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Bones's avatar
14
Bones
1761
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Topic
#3932

THBT: God exists

Status
Finished

The debate is finished. The distribution of the voting points and the winner are presented below.

Winner & statistics
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Better sources
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Better legibility
2
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After 2 votes and with 14 points ahead, the winner is...

Bones
Tags
Philosophy
Parameters
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Last updated date
Type
Standard
Number of rounds
3
Time for argument
Two weeks
Max argument characters
30,000
Voting period
One month
Point system
Multiple criterions
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Open
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quinnonn's avatar
0
quinnonn
1494
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1
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0.0%
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Description

THBT: God exists

Definition:

God - the Creator of the universe

Rules:

No kritiks

Round 1
Bones's avatar
Bones
Pro
#1
THBT: God exists

Thx quinnonn, 

Contention I.     An Explanatory Symmetry Breaker for the Modal Ontological Argument

  • The Modal Ontological Argument for God’s existence (MOA) first conceptualised by St. Anselm of Canterbury, postulates that the possibility of God’s existence necessarily entails his actual existence. The standard argument runs as follows:
    • P1. There possibly exists a perfect being.
    • C1. Therefore, a perfect being exists. 
  • The term of perfect being is usually understood as a metaphysically necessary being that possesses all perfections, whilst an imperfect being is merely any being that is not perfect. The conclusion of the argument follows from the premises via systems S5 of modal logic, an axiom which prunes unnecessary qualifiers in a given statement. The principle holds that if it is possibly the case that something is necessarily true, then its possibility is ultimately necessary. To say that p is possibly necessarily true is to say that, with regard to one possible world, it is true at all worlds; but in that case it is true at all worlds, and so it is simply necessary. A major critique of the MOA is the reverse MOA (RMOA):
    • P1. There possibly does not exist a perfect being.
    • C1. Therefore, a perfect being does not exist.
  • Both renditions of the MOA seem epistemically symmetrical, yet, they render entirely opposite conclusions. Which argument ought we adopt? It seems that, to pursue either argument, there must exist some separate principle which breaks the symmetry and preferences of one rendition over the other. Here, I will argue that there exists a symmetry breaker which favours the existence of God and thus establishes his existence as necessary.
  • This argument largely focuses on what can be known as Existential Facts, that is, true propositions regarding the existence of concrete things (concreate things merely being any existent thing e.g., table, chair) which contains within it some active description and a concrete thing. The statement “turtles exist”, is an Existential Fact which contains an active description (existence) and a concrete thing (turtle). We can observe around us that Existential Facts exist and possess, in most instances, an explanation which contains a concrete thing which is other than itself. The existence of turtles, for example, is explained by some concrete thing which is not itself a turtle - some evolutionary ancestor, for example. This idea seems trivial, the explanation for the existence of turtles cannot itself be a turtle, for that would presuppose the very thing that is being questioned. I call this principle the Principle of Explanation (herein after PE), which can be formally understood as the postulation that every existential fact X is explained by a fact which includes the existence of a concrete thing that is not among the concrete things included in X, all else being equal. More precisely: 
    • PE: "f1 $f2 (Explains(f2, f1) & $z ((z ≺ f2 ) & ~(z ≺ f1))), ceteris paribus. 
  • Two clarifications of the principle are in order. It may seem, at this stage, that PE is sneakily similar to Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, which asserts that everything must have an explanation, cause, or ground. However, there exists one crucial difference. The PE is defeasible, whilst the Principle of Sufficient Reason is not. The PE operates under the assumption of ceteris paribus, that, if all else is equal, an explanation is expected, and we are justified in taking there to be one - unless some positive reason says otherwise. The PE can, in layman terms, be understood as a rule of thumb which, when all else is equal, can be applied to our lives.
  • Why ought we accept such a principle? On top of an abundance of inductive and a posteriori support, this idea is congruent with both philosophical and scientific thinking - when interlocutors engage with an existential fact that they do not understand, even if there is no explanation readily available, it is typically acknowledged that there is some undiscovered explanation which is itself not the initial mysterious existential fact. 
  • Despite the PE already assuming a rather plausible stance, I will propose a variant which is logically weaker yet dialectically superior, to prune unnecessary burdens from my argument. This variant can be understood as the Principle of Possible Explanation (PPE) - that every existential fact X is possibly explained by a fact which includes the existence of a concrete thing that is not among the concrete things included in X, all else being equal. More precisely:
    • PPE: "f1 ◊($f2 (Explains(f2, f1) & $z ((z ≺ f2 ) & ~(z ≺ f1)))), ceteris paribus.
  • The reasons favouring PE plausibly favour PPE as well (since PE entails PPE). But there may also be distinctive modal epistemological support for PPE. Pick some existential fact an explanation for which we lack positive reason to think is impossible. An explanation for such a fact is surely (i) consistent/coherent, (ii) conceivable , and (iii) compatible with the known essences or natures of things. Moreover, we know that many facts about the existence of things are actually (and hence possibly) explained. And arguably there is a defeasible presumption of the uniformity of this modal property (‘being possibly explained’) across the class of facts about the existence of things. Plausibly, these various modal epistemological considerations at least give defeasible reason for the possibility of an explanation of such facts (all else being equal).

