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Something can't come from nothing because nothing isn't able to do anything or to start something.
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It depends how broadly you define 'authority'.
If reason itself is your authority then I certainly don't think that it is irrational to appeal to that authority.
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I'm, kind of, too verbose for my own good. If I want to win more then perhaps i ought to learn to be more concise. But, it's difficult, because I'd rather stay non-concise if becoming concise means leaving anything out because I want to be as absolutely thorough as possible. Thoroughness is paramount to me ... second only to authenticity (and I see honesty and non-sophistry as a subset of authenticity).
In any case, one can be very often right and an unskilled debater and one can be very often wrong and a skilled debater. Even in a debate my goal is never to win via sophistry* my goal is always to state what I think is true and do my best to explain it and if I win then that's a nice side effect of my honesty. As it happens, I am more likely to win through honesty than through sophistry anyways ... as honesty comes very natural to me but trying to win through sophistry would be like a honeybee trying to force itself to stop making honey.
*the point here is I am not somebody who tries to win no matter what. I try to win without any sort of dishonesty or sophistry but, luckily, I am more likely to win via honesty either. I am very very bad at dishonesty and sophistry—probably because I get so little practice at it. And I'm not about to change. I live by my principles. Including my principle that consequences matter more than (other) principles.
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I'm one of those awful devils who prefers Civ 6.
@SupdaDudz I will need more spare time to play Mafia again. I'd love to, actually, but I recently got out of hospital so I need to get my life back on track.
@SupdaDudz I will need more spare time to play Mafia again. I'd love to, actually, but I recently got out of hospital so I need to get my life back on track.
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@sadolite
Well, I already argued for that truth elsewhere on this site.
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We could define 'miss' as 'miss out on'.... if we define it that way then failing to take a shot is missing.
We could define 'miss' as 'not succeed at'.... if we define it that way then not taking a shot is missing.
But ...
We could also define 'miss' as 'Aiming and firing but not hitting,.' If we define it that way then not failing due to not even aiming or firing a shot is not missing.
We could also define 'miss' as 'trying and failing' ... if we define it that way then not trying at all isn't missing.
So, here we have at least 2 senses in which you really do miss 100% of the shots you don't take but we also have at least 2 senses when you really don't miss 100% of the shots you don't take.
The moral of the story is that it's important to be very specific about the definition that is being used before you jump to conclusions because sometimes something is true in one sense but not true in another sense.
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"ethical badness" is only a contradiction if you take it to mean "good but bad" (and even then it's not necessarily a contradiction because it may be that some things can be a mixture of good and bad).
That is absolutely not what I meant. Obviously. What I meant was something that is bad "in an ethical way" and, again, I don't mean something that is bad in a "good way". I mean it in the way that you can talk of something being "morally evil" .... it doesn't mean that something is both moral and evil. It means that something is evil in a moral sense.
That is absolutely not what I meant. Obviously. What I meant was something that is bad "in an ethical way" and, again, I don't mean something that is bad in a "good way". I mean it in the way that you can talk of something being "morally evil" .... it doesn't mean that something is both moral and evil. It means that something is evil in a moral sense.
So, what I am saying is that there are bad things and things can be bad in a non-moral sense or bad in a moral sense. Ethics is about the good life, or the absence of bad life... so if something is ethically bad it means it goes against the good life or the absence of the bad life.
That is a little broader than morality. As morality necessarily involves other people. Whereas you could have an ethics even with just one person. Hence why ethical egoism is a thing.
"And immorality is the opposite of morality,"
Obviously. I don't see how this is relevant to my claims or questions.
Obviously. I don't see how this is relevant to my claims or questions.
If you're still confused then just replace "ethical badness" with "unethicality" or "unethicalness".
" both of which are individual or collective decisions regarding the behaviour of other individuals or groups. "
Okay. Neither of this means that unethicality isn't suffering or that immorality isn't actions that tend to cause suffering. So, what you said could be true without it disagreeing with any of my claims. Which is fine of course. Do you think we disagree?
Okay. Neither of this means that unethicality isn't suffering or that immorality isn't actions that tend to cause suffering. So, what you said could be true without it disagreeing with any of my claims. Which is fine of course. Do you think we disagree?
