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@ethang5
I concur wholeheartedly. Are you also a molinist?
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@ethang5
Thank you for the encouragement. In all honesty the thread is getting a tad tiresome. I think Flrw had the best objection and I will respond to him lastly, after my response to him I might call it a day on this thread. We had a good discussion, I hope they thought so too.
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If there are any Reformed folks on this forum, grace and peace. I usually don't spend too much time with in house discussions right now as I'm currently pursuing natural theology, however this topic is one I love pondering.
I had a very brief flirtation with Calvinism this past year, I ultimately didn't go down that path as I believe Molinism offers a superior solution to the classic questions of divine sovereignty and human freedom.
Here's my thoughts:
In Reformed theology God is absolutely and meticulously sovereign over His creation because nothing happens outside of His decree. If it happened it is because God decreed it.
In the Molinist paradigm however, God is still absolutely and meticulously sovereign over His creation, but not because nothing happens outside of His decree, but because He uses His middle knowledge to achieve His will and purposes through the free undetermined actions of His creatures.
Why is this important?
Well in the Reformed schematic, I don't see how determinism can be affirmed without sourcing the origin of sinful acts in God.
In the Molinist schematic, God can perfectly enact and accomplish His will through completely free creatures.
In other words, under Molinism God doesn't have to play the chess pieces on the board (i.e. decree everything they will do). He can let each piece move freely themselves on their own while still getting His will accomplished. This seems like a superior understanding of God.
Any thoughts?
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@3RU7AL
@Theweakeredge
So far just felt it necessary to say I appreciate the continued dialog and the well thought out responses from everybody. I don't think the reductio ad absurdum has reduced the MOA to absurdity because, as I was trying to point out in my original reply, there's a stark contrast between positing a contigent, material object and an mgb.
Going in reverse because the last point I found most troublesome:
In order for a being to be eternally intelligible it would need an eternal human who needed it and was capable of standing in awe from eternity past.
Bro do you even divine aseity???
In all seriousness, this is QUITE a leap. This wouldn't even apply to humans. Would you fail to exist, or have your existence rendered unintelligible if you were the only being on the planet and nobody else existed to admire you? That just doesn't make sense. God's existence is not contigent on or sustained by our adoration. Really nobody's existence is.
However my point was a chair's intelligibility is in fact dependent on something to seat.
In other words, what makes the very concept of "beingness" intelligible in the first place, is quite frankly, human tushies. Without a person to stand in awe before it, the essence of a being becomes unintelligible
My point originally stated was that the idea of chairness is unintelligible without the corresponding concept of "sitting". And sitting is unintelligible without a being to sit.
To simply assert a being cannot be intelligible without corresponding adoration is hands down the wackiest atheist objection I've ever heard, and can only be responded to with three words:
"Whaddo you meme??"
the very telos of a being is to appear superior to a human.
But no, it isn't. The telos of a chair is to seat things. The telos of being is to be.
I mean, what is a being? A being by definition has legs and a back, as well as a place to sit. I don't see how we can keep those definitions in tact while upholding said being is immaterial. Does this being have immaterial legs? A back not extended in space? Is it made of non physical flesh?
In this case I'm not arguing for a non physical human, that wouldn't make any sense.
I'm arguing for a non physical conscious entity. The statement "a being by definition has a back and legs" not only assumes the only beings that exist are bipeds with a torso (sorry caterpillars) but is simply not what I'm arguing
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@3RU7AL
Is a person who lives a long life necessarily "greater" than someone who lives a short life?
Well no, but in this analogy, you're comparing two contigent beings who share in the same mode of existence.
Imagine two comic book characters... contigent man and Doctor Necessary. Contigent man could easily be killed, he has the potential for non existence. But doctor necessary cannot be destroyed. He never came into being and will never go out of being.
I think which is greater in this case is self evident
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@3RU7AL
@Theweakeredge
Any chair which was maximally great would not need to rely on matter or space to exist.
I think we start getting into some really squirrelly territory here. So first and foremost as I alluded to before, the idea of maximal chair greatness is not really a well defined concept. What one person finds great in a chair could be completely opposite to what another person finds great in a chair.
Secondly, what you're positing now are immaterial chairs. I would argue that's not a very coherent concept.
I mean, what is a chair? A chair by definition has legs and a back, as well as a place to sit. I don't see how we can keep those definitions in tact while upholding said chair is immaterial. Does this chair have immaterial legs? A back not extended in space? Is it made of non physical wood?
Also, perhaps most damagingly to the idea of a maximally great chair, is that, the very telos of a chair is to sit a being with a physical structure similar to that of a human. In the plethora of possible worlds where humans do not exist to give the chair its telos, what can the chair be called at that point?
In other words, what makes the very concept of "chairness" intelligble in the first place, is quite frankly, human tushies. Without a person to sit the essence of a chair becomes unintelligible
When you posit a necessarily existing chair you're in effect saying we have an eternal chair.
