Instigator / Con
8
1514
rating
7
debates
64.29%
won
Topic
#5770
Traditional Knowledge & Justifiable Obtainability
Status
Voting
The participant that receives the most points from the voters is declared a winner.
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Parameters
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- Last updated date
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- Rated
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- 5
- Time for argument
- One week
- Max argument characters
- 10,000
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- Two months
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- Multiple criterions
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Contender / Pro
12
1893
rating
99
debates
93.43%
won
Description
PRO's claim: All traditional knowledge is a justifiably obtainable thing or some traditional knowledge is a justifiably obtainable thing.
CON's claim: No traditional knowledge is a justifiably obtainable thing.
Stipulations:
1) All traditional knowledge is a justified true belief.
2) When mentioning knowledge without "traditional," it is assumed that "traditional knowledge" is meant.
3) Although laws of logic are not necessarily propositions, they can become propositions or claims. For example, "no existence is contradicting" is the law of contradiction (LNC), and the format given is a proposition. That is the treatment of the laws of logic within this debate.
Please see my three recent debates to understand how CON constructs their opening statement.
Round 1
1 LAWS OF LOGIC & JUSTIFICATION
1.1 Definition
1. Every begging the question is fallacy of unwarranted assumption that either assumes the truth of a conclusion in the course of trying to prove it or assumes the truth of a contentious claim.
2. Every fallacy is a poor form of reasoning.
3. Every justification is a good reason for a belief.
4. Every law of logic is a rule that underlies thinking itself.
1.2 Postulates
1. Everything inherent to justification is a thing that necessitates it as a presupposition to be justified.
Explanation. For a simple example: “The bible states that god exists, moreover, the bible is true because it is divinely inspired; therefore, god exists.” The quote showcases begging the question, since being “divinely inspired” is to say it is the word of god—which means it presupposes god’s existence. Within the scope of this argument, god’s existence is a “...thing inherent to justification [which] is a thing that necessitates [god’s existence] as a presupposition”. In the same way, this postulate just points to whatever is inherent to all justifications—which means (in the same way as the example) that whatever that is necessitates it as a presupposition.
2. Everything that necessitates its presupposition to be justified is a thing that justifies itself
Explanation. From the explanation before, it is essentially saying those types of arguments use the conclusion to justify itself.
1.3 Propositions 1-7
Proposition 1.1. NO FALLACY IS JUSTIFIED.
No poor reasoning is justified [Def 1.3], moreover, every fallacy is poor reasoning [Def 1.2]; therefore,no fallacy is justified.
Proposition 1.2. NO BEGGING THE QUESTION IS JUSTIFIED.
No fallacy is justified [1.1], moreover, every begging the question is a fallacy [Def 1.1]; therefore, no begging the question is justified.
Proposition 1.3. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS A THING INHERENT TO JUSTIFICATION.
Everything that underlies good reason is a thing inherent to justification [Def 1.3], moreover, every law of logic is a thing that underlies good reason [Def 1.4]; therefore, every law of logic is a thing inherent to justification.
Proposition 1.4. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS A THING THAT NECESSITATES ITS PRESUPPOSITION TO BE JUSTIFIED.
Everything inherent to justification is a thing that necessitates it as a presupposition to be justified [Postulation 1.1], moreover, every law of logic is a thing inherent to justification [1.3]; therefore, every law of logic is a thing that necessitates its presupposition to be justified.
Proposition 1.5. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS A THING THAT JUSTIFIES ITSELF.
Everything that necessitates its presupposition to be justified is a thing that justifies itself [Postulation 1.2], moreover, every law of logic is a thing that necessitates its presupposition to be justified [1.4]; therefore, every law of logic is a thing that justifies itself.
Proposition 1.6. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS BEGGING THE QUESTION.
Everything that justifies itself is begging the question [Def 1.3], moreover, every law of logic is a thing that justifies itself [1.5]; therefore, every law of logic is begging the question.
Proposition 1.7. NO LAW OF LOGIC IS JUSTIFIED.
No begging the question is justified [1.2], moreover, every law of logic is begging the question [1.6]; therefore, no law of logic is justified.
2 TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE & JUSTIFIABLE OBTAINABILITY
2.1 Definition
- All traditional knowledge is a justified true belief.
2.2 Postulates
1. If no law of logic is justified, then no thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity is justified.
Explanation. In a normal argument the premises lead to the conclusion. The truth of the conclusion depends on the validity and the truth of the premises, which make up the justification. However, if it is known that one of the premises cannot be justified then it follows that the conclusion is not justified from that premise. Laws of logic are implicit necessary premises that support all conclusions, and since they are unjustified [1.7], it follows that the conclusion is unjustified. “Necessity” in the postulate refers to a justification necessarily using laws of logic. When the word "presume" is used here, I mean the justification of a thing uses the law of logic as an implicit premise.
2. Every justifiably obtainable thing is justified.
3. Every justified true belief is justified.
2.3 Propositions 8-12
Proposition 2.1. NO THING THAT PRESUMES THE TRUTH OF THE LAWS OF LOGIC AS A NECESSITY IS JUSTIFIED.
If no law of logic is justified, then no thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity is justified [Postulate 2.1], moreover, no law of logic is justified [1.7]; therefore, no thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity is justified.
Proposition 2.2. NO THING THAT PRESUMES THE TRUTH OF THE LAWS OF LOGIC AS A NECESSITY IS JUSTIFIABLY OBTAINABLE.
Every justifiably obtainable thing is justified [Postulate 2.2], moreover, no thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity is justified [2.1]; therefore, no thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity is justifiably obtainable.
Proposition 2.3. EVERY JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF IS A THING THAT PRESUMES THE TRUTH OF THE LAWS OF LOGIC AS A NECESSITY.
Every justified thing is a thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity [1.3], moreover, every justified true belief is justified [Postulate 2.3]; therefore, every justified true belief is a thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity.