"Morality is very much a human thing "
Can an alien race at least as intelligent as us not also have morality?
Can an alien race at least as intelligent as us not also have morality?
"and we probably on[ly] consider morals because we can. "
Which certainly doesn't mean that morals don't exist or that they can't be objective.
"Which is perhaps a good thing though, as we would probably end up eating our neighbours kids and f**king everything that moved or vice versa."
If morality didn't exist and therefore couldn't be considered?
If morality didn't exist and therefore couldn't be considered?
".Though some would argue that this is a good thing.... Such is the variability of morals."
But if immorality is doing things that tend to cause suffering then things such as rape and torture are morally bad (which doesn't mean good but bad... it means bad in a moral sense) because they tend to cause suffering.
But if immorality is doing things that tend to cause suffering then things such as rape and torture are morally bad (which doesn't mean good but bad... it means bad in a moral sense) because they tend to cause suffering.
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@MisterChris
The definitive edition is the best version.
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@sadolite
Ultimately, nothing is self-inflicted because there is no ultimate free will.
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Aside from the purpose that questions normally have ... it seems like it's just an enjoyable feature. Maybe not everybody enjoys it but I sure do. I like to feel interviewed as if I'm somebody with a distinct ego. Because that amuses me.
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I'm not saying that extinguishing life, to some degree, isn't necessary. Nor am I saying that we don't derive nutrition from living things. I am saying that minimizing suffering is a morally good thing.
Some vegetarians only care about cute and fluffy life. But not all. And I don't see how what vegetarians care about is relevant to my view that we ought to minimize the harm done to life and eating fewer animal products and killing fewer animals is one way to do that.
Some vegans, maybe even most vegans, are just out to impress. But, once again, not all and, more importantly, I, again, don't see how this is relevant. Even if all vegans were stuck-up and only cared about SEEMING good rather than being good .... this wouldn't entail that practicing veganism genuinely doesn't minimize sufferng or isn't morally good.
I never suggested that strawberries themselves could be 'killed' or that all vegans are hypocrites. Are some hypocrites? Perhaps. If by that we mean that some vegans claim to care about all animals but some of them don't care about, say, insects.
I care about insects. But I understand that some insects are going to be harmed and that we can't avoid that. And that insects are going to be harmed when we farm crops. But this doesn't mean I don't think there is anything wrong, say, with killing a little black beetle that has wandered into your home if you could easily put it back outside. Sure, it will die eventually (or soon, from our POV, because its lifespan is short, from our POV .... but not from its POV) then that means it's going to suffer and die in either case. But it may find more water and food outside than in your home. Or you may wish to leave it alone, if there is more food for it in your home, and if it is tiny, harmless and it's a solitary creature that isn't going to cause an infestation that would make YOU suffer.
'Your argument is they are hypocrites for not rising perfectly to a do no harm lifestyle. '
No. My argument is that some, but not all, of them may be hypocrites by at least one definition of 'hypocrite' and that such vegans may be able to rise *closer to* not harming any life. I certainly wouldn't suggest that they, or anybody else, could rise to not harming any life at all. I would say that that couldn't be done and if we tried to achieve it we would end up harming ourselves (lack of nutrition, not protecting ourselves from dangerous animals, etc) and, thus, we wouldn't be following the principle of not harming life because we would be harming ourselves and we're life, too, and we have a duty to ourselves, too.
'This does not invalidate the decreased harm they do over the course of a lifetime by giving up consumption of animal products.'
I agree. And I am not aiming this at any vegans who wouldn't unnecessarily kill an insect. I am aiming at vegans who would. Vegans who think that insects don't count. I understand that we will have to kill insects to some degree. But this doesn't invalidate the principle that killing less insects unnecessarily isn't morally better than killing unnecessarily. Just as how, you rightly say, that minimizing consumption of animal products is still a good thing even if we can't avoid harming animals altogether, if we include, at least, animals like insects---it is also right to say that minimizing kills of insects is still a good thing even if we can't avoid killing them altogether.
