Instigator / Pro
41
1684
rating
15
debates
100.0%
won
Topic
#1240
When should personhood be attributed?
Status
Finished
The debate is finished. The distribution of the voting points and the winner are presented below.
Winner & statistics
After 6 votes and with 26 points ahead, the winner is...
semperfortis
Parameters
- Publication date
- Last updated date
- Type
- Standard
- Number of rounds
- 5
- Time for argument
- One week
- Max argument characters
- 20,000
- Voting period
- Two weeks
- Point system
- Multiple criterions
- Voting system
- Open
Contender / Con
15
1485
rating
92
debates
45.65%
won
Description
*Burden of proof*
-Shared
-PRO: Personhood *should* be attributed at conception
-CON: Personhood *should* be attributed at a time other than conception (e.g birth)
*Definitions*
Personhood - "Perceived by law to possess unalienable rights (specifically the right to life)"
Conception - "The exact moment of the union of the homo sapien spermatazoon and ova, such that a zygote is formed"
*Rules*
1. One must comment on this debate if they wish to accept to ensure that all definitions, BoP etc. are stipulated. Failure to adhere will result in immediate forfeiture.
2. Failure to adhere to the debate format is considered poor conduct.
3. Forfeiture of any round without notice is also considered poor conduct.
4. Don't be afraid to negotiate rules, definitions or formatting before accepting the debate (but do not accept until they are stipulated!)
5. No kritiks
*Format*
Round 1: Opening Arguments
Round 2: Rebuttals
Round 3: Rebuttals/Defence
Round 4: Rebuttals/Defence with summary (no new arguments and or new defence)
(I am more than willing to negotiate the format, if one were to propose a format with only four rounds)
*To note*
-Con must affirm a specific stage of development warranting the attribution of personhood (be it 6 weeks, birth etc.)
Round 1
*Con will be affirming
that personhood ought to be ascribed at birth.*
== Aff ==
Preface
Thank you for accepting the debate! To begin, I will first highlight
the inherent distinction between the Pro and Con position; what their commonalities
are and what differentiates them. I
intend to show that both positions innately entail that biological humanity is an
indubitable facet of personhood. Moreover, I will demonstrate that any position that entails the attribution of personhood at any other time than conception can be reduced to the same inconsistency conveyed through moral scepticism
and value judgements. Furthermore, I will show that attribution of personhood
at conception is the most congruous position in terms of general principles in
law proceedings. .
Distinguishing
Pro from Con
Before I can express my
opening argument, the common ground between the two positions must be clarified. Con’s position differs from mine, insofar as
he asserts personhood ought to be ascribed after a finite period of time after conception (at birth). Moreover, it is
important to note that the resolution implies the possibility of two outcomes:
either personhood is attributed at some time, or it is not attributed at
all. The latter would entail that neither
I, nor Con would be able to fulfil our burdens of proof, thus to even have this
debate we would have to agree that the former is true. This is generally considered to be a truism
by society as a whole anyway – without personhood being attributed no-one would
have fundamental rights which would certainly lead to anarchy.
This begs the question to
what criteria should exist to validly define a person and brings me to the first and most crucial commonality
between the two positions; no matter what stage of the developmental timeline is advocated -- be it conception, six weeks,
birth, 65 years old etc. – all of them share the indubitable and irrefutable
fact that the entity being attributed “personhood” is a “biological
human”. This is true, even at conception, as scientific
consensus postulates that biological humanity begins at conception [1].
This might appear fairly obvious,
but its relevance is clarified when it is illustrated in predicate form. At this stage, we would have that all “people” (i.e those with unalienable rights) must be biologically human, by
definition.
1. ∀x(human(x) <=> person(x)). Viz. “For all x, where x is a human, means
that x is a person”.