Proposition 2.4. NO JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF IS A JUSTIFIABLY OBTAINABLE THING.
No thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity is a justifiably obtainable thing [2.2], moreover, every justified true belief is a thing that presumes the truth of the laws of logic as a necessity [2.3]; therefore, no justified true belief is a justifiably obtainable thing.
Proposition 2.5. NO TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IS A JUSTIFIABLY OBTAINABLE THING.
No justified true belief is a justifiably obtainable thing [2.4], moreover, all traditional knowledge is justified true belief [Def 1.1]; therefore, no traditional knowledge is a justifiably obtainable thing.
The stances here are relatively straightforward. I am to make the case that at least some traditional knowledge is justifiably obtainable.
Knowledge
First what is knowledge? Con stipulates that all knowledge is "a justified true belief." This is correct. Minimally, to know is to have a belief, that is true, and that is held with good reason (justified). I will abbreviate "justified true belief" as JTB.
As JTB is a necessary condition for knowledge, all knowledge is JTB, but JTB is not sufficient for knowledge; more is needed. To show this, consider the Gettier problem in epistemology, where a range of counterexamples demonstrate cases where we have JTB but not knowledge.
The sheep in the field (Chisholm 1966/1977/1989). Imagine that you are standing outside a field. You see, within it, what looks exactly like a sheep. What belief instantly occurs to you? Among the many that could have done so, it happens to be the belief that there is a sheep in the field. And in fact, you are right, because there is a sheep behind the hill in the middle of the field. You cannot see that sheep, though, and you have no direct evidence of its existence. Moreover, what you are seeing is a dog, disguised as a sheep. Hence, you have a well-justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field. But is that belief knowledge?
Knowledge is more like JTB that was not formed by "accident" in some way, or non-Gettiered justified true belief. Thus the conditions for knowledge are:
(1) Person S believes that P
(2) P is true
(3) S is justified in believing that P
(4) S's belief that P is not vulnerable to a Gettier case
My case
I am tasked with the simple burden of showing that some, at least one, case of traditional knowledge is justifiably obtainable. Now that we have conditions for knowledge, the simple procedure shows that each condition is satisfied.
Paradigmatic cases
I believe that bachelors are unmarried men as many do, so the belief condition is satisfied. It is also true that bachelors are unmarried men, by definition. I also have good reason to think this is true, namely, that I can directly apprehend the meanings of the terms I use because meanings are determined by the intentions of speakers. Lastly, this is not a Gettier case. My belief was not formed or justified by accident, hence, I know that bachelors are unmarried men. This argument generalizes to truths like "2+2=4" and "a tiger is a tiger."
My argument did not depend on the law of noncontradiction or the law of excluded middle. In fact, these principles are on shaky ground as I will explain.
Another argument is that my position is more modest. I claim that at least one belief has certain properties and con denies that any belief does. Without considering anything the prior probability of my thesis is much higher, for it is much more modest. If a hundred coins are being flipped, if person A claims they will all land on heads, and B claims that at least one will be tails we would all believe B because his theory is more modest and far more likely to be true. The same applies here.
Rebuttals
Pro starts with four claims:
(1) Person S believes that P
(2) P is true
(3) S is justified in believing that P
(4) S's belief that P is not vulnerable to a Gettier case
My case
I am tasked with the simple burden of showing that some, at least one, case of traditional knowledge is justifiably obtainable. Now that we have conditions for knowledge, the simple procedure shows that each condition is satisfied.
Paradigmatic cases
I believe that bachelors are unmarried men as many do, so the belief condition is satisfied. It is also true that bachelors are unmarried men, by definition. I also have good reason to think this is true, namely, that I can directly apprehend the meanings of the terms I use because meanings are determined by the intentions of speakers. Lastly, this is not a Gettier case. My belief was not formed or justified by accident, hence, I know that bachelors are unmarried men. This argument generalizes to truths like "2+2=4" and "a tiger is a tiger."
My argument did not depend on the law of noncontradiction or the law of excluded middle. In fact, these principles are on shaky ground as I will explain.
Another argument is that my position is more modest. I claim that at least one belief has certain properties and con denies that any belief does. Without considering anything the prior probability of my thesis is much higher, for it is much more modest. If a hundred coins are being flipped, if person A claims they will all land on heads, and B claims that at least one will be tails we would all believe B because his theory is more modest and far more likely to be true. The same applies here.
Rebuttals
Pro starts with four claims:
1. Every begging question is the fallacy of unwarranted assumption that either assumes the truth of a conclusion in the course of trying to prove it or assumes the truth of a contentious claim.2. Every fallacy is a poor form of reasoning.3. Every justification is a good reason for a belief.4. Every law of logic is a rule that underlies thinking itself.
I'll grant 1 and 3, and reject 2 and 4.
We should be cautious about 2 because there are many "informal fallacies" that may not necessarily be cases of poor reasoning at all, and many different references have different lists of which fallacies there are. As I will go on to argue, begging the question may not always be unjustified, and plausibly is in some cases.
4 is just unsupported. Laws of logic like the law of non-contradiction (no proposition is both true and false) and the excluded middle (every proposition is either true or false) aren't presupposed in ordinary reasoning. For instance, we often don't think that propositions like "John is bald" or "It is noonish" are only possibly either true or false as they are cases of semantic vagueness, and may have indeterminate truth values.
Many semantic paradoxes plausibly violate the law of noncontradiction. Consider the following:
We should be cautious about 2 because there are many "informal fallacies" that may not necessarily be cases of poor reasoning at all, and many different references have different lists of which fallacies there are. As I will go on to argue, begging the question may not always be unjustified, and plausibly is in some cases.
4 is just unsupported. Laws of logic like the law of non-contradiction (no proposition is both true and false) and the excluded middle (every proposition is either true or false) aren't presupposed in ordinary reasoning. For instance, we often don't think that propositions like "John is bald" or "It is noonish" are only possibly either true or false as they are cases of semantic vagueness, and may have indeterminate truth values.