'Ought' implies 'can' so I would never suggest that we ought to do the impossible. I would also not suggest that it's not okay to kill insects *when doing so is necessary in order to avoid harm to ourselves*. As, even if insects somehow feel as much pain and suffering as we do then it would at least cancel things out if we killed them .... since not killing them at all kills us (we at least need to eat plants in order to survive and eating plants will kill more insects) then AT LEAST it's morally neutral or indifferent in that particular case. And then the only motivations we are left with are non-moral motivations .... such as survival ... so we would understandably be left eating plants and killing insects.
But that's in that particular case. It doesn't mean it's not bad to unnecessarily kill insects when we can avoid it. It doesn't mean that when we have a choice between either letting a harmless non-pest insect out of our home or crushing that insect to death .... it doesn't mean that the former option in that case isn't morally superior.
'As for vegetarians who consume meat... Yeah, it's a little weird that they want to call themselves vegetarian, instead of just proclaiming being on a no red meat diet.'
I agree. But some people in some countries eat insects. And I would also think it would be a little weird for a vegan to eat insects and say it doesn't count and doesn't make them non-vegan because they personally believe that insects don't feel pain or suffer.
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@Intelligence_06
Neither game is objectively bad at all.
I just dislike them.
I just dislike them.
Now the original GTa .... that was fun.
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I don't think that the concept of relative truth makes any sense. I think all truth is absolute.
I don't think lies are anything metaphysically fundamental. I think that lies are *ethically* fundamental. Although, they're not the most ethically fundamental thing. To me the most ethically fundamental thing is that suffering is essentially bad.
I agree absolute truth is very fundamental. But I see 'absolute truth' as just synonymous with plain old 'truth'.
I think believing in subjective truth is deeply confused.
Relative truth ..... well, I can only make sense of it if it refers to truths relative to whatever those truths refer to. But that even applies to absolute truth and I think that's a completely trivial sense of relative. So, again, I don't think that there's any meaningful way in which truth is relative. So I'm just going to go ahead and say truth is necessarily absolute. Otherwise I'm referring to something meaningless and thereby not really referring to anything at all.
So, I think truth is absolute. But I don't think it's the most fundamental truth that truth is absolute. I think that existence exists is at least as fundamental. I think that consciousness is real is at least as fundamental. There are a few fundamentals. I don't think it's three. I think that there are many fundamental expressions that we can't really specifically innumerate because there are many ways to put things. But there are certainly ways to put things that are incoherent or meaningless. And I don't think that incoherent or meaningless truths belong in the category of the most fundamental truths of existence.
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@zedvictor4
Or it could be a cosmic twofold.
Spacetime (or matter) and energy.
Or a comic onefold.
All is a form of: energy.
Or a comic onefold.
All is a form of: energy.
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Just as there are some people who call themselves vegetarians who still eat fish (they ought to call themselves pescatarians) there are also some people who call themselves vegans who have no problem with killing, for example, insects.
Why is this?
I think it's because that most vegans are vegan for ethical reasons and some of them are vegan for ethical reasons because they want to minimize suffering towards all beings but this only applies to beings that can suffer and some vegans think that they know that insects, for example, either don't suffer, are very unlikely to suffer, or suffer very little.
Why is this?
I think it's because that most vegans are vegan for ethical reasons and some of them are vegan for ethical reasons because they want to minimize suffering towards all beings but this only applies to beings that can suffer and some vegans think that they know that insects, for example, either don't suffer, are very unlikely to suffer, or suffer very little.
It is still the case that they are willing to harm animals, though. Because insects are animals. A vegan who, for example, kills a wasp with a wasp spray is, in my view, causing a great deal of suffering to that wasp and this is bad just as killing a cow is bad.
It's harder to avoid killing or harming insects. But the important thing is that we intend not to.
I would also argue that we ought to never attempt to be violent. I don't believe in anything supernatural and I don't accept the religion of Jainism but one could say that I accept its most fundamental tenant of 'extreme' pacifism. You could call me a secular Jain. Or, with further qualification, a minimalist secular jain (little j).
It's harder to avoid killing or harming insects. But the important thing is that we intend not to.