-

Contention II.      Introspective Argument 

  • P1. The mind exists. 
  • P2. The properties of the mind are not that which matter can have 
  • P3. Substance dualism is false. 
  • P4. If P3, a mind must ground all of reality. 
  • C1. A mind must ground all of reality.  
  • P1.
  • The existence of the mind is accepted by practically every mainstream philosopher through the maxim cogito ergo sum. I will substantiate this premise if CON wishes to. 
  • P2. 
  • To preface substantiate, I will preface by observing that the mind and non-mind are distinct entities. This is true via Leibniz’s Law of Identity of Indiscernible which stipulates that no two things have exactly the same properties. As the mind and non-mind are tautologically distinct, they must also be unique in terms of their properties. Furthermore, through the Princess Elisabeth attack on Descartes' dualistic theory, the mind and non-mind cannot interact with each other. The theory postulates that, given the mind and non-mind are opposites in terms of composition, it is impossible for the two to interact with each other. In particular, Elizabeth employs the following principle:
    • When A causes B, there must be some connection by means of which this causal relation occurs.
  • To assert that the mind and non-mind can communicate would be akin to declaring that an invisible, intangible, inaudible and undetectable fairy can make changes to the physical world - the existence of two fundamentally contrary substances simply cannot, on their own, interact with each other. Clearly, there requires a third substance of which ties the physical and non-physical together, however, there is an absence of evidence for such a material. Thus, currently, we have no reason to believe that the mind and non-mind can interact. From this, we can hold that there is no reason to believe in the existence of the non-mind. As previously established, the existence of the mind is certain, which, when considered with the fact that the mind and non-mind cannot communicate in any known way, entails that the existence of the non-mind is currently incompatible with the known state of the world. Even if the non-mind were to exist, the mind does not possess the faculty to be aware of it, as this would be analogous to fairies interacting with the physical world. Thus, as it has been shown that it is indubitable that the mind exists, whilst it is uncertain that the non-mind exists, the likelihood of metaphysical solipsism logically follows.

  • P3.
  • From P2, substance dualism is false, for there is no proof for material reality. 

  • P4.
  • As I have shown, a solipsisistic world is most likely true, which entails that there is a consciousness that grounds reality. I have shown that reality is mental and it would logically entail that a mind controls it. Since reality itself is a mental product, and would require a mind to ground it, therefore there would exist a being that grounds reality acting as its creator. Thus fitting the definition of God.

  • C1. 
  • The conclusion follows. A mind grounds all of reality. 

-

Contention III.     The Transcendental Argument for God

  • P1. Logical absolutes (LA) exist.
  • P2. The nature of God is such that either He exists, or He doesn’t.
  • P3. If the no-God position fails to account for LA, the contrapositive must necessarily account for LA. 
  • P4. The no-God position fails to account for LA, 
  • C1. Therefore, God must exist to account for LA. 

  • P1. 
  • This is fairly noncontroversial. The existence of the Law of Identity, Non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle are all laws which we presuppose in our daily dialectic.

  • P2.
  • The Law of Excluded Middle verifies this. A third option is logically impossible when discussing God’s existence, either he does, or he doesn’t exist.

  • P3.
  • This premise logically follows from P2. The established existence of logical absolutes necessitates that there be an explanation which is either God or not-God.

  • P4. 
  • Let us first examine the nature of LA’s, which I propose are transcendent, absolute, and independent of the universe.
  • Transcendent
    • Logical absolutes cannot be grounded in human minds - people’s brains are varied and house subjective ideas. What one person considers to be absolute is not necessarily what another considers to be absolute.  Thus, LA cannot be the product of fallible human mind. Furthermore, if LA were dependent on minds, they would cease to exist if people ceased to exist – this is clearly illogical, for we can inductively argue that LA existed prior to humans existing, and that the likes of the law of identity existed prior to humans. 
  • Absolute
    • This is true via tautology. Statements such as “that which exists has both attributes and a nature” are not subjectively true nor are they statements which are sometimes true and sometimes false. They are absolutely and always true. In fact, the “absolute”nature of LA is presupposed by scientists including Steven Hawking, who postulate that the scientific enterprise can only operative if we assume the veracity of scientific determinism. We simply must hold as an axiom at logical statements are absolute. 
  •  Independent of the universe
    • It can be seen that LA is not grounded in any property of the universe. It is illogical for it to be grounded in space (changing locations doesn’t affect LA), time, (Plato utilised the same LA as we do today) or matter (LA cannot be found in atoms, motion etc. Furthermore, it cannot be subject to physical treatment (freezing, burning), suggesting that it doesn’t have a physical presence).
    • With the nature of LA established, I propose that LA are conceptual by nature.
    • Logic is a process of the mind, whilst LA is the framework which logic references. Thus, it is proper to assert that because LA are simply truth statements regarding logical things, which are conceptual, LA too must also be conceptual by nature. 
    • Conceptual processes are indicative of a mind. The nature of minds is such that, on balance, irrational minds create irrational thoughts, whilst rational minds produce rational thoughts. Since LA are transcendent, absolute/perfectly consistent, and independent of the universe, it seems proper to assert that they reflect a transcendent, absolute/perfectly consistent and independent mind i.e., God.
  • Even if CON somehow disproves this criteria, the atheist still must prove that they have an intelligble account for logic. To fail to do so whilst mainting the atheist position is utterly redunt - akin to utalising measurements whilst denying that rulers denoting "5 centimeters" instantiate distance. 