Many semantic paradoxes plausibly violate the law of noncontradiction. Consider the following:
Consider the sentence: ‘This sentence is not true’. There are two options: either the sentence is true or it is not. Suppose it is true. Then what it says is the case. Hence the sentence is not true. Suppose, on the other hand, it is not true. This is what it says. Hence the sentence is true. In either case it is both true and not true.
There are a host of formal systems that don't validate these principles such as para-complete, paraconsistent, relevant logics, etc. Furthermore, there is an even split among philosophers of logic on the classical vs nonclassical divide. It is not some general truth that we reason assuming all these classical principles, nor were they all assumed in any of my arguments, but con seems to assert the former as a fact without any evidence.
From this, these statement of cons:
From this, these statement of cons:
Proposition 2.3. EVERY JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF IS A THING THAT PRESUMES THE TRUTH OF THE LAWS OF LOGIC AS A NECESSITY.Proposition 2.3. EVERY JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF IS A THING THAT PRESUMES THE TRUTH OF THE LAWS OF LOGIC AS A NECESSITY.
Are to be soundly rejected. But it get's worse. His argument for:
Proposition 1.5. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS A THING THAT JUSTIFIES ITSELF.
Requires that "every law of logic is a thing that necessitates its presupposition to be justified." This is false. There could be many reasons to believe that laws of logic are true that don't rely on assuming them. For one, we may think various laws of logic are true because their truth is the best explanation for a range of facts, namely the valid inferences and the success of various formal theories. We may think that they are true because they are in some way analytic facts that capture how we use the language of propositions and logical operators. None of these motivations merely assume them to be true. Next:
Proposition 1.6. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS BEGGING THE QUESTION.
is just confusion about begging the question which is a property of arguments, not propositions or sentences. An individual sentence like a law of logic cannot itself beg the question, but an argument for one could.
From this cons argument for:
From this cons argument for:
Proposition 1.7. NO LAW OF LOGIC IS JUSTIFIED.
Does not work because it relies on the same confusion. Even if he amended the argument to talk about arguments for the laws of logic I have already shown that many of the typically spoken-about laws of logic may not even be true and that it is far from clear that ordinary reasoning requires them. Furthermore, there are many possible arguments for the laws of logic that don't assume them as I have outlined.
Con's arguments require this idea that we somehow always assume the laws of logic that he identifies in our reasoning, and that these are unjustified. I have raised objections to both points, first that we make these presumptions, or that reasoning requires them, and second, that if these laws were true, we would have to beg the question to come to that conclusion.
Now on begging the question (BTQ), if BTQ is any form of circular inference, con bears the burden of showing that there is no plausible notion of virtuous epistemic circularity, on which a lot of philosophical work has been done in the field of epistemology. Epistemologist Ernest Sosa notes that the coherence of beliefs in webs of beliefs may have justification conferring properties even if they all depend on one another.
Con's arguments require this idea that we somehow always assume the laws of logic that he identifies in our reasoning, and that these are unjustified. I have raised objections to both points, first that we make these presumptions, or that reasoning requires them, and second, that if these laws were true, we would have to beg the question to come to that conclusion.
Now on begging the question (BTQ), if BTQ is any form of circular inference, con bears the burden of showing that there is no plausible notion of virtuous epistemic circularity, on which a lot of philosophical work has been done in the field of epistemology. Epistemologist Ernest Sosa notes that the coherence of beliefs in webs of beliefs may have justification conferring properties even if they all depend on one another.
One kind of justification-conferring coherence is among beliefs of the same order. For example, coherence among object-level beliefs, especially explanatory coherence, can boost one’s degree of justification for those beliefs. Another kind of justification-conferring coherence is among beliefs at different orders or levels. For example, one might have a coherent explanation regarding how one’s object-level belief is reliably formed, and hence likely to be true.
There are also coherentist theories of justification that argue that justification has such a structure. Sosa also talks about source and coverage circularity. As John Greco says on the former and latter in Sosa's view:
The first sort we might call “source circularity”: any fully general epistemology must investigate all of our knowledge-conferring sources. But then any such investigation will proceed by exploiting those very sources... As Sosa notes, this does not point to some weakness or defect in the human condition—it is rather the logical consequence of a fully general epistemology...A second kind of benign circularity might be called “coverage circularity”: Any fully general criterion for some epistemic status will cover itself, if it is supposed to itself have that epistemic status. For example, a general criterion might specify necessary and sufficient conditions for justification...But then a justified belief that the criterion is correct will also have to meet those very conditions.
For Con to claim that circularity is always unjustified he has the tall task of undermining every coherentist theory of justification and every motivation for nonvicious epistemic circularity that epistemologists have developed for years as an alternative is the view that begging the question isn't always unjustified.
Conclusion
My case is simple. There are paradigmatic cases of analytic truths that we know. I have shown how these satisfy all the relevant conditions for knowledge. I also appeal to the modest and antecedent likelihood of my position, which itself is a strong reason to vote in its favor. Lastly, I show the flaws in all of cons arguments.
Conclusion
My case is simple. There are paradigmatic cases of analytic truths that we know. I have shown how these satisfy all the relevant conditions for knowledge. I also appeal to the modest and antecedent likelihood of my position, which itself is a strong reason to vote in its favor. Lastly, I show the flaws in all of cons arguments.
Round 2
CON thanks PRO's for their R1 argument.
1 Agreements
As JTB is a necessary condition for knowledge, all knowledge is JTB, but JTB is not sufficient for knowledge; more is needed. To show this, consider the Gettier problem in epistemology, where a range of counterexamples demonstrate cases where we have JTB but not knowledge.
CON wholeheartedly agrees with the characterization of true justified belief as knowledge, especially as mentioned above.
Proposition 1.6. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS BEGGING THE QUESTION.is just confusion about begging the question which is a property of arguments, not propositions or sentences. An individual sentence like a law of logic cannot itself beg the question, but an argument for one could.