I would also argue that we ought to never attempt to be violent. I don't believe in anything supernatural and I don't accept the religion of Jainism but one could say that I accept its most fundamental tenant of 'extreme' pacifism. You could call me a secular Jain. Or, with further qualification, a minimalist secular jain (little j).
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And what does it mean to say that we ought not to do such and such?
I have my own opinions on this.
I have my own opinions on this.
(1) Ethical badness is suffering.
(2) Immorality is actions that cause suffering.
(3) To say that we ought not to do such and such is to say that such and such tends to cause suffering.
What are your opinions on this?
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(1) Autistic people cannot be forced to wear masks. Hence, (2)it's really a matter of how uncomfortable wearing a mask is.
(3) Being forced to give birth is FAR BEYOND mere discomfort. Hence why (4) the two things are not really comparable.
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@Intelligence_06
I know because evolution is a fact.
Science is epistemically objective.
Our mainstream biology is correct because it has the most evidence and soundest evidence backing it up which is precisely why it's become the mainstream.
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I think it's very probably true that most Christians don't read all of their bible.
I think it's very probably true that almost all Christians read some of their bible.
I think it's very probably true that almost all Christians read some of their bible.
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@zedvictor4
The ego is, itself, extremely egotistical but I still don't see how denying the ego is an extremely egotistical thing for a person to do. I would say that it's not extremely egotistical to deny the ego. I would say it's egotistical to deny the ego. But I wouldn't say that it's extremely egotistical to deny the ego. I'd say it's extremely egotistical to either brag that one is completely without an ego and therefore superior or brag that one is superior because of one's ego.
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(P1) If all facts are just feelings then there won't be any examples, at all, of a fact that isn't just feelings.
(P2) It's a fact that we don't have libertarian free will.
(P3) The fact that we don't have libertarian free will is an example of a fact that isn't just feelings.
(C1) Therefore, facts are not just feelings.
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(P1) To have Libertarian FW one has to originate oneself
(P2) One can't originate oneself.
(C1) Therefore, one can't have Libertarian FW.
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I'd say it isn't always because sometimes going against it would be more likely to minimize suffering.
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@zedvictor4
Denying the ego would require the ego but I don't see how it would be extremely egotistical.
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@Intelligence_06
There is strong empirical evidence via science that evolution via natural selection is almost certainly true. That's how I know.
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Empirical facts fundamentally require experiences. But we can imagine a creature that has experiences without feelings.
Non-empirical facts, if they exist, don't require anything if we're including fundamental logical truths such as the LOI.
Non-empirical facts, if they exist, don't require anything if we're including fundamental logical truths such as the LOI.
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When it hurts others as well as yourself then it's not that simple.
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Persons aren't created at all.
Persons evolve.
No person is evil but some persons have malevolent character traits.
Persons evolve.
No person is evil but some persons have malevolent character traits.
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@3RU7AL
The all have the same options but it's not relevant to the matter of determinism vs libertarian free will.
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That's not the question begged. I take no issue accepting the premise that we do that which we do by reason of the way we are. I'm asking, what is the way that we are? Is it a composite of personal experiences? Is it genetically influenced behaviors? Is it perspective? All of the above? And how does it necessarily exclude assuming moral responsibility?
So what is the supposed question begged, then?
If you accept the premise then it simply doesn't matter what the way we are is. If we do what we do because of the way we are then we can't make ourselves the way we are because we can't get back behind ourselves. Whether we are material, immaterial, determined or undetermined it simply does not matter. So your question isn't relevant.
A strong sort of moral responsibility is excluded because a strong sort of free will is excluded. In order to have ultimate moral responsibility and Libertarian Free Will we would have to get back behind X but we can't get back behind X. X's nature is irrelevant because the point is that *whatever X is* we would have to get back behind it in order to have such a kind of free will and responsiiblity but we can't.
If you accept the premise then it simply doesn't matter what the way we are is. If we do what we do because of the way we are then we can't make ourselves the way we are because we can't get back behind ourselves. Whether we are material, immaterial, determined or undetermined it simply does not matter. So your question isn't relevant.