  • C1.
  • Thus, the conclusion follows, the nature of Logical Absolutes, paired with the atheist’s inability to account forlogic, necessitates that the theistic account for Logical Absolutes is true. The contrapositive would entail that we have no account for logic, which implies that the atheist has no grounds for forming intelligible critiques. I would be happy for CON to provide some account for logic, but their inability to do so ought to render their entire argument baseless and null. 

-

  • Conclusion 
  • Based on the three arguments proposed, the God hypothesis is substantiated, and the resolution is upheld. 
quinnonn's avatar
quinnonn
Con
#2
your arguments kinda suck ngl. As per your first argument, even when you concede C1, this perfect being is completely illdefined, and I have no problem conceding that a being with this arbritrary property of "perfection" exists, because perfection isn't even defined.  Here's a tl;dr most of your premises are unsubstantiated, most of your conclusions don't follow, and most of your conclusions don't actually support the idea of a god in the traditional sense, only a being that resolves these specific qualms that were failed to even be substantiated.

To critique the argument itself, this is just a play on godel's argument, in which you assumed that its possible, something you yourself addressed. Your attempt at a symmetry breaker was ill-formed as you used the ambiguity fallacy to try to refer to two separate concepts of probability as the same. The s5 concept of probability is very different from probability in the sense of "possible explanations". Overall pretty bad argument as although your conclusion *does* follow, your premises themselves are something you failed to justify.

Your second argument is honestly just as bad. P2 is improperly substantiated. This law of identity discernable nonsense doesn't apply, because its perfectly reasonable for one object to have every single one of another objects properties so long as it has at least one other property. That is to say that the physical brain can have all of the mind's properties, plus its physical properties. In that sense, the mind is only an abstraction over the brain and simply refers to some of its properties. This sort of supposed separation between them is unsubstantiated. Thereby P3 is unsubstantiated. It assumes there is some metaphysical mind. As per P4, what can be proven to exist depends entirely on what premises you accept to be true. Without sufficient premises, you could not even prove that your mind exists. Plus your whole argument depends on using the appeal to ignorance fallacy "no proof = does not exist", heavily LMAO. And then, even when you accept the conclusion, "control" vs "ground" is different, and you flippantly assert them to be true. This argument only works through heavy use of fallacy and handwavy conflation of different concepts. The foundation of your house upholds your house but doesn't actually influence it. Ultimately, all arguments for a creator fail at showing that this "entity" in question is a personal being with will, or has  ever actively influenced our world, which is the core of these arguments. Even if I concede that there is a mind upholding reality, this logic seems to imply its *me* who is the mind that upholds reality, as opposed to some exterior god. 

as per your last argument, your idea of these laws "existing" is sort of strange, but rolling with it, it's still all bad. your "independent of the universe" thing doesn't actually follow because you failed to substantiate that they are not themselves laws of the universe, the way that electrons always repel each other, or the path of light never bends, or that positrons and electrons utterly destroy each other, etc. But more importantly, you suppose that something can't simultaneously be a product of the mind, and an observation of the universe ta large, that is to say that thy could simply be a coincidental common theme of the laws of nature, that we have noticed the pattern of. Or that physical processes are functionally deterministic in the sense that their results are always predictable within a certain range, etc. You never substantiate that these claims, and your conclusion doesn't really follow without them. Even when you accept the conclusion, your argument doesn't necessitate a god, it only necessitates a premise that accounts for the LA. 

Round 2
Bones's avatar
Bones
Pro
#3
Thx CON

Contention I.     An Explanatory Symmetry Breaker for the Modal Ontological Argument

CON attemps a reductio arguing that"perfect" being is illdefined. Simply defined, a perfect being is a metaphysically necessary being that possesses all perfections essentially and lacks all imperfections essentially, whereas an imperfect being is any being that not perfect. P is a perfectionjust in case it is necessarily better for a being to have P than lack P. Morecolloquially, P is a great-making property; it confers or adds greatness to itsbearer. When we look around, we can see that all things are not perfect things, they are restraint and contingent etc. Thus, from PPPE, the concrete fact of the existence of imperfect things conveys that their must be some perfect thing responsible for their existence. Perfect being, then, fits the criteria for some God. 

CON then address the logic of the argument. Frankly, it is rambled string of thoughts consisting of bare assertions which are unlinked to much of anything. The main argument here is that PRO has mistaken two forms of possibility - the one of s5 modal logic, and the sense of "possible explanation". This is a distinction without difference. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy sites that "A modal is an expression (like ‘necessarily’ or ‘possibly’) that is used to qualify the truth of a judgement. Modal logic is, strictly speaking, the study of the deductive behavior of the expressions ‘it is necessary that’ and ‘it is possible that’." Put simply, the modal logic of s5 regards coloquial notions possibility and neccesity. If CON wishes to show why my use of modality is somehow incompatible with common notions, they must identify where my defintion deviates. 

There scattered mentions that the conclusion does not follow from the premise (quite incredible as the Modal Ontological argument has a single premise). Again, if CON wishes to make this accusation, they ought to substantiate where the unjustified leap in logic occurs. 