PRO is correct in asserting that begging the question is a property of an argument, not a proposition. However, if a proposition is used to justify itself, it is part of an argument and thus begging the question. Coincidentally, proposition 1.6 is an example of this:
Proposition 1.6. EVERY LAW OF LOGIC IS BEGGING THE QUESTION.Everything that justifies itself is begging the question [Def 1.3], moreover, every law of logic is a thing that justifies itself [1.5]; therefore, every law of logic is begging the question.
In this context, the law of logic is justifying itself.
2 Definitions
PRO has rejected definitions Def 1.2 and Def 1.4. PRO has accepted Def 1.1 and Def 1.3.
I'll grant 1 and 3, and reject 2 and 4.
2.1 Definition 1.2
Every fallacy is a poor form of reasoning.
PRO rejected Def 1.2. PRO provides an example of a justified fallacy, namely begging the question, which is coherentism. As agreed, PRO concedes that something is justified is to have a good reason for a belief [1.2]. Therefore, the reason this means Def 1.2 is wrong is due to a justified fallacy being a contradiction. To hold on to the definition provided, CON must reject either that coherentism isn't justified or isn't fallacious, but neither is the case.
Coherentism is a theory of justification. It explains how justifications are structured. Coherentism asserts that the structure of justified beliefs takes form as a web and justifies each other as a coherent whole. This is circular, as PRO pointed out. However, subscribing to coherentism does not entail believing that the structure is justified. CON may be a coherentist but still believe the definition given. This is a crucial distinction between the structure of justified beliefs and a justification. As PRO rightly argued, the begging the question only applies to an argument or justification. Coherentism isn't an argument; it is a description of how justified beliefs interact. It would be akin to saying that believing that "all my beliefs' justification are circular" directly means the person also thinks those beliefs are justified. Which is false, someone can believe all their beliefs are circular but fundamentally unjustified.
To say those beliefs with the coherentist view are justified would mean PRO would have the burden of proof, not CON.
2.2 Definition 1.4
Every law of logic is a rule that underlies thinking itself.
1.4 PRO has asserted that the Law of Non-contradiction (LNC) and Excluded Middle are not used in ordinary reasoning. However, this is based on the false premise that CON's argument hinges on the classical notions of logic, which it does not. In the content of the argument, as in everything that is under the "Propositions" sections, no example of the law of logic is named.
CON asks that PRO address the substance of the argument. The real issue is that the underlying rules of reasoning are not justified, a problem inherent to all formal systems of logic.
PRO stated that the definition is unsupported. The definition is taken from the textbook: "Introduction to Philosophy."
3 Propositions
The critiques of CON's propositions that have not been addressed stem from the definitions that were already addressed.
4 Rebuttal
PRO's gives an example of a justified true belief:
...bachelors are unmarried men.
It is a belief. It is justified by the dictionary and the intention of speakers. Lastly, it is not an example of a Gettier case.
However, for my reasoning in the first R1 argument to be invalid PRO would need to assert that the justification used here is not controlled by the rules of that underlie thinking itself.
In terms of prior probability, CON's argument is clearly superior because it uses deductive logic in the first R1 argument.
Forfeited
Round 3
Extend.
A. Intro
As I said in round 1, JTB is necessary, but not sufficient for knowledge.
Next, con seems to reject the charitable interpretation I offered for what the laws of logic are to their case. As a result of this, it becomes vague and unclear what con means by "the rules that underlie thinking itself" and con provides no further account of what these are supposed to be and what it means for a rule to "underlie thinking."
Exposing this unclarity becomes a theme in my response. I also explore the self-defeating nature of con's view. After all, con has conceded that their position is unjustified by his lights.
Notes
a. In my last round I distinguish between circularity and begging the question. By Con's own definition which I agreed with:
As I said in round 1, JTB is necessary, but not sufficient for knowledge.
Next, con seems to reject the charitable interpretation I offered for what the laws of logic are to their case. As a result of this, it becomes vague and unclear what con means by "the rules that underlie thinking itself" and con provides no further account of what these are supposed to be and what it means for a rule to "underlie thinking."
Exposing this unclarity becomes a theme in my response. I also explore the self-defeating nature of con's view. After all, con has conceded that their position is unjustified by his lights.
Notes
a. In my last round I distinguish between circularity and begging the question. By Con's own definition which I agreed with:
Every begging the question is fallacy of unwarranted assumption...
This means that for circularity to be begging the question, it must be unwarranted. But if coherentism is right, there may be cases of circularity that are warranted based on propositions' role in a coherent web of beliefs.
Even if we assume that part of what Con says is true, all he would have shown is that there is circularity. He has the burden of not only showing that there is this circularity, but that the circularity is unwarranted, such that it becomes begging the question.
As I stated before if con stipulates that all circularity IS begging the question, then I no longer agree to con's terms and they have the burden of showing that BTQ is always fallacious.
b. Con claims there is something that every argument presumes. Some sort of rule that remains a mystery, and con gives no specification of what this rule is or any evidence that every argument presumes it. This can be dismissed as no clarification has been provided and no argument has been given for it.
Even if we assume that part of what Con says is true, all he would have shown is that there is circularity. He has the burden of not only showing that there is this circularity, but that the circularity is unwarranted, such that it becomes begging the question.
As I stated before if con stipulates that all circularity IS begging the question, then I no longer agree to con's terms and they have the burden of showing that BTQ is always fallacious.
b. Con claims there is something that every argument presumes. Some sort of rule that remains a mystery, and con gives no specification of what this rule is or any evidence that every argument presumes it. This can be dismissed as no clarification has been provided and no argument has been given for it.
B. My case
I gave two arguments for there being at least one instance of justifiably obtainable traditional knowledge.