A strong sort of moral responsibility is excluded because a strong sort of free will is excluded. In order to have ultimate moral responsibility and Libertarian Free Will we would have to get back behind X but we can't get back behind X. X's nature is irrelevant because the point is that *whatever X is* we would have to get back behind it in order to have such a kind of free will and responsiiblity but we can't.
Because you're (Strawson's) arguing that X excludes free will. And you haven't substantiated the reason we can't be the cause of X. Hence, the nature of X is important because understanding its nature helps us understands its cause where we can render conclusions soundly on that which causes or does not cause X.
The argument itself is clearly substantiated by the fact that an infinite regress happens whereby we can never get back behind ourselves to make ourselves the way we are. You just keep asking an irrelevant question when you're asking me to substantiate what our nature actually is and asking me "What is the way we are?". It's not relevant. You would have to substantiate the relevance of that question first but you can't substantiate it because we can't get back behind ourselves to make ourselves the way we are *regardless of what the way we are is*. It has absolutely nothing to do with whatever nature we happen to have and everything to do with the fact that we can't get back behind that nature *whatever it is* to make it.
We can't be the ultimate *cause o*f our nature, *regardless* of what our nature is, because it leads to an infinite regress where we would never be able to ultimately cause our nature ... and asking "What is our nature?" has no relevance. It's a red herring.
We can't be the ultimate *cause o*f our nature, *regardless* of what our nature is, because it leads to an infinite regress where we would never be able to ultimately cause our nature ... and asking "What is our nature?" has no relevance. It's a red herring.
I'm going to drop the whole Schopenhauer thing because it's not important and you have conceded that it resembles Strawson's position in some ways which is all I thought to begin with anyway.
Also, we are never going to agree if you think that Schopenhauer is a proponent of free will because that is just absolutely false. It's not a matter of what he 'would be' for the reason you personally think. It's actually the case that he *was* famously well known for being very clearly an *opponent of* free will. It seems that you want to disagree for the sake of disagreeing. If you are going to claim that the philosopher who is most famously a pessimist isn't a pessimist ... then that's just silly and the arguing for the sake of it in face of all evidence to the contrary.
What's more, even if you could muster up an argument for why Schopenahauer was a *compatabilist* ... that would just be yet another red herring. Because that is not the sense of free will that is being argued against.
So after conceding that Schopenhauer's position resembles Strawson's in some ways you still insist that the two positions don't resemble each other. You're contradicting yourself. What's more, you clearly don't know what Schopenhauer's position on free will is if you think he is a proponent of Libertarian Free Will. Both Strawson and Schopenhauer offer similar arguments *against* Libertarian Free Will and *that* is all I mean by the fact that their positions resemble each other. The fact that you accept that they resemble each other in *some* ways is already enough to get to similarity.
Anyway, back to Strawson. I think we should move on from Schopenhauer because it's not important and I'm far more interested in us focussing on the actual argument I offered.
You say that Strawson's third premise is especially substantiated but he substantiated that very clearly in the video that you watched. He also made it clear that the argument I gave, and that he started of with in the video, is the 'crude' version. Meaning that, the purpose of that basic argument isn't to substantiate the premises. An argument isn't supposed to substantiate its own premises. To substantiate the premises for an argument you need another argument. Arguments don't substantiate themselves.
You say that Strawson's third premise is especially substantiated but he substantiated that very clearly in the video that you watched. He also made it clear that the argument I gave, and that he started of with in the video, is the 'crude' version. Meaning that, the purpose of that basic argument isn't to substantiate the premises. An argument isn't supposed to substantiate its own premises. To substantiate the premises for an argument you need another argument. Arguments don't substantiate themselves.
He went into detail about how for us to *ultimately* make ourselves the way that we are we would have to get back behind ourselves infinitely ... a regress happens whereby we can never ultimately get back behind ourselves to make ourselves the way we are. He made this all very clear in the video. He substantiated the argument just fine.
Because the context of my response doesn't concern the veracity of Strawson's premise, only whether it resembled Schopenhauer's position--sound or not.
This isn't an answer to the question and it seems that you just misspoke by saying "no" to the question because you say the opposite below.
Yes, I agree. My agreement would be irrelevant to veracity. You're doing what I was doing: confirming agreement, and nothing more.
