Instigator / Pro
14
1761
rating
31
debates
95.16%
won
Topic
#3815
THBT: On balance, abortion is morally impermissible
Status
Finished
The debate is finished. The distribution of the voting points and the winner are presented below.
Winner & statistics
After 2 votes and with 6 points ahead, the winner is...
Bones
Parameters
- Publication date
- Last updated date
- Type
- Standard
- Number of rounds
- 3
- Time for argument
- One week
- Max argument characters
- 17,000
- Voting period
- One month
- Point system
- Multiple criterions
- Voting system
- Open
Contender / Con
8
1494
rating
1
debates
0.0%
won
Description
THBT: On balance, abortion is morally impermissible
BoP:
Bones = On balance, abortion is morally impermissible
Uragirimono = On balance, abortion is morally permissible
Definition:
Abortion = a procedure to end a pregnancy. It uses medicine or surgery to remove the embryo or fetus and placenta from the uterus.
Moral = A behaviour, conduct, or topic that is based on valid principles and/or foundations
Valid (in reference to its above usage) = having a sound basis in logic or fact; reasonable or cogent
Consent = to give permission for something to occur
On balance = when looked at holistically
RULES:
1. No Kritik.
2. No new arguments are to be made in the final round.
3. The Burden of Proof is shared.
4. Rules are agreed upon and are not to be contested.
5. Sources can be hyperlinked or provided in the comment section.
6. Be decent.
7. A breach of the rules should result in a conduct point deduction for the offender.
Round 1
THBT: On balance, abortion ought to be illegal
I. Distinguishing the case of PRO and CON & the argument from inconsequential differences
To establish the contention between the PRO and CON, we ought to first determine commonalities between the parties. PRO’s position is that the actualization of biological humanity suffices as a criterion for ascribing personhood, whilst CON holds that only after some finite time post conception, whether it be consciousness, birth etc, personhood ought to be ascribed. The commonality can be observed in the fact that both parties hold that only beings with biological humanity can be considered (whatever CON chooses as the additional criteria [consciousness, birth etc] their additional predicate is applied on the backdrop of biological humanity) as possessing personhood, with the difference being that CON advocates that biological humanity is not the sole determiner of personhood.
The commonality and differences between the two positions is crucial and ought to be clearly understood.
- PRO holds that all beings who are humans possess personhood.
- CON holds that all beings who are humans and possess X characteristic (be it birth, self-awareness) possess personhood.
The additional burden which CON carries is clear - they must maintain that, not only must being human be fulfilled as a criteria, but also some additional predicate which they must define. PRO opines that the onus of identifying an additional predicate which does not result in logical inconsistencies is impossible. I propose three reasons for this. The first regards the logical impossibility of proposing a sound criteria for instilling personhood between conception and birth, the second observes that even if a criteria is conjured, it is subjective and ambiguous, thereby failing to satisfy the criterion of legal certainty, and the third finds that the creation of an additional predicate is itself an unnecessary ontological burden.
Impossibility of proposing a criteria from inconsequential differences
The differences between a fetus and a born baby is three fold.
- Level of development
- Environment
- Degree of dependency
I assert that these differences are insignificant in determining the moral agency of an individual.
Level of development
Children are generally less developed than adults yet this does not mean that children are morally inferior to their parents. Some people with developmental disabilities are also less developed than children, yet society never argues that these conditions are a reason for them to be executed.
Environment
The geographic location of an individual surely has nothing to do with their moral worth. Just as moving from the garage to the bedroom does not affect one's moral worth, moving from inside the womb onto the delivery room table shouldn’t either.
Degree of dependency
It is often opined that "as a fetus is reliant on a separate entity, it has no serious right to life”. This argumentation can be applied to all human beings. No person isn’t reliant on some external entity, whether it is food, water, or oxygen - it just so happens that fetuses are also dependent on their mothers. Fetuses which rely on an umbilical cord in the womb should be as human as those who rely on a feeding tube outside the womb.
Thus, it can be seen that the differences between a fetus and a newborn are nonconsequential. There is no stage between conception and birth that allows for people to soundly prescribe moral agency. Thus, if we are to pursue the notion that human beings ought to have rights, the only appropriate time to establish this is the actualization of biological humanity.