Here is where the debate begins
– I, as Pro, must advocate why this proposition is most prudent. Con, on the other hand, must advocate that
personhood is not only implied by biological humanity, but also by other predicates. An example of this would be as such:
2. ∀x( ((human(x) ^ conscious(x)) <=> person(x)). Viz. “For all x, where x is a person and
where x is conscious, means x is a person”
Via first order syntax, the
distinction between our positions is clearly depicted. It can be seen that not only does Con share
the predicate of biological humanity, he is also burdened with the
justification of multiplicity of predicates, be it consciousness, viability
(whatever he chooses). However, the predicate
of biological humanity is true by definition (as personhood must be
attributed). However, the same cannot be said about the additional predicates. As such, Con is burdened with providing the
additional justification to why more predicates (criteria) is needed to attribute
personhood, but I argue that no matter what justification this is, it cannot be
agreed upon and will lead to logical inconsistencies (similar to the problems conveyed
in moral scepticism). I argue that the
only position exempt of these inconsistencies is the attribution of personhood
at conception.
A1. Moral Scepticism and Value Judgement
To reject the Pro position, that biological humanity is the
sole implication of personhood, would be to state that either biological humanity
does not implicate personhood at all, or biological humanity is not
enough to implicate personhood. The
former is implausible if we are to value a functioning society – to reject this
would entail that I can justly kill whomever I please. This means we are left with the latter, i.e
Con’s position. The problem begins with
the suggestion that a biological human is attributed personhood at a time other
than conception. This is because, there
ought to be justification to why that human is now a person, but was
not one at conception. One can only
do this by attributing value to something acquired later in development, or by attributing
moral value to something acquired later in development. If no value was gained, there would be no
justification for assigning personhood at any other time but conception. Thus, for the time of conception to have less
value than birth would be to assume that either development as a whole, or
something acquired throughout development. entails more qualitative and measurable
value relative to that of the point of conception. However, I argue that this position is unescapable
from the issues associated with moral and value scepticism. This is because, there is no agreeable measurement of value (moral or absolute) that can be argued for in this
context.
Let’s examine ways of which we could attempt to ascribe moral
and absolute value and compare them relative to different points of the
developmental timeline.
I) Moral Value
Let’s compare a zygote, to a new-born baby. Whom has greater moral value? Prima facie one might argue that a bundle
of cells has infinitesimal moral value relative to a fully developed baby – the
feeble bundle of cells does not possess a heartbeat, consciousness, the ability
to self-sustain or many of the other properties a baby has. Admittedly, I would feel more morally
reprehensible if anything detrimental were to happen to the baby than the
zygote. However, attributing value in this way leads to a superabundance of
inconsistencies and disagreement. Firstly,
whilst many concur with this view, a mother who has finally conceived a child
after many years of effort would certainly contend that their unborn,
underdeveloped bundle of cells is valuable. What if the unborn
child were to be your own child, brother or sister, would they still not be
valued – or be seen as less valuable to another fully born baby? I would contend the mother would certainly value
their unborn more than many live members of our community, so who’s view is correct? Does consciousness, agency and self-sustainability
outweigh the value one would place on the unborn, be it that they are a part of
one’s family? What is the absolute value
of it? How does one compare or measure
the value of the different properties? Who
is to say that these properties are valuable at all? To reiterate, let’s examine the two scenarios I
just mentioned, labelled A and B:
A: One values a baby as
possessing more moral value because it possesses properties like consciousness,
viability etc.
B: Another values a zygote as having more moral value,
because that zygote is their own child, brother, sister (whomever they may be)
Who is correct? Do properties like consciousness entail more
value than the intrinsic value a family member places on another? How on earth would we compare them? These are
the issues conveyed with moral scepticism. Without an objective morality (which has yet to be observed in nature,
outside of a religious notion) to commend what is morally valuable and what is
not, such is open to speculation and scepticism . Such a metric wouldn’t be a very suitable method
for comparison. For example, if we choose
to see moral value in consciousness, it would alienate the comatose (whom many
still value dearly) and render them without rights. If we were to see moral value found in
family, would alienate all those whom are not family. Clearly, inconsistencies and unjustifiable
differentiation are ubiquitous in assigning value this way.
If moral value cannot be agreed upon and leads to
inconsistencies, then what about absolute value?
II) Absolute value
I am referring to “absolute value” as something separate
to intrinsic notions of value; something like utilitarianism, an ethical theory
that promotes actions that maximise happiness and well-being for the majority
of the population. The problem with this
and the notion of consequentialism as a whole, occurs when we quantify value in
terms of overall utility or benefit to society, as it too leads to many
inconsistencies rendering it as a poor moral theory.