(i) The first consisted of giving paradigmatic examples that satisfy the conditions for knowledge as laid out. For example, we know things like "bachelors are unmarried" "tigers are tigers" and "1+1=2" etc. precisely because we have direct access to the meanings of terms in our language as we use them.
Pro says in response:
However, for my reasoning in the first R1 argument to be invalid PRO would need to assert that the justification used here is not controlled by the rules that underlie thinking itself.
First, this is confusion between validity and soundness. Second, con continues to employ this mysterious language about "rules that underlie thinking itself." They should be more specific—it's not clear what they are talking about. So, as of now, there has not been a rejoinder to my first argument.
But there seems to be some idea here that if arguments ultimately assume some principle, whatever that may be, then they could not justify. First, no evidence has been given that every argument assumes some principle or set of principles, and no evidence has been given that even if this were true, circularity is always unjustified. It also could be the case that there are just foundational principles that are justified non inferentially and con has done nothing to rule out that possibility.
(ii) The second argument was a simple examination of the prior probability of my side of the burden. Con in response says:
In terms of prior probability, CON's argument is clearly superior because it uses deductive logic in the first R1 argument.
This is frankly bizarre. Just because an argument is framed in a certain way does not make it "better" than an argument framed differently. The following argument is a deductive argument for example:
[1] If the sky is blue, then pigs fly
[2] The sky is blue
[3] Hence, pigs fly (1, 2)
But it is a terrible argument not better than the host of inductive arguments that support the theory of evolution, or the inductive inferences based on observations and recoded data from experiments in physics.
Just because an argument is presented deductively does not mean you have good reason to believe the premises are true. Similarly, an argument may be inductive, and provide excellent reasons to accept the premises and the conclusion.
As we can see, this does not respond to the argument from prior probability, so it may as well be extended. The likelihood that at least one instance of traditional knowledge is justifiably obtainable is much higher than the probability that none are whatsoever because the former is a much more modest and much weaker claim. For this reason alone, my position is apparent.
C. Rebuttals
Self Defeat
Con claims that no argument can justify the belief in a proposition. By his lights, no argument that con themself has given in this debate justifies belief in the claim he is defending.
If that's right, con concedes that their own position is unjustified, and thus concedes that they are unable to defend their position. So, con's position is self-defeating.
The voters should not vote for the debater who admits his own position is unjustified. Since has conceded their position is unjustified, the voters need not consider it.
Circularity/Begging the question
Pro seems to be confused about a lot. For one they say that:
However, subscribing to coherentism does not entail believing that the structure is justified.
Justification is not a property of the structure of justification, justification is a property of the beliefs we have, so this message is incoherent. They go on to assert that:
As PRO rightly argued, the begging question only applies to an argument or justification. Coherentism isn't an argument; it is a description of how justified beliefs interact.
This is a confusion about the point. Whether "begging the question" is always fallacious is in contention. Coherentism is an inferential theory of justification! This means that for the Coherentist, beliefs are justified by inferences also known as arguments, it is just permissible for those arguments to be circular if they appeal to coherence with a web of beliefs. Thus to defend the claim that begging the question is always unjustified, con carries the burden of showing that justification does not ever have a coherentist structure, and con has provided no evidence of this whatsoever.
I cited information about the research program on coherentism as a theory of justification in the philosophy of knowledge in my last post. Here is the dilemma:
On Con's definition of BTQ the circularity must be unwarranted. Either he shows that all cases of circularity are warranted in which case he bears a tall burden or he stipulates that all cases of circularity are begging the question of which case I reject such a stipulation, and he bears the burden of defending it.
Laws of logic
I provided a charitable interpretation of con in terms of the traditional classical laws of logic, but he insists this isn't right. Rather laws of logic are merely "rules that underly thinking itself" according to Con with no example or indication of what they could be talking about.
Logic is a pluralistic endeavor both mathematically, and in actual reasoning. There are different principles of logic used in mathematical proofs and ordinary reasoning in different contexts and no apparent reason to accept Con's broad claim that all reasoning assumes some specific set of principles. Con has provided no evidence for this claim whatsoever, and his argument hinges on it.
Aside from my interpretation, what con thinks a law of logic is becomes very vague. What is a "rule that underlies thinking itself?" What does con mean by "rule"—which is a notoriously polysemous notion that can refer to both descriptive and normative principles—in this context and what does it mean for one to "underly thinking?"
Con says:
The real issue is that the underlying rules of reasoning are not justified, a problem inherent to all formal systems of logic.
But what exactly does con mean by "underlying rules of reasoning" in the context of a formal system? Formal systems are composed of a formal language, which is a class of well-formed formulas, and a consequence relation modeled in its deduction system or its semantics, often both. In his next response, con should say what specifically the "underlying rules of reasoning" are in the mathematical system given that he is commenting on them as applied to formal systems.
Conclusion
Con misunderstands a lot of basic points of the debate. But some key points of contention remain:
(i) Circuarlity is always unjustified (unsupported)
(ii) All arguments assume some principle or a collection of principles (unsupported).
(iii) The vagueness of "the rules that underly thinking itself" which con has not explained nor given any examples of.
Even aside all this con must undermine all of my arguments—the second of which showing the extremely low probability of his view—overcome the self-defeat of his own position, and show that coherence justification and non-inferential justification are both impossible. This is starting to look like an untenable task for them.
Round 4
Coherentism
This means that for circularity to be begging the question, it must be unwarranted. But if coherentism is right, there may be cases of circularity that are warranted based on propositions' role in a coherent web of beliefs.
In the previous response, CON challenged this idea, and PRO has not responded to it. Again, coherentism asserts that the structure of justified beliefs is a coherent web that is essentially circular. A coherentist can believe these beliefs are fundamentally unjustified. Coherentism can be the most accurate and correct model of how justified beliefs interact, but that doesn't mean these beliefs are fundamentallynjustified.
Notice this claim PRO is making, that if coherentism is true, then some circularity is warranted. However, this is unsubstantiated. Please quote when this is substantiated if PRO believes that they have.
