*Con will be affirming
that personhood ought to be ascribed at birth.*
== Aff ==
Preface
Thank you for accepting the debate! To begin, I will first highlight
the inherent distinction between the Pro and Con position; what their commonalities
are and what differentiates them. I
intend to show that both positions innately entail that biological humanity is an
indubitable facet of personhood. Moreover, I will demonstrate that any position that entails the attribution of personhood at any other time than conception can be reduced to the same inconsistency conveyed through moral scepticism
and value judgements. Furthermore, I will show that attribution of personhood
at conception is the most congruous position in terms of general principles in
law proceedings. .
Distinguishing
Pro from Con
Before I can express my
opening argument, the common ground between the two positions must be clarified. Con’s position differs from mine, insofar as
he asserts personhood ought to be ascribed after a finite period of time after conception (at birth). Moreover, it is
important to note that the resolution implies the possibility of two outcomes:
either personhood is attributed at some time, or it is not attributed at
all. The latter would entail that neither
I, nor Con would be able to fulfil our burdens of proof, thus to even have this
debate we would have to agree that the former is true. This is generally considered to be a truism
by society as a whole anyway – without personhood being attributed no-one would
have fundamental rights which would certainly lead to anarchy.
This begs the question to
what criteria should exist to validly define a person and brings me to the first and most crucial commonality
between the two positions; no matter what stage of the developmental timeline is advocated -- be it conception, six weeks,
birth, 65 years old etc. – all of them share the indubitable and irrefutable
fact that the entity being attributed “personhood” is a “biological
human”. This is true, even at conception, as scientific
consensus postulates that biological humanity begins at conception [1].
This might appear fairly obvious,
but its relevance is clarified when it is illustrated in predicate form. At this stage, we would have that all “people” (i.e those with unalienable rights) must be biologically human, by
definition.
1. ∀x(human(x) <=> person(x)). Viz. “For all x, where x is a human, means
that x is a person”.
Here is where the debate begins
– I, as Pro, must advocate why this proposition is most prudent. Con, on the other hand, must advocate that
personhood is not only implied by biological humanity, but also by other predicates. An example of this would be as such:
2. ∀x( ((human(x) ^ conscious(x)) <=> person(x)). Viz. “For all x, where x is a person and
where x is conscious, means x is a person”
Via first order syntax, the
distinction between our positions is clearly depicted. It can be seen that not only does Con share
the predicate of biological humanity, he is also burdened with the
justification of multiplicity of predicates, be it consciousness, viability
(whatever he chooses). However, the predicate
of biological humanity is true by definition (as personhood must be
attributed). However, the same cannot be said about the additional predicates. As such, Con is burdened with providing the
additional justification to why more predicates (criteria) is needed to attribute
personhood, but I argue that no matter what justification this is, it cannot be
agreed upon and will lead to logical inconsistencies (similar to the problems conveyed
in moral scepticism). I argue that the
only position exempt of these inconsistencies is the attribution of personhood
at conception.
A1. Moral Scepticism and Value Judgement
To reject the Pro position, that biological humanity is the
sole implication of personhood, would be to state that either biological humanity
does not implicate personhood at all, or biological humanity is not
enough to implicate personhood. The
former is implausible if we are to value a functioning society – to reject this
would entail that I can justly kill whomever I please. This means we are left with the latter, i.e
Con’s position. The problem begins with
the suggestion that a biological human is attributed personhood at a time other
than conception. This is because, there
ought to be justification to why that human is now a person, but was
not one at conception. One can only
do this by attributing value to something acquired later in development, or by attributing
moral value to something acquired later in development. If no value was gained, there would be no
justification for assigning personhood at any other time but conception. Thus, for the time of conception to have less
value than birth would be to assume that either development as a whole, or
something acquired throughout development. entails more qualitative and measurable
value relative to that of the point of conception. However, I argue that this position is unescapable
from the issues associated with moral and value scepticism. This is because, there is no agreeable measurement of value (moral or absolute) that can be argued for in this
context.
Let’s examine ways of which we could attempt to ascribe moral
and absolute value and compare them relative to different points of the
developmental timeline.
I) Moral Value
Let’s compare a zygote, to a new-born baby. Whom has greater moral value? Prima facie one might argue that a bundle
of cells has infinitesimal moral value relative to a fully developed baby – the
feeble bundle of cells does not possess a heartbeat, consciousness, the ability
to self-sustain or many of the other properties a baby has. Admittedly, I would feel more morally
reprehensible if anything detrimental were to happen to the baby than the
zygote. However, attributing value in this way leads to a superabundance of
inconsistencies and disagreement. Firstly,
whilst many concur with this view, a mother who has finally conceived a child
after many years of effort would certainly contend that their unborn,
underdeveloped bundle of cells is valuable. What if the unborn
child were to be your own child, brother or sister, would they still not be
valued – or be seen as less valuable to another fully born baby? I would contend the mother would certainly value
their unborn more than many live members of our community, so who’s view is correct? Does consciousness, agency and self-sustainability
outweigh the value one would place on the unborn, be it that they are a part of
one’s family? What is the absolute value
of it? How does one compare or measure
the value of the different properties? Who
is to say that these properties are valuable at all? To reiterate, let’s examine the two scenarios I
just mentioned, labelled A and B:
A: One values a baby as
possessing more moral value because it possesses properties like consciousness,
viability etc.