Firstly, it is absurd to ever act truly in a
utilitarian fashion; every decision you make depends on the net utility or
happiness generated – yet it is impossible to know the full extent of an
action. If the end goal is net utility
for the majority, one could simply enslave a minority – even though the
minority is very unhappy, the majority would benefit greatly from the free
labour of the minority. We reject
slavery in modern society, so clearly utilitarianism isn’t an efficacious metric
for assigning value.
Simply, one cannot attribute value without being able to
measure – empirically -- a value reducible to something grounded in the
physical world. However, moral and value
scepticism would posit that there exists no such grounding. This means we are left with arbitrary notions
of value e.g “currency”. However, such a
method is tremendously insipid; we cannot agree on how much each individual person
is valued and we don’t have a system of exchangeability (i.e arbitrary currency
for a service or good) for an arbitrary value such as this to have any
viability or efficacy.
Con has a cumbersome burden here – he must first determine
what properties have more qualitive value, how these values relate to each
other and why at birth a baby possesses more absolute value than at
conception. I opine such an onus is
impossible to fulfil.
One might wonder how my position is exempt of the aforementioned
inconsistencies and issues…It doesn’t *objectively* avoid it, but to contend the
criteria of biological humanity would entail that no biological human can have
rights. We accept as a society that we
ought to have rights, therefore this criterion is axiomatic. As
such, we are grounding this as our empirical axiom, similar to the axiomatic
horn of the Munchausen’s Trilemma. This
cannot be said for the other criteria as stated above, thus, we are left with
the Pro position that unequivocally avoids the underlying issues of moral and
value scepticism.
A2. Legal Attribution
The context of this debate hones specifically to “legal” attribution of personhood, thus any substantial argument to propose “legal” attribution of something requires the examination of how this concurs with
valid legal proceedings. Following A1,
that the Pro position is the option that provides the most consistency and certainty,
I assert that attributing personhood at conception is far more compatible with
general principles of jurisprudence and that attributing personhood at any
other time imposes a greater level of ambiguity and uncertainty that ought to
be avoided.
2.1 The Rule of Law
Without the Rule of Law, that is, “the principle
whereby all members of a society are considered equally subject to publicly
disclosed legal codes and processes” [2], society as we know it
crumbles – e.g some people having the right to kill humans and others not –
which is why the Rule of Law is a fundamental constitutional principle in
modern democracies. Examining the Rule of Law, it is comprised of
another two axiomatic principles: legal consistency and the principle of legal
certainty[3][4].
2.1.2 The Principle of Legal Consistency
The importance of legal consistency is described as being “deeply
rooted” in law and is a crucial facet of the Rule of Law:
“The rule of law requires that laws be applied equally,
without unjustifiable differentiation.” [5]
Now referring back to the baseline commonality between Con
and I -- that all people are human -- if there were to exist additional
criteria to the attribution of personhood, it ought to be consistent and
certain for it to be considered congruent with The Rule of Law.
Unfortunately, It has been demonstrated
by A1 that additional criteria *inevitably leads to inconsistencies and
disagreement* i.e unjustifiable differentiation! There is no unjustifiable differentiation if
personhood were to be assumed at conception, because it would apply to every
biological human.
2.1.3 The Principle of Legal Certainty
This principle is best suggested and defined as such:
“The legal system
needs to permit those subject to the law to regulate their conduct with
certainty and to protect those subject to the law from arbitrary use of state
power. Legal certainty represents a requirement that decisions be made
according to legal rules, i.e. be lawful.”[3]
From this description, it is
evident that personhood at conception ties seamlessly with the notion of legal
certainty, as it is set in stone that unalienable rights and what they entail
are to be applied to everyone at conception. However, this cannot be said for any other position; if personhood is
attributed due to arbitrary criteria, there is a possible outcome of tyrannical “use of state power”. For example,
if we are to accept that consciousness is a criterion of personhood, all of the
comatose and those unconscious would temporarily lose their personhood. Likewise, if it were derived from net
utility, one who is arbitrarily deemed as “not useful”, again, would
lose their personhood. It is a risky
game; delving into how people can lose their personhood due to “legal technicalities”. As such, the position of personhood at
conception is clearly the most attractive option.