Even if we assume that part of what Con says is true, all he would have shown is that there is circularity. He has the burden of not only showing that there is this circularity, but that the circularity is unwarranted, such that it becomes begging the question.
Show circularity where exactly? In coherentism or in general? PRO is vague in this instance. It could be coherentism, but that wouldn't make sense as PRO explicitly claimed the same thing. In general, that has been demonstrated in the first R1 argument.
As I stated before if con stipulates that all circularity IS begging the question, then I no longer agree to con's terms and they have the burden of showing that BTQ is always fallacious.
Then it is good that CON never claimed all circularity is fallacious or begging the question. Going back to the R1 argument, CON has never even claimed that. Also, the definitions should be judged on their own, not in terms of the context of the surrounding argument.
However, subscribing to coherentism does not entail believing that the structure is justified.Justification is not a property of the structure of justification, justification is a property of the beliefs we have, so this message is incoherent. They go on to assert that:As PRO rightly argued, the begging question only applies to an argument or justification. Coherentism isn't an argument; it is a description of how justified beliefs interact.
It's almost like these two quotes are related and expand on each other.
This is a confusion about the point. Whether "begging the question" is always fallacious is in contention. Coherentism is an inferential theory of justification! This means that for the Coherentist, beliefs are justified by inferences also known as arguments, it is just permissible for those arguments to be circular if they appeal to coherence with a web of beliefs. Thus to defend the claim that begging the question is always unjustified, con carries the burden of showing that justification does not ever have a coherentist structure, and con has provided no evidence of this whatsoever.
What? This does not address the rebuttal given to PRO. The point is that a description of how justified beliefs interact does not entail those beliefs being fundamentally justified. The only difference here is that PRO adds that the strength of these justified beliefs depends on the coherence and number of arguments supporting a conclusion, which is also part of the description.
Rules that underlie thoughts
b. Con claims there is something that every argument presumes. Some sort of rule that remains a mystery, and con gives no specification of what this rule is or any evidence that every argument presumes it. This can be dismissed as no clarification has been provided and no argument has been given for it....First, this is confusion between validity and soundness. Second, con continues to employ this mysterious language about "rules that underlie thinking itself." They should be more specific—it's not clear what they are talking about. So, as of now, there has not been a rejoinder to my first argument.But there seems to be some idea here that if arguments ultimately assume some principle, whatever that may be, then they could not justify. First, no evidence has been given that every argument assumes some principle or set of principles, and no evidence has been given that even if this were true, circularity is always unjustified. It also could be the case that there are just foundational principles that are justified non inferentially and con has done nothing to rule out that possibility....Logic is a pluralistic endeavor both mathematically, and in actual reasoning. There are different principles of logic used in mathematical proofs and ordinary reasoning in different contexts and no apparent reason to accept Con's broad claim that all reasoning assumes some specific set of principles. Con has provided no evidence for this claim whatsoever, and his argument hinges on it.
Sure, name what formal system of logic PRO subscribes to - and CON will do the due diligence of researching what rules a system has, as that is what CON is referring to - unless PRO is asking CON to describe every single formal logic rule of how reasoning works, which is not humanly possible.
There are a host of formal systems that don't validate these principles such as para-complete, paraconsistent, relevant logics, etc
Also, CON has conflated soundness and validity; CON means soundness.
his next response, con should say what specifically the "underlying rules of reasoning" are in the mathematical system given that he is commenting on them as applied to formal systems.
Sure.
This will be limited to algebraic rules. Assuming a, b, c, and so on are all real numbers:
- If a = b and c = d, then a + c = b + d; addition
- If a = b and c = d, then a − c = b − d; subtraction
- If a = b, then ca = cb; multiplication
- If a = b and c =/ 0, then a/c = b/c; division
- If a = b, then either a or b may be substituted for the other in any equation or inequality.
- a = a
- If a = b, then b = a.
- If a ≤ b, then b ≥ a.
- If a ≥ b, then b ≤ a.
- If a ≥ b and b ≥ c, then a ≥ c.
- If a ≤ b and b ≤ c, then a ≤ c.
- If a ≥ b and b > c, then a > c.
- If a = b and b > c, then a > c.
- If a ≤ b, then a + c ≤ b + c and a − c ≤ b − c.
- If a ≥ b, then a + c ≥ b + c and a − c ≥ b − c.
- If a ≥ b and c > 0, then ac ≥ bc and a/c ≥ b/c .
- If a ≤ b and c > 0, then ac ≤ bc and a/c ≤ b/c .
- If a ≥ b and c < 0, then ac ≤ bc and a/c ≤ b/c .
- If a ≤ b and c < 0, then ac ≥ bc and a/c ≥ b/c .
- If a ≤ b, then −a ≥ −b.
- If a ≥ b, then −a ≤ −b.
Where and b are either both positive or both negative:
22. If a ≤ b, then 1/a ≥ 1/b.
23. If a ≥ b, then 1/a ≤ 1/b.
24. If a > (−b), then 1/b > (− 1/a).
CON is sure what this proves, but here is a reference.
Inductive VS Deductive
This is frankly bizarre. Just because an argument is framed in a certain way does not make it "better" than an argument framed differently. The following argument is a deductive argument for example:[1] If the sky is blue, then pigs fly[2] The sky is blue[3] Hence, pigs fly (1, 2)But it is a terrible argument not better than the host of inductive arguments that support the theory of evolution, or the inductive inferences based on observations and recoded data from experiments in physics.
Notice how PRO has not compared an inductive argument with a deductive argument that tries to prove the same claim. It is obvious why: one would be better. This isn't a matter of how an argument is framed - this is a matter of necessity versus likelihood.
Just because an argument is presented deductively does not mean you have good reason to believe the premises are true. Similarly, an argument may be inductive, and provide excellent reasons to accept the premises and the conclusion.