-


Contention II.      Introspective Argument 

 CON critiques the second premise, that the properties of the mind are not that which matter can have. It is asserted (with 0 evidence) that "it is reasonable for one object to have every single one of another objects properties so long as it has at least one other property". Here, it is asserted that it is possible for two entities to interact so long as there is a shared substance, or "one other property". CON must prove that there is some substance which bridges the material with the mind. The ultimate problem is that the mind is tautologically immaterial, and the material is tautologically material, so the interaction between two utterly different substances is entirely unjustified. This would be like saying invisible, indetectable, inaudble fairies used their being to push my cup over. This would only be possible if some seperate, bridging substance was found, however, as there is no such bridge, the link is unjustified. CON then must answer the question - "how can the mind and matter interact?"

CON then says that the PRO argument is predicated on faulty logic, that it uses the "appeal to ignorance fallacy "no proof = does not exist", heavily LMAO". However, they mistake "does not exist" with "no reason to believe it exists". If I postulated the existence of fairies and could not substantiate it, it would be reasonable to say that we have no reason to believe in the existence of fairies. However, it would be a logical leap to then assert that there is no place in the universe where fairies do not exist. Much in the same way we ought to look at the fairy example, so too should be be skeptical of the mind/matter interaction. As of current, there is no property which links the mind with the matter, we have no evidence to believe in such a thing thus we ought to act as though such a thing does not exist. 

CON then introduces the idea that even if such a being exists, there is no reason why they have a will or have influenced with our world. Clearly, for the mind to be instantiated, there must be some grounds, some version of the mind which grounds it - the grounding instantiating mind. Furthermore, the proposed definition of God, being the creator of the universe, is sufficiently defended. If God, or the grounding mind, is what created my mind, which is all that exists, then he created the totality of everything, ie the universe. 

CON's argument concludes with a lot of nothing burger - accusations of "handwaving, fallacy" analogies of my argument with a house with no foundation. Such can be discarded as it is asserted with no evidence. 

-

Contention III.     The Transcendental Argument for God

CON's main issue here is that they postulate it is possible that the laws of logic could be just laws of the universe. However, PRO could just adopt this into their arugment and argue that the uniformity of nature is a feature of God's existence. The fact that particles can be utterly destroyed yet the laws remain implies that there is an immaterial force which instantites and sustains the laws of nature. If the laws of nature were contingent on particles (circular) then the breaking of particles (hydrogen bombs) would mean the suspension of natural laws. Yet we know that there is no treatement of nature which suspends the laws of nature. And even if, for the sake of a reductio, there were, the same would not apply to logic. Logic is, as demonstrated, absolute and thus their grounding must be outside of reality. 

CON argues that the argument does not necessitate a God, but clearly they missed my syllogism, particually the premise if the no-God position fails to account for LA, the contrapositive must necessarily account for LA. The fact that CON at this moment cannot account for logic, combine with the observation that logic does in fact exist, entails that the opposing theory must account for them. The nature of God's existence is that he either exists or he doesn't, and if his nonexistence entails no standard for logic, his existence neccessarily follows. The only thing which CON can do at this stage is to account for logic. 

quinnonn's avatar
quinnonn
Con
#4
As per contention 1's thing about perfection, you didn't actually define perfect in any meaningful way, you just moved the point of contention to what it means for one thing to better than another thing. We could go back and forth for the rest of the debate on this, or altnernatively, you could just give a clearcut definition of what a perfection is, a criteria for which you take an an attribute, apply the criteria, and receive a true or false as to whether not said attribute/characteristic is perfect. The reason I bring up this contention is that in most other definitions of "better" or greatness, good and bad are in reference to some standard. "Good at math" is shorthand for "Good at math in accordance to the standard in which skill at math is good", likewise there could easily be a standard where lacking  skill at math is good. The reason we specify the latter and not the former is not because the latter is somehow a superior form of good, its just a preferred one. I have a suspicion that this argument falls apart when you examine that perfection is preferentially defined. 

As per your attempted "defense" of your conflation of these two forms of probability, the deviation is obviously is that in actual probability, we aren't referring to "some world" or "other worlds", or "some world where something exists", and instead simply a notion of expectation for the future. When something is probable, you're not saying "there are a lot of worlds where this is true", you're simply saying that you might expect this to be true. Hence, by the colloquial definition of possible, there's no real reason to believe that god's existence is possible. Once again, I don't dispute that there is a being with necessary existence, but "PRO", has soundly failed to show that said being with necessary existence *is* god, which is my primary contention with their conclusion. You simply never soundly substantiate why its "MOA" rather than "anti-MOA". If anything, it's PRO, who actually went into an unrelated ramble about possibility in a completely different sense from the sense described in MOA. Once again, and finally, the MOA argument is just a briefer version of Godel's ontological argument, and is just as flawed, in that the concept of "perfection" or "positive traits" in godel's case, is never thoroughly explained, and thereby fails to prove anything meaningful, as well as that the claim that its "possible" for god to exist" in the sense described, is never substantiated either. 