Conclusion
I have demonstrated that personhood at conception is the only option that evades inconsistency and disagreement. To argue against this entails additional criteria to what should constitute a person. However, said criteria can never be indubitable, leading to contradictions, inconsistencies both metaphysically and with valid principles in law. I have shown that assigning personhood at any other time but conception unjustifiably demarcates personhood and thus should be rejected in light of the Pro position. The resolution is therefore affirmed.
I have demonstrated that personhood at conception is the only option that evades inconsistency and disagreement. To argue against this entails additional criteria to what should constitute a person. However, said criteria can never be indubitable, leading to contradictions, inconsistencies both metaphysically and with valid principles in law. I have shown that assigning personhood at any other time but conception unjustifiably demarcates personhood and thus should be rejected in light of the Pro position. The resolution is therefore affirmed.
Over to Con.
References
I have to skip this round. I will post my arguments and rebuttals in this round and waive the last round.
Round 2
Waive.
Thank you for your speedy reply. I am rushing here so please forgive me. I really hate this time of year.
I. Embryology 101
In order to better understand the resolution of this debate, it is important to have a little understanding of embryology. Pro is arguing that person-hood should start at the moment of conception and we shall soon see why that is absurd. When an egg and sperm combine, they form a zygote. While it is scientifically accurate to say that a new life has started (indeed, the zygote contains all the genetic information to make a baby), to call it a philosophical and legal person is incorrect. For the first few days after conception, the zygote travels down the fallopian tube and forms a ball of cells called a blastocyst, which is made up of inner groups of cells with an outer shell. The inner groups becomes the embryo and the embryo will develop to become a baby. The outer group of these cells create a protective membrane which nourishes and protects the embryo [1]. The brain and heart don't even start to form until at least week 6 [2] Since the group of zygotes and early stage of pregnancy has no brain or heart, the zygote does not have any form of consciousness. In fact, the fetus does not have any form of consciousness until at least the 24th or 28th week of pregnancy [3]. In fact, it is worth noting that the vast majority of zygotes die before becoming a fetus. Indeed, between 40-60 percent of zygotes are spontaneously aborted before the woman even knows she is pregnant [4].
II. Requirements for Personhood
P1: In order for an entity to be considered a legal person, it must have, at the very least, be conscious and self-aware
P2: The fetus does not have consciousness and self-awareness
C1: Therefore, the fetus cannot be considered a person.
P2 has already been proven in the debate introduction. P1 is fairly obvious. A person who is brain dead is no longer a legal or moral person so why should a fetus that cannot feel pain, has no heartbeat, and has no consciousness be considered a person?
I am out of time and am sorry. I wanted to get at least something up.
Sources
Round 3
Preface
Before I commence with my rebuttals there’s a few things
that ought to be pointed out. Firstly, Con hasn’t provided a rebuttal and
secondly Con’s argument doesn’t affirm his stance that he propositioned
(personhood at birth). At this stage, I
suggest that we just forget about the debate formatting and just try and
provide as much substance as possible.
== Rebuttals ==
I. Embryology 101
I am unsure what the relevance of this argument is. Con begins by asserting “while it is scientifically accurate to say that
a new life has started [at conception]… to call it a philosophical and legal
person is incorrect” but
fails to really justify this or link anything directly to it. This argument is merely a motley of what a ‘zygote’ and a ‘foetus’ do not possess (e.g heart beats, awareness etc.) and
Con doesn’t evince personhood until his next argument. As it stands, this is a red-herring as there
is no correlation from this argument to the conclusion that a personhood ought
not to be attributed at conception – a non-sequitur.
II. Requirements for Personhood
Prima facie this argument fails to meet Con’s onus. Con initially propositioned that he would be
defending *personhood at birth*, yet his argument is contingent upon the sole criterion of “consciousness”. Whilst advocating this criterion Con nullifies
his own position by positing that consciousness is developed between the “24th or 28th week of pregnancy” [Cf. R1, I. Embryology 101]. Thus, Con’s syllogism would deductively ascribe
personhood “between the 24th and 28th week of
pregnancy” not at birth. Despite Con initially advocating for personhood
at birth, since it wasn’t formally stated I suggest we should continue this
debate as if Con were to be advocating for the attribution of personhood to be between “24th or 28th week of pregnancy”.