Subjectivity and ambiguity
Suppose that we compare the value of a fetus and a newborn. Ceteris paribus, a newborn, possesses more moral worth than a mere fetus. However, consider what a mother who, after countless attempts of conceiving a child and who finally succeeds, would think of their “fetus”. Surely, she would hold the moral worth of the fetus to equal, if not higher, moral regard when compared with live humans. Notice how, in the two examples, a very different moral worth has been yielded when considering the fetus’ value. Who is correct? The layman who cares little for the fetus, or the future mother who can finally fulfill her dreams of being a parent and who cares very much for the fetus? Notice that, even if one were to articulate a factor which determines moral worth, another party can simply object and propose their own criteria, thereby casting the conversation into a standstill. The fact that one being (the fetus) can be subjected to opposing moral treatments from differing individuals is wholly illogical - in reality, the fetus either has rights, or it doesn’t - a third option is impossible via the law of excluded middle. It seems clear, therefore, that a vehicle for determining moral worth which creates two contradictory assessments is not sufficient in prescribing personhood. Thus, even if CON can propose a criteria, it is purely speculative and merely an articulation of their personal values.
If it is the case that CON does not provide a sound criteria for when human beings ought to gain personhood and and moral rights, it would follow that no humans would have human rights. Thus, the establishment of a criteria is crucial to the integrity of CON's case - if such is not provided, the logical entailments would entail the jeopardisation of human rights.
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II. Principle of uncertainty
One fact that both pro-lifers and pro-choicers can agree on is that in order for abortion to be justified, there must be absolute certainty that it does not murder a human person. When considering the nature of abortion, there are only four possible outcomes which can arise. They are as follows (consider with ceteris paribus):
- The fetus is a person and this is known.
- The fetus is a person and this is not known.
- The fetus is not a person and this is not known.
- The fetus is not a person and this is known.
The ramification of abortion in each of these situations are:
- You have intentionally killed a human being.
- You have unintentionally killed a human being
- You have intentionally risked killing a human being.
- You have done nothing wrong.
Notice how all the above scenarios either involve criminal activity or are simply impossible. Scenario 1 is plain first-degree murder. Scenario 2 is akin to shooting toxic chemicals into a building which you believe, wrongly so, that there is no one in. Scenario 3 is comparable to fumigating a building without knowing whether there are residents inside. Scenario 4, as aforementioned is the only morally permissible situation however is impossible to recreate in reality, due to the indistinct measurements used to assess personhood. As it is there is no way to determine with absolute certainty that abortion does not kill a person, abortion at best requires its adherence to commit criminal negligence, and at worst is 1st-degree murder.
Notice how this issue of subjectivity is seamlessly resolved when adopting biological humanity as the criteria for who ought to have moral agency. When defining personhood in terms of CON's subjective metaphysical benchmark, the difficulty of the Principle of Uncertainty emerges.
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III. Comparison to unjustified killing
P1. If abortion is killing and the reason for aborting is unjustified, abortion is unjustified killing.
P2. Abortion involves killing.
P3. The reasons for aborting are unjustified.
C1. Abortion is unjustified killing.
P4. Unjustified killing ought to be illegal.
C2. Abortion ought to be illegal.
P1.
Fairly axiomatic and tautological.
P2.
To kill is to deprive of life. Thus, as 96% of biologists believe that life begins at fertilisation (additional scientific evidence can be provided if pressed), and abortion involves the depriving of said life life, abortion is killing.
P3.
Merely establishing that abortion is killing is not sufficient in ruling that it is immoral - after all, the killing of a home intruder to defend your family can be argued as being a moral imperative. Thus, we ought examine the reasons people have abortions, in order to understand whether these reasons surfice in justifying what has been established as killing.
According to the Guttmacher institute the two most common reasons for having abortions were "having a baby would dramatically change my life" and "I can't afford a baby now" (cited by 74% and 73%, respectively). Obviously, these reasons do not justify the killing of a born human lives, and thus should not be justifications for killing unborn human lives.
C1.
The conclusion is thus valid via modus ponens. The implication of the fact that abortion is unjustified killing entails that it is immoral.
P4.
Unjustified killing is, tautologically, killing of which cannot be justified and thus, is morally impermisssable.
C2.
The conclusion follows - abortion is morally impermisssable.