"CON critiques the second premise, that the properties of the mind are not that which matter can have. It is asserted (with 0 evidence) that "it is reasonable for one object to have every single one of another objects properties so long as it has at least one other property". Here, it is asserted that it is possible for two entities to interact so long as there is a shared substance, or "one other property"."

As far as this goes, you've fantastically misrepresented my critique. Here is what I *actually* said: 

"This law of identity discernable nonsense doesn't apply, because its perfectly reasonable for one object to have every single one of another objects properties so long as it has at least one other property. That is to say that the physical brain can have all of the mind's properties, plus its physical properties. In that sense, the mind is only an abstraction over the brain and simply refers to some of its properties. This sort of supposed separation between them is unsubstantiated."


My actual critique,  was that the idea that the mind and physical body are separate itself is unsubstantiated, and the law of discernable(can't remember its name) does not apply if you don't consider them exactly the same. I'm not sure how you could misunderstand this when nothing you said that I said was said or alluded to, but moving on. 

As far as your next statement about my accusation of your appeal to ignorance, you were the one who made the assertion that its outright false because of the lack of evidence. The problem is that your statement relies on the idea that the mind and body are separate to begin with, which as already established is unsubstantiated. As far as your next point, I think most would agree that simply being a willless creator would not make you god. In fact, creator is a word almost exclusively reserved for those with intelligence and will. You wouldn't say that the laws of nature "created" the earth, even though they are directly responsible for it, you would say that they caused it. Your argument at best shows that there is an uncaused cause, and at worst shows that the most logical conclusion for any observer is that the universe only exists in their mind. 

I quite literally did substantiate what I meant by "handwavy" before I said it. All of my assertions are well substantiated. Your inability to read and understand is the issue here, not my lack of substantiation
"I have shown that reality is mental and it would logically entail that a mind controls it." this is what you said. This is what I said, calling it handwavy:

"And then, even when you accept the conclusion, "control" vs "ground" is different, and you flippantly assert them to be true. This argument only works through heavy use of fallacy and handwavy conflation of different concepts." 

"Plus your whole argument depends on using the appeal to ignorance fallacy "no proof = does not exist", heavily LMAO." this is the fallacy you engaged in. You could also say rather its special pleading where you assert that god exists despite a lack of proof or evidence, but substantialist dualism doesn't, because of the lack of proof or evidence. You never really explain why one is an acceptable explanation without proof but not the other. You actually commited two fallacies, thanks for catching that for me

> CON's main issue here is that they postulate it is possible that the laws of logic could be just laws of the universe. However, PRO could just adopt this into their arugment and argue that the uniformity of nature is a feature of God's existence. The fact that particles can be utterly destroyed yet the laws remain implies that there is an immaterial force which instantites and sustains the laws of nature. If the laws of nature were contingent on particles (circular) then the breaking of particles (hydrogen bombs) would mean the suspension of natural laws. Yet we know that there is no treatement of nature which suspends the laws of nature. And even if, for the sake of a reductio, there were, the same would not apply to logic. Logic is, as demonstrated, absolute and thus their grounding must be outside of reality. 


You say all of this but none of this is actually substantiated. You assert this "The fact that particles can be utterly destroyed yet the laws remain implies that there is an immaterial force which instantites and sustains the laws of nature" but you never substantiate it. Forces aren't the only ways to affect something. Plus, particles cannot be utterly destroyed, they can only be converted. Every bit of this is a series of unsubstantiated assertions about how the universe works to pathetically attempt to fit this egregious oversight into your worldview. "If the laws of nature were contingent on particles (circular) then the breaking of particles (hydrogen bombs) would mean the suspension of natural laws" unsubstantiated? What would the "suspension of natural laws" even entail? "Logic is, as demonstrated, absolute and thus their grounding must be outside of reality." this conclusion doesn't follow from its premises, because you haven't ruled out every in-reality solution that solves the problem lol.

"CON argues that the argument does not necessitate a God, but clearly they missed my syllogism, particually the premise if the no-God position fails to account for LA, the contrapositive must necessarily account for LA. The fact that CON at this moment cannot account for logic, combine with the observation that logic does in fact exist, entails that the opposing theory must account for them. " This is a glorified appeal to ignorance fallacy. My personal inability to explain something, and your ability to explain it doesn't make you right. Your syllogism is actually false. "If the no-god position contradicts with LA, then the inverse must be true" is the true statement. The fact that you can explain something doesn't mean your explanation is correct LMAO


Round 3
Bones's avatar
Bones
Pro
#5
Contention I.     An Explanatory Symmetry Breaker for the Modal Ontological Argument

CON complains that the definition of "perfect" is not to their standard. Although this may ostensibly seem to be a break through argument, it is philosophically uncompelling. As already stated, not all definitions are meant to be informative analyses. The provided definition was not an informative analysis but rather explicating what the meaning of a perfect being in terms of a term, perfection, which is already a term grounded so deeply into philosophy that anyone who vaguley reads into the literature would know does not require exposition. As already defined in the first round, a perfection is a necessarily great-making feature for beings — its a feature whose possession thereby makes any bearer greater than it would be without that feature. A chair cannot be a be a perfect being, since it doesn’t have every perfection essentially — Eg, knowledge is a perfection (if something has knowledge, it’s thereby more valuable than it would be without knowledge), but chairs lack knowledge.Perfections are often also called great-making features/properties or positive properties. Pruss and Rasmussen’s (2018) literature Necessry Existence has a provides exposition of positive properties in one of the later chapters, the definition widely accepted, as well as Nagasawa (2017) in regards to perfections/great-making features.