Con’s Syllogism
"P1: In order for an entity to be
considered a legal person, it must have, at the very least, be conscious and
self-aware
P2: The fetus does not have
consciousness and self-awareness
C1: Therefore, the fetus cannot be
considered a person"
I reject the first premise. Before I examine its veracity it’s prudent to
exemplify the linguistic proposition to a more objective, first-order predicate
format:
-Let ‘P’ represent the predicate “person” and ‘C’ the predicate “consciousness”
and ‘S’ the predicate “self-aware”.
-Let ‘b’ represent a singular term (a free variable)
– the singular term in subject position is a name for an entity.
-Therefore, Pb can be read as “entity b
is a person”
(1) Pb => (Cb ^ Sb) [Universal
Instantiation]
(2) (∀x)(Px)
=> (∀x)(Cx ^ Sx) [Universal
Generalisation]
Here we have that for all x, where x is an entity,
x is a person implies that x is conscious and self-aware. Now, to address why this premise ought to be
rejected.
1. Inadequate justification for
predicate expressions
Con demarcates personhood with two specific criterions:
consciousness and self-awareness, yet his justification of them is essentially
left untold. In fact, Con mentions many
other properties in his opening case, especially in I. Embryology 101 and
specifically talks about a foetus’ inability to feel pain or possess a heartbeat
in his concluding statements, but doesn’t include them as criteria to fit
personhood? Con doesn’t link personhood
to these predicates, nor does he attempt to explain why these predicates are
even important or consistent. If
consciousness were an efficacious predicate, then why is it that we don’t
assign personhood to animals? I will wait until the next round for Con to provide
coherent explanation to why personhood is tied with this criteria.
2. Irrational predicates
Accepting Con’s argument would be to strip many different
members of our community of their inalienable rights. For example, the comatose do not meet the
criterion of consciousness, yet it does not follow that we are allowed to kill
them [1]. Moreover, it could be argued
that people with late onset Alzheimer’s have little brain capacity to think
rationally [2]. By many standard’s these
people would not be considered to meet the criterion of “self-awareness”,
yet many have an inner nisus to value these people regardless.
As Con’s argument currently stands, a pelican would
be considered a person over someone getting their wisdom teeth removed under
general anaesthetic.
Over to Con.
References
Forfeited
Round 4
Pity seeing such a promising debate go to waste.
Extend all arguments.
The end
Round 5
Waive.
the end.
Indeed.
It is a shame. I was looking forward to hearing Contenders arguments.
There is a small typo in my opening case.
What is read: "Viz. “For all x, where x is a person and where x is conscious, means x is a person”"
Should be read as: Viz. “For all x, where x is a *biological human* and where x is conscious, means x is a person”
Look forward to hearing the lines of reasoning from both of you!
>>"magically happens"
It is not going to be that more so reasons that you don't think is better than attributing Personhood at conception.
Thank you!
Looking forward to this debate. In particular, I'm looking forward to learning what "magically happens" at birth or any other point in time other than conception that deems the life worthy of protection.
With the two of you, even while being tired of this broad topic, I am now excited for this debate.
Don't think so. Don't think the instigator would need it either.
Your arguments would speak for themselves. If you are consistent in giving what you can then hope that your can is good enough. Guess hope can be luck but no amount of hope would make your argument more convincing.
Basically saying. Argument good. No need luck. Argument bad. You need miracle.
Thanks. I'll need it
Good luck
**Note: Pro and I agreed to debate this in PM**
Are you going to take up the debate?
That is true.
Personhood is usually attributed during birth. Period.
And my standard would be at the biological beginning of human life, that happens to be at the moment of conception. Would you be willing to debate on these terms or would you still rather it the other way?
I understand your concern. To avoid this you could say that your standard is when sentience and pain sensation begins, rather than "exactly" 24 weeks.
I’d be more interested, though, in a debate that compares our two specific standards. So, rather than us debating two different topics -- you affirming that the standard should be at conception and me defending that it should be exactly 24 weeks -- it would be you saying that 24 weeks is worse than conception and me saying conception is worse than 24 weeks.
