge.
CON wholeheartedly agrees with the characterization of true justified belief as knowledge, especially as mentioned above.
Proposition 1.6. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS BEGGING THE QUESTION.is just confusion about begging the question which is a property of arguments, not propositions or sentences. An individual sentence like a law of logic cannot itself beg the question, but an argument for one could.
PRO is correct in asserting that begging the question is a property of an argument, not a proposition. However, if a proposition is used to justify itself, it is part of an argument and thus begging the question. Coincidentally, proposition 1.6 is an example of this:
Proposition 1.6. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS BEGGING THE QUESTION.Everything that justifies itself is begging the question [Def 1.3], moreover, every law of logic is a thing that justifies itself [1.5]; therefore, every law of logic is begging the question.
In this context, the law of logic is justifying itself.
2 Definitions
PRO has rejected definitions Def 1.2 and Def 1.4. PRO has accepted Def 1.1 and Def 1.3.
I'll grant 1 and 3, and reject 2 and 4.
2.1 Definition 1.2
Every fallacy is a poor form of reasoning.
PRO rejected Def 1.2. PRO provides an example of a justified fallacy, namely begging the question, which is coherentism. As agreed, PRO concedes that something is justified is to have a good reason for a belief [1.2]. Therefore, the reason this means Def 1.2 is wrong is due to a justified fallacy being a contradiction. To hold on to the definition provided, CON must reject either that coherentism isn't justified or isn't fallacious, but neither is the case.
Coherentism is a theory of justification. It explains how justifications are structured. Coherentism asserts that the structure of justified beliefs takes form as a web and justifies each other as a coherent whole. This is circular, as PRO pointed out. However, subscribing to coherentism does not entail believing that the structure is justified. CON may be a coherentist but still believe the definition given. This is a crucial distinction between the structure of justified beliefs and a justification. As PRO rightly argued, the begging the question only applies to an argument or justification. Coherentism isn't an argument; it is a description of how justified beliefs interact. It would be akin to saying that believing that "all my beliefs' justification are circular" directly means the person also thinks those beliefs are justified. Which is false, someone can believe all their beliefs are circular but fundamentally unjustified.
To say those beliefs with the coherentist view are justified would mean PRO would have the burden of proof, not CON.
2.2 Definition 1.4
Every law of logic is a rule that underlies thinking itself.
1.4 PRO has asserted that the Law of Non-contradiction (LNC) and Excluded Middle are not used in ordinary reasoning. However, this is based on the false premise that CON's argument hinges on the classical notions of logic, which it does not. In the content of the argument, as in everything that is under the "Propositions" sections, no example of the law of logic is named.
CON asks that PRO address the substance of the argument. The real issue is that the underlying rules of reasoning are not justified, a problem inherent to all formal systems of logic.
PRO stated that the definition is unsupported. The definition is taken from the textbook: "Introduction to Philosophy."
3 Propositions
The critiques of CON's propositions that have not been addressed stem from the definitions that were already addressed.
4 Rebuttal
PRO's gives an example of a justified true belief:
...bachelors are unmarried men.
It is a belief. It is justified by the dictionary and the intention of speakers. Lastly, it is not an example of a Gettier case.
However, for my reasoning in the first R1 argument to be invalid PRO would need to assert that the justification used here is not controlled by the rules of that underlie thinking itself.
In terms of prior probability, CON's argument is clearly superior because it uses deductive logic in the first R1 argument.
Forfeited
Round 3
Extend.
Not published yet
Round 4
Not published yet
Not published yet
Round 5
Not published yet
Not published yet
Novice is back ^^
Case and point.
Couldn't it be that I merely did not enjoy debating you much?
All of you that run, block , I get under your skin.
Who's the "other one"?
Another one I got on the run.