This House Prefers Kantian Ethics over Utilitarianism

  Thank you RationalMadman for accepting this debate. 

  In the book, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant is seeking to determine a Metaphysic, a first principle, of morality. So I am going to attempt to do it justice and identify the Supreme Principle of Morality, and defend that reasoning.

  The will is, "The faculty by which a person decides on and initiates action [3]." 

  One important idea to understanding Kant's system of ethics, is to understand his idea of autonomy. The word "autonomy" is composed of the greek word, "Nomos," meaning "law" [1], and the greek prefix "auto-," meaning "self" [2]. Therefore, to act autonomously is to act according to a law one gives oneself. The contrast of this is "heteronomy," [4] or, "acting according to a law given by another [5]" 

  Our desires can, and oftentimes do, impose themselves on our will. If we are simply obeying the whims of our desires, then we are not acting autonomously, but heteronomously. This reasoning extends to moral autonomy. If one is to act morally autonomous, then they are to act according to a moral law they give themselves. But moral autonomy is not enough to take us to moral good, so Kant makes the classical distinction between things with intrinsic value and things with instrumental worth. The thing that is intrinsically good is the good will. 

  Talents, temperament, fortune, and even happiness, are not good without qualification. Only when they contain good will, do they gain moral value. It's moral value is not derived from what it brings about or accomplishes. Good will is to virtue and action, what a gemstone is to a ring. It has its full value in itself, and its value isn't modified by its setting. The good will is a broader concept, incorporating the dutiful will. A will acting from duty overcomes hindrances to maintain the moral law. Therefore, we may distinguish the dutiful will as a form of good will, that acts from good will in the face of adversity [6]. 

  There are only two types of motives: motives of duty, and motives of inclination. 

  All inclinations, preferences, and desires, are motives of action that are qualified by their satisfaction. All inclinations are arbitrary and cannot convey moral praiseworthiness to an action. Oftentimes, duty constrains us against our inclinations. Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between an action done from duty, and an action merely in accordance with duty. 

  Take the example of a shopkeeper who has the opportunity to shortchange his customers. He decides not to for the reason that he will lose reputation. While he did the right thing, it was for the wrong reason. He acted in accordance with the moral law, but not from duty to the moral law. Had he been following the maxim, "I will always give my customers the correct change, because it's the right thing to do," then his decision would have moral worth. That means that there are two kinds of moral imperatives, categorical ones, that are binding without qualification; and hypothetical ones, that are based on the satisfaction of inclinations.

  A categorical imperative of morality is binding in all cases as a moral principle.

  A hypothetical imperative of morality is an "if, then" statement. The moral obligation is always qualified by the satisfaction of the "if."

  We have no room for hypotheticals in this approach, because we don't' want anything said to even resemble mere opinion.

  The Supreme Principle of Morality is the Categorical Imperative.

  Kant formulates the Categorical Imperative in two major ways that we will be analyzing:

1. The Principle of Universalizability

2. The Principle of Respect for Persons

  The first formulation is the negative, restrictive form:

  Any A Priori principle must be Universal. Otherwise, it wouldn't be a metaphysic. Since we have established that the moral value is held in the reason for a moral action, then that reason must be taken up the stratum of thought to the level of principle if we are to establish whether it is in line with a first principle of morality. Since moral principles are founded in Reason, then they must be subject to the same laws as Reason, such as the law of non-contradiction. Therefore, if one's reason for a moral action is, when considered in the framework of a first principle,  self-contradictory, then it cannot be a moral principle. It is inherently irrational to contradict yourself.

  The second formulation is the positive form, describing how one ought to treat persons:

  My opponent has elected not to provide a constructive, so I have nothing to refute. Extend all points.

Extend.

It's my Kantian Duty to concede this debate and my Utilitarian directive to give a nice song as I do it:

I am just not into this debate right now tbh.

In the end, nobody's gonna be a utilitarian slave to societal wellbeing at all times, that's a foolish cuck.

At the same time, nobody's gonna be a Kantian hardcore dutiful robot, that's bullshit.

My opponent has kindly conceded the debate. I have no further arguments.

Loss