PRO has conflated soundness and validity with cogency and the truth of premises. PRO compares a deductive argument with validity but without soundness and an inductive argument with both cogency and true premises. It's obvious why these are not comparable.
The debate between CON and PRO here depends on validity, cogency, and truth. Of course, CON would try to argue for the soundness of their arguments - otherwise, their argument should not be used as evidence. So, comparing these two types of arguments is silly. The only scenario this makes sense is if CON was trying to say that their conclusion is reality even though the premises are false, which is not the case and the reason why it is better.
Self Defeating
Incorrect. As a person with a brain, there are things in reality that cannot be avoided or engaged with - unless self-deletion. Laws of logic, for example, are inherent to the engagement of perceived reality. So even though these laws are fundamentally unjustified, CON and PRO have no choice but to engage with these things. CON is just using a mutual inherent engagement with the laws of logic to discuss these things.
CON argues that knowledge is not obtainable through the confines of our perceived reality.
End
(i) Circuarlity is always unjustified (unsupported)
CON has never said that.
(ii) All arguments assume some principle or a collection of principles (unsupported).
That statement is true since it is impossible to prove due to this limited medium and time constraint. That is why CON asks for the formal logic system PRO prescribes.
(iii) The vagueness of "the rules that underly thinking itself" which con has not explained nor given any examples of.
Non-contradiction is an example. That doesn't mean it manifests in reality - it is an example of one. CON doesn't know how to explain it more than the definition. What exactly is confusing?
PRO already understood that LNC is an example, as they previously referred to it as such, so why are other logic systems incapable of having other similar rules? Is traditional knowledge the only formal system with laws that decide the validity of arguments?
Last question: what was the definition of the "law of logic" that PRO held before this debate?
A. Intro
I notice that beyond a range of misunderstandings, con’s structure deteriorates with progressing rounds, making it slightly more difficult to engage with, but not impossible, so we proceed.
B. My case
I gave two arguments in favor of my position, neither of which have been given any serious response.
The first argument was from knowledge of analytic or conceptual truths such as bachelors are unmarried men, or that 2+2=4, etc. statements are true in virtue of the concepts involved in the expressions. This knowledge is direct in a way where the agents that possess the concepts have privileged access to the truths and their justification given that meaning is determined by intentions.
There has been no further direct response to this argument in the last round.
The second argument I provided was in favor of the high antecedent likelihood of my position.
If you have a jar of marbles, and someone claims that all the marbles are black, criteria paribus, that statement is very probably false for one marble need to be non black to falsify it. Similarly, con’s claim that no knowledge is attainable is very unlikely as once instance is required to falsify the statement, so his position is probably false.
In vague response to this con continues to perpetuate confusion about deductive and inductive arguments, the rest of his remarks being unclear. Once again, a deductive argument is not in any way inherently better than an inductive one precisely because a cogent inductive argument may have more plausible premises, then an unsound deductive argument, and many of them do, examples given in my last round.
Aside from this, there has been no further response or even attempted response to my arguments, so I extend them to the next round.
C. Rebuttals
Self-defeat
Incorrect
Pro says, but no part of his response falsifies a single thing I said, so it can be be promptly cast aside as irrelevant.
Pro is claiming that all arguments are unjustified and thus has already conceded that his arguments are unjustified. Every argument they forward is implicated with this preemptive concession that their own position is unjustified.
Surely, if a debater concedes that their position is unjustified, there is much else that needs to be done to sway the voters.
Circularity/Begging the question
Con has raised no objection to the viability of coherentism as a theory of justification, which means that even if it were true that all possible arguments relied on certain principles (which con has shown no evidence for) such arguments may still be justified. So even if part of con’s unfortunately misguided reasoning were taken for granted, they would have to undermine circular forms of justification.
They would also have to undermine non-inferential forms of justification as cited in the last round. That is, the structure of justification might be such that certain beliefs are justified without need of inference whatsoever.
Con must show how both views are ruled out to even scratch the surface of defending his case, and he hasn't even attempted to do so.
Con also insists that they:
never claimed all circularity is fallacious or begging the question
If this is true, then con concedes that showing the presence of circularity is not enough to show that a belief is unjustified even if it were present.
He also insists that:
Notice this claim PRO is making, that if coherentism is true, then some circularity is warranted
Which is false, a claim I never made. The point on coherentism, other theories of justification, and the heavy burden con bears is clearly stated above and in my previous rounds.
Laws of logic
Con unfortunately does not explain what he means by the mysterious “rules that underlie thinking itself” as if there is some universal, all encompassing set of norms or principles that all forms of reasoning presuppose, so it's unclear what he is talking about, and frankly there isn't much to engage with on this point.
He makes strange vague appeals to me, such as to:
name what formal system of logic PRO subscribes to
Frankly, I have no idea what con is asking me: what it means to subscribe to a formal system, or how this has any relevance to our debate.
Con even conceded that his claim that all arguments assume some principle or a collection of principles is:
impossible to prove due to this limited medium and time constraint
So con fully admits that he is making claims in our debate that he couldn't possibly defend. Since concedes this, he conceded that he is not able to defend his initial argument which relies on the very idea he admits he is not able to demonstrate.
Conclusion
This is fairly straightforward. With the debate drawing to a close, two strong arguments largely unresponded to, rebuttals to the arguments of con largely unresponded to, con conceding that he is not able to defend the claim that his arguments hinge upon, and con conceding that his very own position is unjustified, it stands to reason that the trajectory of the debate in hard fixed in a certain direction and plausibly won't change.
Round 5
As PRO does not have the courtesy of responding to any of CON's R4 arguments, CON will forward the same treatment.
The difference in engagement in the debate is evident: CON has systematically dissected PRO's arguments, and now PRO does not even try to answer direct questions, most likely because it would showcase the absurdity of their demands.
PRO complains there was no serious engagement for both of their arguments, even though CON has painstakingly explained exactly why their reasoning is better. Which has never been responded to - instead, they repeat what they originally said as if CON has not responded.