But I guess it wouldn’t be that different either way. My issue is it’s hard for me to defend 24 over, say, 25, because really my standard is just “when the fetus begins to feel pain and be sentient” and the research still doesn’t know the exact number. So approximately 24 would be my standard.
I should clarify that it would be an unsuitable rebuttal for me to say "what about 23 weeks, 6 days, 23 hours and 59 minutes?" I understand that your approximation of 24 weeks cannot be an *objective*, objective standard, if you know what I mean. For example, someone could say personhood should be attributed when they develop their own heartbeat, are viable outwith the womb etc. it doesn't have to be a specific time per se.
The intent of this debate was to try and find which standard is the best. For example, if I were to assert that the voting age should be 18, it would be unsubstantial that I only affirm why it is a more suitable voting age than 16 (because, why not 21, 25 etc.?)
And we would both be incumbent on proving why our selected standard *is the best* and our rebuttals would be to show why our opponent's are not the best. Do you see where I am coming from or am I misrepresenting your point?
"Isn't it essentially the same BoP if you were to affirm why personhood should be granted at 24 weeks and justify why that time is more suitable than ¬24 weeks?"
I agree that this is my BoP -- to prove that my standard is better than yours. But I disagree that I need to prove my standard objectively. My burden isn’t to show that 24 weeks is the exact correct standard, simply that it’s a better standard than yours. And if I prove that your standard has harms that my standard doesn’t, my burden is met. So maybe change the line to “Con’s BoP is to show that their standard is better than the standard of conception.”
" I think my actual burden of proof would be to show that attributing personhood at conception is a bad thing and would do active harm."
I disagree. I would consider this more of a rebuttal (since I am affirming personhood at conception). The purpose of the debate is to answer: if not at conception, then when? Isn't it essentially the same BoP if you were to affirm why personhood should be granted at 24 weeks and justify why that time is more suitable than ¬24 weeks?
** I think my actual burden of proof would be to show that attributing personhood at conception is a bad thing and would do active harm.**
This oughtta be interesteing. Would love to debate that with you
And the debate might end up requiring me to justify personhood after conception, but clearly both of us agree that -- after conception -- we should attribute personhood, and the only question in the debate is whether, at the points between conception and approximately 24 weeks, we should attribute personhood -- my BOP would be to say that we should not.
I also disagree that my burden of proof is necessarily that “Personhood *should* be attributed at a time other than conception (e.g birth).” I think my actual burden of proof would be to show that attributing personhood at conception is a bad thing and would do active harm.
In fact let me change the format first.
Feel free to accept, Tej.
“I would accept that format. What stage of development would you like to affirm?”
Around 24 weeks.
I still wouldn't accept that a zygote is cancer; it is not a disease and it is not unnatural.
I would accept that format. What stage of development would you like to affirm?
Let the record show I've been blocked by RationalMadman.
A plea to RationalMadman:
Hey now. Didn't mean to offend. I really do want to know how you would define a person. SOrry about the sarcasm. i'll refrain.
I'm serious though, I don't care what Merriam Webster says about "person", or "personhood" or "conscious". I want to know what YOU think. It's actually very important and relevant to the discussion, because how a "person" is defined will determine what is a "person" and thus determine whether or not it's worthy to allow to live or not. Whether or not something should be allowed to live is a very serious decision, a weighty one and must not be taken lightly.
I am done with your sarcasm.
Great, thanks for the clarification. So your definition now becomes this:
"A person, in my version of English and morality, is a conscious being that is beneficial to the society as a whole."
Again, just so I'm clear-- what exactly do you mean by this new word you added ,"conscious?". I can google or consult my good friend Merriam-Webster on what "conscious" means, but we also know you may not agree to generally accepted definition of terms. So what does "conscious" mean to you?
** If you google abortion rates and look at the charts for it, as birth control use has been going up, abortion rates have been falling. It is because of birth control that I predict that abortions will no longer have to be used by 2030.**
Guess we’ll see how it goes, won’t we? Let’s hope Debateart is still around in 11 years, but just in case I’m screenshotting this thread ;-). Seriously though, birth control has been around for a long time…a VERY LONG TIME. Unfortunately, so has abortion. You’d think with birth control being so ubiquitous, it’d be non-existent by now—that it would be something archaic, a thing of the past, something we would just be telling our grandkids about around the fireplace….”I remember back in the day, we had the phonograph, we read the news on paper, and we also had to end life in the womb! You young whippersnappers have it too easy these days—with your Spotify…your streaming news….your birth control!” But no…not the case.