-
Conclusion
Through the three arguments proposed, the intellectual price tag of CON's position is clear - the ontological burden of manifesting an additional predicate on the backdrop of biological humanity is simply impossible and incongruent with the operation of the law. Furthermore, through the second contention, the uncertainty principle exemplifies the cumbersome burden which CON bears - not only must their position be probable, but it must be certain in order for abortion to be justified. The final contention draws a comparison to unjustified killing shows that abortion is akin to some of the most heinous crimes our society condemns. The biggest take away of my r1 is this - CON presumably believes that the average 20 year old human being ought not be killed, but by defending the pro-choice position, they lack justification for why this intuition is the case. The PRO position offers that it is because all human beings ought to have rights - the CON however, will struggle in establishing some criteria inclusive of all human beings whilst excluding the unborn. Thus, the resolution is upheld and CON's position is yielded untenable.
- CON holds that all beings who are humans and possess X characteristic (be it birth, self-awareness) possess personhood.
This is not my position and, throughout all the forum discussion that led to this debate, has never been my position. I will address the idea of personhood as it relates to abortion, but it will not be in the methodology used by CON because it is an inaccurate representation on the role of personhood in regards to abortion specifically.
What is Personhood?
Personhood is defined as "the quality or condition of being an individual person." Individual is most simply defined as "single, separate." When we're discussing personhood then, we're discussing what is required for one to be a single and separate person. Already we have the debunked PRO's simplistic statement of "Thus, it can be seen that the differences between a fetus and a newborn are nonconsequential." A newborn is in fact single and separate from its parents, easily demonstrated by the fact that it can exist in the bedroom while the mother is in the garage. A fetus, however, cannot exist separately from the mother and is therefore not an individual person.
No person isn’t reliant on some external entity, whether it is food, water, or oxygen - it just so happens that fetuses are also dependent on their mothers.
Human beings are heterotrophs -- we need to consume other species (be they plant or animal) to survive. "Relying on an external entity such as food or water" as PRO states, is not the definition of heterotroph, and does not equate a fetus to a fully formed person. Fetuses (and the placentas they use to survive) are scientifically parasites as they get their nutrients not from their own act of consuming food but from the food which was consumed by their host. The act of birth passes the fetus from the parasite stage (only getting their nutrients from their mother) to the heterotroph stage (consuming their own nutrients) -- whether or not they need help consuming nutrients does not change their scientific classification.
If we are to consider personhood as a state of individuality or separateness, then, one who relies on the body of another is clearly not separate. It is commonly said "but all children rely on the help of others to stay alive" -- that is why our distinction between heterotroph and parasite is key. Of course children need assistance to survive, but the physiological processes which keep them alive do not directly depend on the physiological processes of another human. Anyone with reason can see the difference between making your child a peanut butter and jelly sandwich and your lungs sending oxygen to the cells of your child's body.
Were personhood a point on which my argument rests then, it would be easily demonstrable that there is a scientific difference between the born and the unborn, and that no fetus is a separate, single entity while in utero.
What role does personhood play in matters of abortion?
Simply put, personhood is irrelevant to matters of abortion.
the ontological burden of manifesting an additional predicate on the backdrop of biological humanity is simply impossible and incongruent with the operation of the law.
I agree with this statement, and am left wondering why PRO wrote such a lengthy argument defining personhood when doing so is so tedious.
Even the Supreme Court declined to hear a case on fetal personhood, leaving in place Rhode Island's ruling that fetuses do not have legal personhood. Alito, arguably one of the most conservative justices, said "Our opinion (referring to the overturning of Roe v Wade) is not based on any view about if and when prenatal life is entitled to any of the rights enjoyed after birth.” If the very Supreme Court that ended abortion access for many Americans thinks personhood is a matter separate from and unrelated to abortion, why then are we debating this here.
For the sake of this argument, however, let's say we both agree on the definition of personhood. As PRO states, from the moment of conception, a fetus has all the rights of any other born person. Hypothetically, then a fetus would have all the legal and moral standing of a 60 year old born adult.
What PRO fails to prove is that any human, legally or morally, is required to use their body to keep another human alive. Pregnancy is unique among the human experience because it cannot be passed on or shared. If, as we've said, a fetus is a person in all respects, then we are faced with the truth that for nine months one person is solely responsible for keeping another person alive. Other humans cannot help or take over -- every need must be met by the mother, every interaction with the outside world passes through the mother's body.
PRO must then prove that it is moral to force one person to sustain another against their will. Outside of pregnancy, this is unprecedented in medicine and law, as we do not force organ donations, even if someone directly causes a need for organ transplant. Why then does PRO consider it morally sound to force someone into nine months of physiological bondage? The 60 year old man we equate with the fetus does not have a right to someone's lung, even if the someone attacks him and rips his lungs out. Why then does PRO feel fetuses, with all their personhood, are entitled to the bodies of their mothers?