They complain that the vague notion of "rules that underlie thinking itself" brushed off their argument, even though CON has given in to their demands to give these rules for mathematics. They do not even answer simple questions regarding that topic. Now, PRO is unironically trying to demand CON to show the rules of every formal logic system, as if the mathematics demand did not take a quarter of the characters available. They say this, but in the same post, deny mentioning the formal logic system they prescribe with the justification that CON needs to prove that every formal logic system has rules deciding validity as if it is a necessary part of CON's rationale - even though it is not.
Unless PRO is handpicking formal logic systems to prescribe to when it is convenient, they believe one accurately describes logic and thus is how logic works, so as long as there are rules to how logic works, then proving other logic systems is irrelevant. For God's sake - PRO's entire R1 argument rebuttal was about discrediting traditional knowledge. How come now it is the case that the subject of what formal logic system accurately describes the true nature of logic is nonessential?
Already, CON has put more effort into this reply than PRO's latest response.
They also say this is not a claim:
But if coherentism is right, there may be cases of circularity that are warranted based on propositions' role in a coherent web of beliefs.
Just because there is a "may," does not mean it is not a claim. It is one. Modal logic deals with possibilities within logic, and they are propositions: claims. If-then statements are also propositions, complex ones, to be more specific.
A. Intro
As con stated in the first sentence of his case, he will deliberately not respond to any of the arguments levied against his position—not something I would personally do, but their prerogative.
Since many of my arguments have been dropped effectively, I'll provide a summary of my case that is yet to be responded to, and the critiques of con's arguments that they refuse to engage with this round.
Overview
This has been an interesting debate. It stands out that con's case is all over the place from continuing to argue after admitting that their position is unjustified, to saying I don't "answer questions" in a debate that doesn't have a structured Q&A format or cross-examination... it's bizarre.
Nevertheless, to wrap up this debate I will summarize my arguments that have not been close sufficiently responded to, and my critiques of con that share the same property.
B. My Case
I gave two simple arguments for my position. The first argument was from paradigmatic cases of conceptual knowledge. From my case:
(i) The first consisted of giving paradigmatic examples that satisfy the conditions for knowledge as laid out. For example, we know things like "bachelors are unmarried" "tigers are tigers" and "1+1=2" etc. precisely because we have direct access to the meanings of terms in our language as we use them.
In R3, con attempted to respond to the argument which I rebutted subsequently and pointed out that there was no further response in R4, and by extension, R5 as con admitted their refusal to engage with my arguments meaning this argument has effectively been dropped.
My next argument was an argument from the probability of my position being true.
As I say:
...my position is more modest. I claim that at least one belief has certain properties and con denies that any belief does. Without considering anything the prior probability of my thesis is much higher, for it is much more modest. If a hundred coins are being flipped, if person A claims they will all land on heads, and B claims that at least one will be tails we would all believe B because his theory is more modest and far more likely to be true. The same applies here.
This shows that even if all other arguments are even, (they aren't) all else equal I should win the debate by virtue of the modesty of my position.
Con tried to respond to this first by saying his argument was "superior" because it was deductive which is a bizarre falsehood as I explained:
Just because an argument is presented deductively does not mean you have good reason to believe the premises are true. Similarly, an argument may be inductive, and provide excellent reasons to accept the premises and the conclusion.
And there has been no further response to this argument other than doubling down on the same confusion, me extending my response in turn.
Both of my arguments remain untouched by con, so perhaps taking the last round off wasn't the best idea.
C. Rebuttals
Self-defeat
Do not forget that con has already admitted that his very position is unjustified, along with every argument he has made. He clearly stated in round one that every position, including his own, is unjustified.
Despite the fact that I am arguing against the position that every belief is unjustified, con admits in his own light that his position is unjustified.
Imagine if there was a policy debate on gun control, and the affirmative debater said "My position is unjustified." We would all take this as an apparent concession of the debate and it should be no different here.
Circularity/Begging the question + Laws of logic
Here I address the issues of circularity, the laws of logic, and the vagueness of con's gesture to "rules that underly thinking itself" that he has not globally defined, shown to be the case, and admits that he could not do so.
Con's arguments hinge on the idea that:
(1) All arguments rely on a universally shared set of principles
(2) Such principles cannot be justified without circularity
and
(3) Because of such circularity such arguments are unjustified.
Con conceded that he asserted (1) fully unable to prove it, saying:
It is impossible to prove due to this limited medium and time constraint
So we can dismiss (1) on the grounds of lack of evidence, con admittedly asserting something he could not demonstrate in the debate.
I have disputed (2) in both rounds 3 and 4 by pointing to the possibility of non-inferential justification wherein certain propositions are justified without the need for inference of any kind, and con has the burden of showing that not a single belief is justified in this manner. Con completely dropped this point throughout the debate.
I have disputed (3) by showing that coherentism is a theory of justification under which justificatory arguments can be circular if they appeal to coherence with a web of beliefs. I argued that to show (3) is true, con must show that not a single belief is justified this way.
Con in response tried to shift the burden onto me to show that beliefs are justified in this way, missing the point of the argument and misunderstanding the dialogue. I have given arguments for my position in my positive case, this was an undercutting defeater levied at con showing that they have not sufficiently justified their position. Con did not attempt to provide an argument that no belief is justified circularly, so they may have well dropped this point.
Conclusion
Each one of con's main points has been thoroughly attacked throughout the debate and con unfortunately was unable to successfully engage with any of my rebuttals.
With my arguments largely unaddressed, my rebuttals largely unaddressed/dropped, and con's self-defeating position they admit is unjustified, this one becomes fairly straightforward, but issues like this remain important and play a role philosophically, and are nevertheless noteworthy to consider.
Novice is back ^^
Case and point.
Couldn't it be that I merely did not enjoy debating you much?
All of you that run, block , I get under your skin.
Who's the "other one"?
Another one I got on the run.