Further, we ought not mistake CON's personal incredulitly and unfamiliarity with the subject matter as some profound revalation. We all know (although common sense is not so common, evidently) that chairs are not perfect objects. We all know that lamps are not perfect objects. The simple fact that the definition of perfect is not only philosophically fundemental but also colloquially thus ought to reveal CON's bad faith conduct. 

CON substantiates their critique that PRO has somehow misued the definition of "possible" - "the deviation is obviously is that in actual probability, we aren't referring to "some world" or "other worlds", or "some world where something exists", and instead simply a notion of expectation for the future". This however simply exposes my opponents understanding of the philosophical literature. The first issue is that, in Modal Logic, talk of "possible worlds" as a phrase of possibility is the entire point of each argument. That my opponent is confused with this terminology exposes that they do not have much exposure to ontological arguments, much less modality. Ontological arguments are based on "possible worlds" - not actual physical possible worlds as one unexperienced may believe, but merely whether the features of a given ontology are inherently contradictory.  Thus it seems that PRO's use of possibility, congurent with philosophical literature and substantiated the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, is a justified employment. The second issue with CON is that you can actually apply terminology of modal possibility in colloquial speech. When CON says "when something is probable, you're not saying "there are a lot of worlds where this is true", you're simply saying that you might expect this to be true", this is a terrible misunderstanding of modal possibility. When asking, in terms of modal logic, if something is possible, the answer cannot be "well it's possible X times and not possible Y times", the possibility that is being asked is one on the logical and metaphysical level. When I ask my friend "can you do X", and they say "it is possible", it can be said that their use of possibility is a shorthand for "in a plethora of possible worlds, the action can be completed". Obviously no one talks in such an obtuse way, but nonethesless, it remains applicable.  

CON then makes more off hand remarks - "You simply never soundly substantiate why its "MOA" rather than "anti-MOA" evidently indicating that they missed two thirds of my opening argument which provides a symmetry breaker Such can be disregarded. 

-

Contention II.      Introspective Argument 

CON argues that the mind and body are the same substance. This, however, is easily diffused through Decartes' prelimiary philosophy. It can be understood that all of reality is possibly a delusion - that we are a brain in the vat. Thus, all that is material objects are possibly hallucinatory. Yet, an omnimalevoent deity could not convince one that they did not exist, for the act of convincing them that they did not exist would involve their existence, hence rendering into contradiction. It seems clear that, whilst the material world's existence is dubitable, the mind is not. Hence the distinction (note of course that this was all covered in my syllogism, of which CON has kindly ignored). 

CON then, for reasons unknown, repeat an argument, that "I think most would agree that simply being a willlness [what is this word which CON made up?] creator would not make you a god". I'm forced to repeat myself - "furthermore, the proposed definition of God, being the creator of the universe, is sufficiently defended. If God, or the grounding mind, is what created my mind, which is all that exists, then he created the totality of everything, ie the universe."

CON then creates a problem for themself - they assert that PRO's conclusion does not entail, and that "control" vs "ground" is distinct.  Yet, it is abundently clear that in the given context, the term "ground" can be used entirely justifably - "I have shown that reality is mental and it would logically entail that a mind grounds it". Happy?

CON concludes again with their rattling off of fallacies they've memorised, never once linking to anything specific. Again, the accusation of the "ignorance fallacy" when PRO allegedly asserts "no proof = does not exist", was dismissed prior when PRO stated - However, they mistake "does not exist" with "no reason to believe it exists". If I postulated the existence of fairies and could not substantiate it, it would be reasonable to say that we have no reason to believe in the existence of fairies. However, it would be a logical leap to then assert that there is no place in the universe where fairies do not exist. Much in the same way we ought to look at the fairy example, so too should be be skeptical of the mind/matter interaction. As of current, there is no property which links the mind with the matter, we have no evidence to believe in such a thing thus we ought to act as though such a thing does not exist.

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Contention III.     The Transcendental Argument for God

CON displays a startling misunderstanding of the burden of proof when asserting - "this conclusion doesn't follow from its premises, because you haven't ruled out every in-reality solution that solves the problem lol". Clearly, such an understanding of the burden of proof is utterly and entiretly wrong. When a scientist postulates a theory, they do not need to dissprove every single possible alternative (when positing evolution, scientists need not inspect every single quak theory to understand whether they are justified, because it is the burden of each quack theory to propose themself to be inspected). This line of thinking is much like the zealot who asserts "how can you be an atheist if you have not disproved every single God". Simply because it is not the role of the atheist to disprove every single God - if there is a theist who wishes to propose their deity, they will do so and the evidence will be judged, but ultimately, it is the maker of the claim who bears the proof of burden. 

CON then states "My personal inability to explain something, and your ability to explain it doesn't make you right. Your syllogism is actually false". This is clearly a misunderstanding of basic Platonic logic on the part of CON, namely the Law of the excluded middle. If it is the case that either God, or not God accounts for logic, and not God cannot account for logic, then God must account for logic. No where in CON's argument is there investigation of this premise. 