I don't agree with you that Schopenhauer believed in Libertarian Free Will (and if your point is that you think that he believed in Compatabilist free will then that's a red herring), I don't agree that Schopenhauer's position doesn't resemble Strawson's (and you conceded that they do partially resemble each other ... and I never claimed that they wholly did) .... and they both do offer similar arguments against Libertarian Free Will. It's pointless for us to argue about how much position A has to resemble position B for them to count as resembling. There was no point in you arguing about Schopenhauer anyway because the topic of the thread is whether free will exists and I was offering an argument against free will. So that is what we should be focussing on.
Again, the only reason I left that part about Schopenhauer in is because I like to give more rather than less context of the source I'm quoting from. Strawson's argument is the only important part. You happen to be wrong about Schopenhauer, as he is famously against Libertarian Free Will, but it's really not important or even relevant to actually addressing Strawson's argument.
You're the one who injected Schopenhauer in the first place. I'm merely responding.
I already dealt with this prior to you saying this. Again, I was just trying to not leave out the context from where I was quoting from. It's a great vice to quote mine so I didn't want to do that. I already explained this. The actual argument that Strawson provided is clearly what needs to be addressed because that's actually an argument against free will that has been offered.
And you're not merely responding ... you're responding with red herrings!
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@Athias
'We do what we do because of the way we are' is a premise that you can accept or reject ... not a question begged. For it to beg the question it would have to be synonymous with the conclusion but it isn't.
To cause the way we are we *would* have to be the cause of ourselves but we can't be the cause of ourselves.
It really doesn't matter what the nature of way we are is if we do what we do because of the way we are.
By asking "What is the way we are?" I have to just again ask in response "How is that relevant?". Again, how is the nature of X relevant when X is the cause of what we do and we can't be the cause of X?
I didn't say that Strawson's position perfectly resembles Schopenhauer's. I'm saying that it resembles it in the relevant sense. Namely, that our motives are causes from within and that we can do what we will but we can't will what we will. *That* is part of Schopenhauer's position that Strawson is very much in agreement with and *that* is the relevant resemblance.
What's more, why did you say "no" in response to me saying that it doesn't matter what a philosopher thinks of X if X is sound? Do you not agree that if X is sound then X is sound regardless of what another philosopher thinks of X in such a case? Who cares what Schopenahauer thinks in such a case, anyway, if X is sound anyway. The part about Schopenhauer was just part of the quote from Wikipedia. It was really Strawson's argument from that page that was important ... and I just try to not leave out context that I'm quoting from.
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@Athias
Galen pointed out that immaterialism/materialism and determinism/indeterminism aren't relevant. It's claiming that those thing matter that are merely a claim. It's special pleading to just say that if you're an indetermined immaterial soul then that's not what you are. In fact, if that's what you are then that's what you are. Far from just being a claim, that's a tautology. If you do what you do because of what you are and you are X then you do what you do because of X. It doesn't matter whether X is indeterministic or immaterial or not. If you do Y because of X then you do Y because X ... regardless of the nature of X. What do you mean "What does the way were are" mean? We are the way we are regardless of materialism, immaterialism, determinism or indeterminism.
Schopenhauer may not agree with the entirety of Galen's position but he did say that we cannot choose our motives and he also said that motives are causes from within ... and that's suffering that Galen would agree with. Also, it's irrelevant what a particular philosopher thought or didn't think about X if X is sound.
What do you mean "How can he allege that it's not causi sui"? Galen says that Libertarian Free Will would have to require that. The reason why it's not reasonable is because it would require an infinite regress of causation and we are not infinite beings. We would have to always require a further cause and we'd never reach free will. He's offering an infinite regress argument against free will.
Libertarian Free Will requires a sort of ultimate SELF-determinism. In other words, we'd have to be the ultimate cause of ourselves. So neither us being ultimately caused by other things (determinism) nor us being uncaused (indeterminism) will suffice.
And the reason why Galen Strawson refuses to define the mind as a materially closed system is because like he said ... giving us indeterminism and a soul won't help either. If that's what we are then that won't help. You ask what it means to say "the way we are" in such a case but I will instead ask "What does it even mean to say that "the way we are" only makes sense in a materially closed system?".