Whose Bodily Autonomy wins out?
More significant to abortion considerations than the concept of personhood, bodily autonomy is central to the discussion. Bodily autonomy is, simply, the right to governance over one's own body. It is the idea that an individual gets the final say in what happens to their own bodies. It is often said that "one's right to bodily autonomy ends where another's begins."
This is the crux of the argument, and why abortion can be morally permissible. If a woman does not want to be pregnant, it is within her rights to decide how her body will be used and therefore, within her rights to terminate the pregnancy. The fetus has no bodily autonomy, as it is incapable of governance and does not even have its own body in the first place. A fetus's (presumed, of course) desire to be carried to term would necessitate a violation of the mother's bodily autonomy if she does not wish to carry to term. While an abortion may result in the death of a fetus, the death is not the goal of the procedure -- protecting the mother's bodily autonomy is.
Let's bring this back to PRO's concept of personhood. If person A will die without the use of person B's body, it is not murder for person B to deny that usage. The motivations of person B in making that denial are irrelevant -- PRO's mention of why people have abortions is little more than a pull at emotional and subjective heartstrings. Person B legally and morally controls their own body and no other person, not even their own child, is legally or morally obligated to the use of it. Abortion, as defined by PRO, is the ending of a pregnancy. The option to end a pregnancy is necessary and moral in order to ensure the respect of a pregnant person's bodily autonomy.
The Australian Institute on International Affairs uses a similar example here, concluding with this statement:
With regard to the issue of abortion, women’s rights evidently outweigh the possible or future rights of the fetus. It is illegitimate to value the potential person’s rights, over the actual real woman with real needs, desires, and rights.
The fact that a fetus may one day survive on its own -- its potential, as mentioned above -- cannot be valued over the bodily autonomy of the woman in the present. In pregnancy, one person has bodily autonomy and the other does not. The fact that it may have bodily autonomy in the future cannot be used to override the woman's choice to do with her body as she sees fit in the present, including denying its use to the fetus. This makes abortion a permissible choice for those that don't wish to be pregnant.
Conclusion
1. Personhood is irrelevant to abortion, as even granting full personhood at the moment of conception does not entitle one person to the use of another's body.
2. PRO has failed to establish why embryos or fetuses should be entitled to the use of a mother's body if that mother is unwilling to provide it.
3. If the fetus is in fact not entitled to the mother's body (as is no other born person), then abortion must be considered a potential moral and acceptable outcome of a pregnant person's bodily autonomy.
Round 2
Thx Uragirimono,
Prelim:
- CON has offered a hugely vacuous case, of which can be hardly categorised as a substantive or rebuttal. There are occasional allusions and quotations from my case, however, the structured subtitles of PRO's arguments go unmentioned.
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Rebuttals:
What is Personhood?
CON offers an unsourced definition of personhood: the quality or condition of being an individual person, and defines "individual" as being singular, thus concluding that the criteria for being a person is merely being detached from any other being. I take two issues with this.
The definition is un-compelling
- In a debate regarding the moral status of the unborn, we ought to apply the most philosophically relavant definitions. The questioning of whether the unborn is a person clearly revolves around the doctrine of personhood, whereby person is defined as any entity that has the moral right of self-determination. We ought to take this definition, for the title of this debate questions whether abortion is morally permissible, therefore implying that we ought to question whether the the unborn has any moral status which will be violated.
CON has misunderstood the definition they have provided
- CON argues that as the unborn not "individual" and "seperate" in the physical sense, it therefore is not a person. I argue that the unborn is very much seperate - it is an individual being in the moral sense - that is, it ought to have individual moral consideration. Why ought we preference the moral definition? If we take that a person must be a "separate" individual in order to have moral consideration, comatose people will be rendered void of moral rights. CON states "A fetus, however, cannot exist separately from the mother and is therefore not an individual person", however, PRO can easily retort by asserting that an elderly cannot exist separately from their pacemaker, and are therefore not an individual person. Clearly, this physical "separation" argument is un-compelling - we believe the elderly have rights because we believe they are "individual" in the moral sense - that their existence is belongs to themselves only, even if they are physically "non-individual".
- Furthermore, as PRO am the maker of this argument, PRO gets to dictate what the terms mean - they were making an argument about moral rights as opposed to CON's physical separation one.