Conclusion
Frankly, CON's arguments are both poor in format and structure. Not once is a single premise mentioned explicitly, instead PRO is given a brick wall of words where they must dig through to draw relavance. Unfortunately, PRO was forced to repeat themself, yet this was clearly as CON chose to repeat their talking points without addressing given refutations in their oppositions case. 
quinnonn's avatar
quinnonn
Con
#6
> CON complains that the definition of "perfect" is not to their standard. Although this may ostensibly seem to be a break through argument, it is philosophically uncompelling. As already stated, not all definitions are meant to be informative analyses. The provided definition was not an informative analysis but rather explicating what the meaning of a perfect being in terms of a term, perfection, which is already a term grounded so deeply into philosophy that anyone who vaguley reads into the literature would know does not require exposition

Starting here, it's obvious PRO doesn't actually read my responses for understanding. The problem is that because you do not provide an actual criterion for a perfection, your argument fails to say anything of substance, nor is it even valid argumentatively. The argument that given the possibility of a being with necessary existence, they must exist, is logically valid as far as I'm aware, but the issue is your attempt to extend this to "perfect" beings without reason. Because you don't really connect perfection to necessary existence, one might argue that your premise is ultimately unsubstantiated. By one, I mean me. I'm saying that. Your argument is just like Godel's and falls into the same pitfalls lol. That a being with necessary existence is possible in this sense is unsubstantiated, as is that said being also possesses every perfection. 

> A chair cannot be a be a perfect being, since it doesn’t have every perfection essentially — Eg, knowledge is a perfection (if something has knowledge, it’s thereby more valuable than it would be without knowledge), but chairs lack knowledge

Wow, just as I suspected, this is very subjective. Value is a purely human construct and serves to express one's desire for one thing over another thing. Something has value because you desire it indirectly, or directly. 

> Further, we ought not mistake CON's personal incredulitly and unfamiliarity with the subject matter as some profound revalation. We all know (although common sense is not so common, evidently) that chairs are not perfect objects. We all know that lamps are not perfect objects. The simple fact that the definition of perfect is not only philosophically fundemental but also colloquially thus ought to reveal CON's bad faith conduct. 

Is this "everybody agrees with me, therefore you are arguing in bad faith"? My issue is that you speak of perfection as if its some sort of criterion, external to human opinion, but it seems fairly clear based on what you've said thusfar that its only some nebulous concept that you can only refer to vaguely when its convenient, but not actually give a rigorous definition of it. 

your conclusion does not have merit, because you fail to define the key descriptor of this being which is meant to make it god, therefore, you fail to prove god exists

If I were to refer loosely to some concept in an argument, be asked to define it and give a clear definition of it multiple times, and consistently deflected to only describing said concept without giving a clear idea of what it is that makes it what it is, and then I said the other person was arguing in bad faith, I would be laughed out of any serious debate. 

> CON then makes more off hand remarks - "You simply never soundly substantiate why its "MOA" rather than "anti-MOA" evidently indicating that they missed two thirds of my opening argument which provides a symmetry breaker Such can be disregarded. 

I didn't "miss" your symmetry breaker. It's just invalid. I spoke about how it is an argument from an ambiguity fallacy already. To go into your detail, you never really explain why it is that a perfect being could possibly exist, which is the core contention, or what a perfect being is to begin with. It seems like you're trying to imply that a perfect being is the ultimate explanation in terms of the principle of explanation, but you also never explain why this ultimate explanation(which is just a rephrasing of the Actus Purus argument which is just invalid) should be a perfect being. You loosely refer to things, but never explain their connections which are absolutely integral to your argument, and while the first time you can be forgiven, given my constant objection to these things on the grounds that they are improperly substantiated, it seems like you just have no intention of properly substantiating any of your claims. 


"CON argues that the mind and body are the same substance. This, however, is easily diffused through Decartes' prelimiary philosophy. It can be understood that all of reality is possibly a delusion - that we are a brain in the vat. Thus, all that is material objects are possibly hallucinatory. Yet, an omnimalevoent deity could not convince one that they did not exist, for the act of convincing them that they did not exist would involve their existence, hence rendering into contradiction. It seems clear that, whilst the material world's existence is dubitable, the mind is not. Hence the distinction (note of course that this was all covered in my syllogism, of which CON has kindly ignored). "

You know omnimalevolent means infinitely evil, right? I assume you mean omnipotent or something because that doesn't make any sense. Moreover, I assume you mean that an omnipotent deity could not convince a person that said person does not exist because they could definitely easily convince a person that the omnipotent being doesn't exist, through the right means. And I'll also assume that the person is a rational agent who cannot possibly have contradictory beliefs, because an actual person could definitely be mindcontrolled by an omnipotent being into having contradictory beliefs. In fact, there are so many people with contradictory beliefs that there's a word for it, "cognitive dissonance". And I'll assume that you mean logical omnipotence in the sense of maximal ability, rather than the colloquial "all ability" because beings with "all ability" are not logically meritorious because they can create contradiction 

Now I'm going to address this "A logically omnipotent deity could not convince a rational agent with necessarily consistent beliefs that said agent did not exist, because the act of convincing them would create inconsistency". The reason I'm addressing against this, and not what you said, is because anything else has already been refuted by me, and doesn't make any real sense, unless you mean another word than "omnipotent". If you meant something else, feel free to clarify in the after-debate but this is the best I can do because what you said was extremely unclear.