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"Stimulants, depressants or hallucinogens?"
Stimulants.
Stimulants.
"Compassion, justice or loyalty?"
Compassion.
Compassion.
"Between strategic cunning, IQ, creative thinking and fast thinking, which displays intelligence in its finest form?"
Between all of those I'd put strategic thinking, creative thinking and fast thinking as all equally important but I'd personally say that deep thinking/philosophical thinking is above all of them. And I do distinguish that as its own category from creativity, strategy, speed and IQ.
Between all of those I'd put strategic thinking, creative thinking and fast thinking as all equally important but I'd personally say that deep thinking/philosophical thinking is above all of them. And I do distinguish that as its own category from creativity, strategy, speed and IQ.
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I think it's *perhaps* just from the POV of Rule Consequentialism but definitely not always just from the POV of Act Consequentialism.
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@Athias
Sure, here's the proof in written form:
In the free will debate, Strawson holds that there is a fundamental sense in which free will is impossible, whether determinism is true or not. He argues for this position with what he calls his "basic argument", which aims to show that no-one is ever ultimately morally responsible for their actions, and hence that no one has free will in the sense that usually concerns us. In its simplest form, the basic argument runs thus:
- You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.
- To be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental respects.
- But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
- So you cannot be ultimately responsible for what you do.[4]
This argument resembles Arthur Schopenhauer's position in On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, summarised by E. F. J. Payne as the "law of motivation, which states that a definite course of action inevitably ensues on a given character and motive".
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And here is the same philosopher giving the argument in video form:
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Very strange way of putting it.
A simpler way of putting it is that it is already accepted that Libertarianism is incompatible with determinism but indeterminism doesn't help Libertarianism either because indeterminism means that we can't determine our own actions. Libertarianism would require a sort of ultimate SELF-determinism rather than merely an absence of OTHER-determinism.
And a person whose actions are ultimately self-determined is a person who would have to be the cause of themselves infinitely. An infinite regress would happen of a sort even problematic for God because it's disputed whether actual infinites are even metaphysically possible at all let alone possible for mere human beings.
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Libertarian free will is provably impossible whether determinism is true or false.
Compatabilist free will is true--but vacuously and trivially so--whether determinism is true or false.
Libertarian free will is the meaningful kind of free that most people want to believe in and do believe in ... but it's absurd.
Compatabilist free will is the meaningless kind of free will that everybody but a pure fatalist also believes in, in addition to the majority that believe in the more meaningful but absurd compatabilist kind, but it's completely useless (to everybody but an absolute fatalist which is almost nobody).
It could even be argued that compatabilism isn't even helpful to the fatalist. Because compatabilism merely labels actions as free actions and will as free will. Compatabilist free will is true by definition but only because it's labelled even the non-free as free. It's a completely empty sense of freedom because it completely ignores the distinction between freedom's presence and freedom's absence. And I'm ignoring the standard constraint account because even pure fatalists recognize that distinction they just wrongly don't see themselves as part of the causal chain. Nobody thinks that there isn't a difference between being coerced and not being coerced. The only interesting question is whether somebody can, ultimately, determine their own behavior and the answer to that really is no.
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@PressF4Respect
IMO, he should be modkilled even if he faked it.
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All caught up.
My reads of RM, Croc and possibly PressF4Respect being scum remain the same. And I don't think User is scum but I think that somebody who copypastes either a real *or* fake rolepm should be modkilled anyway so I'm going to policy lynch him if that's not going to happen.
UNVTL
VTL User
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@RationalMadman
Seems obvious for me what's going on. Somebody was scumread strongly and they almost got lynched and beforehand they claimed they was a doctor.
So now you and them decide to abstain from NKing to try and make him look like a doctor.
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@Speedrace
Ah thanks. I wouldn't be surprised if PressF4Respect was the third scum but that one is just a hunch. Okay, anyway, later folks.
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I gotta go and spend time with the GF now. Good luck folks (and, again, "good luck folks" is an alignment-neutral statement that applies regardless of faction so it's NOT an example of LAMIST). I always say that regardless.
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