CON has opted to, instead of discussing the moral implications of abortion, dedicate this argument to semantically (and quite illogically) arguing that the "separateness" of an unborn necessitates its a-moral status. I will go further into why this is problematic in the revisitation of my first contention.
What role does personhood play in matters of abortion?
CON states: simply put, personhood is irrelevant to matters of abortion. This highlights a clear misunderstanding of the topic. Personhood refers to whether a being has moral rights or not, so clearly, the matter of whether the unborn have rights it pivotal to the abortion debate. If we can determine whether the unborn have personhood (that is, whether they have moral rights), then we can determine whether abortion is an act of killing or merely a morally neutral act. CON states that they agree when PRO concludes "the ontological burden of manifesting an additional predicate on the backdrop of biological humanity is simply impossible and incongruent with the operation of the law", however, such a conclusion is wholly incompatible to their position. If we hold, as CON seems to agree, that it is impossible to assign a time after biological actualisation where "personhood" is instilled, we are left with two options.
- Personhood is assigned at biological actualisation and any being who has gone through this stage has moral rights (PRO position)
- There is no time after biological actualisation where humans get rights, hence, no human rights exist.
If CON believes in human rights, they must tell us when these rights are given, and why their criteria is compelling. Thus far, they have proposed that physical separation is this criteria, however, this stance is riddled with inconsistencies, as shown above.
CON then proposes an "even if" argument, and grants that even if the unborn have moral rights, they still do not have the rights to intervene on a mothers body. They state "PRO must then prove that it is moral to force one person to sustain another against their will", ignoring the crucial fact that most women (statistically 99 percent) choose to get pregnant and only withdraw when they face hardship. Consider the following analogy.
- Suppose there exists a room which gives all those in it a natural spike in dopamine for a period of 20 minutes. The entrance is free, however, there is one condition - if you enter, there is a 2 percent there about's chance that you will exist with a human being, whose life is contingent upon your body, attached to you for a duration of just under a year. Now suppose that you enter this room multiple times with no repercussions, however, after a number of trips, you find a human being attached to you. Are you morally allowed to kill this human being
I assert that, in the thought experiment, it is a moral crime to kill the human being attached to you. Observe that the above is not some make belief scenario - it is the bedroom in which people have sex. The argument that there are risks in carrying the human (a risk which is well documented, observed and understood by any with minimal knowledge) does not hold - it is clear that these minute dangers were present before one enters a room and are implicitly accepted upon entrance. If you sign a waiver form agreeing that an entrance into a rollercoaster comes with your own risks, and you happen to injure yourself on the ride, you cannot "withdraw" your consent form which clearly indicates that you acknowledge risk. CON attempts to have their fun and yet coils when they are forced to take responsibility.
Whose Bodily Autonomy wins out?
The argument here again assumes that the unborn doesn't have any rights - "The fetus has no bodily autonomy, as it is incapable of governance and does not even have its own body in the first place" - and thus is null and void. If CON believes that the fetus does not have moral rights, then they disagree that biological humanity converts moral rights, which implies that they must create a criteria past conception wherein humans gain rights. They have not done so, thus this entire argument can be ignored.
Interestingly though, CON states "The fact that a fetus may one day survive on its own -- its potential, as mentioned above -- cannot be valued over the bodily autonomy of the woman in the present". This is clearly absurd - if you were given a choice to eat a tasty chocolate which would result in the torture of 1 million people in exactly one years time, it is clear that the potential suffering which could manifest ought to outweigh you desires "at present".
Affirmations:
I. Distinguishing the case of PRO and CON & the argument from inconsequential differences
CON asserts that they agree with this argument - "I agree with this statement, and am left wondering why PRO wrote such a lengthy argument defining personhood when doing so is so tedious" - however, does not apply their own criteria for when humans ought to have rights. Again, as stated before, personhood merely refers to whether a being has rights or not. Does the unborn have rights? If yes, then abortion is wrong. If no, then it is not wrong. CON opts to take the second route, however, they cannot merely reject that the unborn has rights without identifying a moral framework which gives humans rights. The case is, thus far, as follows - CON wishes to get all the benefits of prescribing personhood at conception (uncontradictory doctrine, gives all people, whether healthy or comatose rights) yet they deny the implication that the unborn have rights. If CON believes that the average human has rights, they must tell us when they received that rights. CON proposed that physical separation is the criteria, however, as demonstrated, this does not work. It entails that, if a man stabs an 8 month and 25 day pregnant women in the stomach, they are merely killing a person. It entails that, if a man were to secretively give a pregnant woman a drink laced with abortion pills, thereby killing the unborn, that they have done nothing morally wrong, for the unborn is not a moral agent (would be akin to say discarding of hair). It entails that people who rely on a caretaker or some machinery can be killed without moral difficulty. All these acts which we view are wrong are only wrong if we adopt the view that persons have rights if they are biologically actualised.