Now to address this, its true using most existence definitions AFAIK, but the statement about the mind is what's false, but in a sneakier way. The problem is that, an observer doesn't actually know with certainty that they have a mind. An observer knows, at most, that they are capable of storing information, and nothing else. Anything else is an inference based on that information and could definitely be untrue. You can only conclude that you have a "mind" if you accept a series of premises to be true, namely the passing of time, and thereby present cognitive function, and solve the criterion problem. The mind's existence in the sense that is most commonly used, that of cognitive function + knowledge, is actually dubious as only knowledge is certain and cognitive function is inferential. The existence of both the mind, and the physical body, are equally dubious given that they can only be concluded inferentially, and there is no deductive conclusion of their existence.


That is to say that you are engaging in the special pleading fallacy by saying that one is true because the other has no evidence, but don't fully explain why one is true but not the other. Your syllogism wasn't ignored, it is just invalid, and said invalidity was not addressed. You have consistently made pointed remarks that misrepresent my arguments lol. I agree that the mind exists, I disagree that its somehow absolutely certain, unlike the physical world 

I meant willless, as in lacking will. I put up with your typos all the time. Moreover, no its not defended. Its only defended when you conflate grounding with creation, or control. As mentioned, you haven't really substantiated what it is that makes it so that because one thing grounds another thing, it influences, created, or controls said thing. Even when its conceded that a mind "grounds" reality, its still most reasonable that said mind is our own mind, rather than someone else's. After all, its the only mind we come close to knowing exists. 

You did dismiss my accusation of fallacious reasoning, and then I addressed your dismissal, which you then didn't address. My objection still stands, that you failed to adequately substantiate why one conclusion, that the mind is simply a property of the physical world, is more valid than the conclusion that the mind is separate from the physical world, in that the physical world is only an illusion created by the mind. Arguably, though, there is no distinction between information given to a brain in a vat, and information given through "actual" senses, so from the perspective of an observer, the most rational course of action is to act as if the latter is true, because the former and latter have no real difference. The pleasures you feel from achieving your desires are still the same. 

As per your faerie analogy to explain your dismissal, the same logic still applies, that there is no distinction between an illusionary world and a real one from the perspective of an observer. 

none of this demonstrates that even if a mind did ground reality, that said mind controls or created reality, or that said mind is a distinct entity from the observer as opposed to being the observer themselves

> CON displays a startling misunderstanding of the burden of proof when asserting - "this conclusion doesn't follow from its premises, because you haven't ruled out every in-reality solution that solves the problem lol". Clearly, such an understanding of the burden of proof is utterly and entiretly wrong. When a scientist postulates a theory, they do not need to dissprove every single possible alternative (when positing evolution, scientists need not inspect every single quak theory to understand whether they are justified, because it is the burden of each quack theory to propose themself to be inspected).

When a scientist postulates their theory, they don't assert it as definitively true, they assert it as a good description of reality that is consistent with observation. Science exists to describe reality, not define it, and simply describing reality in a way that's useful is good enough for a scientist. You addressed like 2 explanations, based on awful logic, and then concluded "welp i'm definitely right ez". You're also not a scientist, and this isn't a theory, this is a debate, so I expect you to not just dismiss two or three possible explanations for something using bad logic, but actually explain why your conclusion follows from your premises. The burden is on you to actually argue your point. 

>  If it is the case that either God, or not God accounts for logic, and not God cannot account for logic, then God must account for logic. No where in CON's argument is there investigation of this premise. 

Uh yes I did, my specific objection is that there is no reason to expect that out of two binary options, if one doesn't account for another premise being true, that means the other is true. If I said "Well, either me wearing a blue shirt, or me wearing a not blue shirt accounts for logic, and me wearing a blue shirt doesn't account for logic, therefore to account for logic, I am not wearing a blue shirt". Its obviously ridiculous to expect that at least one of them to "account" for logic. If your premises were true, your conclusion would be true in this specific argument, but P1 is dubious and P3 is outright false, and you haven't adequately substantiated either. 

> Frankly, CON's arguments are both poor in format and structure. Not once is a single premise mentioned explicitly, instead PRO is given a brick wall of words where they must dig through to draw relavance. Unfortunately, PRO was forced to repeat themself, yet this was clearly as CON chose to repeat their talking points without addressing given refutations in their oppositions case. 

Ironic that your conclusion is this where my very first response addressed several of your premises by name, and addressed others by the substance of they themselves or your "attempt" at substantiating them. If anything, it just seems like you aren't really reading my arguments. I'm repeating my talking points because your refutations don't actually address them in any meaningful context. 

conclusion: I'll concede that my arguments are lacking in format and structure. Yours are lacking in content. None of your arguments adequately substantiate their premises, and only one actually concludes god; with the others, even when their conclusion is conceded, could have various other entities meet the criteria outside of the creator of the universe themselves. Moreover, you fail to adequately address any objections raised. Not one. You could not even bring yourself to give a criterion for a perfection.

I put all the most important parts in bold, since you have trouble reading.