B: Another values a zygote as having more moral value,
because that zygote is their own child, brother, sister (whomever they may be)
Who is correct? Do properties like consciousness entail more
value than the intrinsic value a family member places on another? How on earth would we compare them? These are
the issues conveyed with moral scepticism. Without an objective morality (which has yet to be observed in nature,
outside of a religious notion) to commend what is morally valuable and what is
not, such is open to speculation and scepticism . Such a metric wouldn’t be a very suitable method
for comparison. For example, if we choose
to see moral value in consciousness, it would alienate the comatose (whom many
still value dearly) and render them without rights. If we were to see moral value found in
family, would alienate all those whom are not family. Clearly, inconsistencies and unjustifiable
differentiation are ubiquitous in assigning value this way.
If moral value cannot be agreed upon and leads to
inconsistencies, then what about absolute value?
II) Absolute value
I am referring to “absolute value” as something separate
to intrinsic notions of value; something like utilitarianism, an ethical theory
that promotes actions that maximise happiness and well-being for the majority
of the population. The problem with this
and the notion of consequentialism as a whole, occurs when we quantify value in
terms of overall utility or benefit to society, as it too leads to many
inconsistencies rendering it as a poor moral theory.
Firstly, it is absurd to ever act truly in a
utilitarian fashion; every decision you make depends on the net utility or
happiness generated – yet it is impossible to know the full extent of an
action. If the end goal is net utility
for the majority, one could simply enslave a minority – even though the
minority is very unhappy, the majority would benefit greatly from the free
labour of the minority. We reject
slavery in modern society, so clearly utilitarianism isn’t an efficacious metric
for assigning value.
Simply, one cannot attribute value without being able to
measure – empirically -- a value reducible to something grounded in the
physical world. However, moral and value
scepticism would posit that there exists no such grounding. This means we are left with arbitrary notions
of value e.g “currency”. However, such a
method is tremendously insipid; we cannot agree on how much each individual person
is valued and we don’t have a system of exchangeability (i.e arbitrary currency
for a service or good) for an arbitrary value such as this to have any
viability or efficacy.
Con has a cumbersome burden here – he must first determine
what properties have more qualitive value, how these values relate to each
other and why at birth a baby possesses more absolute value than at
conception. I opine such an onus is
impossible to fulfil.
One might wonder how my position is exempt of the aforementioned
inconsistencies and issues…It doesn’t *objectively* avoid it, but to contend the
criteria of biological humanity would entail that no biological human can have
rights. We accept as a society that we
ought to have rights, therefore this criterion is axiomatic. As
such, we are grounding this as our empirical axiom, similar to the axiomatic
horn of the Munchausen’s Trilemma. This
cannot be said for the other criteria as stated above, thus, we are left with
the Pro position that unequivocally avoids the underlying issues of moral and
value scepticism.
A2. Legal Attribution
The context of this debate hones specifically to “legal” attribution of personhood, thus any substantial argument to propose “legal” attribution of something requires the examination of how this concurs with
valid legal proceedings. Following A1,
that the Pro position is the option that provides the most consistency and certainty,
I assert that attributing personhood at conception is far more compatible with
general principles of jurisprudence and that attributing personhood at any
other time imposes a greater level of ambiguity and uncertainty that ought to
be avoided.
2.1 The Rule of Law
Without the Rule of Law, that is, “the principle
whereby all members of a society are considered equally subject to publicly
disclosed legal codes and processes” [2], society as we know it
crumbles – e.g some people having the right to kill humans and others not –
which is why the Rule of Law is a fundamental constitutional principle in
modern democracies. Examining the Rule of Law, it is comprised of
another two axiomatic principles: legal consistency and the principle of legal
certainty[3][4].
2.1.2 The Principle of Legal Consistency
The importance of legal consistency is described as being “deeply
rooted” in law and is a crucial facet of the Rule of Law:
“The rule of law requires that laws be applied equally,
without unjustifiable differentiation.” [5]
Now referring back to the baseline commonality between Con
and I -- that all people are human -- if there were to exist additional
criteria to the attribution of personhood, it ought to be consistent and
certain for it to be considered congruent with The Rule of Law.