II. Principle of uncertainty
- Dropped entirely.
III. Comparison to unjustified killing
- Dropped entirely. This is particularly unfortunate as I believe CON does not have the capacity to address each syllogism honestly.
If we can determine whether the unborn have personhood (that is, whether they have moral rights), then we can determine whether abortion is an act of killing or merely a morally neutral act.
This is incorrect. There is no moral, philosophical, or legal definition of personhood that entitles one person to the use of another's body without consent. I am not engaging in deliberation on when or how a fetus gets personhood because there is no outcome that grants anyone, born or unborn, the right to use another's body without consent.
- Personhood is assigned at biological actualisation and any being who has gone through this stage has moral rights (PRO position)
Even if this is true, the moral rights granted to the fetus at biological actualization do not grant it the right to another person's body. This debate is centered on the moral permissibility of abortion, not on the nature of being human. If you'd like to discuss the nature of being human it sounds like a lovely topic to pick apart with you, but that is not what we're here to debate.
PRO has repeatedly stated that they hold the belief that personhood is attributed at conception. Even if CON agrees with that point, it is on PRO prove that among the moral rights imparted to the newly conceived human is the right to use another person's body against that person's consent. If the fetus has no such right, then a pregnant person is violating no one's rights in having an abortion, thus making abortion morally permissible.
it is clear that these minute dangers were present before one enters a room and are implicitly accepted upon entrance.
Inevitably, the "you consented to pregnancy when you consented to sex" argument has arisen. Let's break it down.
Consent is defined above as "to give permission to something to occur." I will be using this definition to prove that one cannot consent to pregnancy by consenting to sex.
Despite what the average American man seems to believe, two processes are required for a human pregnancy to occur. The first is presence of sperm, presumably from a man ejaculating inside the woman. The second is presence of egg, sent down to the uterus from the ovaries via ovulation. A woman, it can be said, consents to the presence of sperm when she agrees to have sex with a man. But she cannot consent to the presence of her egg. Ovulation is a natural bodily process outside of human control. The best science is currently capable of doing is predicting a two to three day window of when an egg might be released. Sometimes this release does not occur at all, sometimes the release is early or late, sometimes the release contains more than one egg. This is a process , a biological lottery, that cannot be consented to. Just as we cannot give consent to our stomach to digest, or to our kidneys to filter blood, or our hair to turn gray and fall out, no one can control the process by which pregnancy occurs. If a woman does not give permission for her ovaries to release an egg, then she has not given permission to be pregnant.
Pregnancy is, however, a potential consequence of sex. In abortion discussions, some form of "You had sex, now deal with the consequences" invariably comes up. What those who don't support abortion fail to realize is that abortion is dealing with the consequences of sex. We acknowledge that car crashes can be a consequence of driving, but we do not deny those who are in crashes medical care, saying "You chose to drive, now deal with the consequences." We acknowledge the cancer is often a consequence of smoking, yet we do not deny medical care to smokers, saying "You chose to smoke, now deal with the consequences." Pregnancy is the only medical condition where we treat the decision to engage in a given activity as justification for denying the person the medical care they seek. If we do not deny medical care on the basis of "bad" decisions, there is no justification using the "consequence of sex" line of thought in denying abortion care.
The hypocrisy of PROs position is revealed here. On the one hand, fetuses and embryos are full human beings, to be accorded all the rights and privileges of the born. On the other hand, they are but consequences, nothing more than a roller coaster ride that the mother consented to by having sex. Even in their own argument, PRO is willing to use whatever image of the unborn suits their point. An embryo is either a consequence of sex just as cancer is a consequence of smoking (and can therefore be dealt with like any other medical condition) or it is a full person with full rights (none of which entitle them to the use of another person's body without that person's permission). Neither of these options makes abortion morally impermissible.
It entails that, if a man stabs an 8 month and 25 day pregnant women in the stomach, they are merely killing a person. It entails that, if a man were to secretively give a pregnant woman a drink laced with abortion pills, thereby killing the unborn, that they have done nothing morally wrong, for the unborn is not a moral agent (would be akin to say discarding of hair).