** It removes a sense of "responsibility" when it comes to sex. **
Does there have to be a sense of responsibility? One night of sex shouldn't correspond to 18 years of responsibility. Granted, killing the kid after 6 weeks ought to be banned. But preventing a kid from being conceived; seems alright. The women are cool with having sex generally provided they don't get pregnant. If the woman consents and she doesn't get pregnant or transmit any STDs, then I would let people have sex and it doesn't oppress women. Granted, I would require birth control to be used that is 100% effective to prevent pregnancies.
Like I said, it’s a subject for another debate ;-). There doesn’t have to be a sense of responsibility—the real question is, should there be? We can remove (or try to remove) consequences (responsibilities) all we want from actions. But then, when we do that—what are the consequences of doing that?
Add the word 'conscious' before being. Living is a secondary necessity but is a flavour of the definition. Highly developed AI and ghosts would be people in my eyes but they're not alive.
**An uninterrupted sperm cell will form a zygote if in a woman. Does this mean that we should ban things that prevent sperm from reaching eggs? If you say yes, it would ban birth control, but it would also ban abstinence since that also prevents sperm from reaching an egg.**
Sorry—you can’t make that leap. You are making the mistake of equating a sperm cell with a an already formed member of the human species (zygote). A sperm cell, as it is, is not a member of the human species-- needs certain things to happen in order for it to become a member of the human species. A zygote on the other hand is already a member of the human species, it’s already on the “human species” life continuum.
** We have separation of church and state. I don't know too much about stem cell research to have an opinion on it.**
Yep I totally agree—we do have separation of Church and State. And at no point did I state I hold this position as a “religious belief”. I’m not saying “Stem Cell Research should be banned because the Church says so!”. I don’t believe we should intentionally kill innocent toddlers so we can study their brains. Why not? Because I believe the human toddler is a stage of human life on the human life continuum (the science is pretty solid on that) and thus it’s worthy of protection. Likewise, I don’t believe we should kill zygotes, embryos, fetuses so we can harvest their Stem Cells? Why not? Because I believe the zygote (embryo, fetus) is stage of human life on the human life continuum (the science is pretty solid on that) and thus it’s worthy of protection. It’s not a “religious belief” per se-- but the Church happens to agree with me on it ;-)
You are correct sir.
45 comments and no accpetance
** A person, in my version of English and morality, is a being that is beneficial to the society as a whole. **.
Great, now we are getting somewhere! Personally speaking, I think words and definitions are very important. And I am very truly interested in understanding your viewpoint. In order to do so though I have to ask questions to make sure I'm on the same page as you. I don't want to presume to know what you think or believe.
I'll submit to you that most Philosophers, Theologians etc would define "being" or "a being" as "anything that has existence." So given that, a car, a computer, a cell phone, bacterium, Lebron James, a glass of Merlot, the Stanley Cup, a Martin 12-String, oxygen, CO2, Bubonic Plague are all "beings" from a philosophical standpoint-- they all have existence.
Given your definition then of "person", any one of these things could potentially be called a person: They are all "beings" (they all have existence), therefore whether or not they are "persons" would hinge on whether or not it's beneficial to society as a whole. Again, this is your definition, not mine. So, Oxygen is a "being" (it has existence), and Oxygen benefits society as a whole (without it people and thus Society would cease to exist...the science is pretty solid on that one), so it follows from your definition "Oxygen" could be considered a "person". Do you agree? If not, then why not?
Would you care to modify, clarify, or expand upon your social construct, er, definition of "person?"
** Nope. There is something uniquely different about a zygote (embryo)-- when uninterrupted a zygote will continue to develop along the human life continuum. **
An uninterrupted sperm cell will form a zygote if in a woman. Does this mean that we should ban things that prevent sperm from reaching eggs? If you say yes, it would ban birth control, but it would also ban abstinence since that also prevents sperm from reaching an egg.