Unfortunately, It has been demonstrated
by A1 that additional criteria *inevitably leads to inconsistencies and
disagreement* i.e unjustifiable differentiation! There is no unjustifiable differentiation if
personhood were to be assumed at conception, because it would apply to every
biological human.
2.1.3 The Principle of Legal Certainty
This principle is best suggested and defined as such:
“The legal system
needs to permit those subject to the law to regulate their conduct with
certainty and to protect those subject to the law from arbitrary use of state
power. Legal certainty represents a requirement that decisions be made
according to legal rules, i.e. be lawful.”[3]
From this description, it is
evident that personhood at conception ties seamlessly with the notion of legal
certainty, as it is set in stone that unalienable rights and what they entail
are to be applied to everyone at conception. However, this cannot be said for any other position; if personhood is
attributed due to arbitrary criteria, there is a possible outcome of tyrannical “use of state power”. For example,
if we are to accept that consciousness is a criterion of personhood, all of the
comatose and those unconscious would temporarily lose their personhood. Likewise, if it were derived from net
utility, one who is arbitrarily deemed as “not useful”, again, would
lose their personhood. It is a risky
game; delving into how people can lose their personhood due to “legal technicalities”. As such, the position of personhood at
conception is clearly the most attractive option.
Conclusion
I have demonstrated that personhood at conception is the
only option that evades inconsistency and disagreement. To argue against this entails
additional criteria to what should constitute a person. However, said criteria can never be
indubitable, leading to contradictions, inconsistencies both metaphysically and
with valid principles in law. I have shown that assigning personhood at any
other time but conception unjustifiably demarcates personhood and thus should be
rejected in light of the Pro position. The
resolution is therefore affirmed.
Over to Con.
References
Since you said that at conception, the fetus has it's own unique DNA, you kindof were saying that the uniqueness of the DNA mattered.
"What makes it human is the fact that has human DNA"
Cancer DNA is also human DNA. Are cancer cells human beings?
"Keep in mind not all stem cells are the same."
What's the difference between stem cells and other cells that don't specialize? They both reproduce like crazy.
Also, this is off topic, but what are your thoughts on birth control? I asked semperfortis the same question.
The woman does have the right to life, the clone wouldn't unless the clone has their cells specialized which occurs at 6 weeks of pregnancy. Any time before that, the zygote resembles cancer too much. Given that the left wants to legalize abortion unrestricted up until 20 weeks, 6 weeks is a good compromise.
A person, in my version of English and morality, is a being that is beneficial to the society as a whole. Whether it keeps the people around it happy despite being unemployed or is legally employed despite being a dickhead, I support all such beings as qualifying as persons.
All drains on society and obstacles to societal harmony and progress are beings that start to sacrifice personhood and this is why we are allowed to put some of them in prison. This also is why I support euthanasia and legal abortions up until the 2-term mark. If a foetus is past 5 months, it clearly is too far in to be considered a non-person, it already is developing a personality and the mother has clearly gone too far into the pregnancy to pretend it's a fuck-up on her part that she just wants to get rid of.
Instead of going there with your analogy, consider which of the two of us will maim a chimpanzee. Now stretch that to farm animal.
I see a person when I see a chimpanzee. I do not see a mouse or cat and want to treat it like a stuffed toy. That is a being with consciousness far kinder and better to spend time with than a lot of humans I know. I would much rather have it by my side and not be dead than those humans but I understand that when it comes down to it I am in a society that is human-supremacist and I must sacrifice my beliefs and joy for the sake of their ego and agenda.
**The clone does not have unique DNA. If uniqueness of DNA is the sole criteria for person hood, then this clone wouldn't be a human. If this clone isn't a human, then neither are real life non clones. **
I don't think you could make this claim. First, I don't think anyone said it's the "uniqueness" of the DNA that determines it's human. What makes it human is the fact that has human DNA, it just so happens to be unique.
**The definition of person in the dictionary specifies they need to be human. This blackballs me into not pivoting the concept of an animal being more beneficial to society than a human to display the arbitrary nature of personhood and then to conclude that it should begin where we seem is most sane and convenient for society, which is 2/3 into a pregnancy.**
Wow, so the common accepted definition of "person" doesn't fit your concept of an animal being more important than human-- so your MO or desire is to change the definition to suit your agenda?
Remind me not to piss you off-- I would hate to have you mad at me because, who knows-- you might just redefine "person" again to exclude me and then next thing you know, I sleep with da' fishes....
It begs the question, what is your social construct, i mean, definition of "personhood?"
** I fear for my legal safety if I admit my true views on the laws that irrationally favour our species. I'd prefer no official debate on it, just read between the lines.**
Seriously? You say you can provide "objective proof", but then when challenged on it you say no, for me to read between the lines? Sorry-- "objective proof" clearly lays out ideas, philosophies, and dare I say, facts to "prove something"-- it doesn't force the opposition to "read between the lines."