The violation in these instances is to the woman. Spiking someone's drink is a crime regardless of whether or not they're pregnant. The moral agency of the child does not invalidate or eliminate the moral agency of the mother -- she was the one given a spiked drink, she was the one wronged. You've revealed your true belief here -- that women do not have moral agency equivalent to that of the child you're so desperate to protect. My argument acknowledges that both woman and child have moral agency, and that neither of them are entitled to the use of the other's body. Your argument, based on this example, is that if the child has no moral agency to violate neither does the woman.
Does the unborn have rights? If yes, then abortion is wrong.
What rights of the unborn does abortion violate?
This is particularly unfortunate as I believe CON does not have the capacity to address each syllogism honestly.
If you would like a syllogism, here you go.
Mother and child are both humans, morally and legally given full equal rights as enjoyed by all other humans, born and unborn.
No moral or legal human right gives one person the right to use another person's body without their consent.
The child, therefore, is human and like every other human, has no right to the mother's body unless she consents to it.
Abortion as termination of pregnancy is a morally permissible act under the mother's moral right to use her body as she sees fit. Abortion does not violate the fetus's human or moral rights as there is no human or moral right granting it the use of the mother's body without her consent, even when it is seen as a person from conception.
Round 3
Preliminary
- We ought to accept that CON has conceded the conclusions and impact of my three contentions, Inconsequential Differences), Principle of uncertainty (entirely unaddressed) and Comparison to unjustified killing(entirely unaddressed). The conclusions of the three arguments is that we must accept accept that the unborn have human rights, as adopting any model contrary to the one proposed by PRO renders contradictions. Though CON does not explicitly state a concession on the veracity of their argument contentions, their entire final argument hinges on the following sentiment.
- I am not engaging in deliberation on when or how a fetus gets personhood because there is no outcome that grants anyone, born or unborn, the right to use another's body without consent.
- Here then, it is apparent that CON forgoes the importance of the moral status of the unborn - as such, we ought to grant it the case that the unborn have moral rights, for the CON case gives no refutation to such a stipulation. CON instead opts for a refutation which accepts my argument - that the fact that the unborn have moral rights does not imply that abortion is itself immoral Thus, voters ought to accept the contingencies of my contentions are valid, for the CON argument does not require its falsification.
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Rebuttals
CON proposes the following syllogism, which is the heart of their rebuttals.
- Mother and child are both humans, morally and legally given full equal rights as enjoyed by all other humans, born and unborn.
- No moral or legal human right gives one person the right to use another person's body without their consent.
- The child, therefore, is human and like every other human, has no right to the mother's body unless she consents to it.
CON has created their entire argument under the sentiment that no human human being is allowed to use another person's body. In the last round, PRO proposed the dopamine room, which showed that the possibility of pregnancy is one which is accepted before any person has engaged in intercourse. CON asserted the following in response - "we do not deny those who are in crashes medical care, saying "You chose to drive, now deal with the consequences.". This is clearly an entirely fallacious equivocation. Consider the key aspects of abortion, compared with driving
Driving
- You willingly drive and after getting into an accident you willingly seek medical attention for yourself.
Abortion
- You willingly engage in sex and after getting pregnant, you willing seek medical intervention to kill the unborn.
The crucial difference is that, when in an accident after driving, one seeks medical attention to help yourself, however, in the case of abortion, you are seeking medical intervention to not only help yourself, but to kill a human being (recall that this is a correct analyses, from CON's decision to concede refuting the moral status of the unborn). The moral difference is clearly extrodinarly different - with the difference being an entire human being.