** Again, what most institutions, at least the Catholic Church anyway, opposes is what is done to get certain stem cells -- the embryo (human life) is destroyed. If there was a way to use embryonic stem cells in such a way that it doesn't harm or destroy that embryo (human life), I and the Church would be all for it. **
We have separation of church and state. I don't know too much about stem cell research to have an opinion on it.
** I believe that Birth Control, rather then "reduce abortions or pregnancies", does the opposite. **
If you google abortion rates and look at the charts for it, as birth control use has been going up, abortion rates have been falling. It is because of birth control that I predict that abortions will no longer have to be used by 2030.
** It removes a sense of "responsibility" when it comes to sex. **
Does there have to be a sense of responsibility? One night of sex shouldn't correspond to 18 years of responsibility. Granted, killing the kid after 6 weeks ought to be banned. But preventing a kid from being conceived; seems alright. The women are cool with having sex generally provided they don't get pregnant. If the woman consents and she doesn't get pregnant or transmit any STDs, then I would let people have sex and it doesn't oppress women. Granted, I would require birth control to be used that is 100% effective to prevent pregnancies.
fundamentally, yes
I’d be down to debate this, but I dislike the format -- it’s so weird, there’d be blank spaces on the flow at random speeches.
I’d prefer R1–R4 standard format, with no new offense and no new defensive arguments in response to R1/R2 arguments in R4. So, for example:
Pro presents their contentions in R1 -> Con rebuts Pro’s case and presents Con’s contentions in R1 (though Con could integrate the two insofar as they had some offense, assuming a shared BoP) -> Pro rebuts Con’s R1 arguments, and so on (when I say “arguments,” I include rebuttal).
If cancer was somehow harmless to a woman, would killing the cancer if it never develops into a human being be classified as a felony?
So you believe personhood relies on if someone can bring joy to another?
A world where we fuck, love and have fun as much as possible while being responsible enough to stop overpopulation or undisciplined use of resources (including humans resources) is far more ideal than one where you marry, fuck after marriage solely for conception and feel like every single thing that makes you happy is a filthy sinful thing to fight.
I'm against birth control. I'm sure this will trigger all sorts of questions ("Ok, but birth control does this this and that"), debates, etc. But that is my belief (Granted I used to be vehemently pro-choice and pro-birth control etc. I've since changed my views).
I believe that Birth Control, rather then "reduce abortions or pregnancies", does the opposite. I believe it fosters a belief or culture of "anything goes" when it comes to sex. It devalues the sexual relationship and reduces the act to one that is simply for pleasure. It removes a sense of "responsibility" when it comes to sex. . It denigrates women and makes it easier for men to use women as sexual objects. It helps foster a culture of promiscuity.
** Cancer DNA is also human DNA. Are cancer cells human beings?**
Nope. THere is something uniquely different about a zygote (embryo)-- when uninterrupted a zygote will continue to develop along the human life continuum. Cancer cells aren't even on that continuum. So from that perspective, a cancer is really analogous to a hair from your cell, fingernail, or fecal matter-- while it may contain the human DNA, it is not a human being.
** What's the difference between stem cells and other cells that don't specialize? They both reproduce like crazy.**
It's not "how the cells are used" or "what the cells can do" that forms the basis for being "opposed to stem cell research." Again, what most institutions, at least the Catholic Church anyway, opposes is what is done to get certain stem cells -- the embryo (human life) is destroyed. If there was a way to use embryonic stem cells in such a way that it doesn't harm or destroy that embryo (human life), I and the Church would be all for it.
I think you could be transferring the negative connotations of cancer to a zygote. What makes cancer a 'bad' thing is that it is an unnatural disease; a zygote is not.
How early born?
The disabled can do things and bring joy to those around them.
The elderly eventually, especially if vegetative, reach a stage where they lose personhood yes. I support euthanasia and have personally seen the horror of a relative living through a euthanasia-worthy decline to the bitter end, it is disgusting to imagine experiencing shitting yourself not know what's going on and crying at times from sheer frustration and confusion. That is someone in hell, trapped in the role of being a 'person'.
Early born babies and children, the elderly and the disabled would all be disqualified from your definition of personhood.