Come on, let's play.
Yes
That woman would already possess the unalienable right to life; therefore the clone would also have the right of life ipso facto. Or would you contend that this isn't the case?
I am a tremendous advocate for birth control; teenage and out of wed-lock pregnancies are a big contributor to poverty.
**I'm implying both that and also that a human can be a non-person. It's a social construct.**
So can I recap. Please correct me if I"m wrong.; You believe the following:
a) A "person" can be non-human
b) A human can be "non-person"
Am I understanding you correctly? Is that what you meant?
"when a zygote has its own individual genetic blueprint, where hair colour, eye colour, race etc. are already determined?"
Lets say that a woman was pregnant with a clone of hers. The clone does not have unique DNA. If uniqueness of DNA is the sole criteria for person hood, then this clone wouldn't be a human. If this clone isn't a human, then neither are real life non clones. Therefore, it would seem as if cell specialization would be a better qualifier of a human being then DNA.
This is off topic, but what are your thoughts on birth control? It reduces abortions.
The current defnition is not incongruent with your argument. You could argue that a human that is not developmentally 6 months old, does not bring more benefit to society (utilitarianism) than an animal (which we kill all the time). Unless I am misrepresenting your argument -- this is your intent, right?
You are correct. Stem cells are not human beings. I don't think any reputable scientist or knowledgeable opponent of stem cell research opponent has ever said they are humans. Keep in mind not all stem cells are the same. Typically what is opposed is the killing of an embryo in order to harvest (use) the stem cells from that embryo. An embryo (per my other comment) is a stage of Human Life. Some institutions oppose the killing of a human at any stage,
The Church supports research involving stems cells from adult tissues or umbilical cord blood, neither which results in the killing of an embryo.
So, in short, it's not Stem Research that is opposed, but rather the killing of an embryo (human life) for stem research.
An analogy (not strawman, but analogy) would be this-- I fully support brain research in order to help cure cancers like brain cancer, etc. What I vehemently oppose is the intentional killing of another human being in order to study their brain....
The definition of person in the dictionary specifies they need to be human. This blackballs me into not pivoting the concept of an animal being more beneficial to society than a human to display the arbitrary nature of personhood and then to conclude that it should begin where we seem is most sane and convenient for society, which is 2/3 into a pregnancy.
I remain puzzled to why this causes you to reject the definition.
I fear for my legal safety if I admit my true views on the laws that irrationally favour our species. I'd prefer no official debate on it, just read between the lines.
I'm implying both that and also that a human can be a non-person. It's a social construct.
Why is it an issue for you that the definition of "person" contains the word "human"? In order for it to be a "person", isn't it required to be "human?" To me it's redundant. "Person" implies human, unless you're advocating that a "person" can be something other than human?
I'm very curious to see your "objective" proof that it is irrtaiontlal to want something to live or consider it a person that should be illegal to dispose of just because the species of the being is human.
I'd be willing to engage in a debate with you on this, simply because I want to see your "proof". We can call the debate "It is irrational to want something to live or consider it a person that should be illegal to dispose of just because the species of the being is human."
You game?
I would then have to ask why specialized cells demacartes humanity, when a zygote has its own individual genetic blueprint, where hair colour, eye colour, race etc. are already determined?
Stem cells aren't human beings either. Killing a stem cell shouldn't be classified as murder.
Like for example stem cells are unspecialized.
Interesting. Although, then wouldn't all regular non-specialized cells that grow and divide normally be considered cancer as well?
Cancer isin't specialized cells. A fetus has specialized cells, and they have a heart and brainwaves within 6 weeks.
Yup, I am arguing PRO.
Are you arguing "PRO" - meaning you believe "personhood" should be attributed at conception?
Why wouldn't it be considered cancer even when cell specialization occurs?
6 weeks. A fetus's cells specialize by then. They are no longer cancer.
Good setup.
If you take issue with the definition, I am sure we can agree on one. However, I am puzzled to why the specification that it is a 'human' is problematic for you. The intent of the debate does not encompass animal rights, or anything 'inhuman'.
'
the definition of person includes 'human' currently. That's an issue for me so I won't engage in this debate.
5-6 months into pregnancy.
I will prove objectively that it is irrational to want something to live or consider it a person that should be illegal to dispose of just because the species of the being is human. This doesn't mean I disagree with outlawing murder, it means I know why murder is outlawed; for the convenience and safety of the society that outlaws it.
If a dog is more useful to us than a human, brings more joy to the people around it etc. What does the society benefit from saving the human? At present, it saves itself a riot from human-supremacists (which is most people).