Whilst is is abundantly clear that it is entirely moral to seek help when you have injured yourself, this is in no way logically synonymous to allowing one to kill another human being after making a bad decision. This is exactly why the Dopamine Room thought experiment is employed - instead of the ambiguous "driving" and "drinking" examples which CON wishes to rely on, the Dopamine thought experiment has zero extraneous variables. The circumstances and crucial facets of the thought experiment and abortion are entirely the same. To recall:
- Suppose there exists a room which gives all those in it a natural spike in dopamine for a period of 20 minutes. The entrance is free, however, there is one condition - if you enter, there is a 2 percent there about's chance that you will exist with a human being, whose life is contingent upon your body, attached to you for a duration of just under a year. Now suppose that you enter this room multiple times with no repercussions, however, after a number of trips, you find a human being attached to you. Are you morally allowed to kill this human being
CON asserts "If we do not deny medical care on the basis of "bad" decisions, there is no justification using the "consequence of sex" line of thought in denying abortion care", yet they clearly ignore the crucial importance the "consequence" clearly matters if another life is on the line. Consider, for example, why we think killing children is wrong - it is because of both the active decision (mens rea) coupled with the impact. CON isolates the decision which, on it's own is not sufficient in charging an act as immoral, however, they are entirely blind as to the effects which abortion has, namely killing a human being. To return to the dopamine room, notice how CON isolates the conclusion the experiment quoting when I stated "it is clear that these minute dangers were present before one enters a room and are implicitly accepted upon entrance" and building their case of that, ignoring the moral implications of the act. To conflate the impacts of smoking (impacts the self) with the impacts of abortion (impacts the self and crucially the life of a literal human being).
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Affirmations
Nothing to be said here, besides that CON has accepted the first and ignored the other two (neglected mention in any capacity of two of my arguments). They thus ought to be accepted as valid.
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Conclusion
A short round from me (especially considering the valiant concession of my arguments from CON), but CON decided to put all their eggs into a single basket, and as has been exposed here, the particular route CON decided on is quite weak. The insensitivity and false equivocation between the likes of driving and smoking with abortion, ignoring an entire stakeholder holds little water.
- Suppose there exists a room which gives all those in it a natural spike in dopamine for a period of 20 minutes. The entrance is free, however, there is one condition - if you enter, there is a 2 percent there about's chance that you will exist with a human being, whose life is contingent upon your body, attached to you for a duration of just under a year. Now suppose that you enter this room multiple times with no repercussions, however, after a number of trips, you find a human being attached to you. Are you morally allowed to kill this human being
Let's bring PRO's dopamine room into the real world. If we assume this is happening in reality, then at the conclusion of this experiment, where the participant suddenly finds a human being attached to them, what is their next step? As we agree, stepping into the room was accepting the potentiality of being attached to the other human being. But nowhere did CON's thought experiment say the attachment was immune to the person's continued consent. The person consented to the attachment by stepping into the room and, by all our current legal and medical practices, has the right to revoke that consent after exiting the room.
If this person left the dopamine room and went to a hospital to seek detachment, doctors would provide it to them. Whether the attached person would live or die after separation isn't clear in PRO's thought game, perhaps unintentionally alluding to the fact that even at risk of death no person is entitled to the use of another's body without consent.
Conclusion
It's a fact of human existence that the continuation of our species rests on the use of the female body. Pregnancy is a life experience and medical condition we all experience in one way or another, but the somatic processes that bring new humans into existence rests entirely on those humans assigned female at birth. While arguing against the morality of abortion, anti-abortion advocates often appeal to the humanity of the unborn. PRO's argument rested on this moral necessity -- that the unborn have moral rights just as the born.
The implication of this then, is there are two people involved in all discussions regarding pregnancy. CON's stance -- that abortion is not morally permissible -- means that the woman's humanity -- her bodily autonomy, her choices, her freedom, her right to life live in the way she deems fit -- is less significant than the humanity of the person inside her. Her body is the one being used during the pregnancy, and denying the morality of abortion is denying her the choice of whether she will continue to allow her body to be used. We cannot even verify the fetus's will or desire to live (as it neither has desires nor a way to communicate them), so by deeming abortion immoral, we invalidate the only desire that we are capable of hearing.
My stance -- that abortion is morally permissible -- acknowledges the difficulties of pregnancy. All life is precious, and I am not celebrating when one life is terminated. But the rights of the human person must be respected at all times, especially in the face of difficult or unclear decisions. No person, born or unborn, has the legal, moral, or philosophical right to use another's body without consent. But all people have the moral, legal, and philosophical right to control how and when their bodies will be used. Stating that abortion is moral is merely remaining consistent with the values we live with every day -- consent, self-determination, and freedom. Believing in the morality of abortion is believing in the value of humanity. It is believing that the continuation of the species is less significant than how the species is continued. It is believing that a species that cannot reproduce without the constant consent of their mothers is not a species worth continuing.
We are not animals locked inescapably into our reproductive cycles. We are in control of ourselves, our lives, our bodies, and our choices. Abortion is morally permissible precisely because we are human.
bump
Skimmed this. While I agree with con, I strongly suspect my vote will favor pro for quality of arguments.
I’ll aim to get a vote up on this. Remind me as it gets later in the voting period.