In order for a chair to be eternally intelligible it would need an eternal agent who needed and was capable of sitting from eternity past.
I would argue the atheist is trying to avoid such a being.
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@zedvictor4
Would firstly, only like to know the significance of the crazy Latin name?
Soluminsanis =
Solum: Latin for alone
Insanis: Latin for insane.
Literally "alone and insane". It's an homage to not only the celibate lifestyle, but also the potential extreme mental suffering many who have embraced a monastic lifestyle have experienced throughout history. This, in my view, is greatly under mentioned whenever a monastic from history is spoken of. Years of solitude take their toll on a man. No one ever seems to mention that though.
My profile picture is St. Athanasius, the great defender of the Holy Trinity. He is often depicted as "Athanasius contra mundum" or Athanasius against the world.
The story goes he was among the last Trinitarians of his time, arguing for the truth of the Trinity from exile, while the Arians had a temporary stronghold on Christendom.
One can only imagine how lonely he felt.
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@ethang5
I would say so. It's often been said the ontological argument frames God's existence as either being impossible or absolutely certain. The ontological argument takes away all middle ground. The idea is if God's existence is possible God's existence is certain.
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@fauxlaw
Thank you for the welcome. In regards to me personally, there's not much to know about me honestly. Just an average Joe that has a theology interest.
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@3RU7AL
1. It is possible that a maximally great CHAIR* (mgC for short) exists.2. A mgC exists in some possible world.3. If a mgC exists in one possible world, then a mgC exists in all possible worlds.4. A mgC exists in the actual world.5. Therefore a maximally great CHAIR exists (in every possible fraction of the multi-cosmos).*for our purposes an mgC is defined as a being that possesses all great CHAIR properties, and lacks no great CHAIR property.
So now we're getting into some more meaty objections. It was the monk Guanilo that originally opposed St. Anselm's ontological argument with the idea of a perfect conceivable island.
Some atheists parodying the argument will use unicorns, or pizza, or what have you. In this case you used a chair. We'll go with that for now.
The parodies of the OA seem convincing at first, however, I can't say that I'm convinced they go through. And because they don't go through, I still believe the OA is intact.
So let's think about possible worlds and the idea of a maximally great chair.
In order for an mgc to exist in all possible worlds, several things would need to be true.
The chair itself would have to exemplify maximal greatness.
The chair would have to exist across all possible worlds.
This simply isn't possible though.
We can imagine several possible worlds where the space time continuum either doesn't exist or is dramatically different. If there exists a possible world where no space exists, then we cannot have a mgc in that world because there is no space for the matter of the chair to be extended into.
Likewise, most chairs are made of either wood, plastic, or metal, these materials cannot exist necessarily because they have the potential for non existence. Imagine a possible world where everything was the temperature of the sun. A chair couldn't exist in that possible world due to the extreme conditions which would preclude the chair's existence.
Finally, the idea of a chair itself exemplifying maximal greatness is some what incoherent. What makes a chair great is subjective.
I like my chairs made of bean bags, others would prefer a rocking chair, others a barka lounger. The idea of chair greatness cannot exactly be nailed down.
I don't this particular version of the argument goes through
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@Sum1hugme
In regards to what constitutes greatness, I've fleshed this out in my replies to others. At risk of being repetitive, have you read my replies to drafterman or flrw?
In regards to defining God into existence, which premise do you believe does this, and we can discuss it
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@FLRW
1. We don't know that intelligibility implies possibilityAnd2. We don't know that "maximally-great being" is a truly intelligible conceptSo3. We don't know that it is possible for a maximally-great being to exist.What's more4. We don't know that necessity is a predicateWhich means5. We don't know it is greater to exist necessarily than contingentlyTherefore6. Plantinga's proof fails.
I think you're employing an unnecessary amount of agnosticism in regards to each premise.
If we're talking about metaphysical possibility as opposed to epistemic possibility, then all that would be required for any concept to go through is it being logical coherent. Probability doesn't necessarily play a role.
I don't see anything unintelligible about the idea of an mgb. Do you have anything particular in mind?
What would be required for us to know whether or not an mgb is possible? Again if it is logically coherent there wouldn't be anything precluding its existence in modal logic.
As far as point five, I believe this to be self evident. If a being is contingent, it came into being and can go out of being. If it is necessary it did not come into being and cannot go out of being. This is self evidently greater
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@drafterman
@3RU7AL
@zedvictor4
@FLRW
@Sum1hugme
6 against 1....I like those odds.
@drafterman, thus far, most of our discussion has been me trying various ways to explain the concept of great making properties and the concept of maximal greatness. I must not be a very articulate guy because I feel like you've asked me the same question multiple times in multiple ways. I'm not sure how much clearer I can make it. My fault not yours, I'm going to leave your last question off to the side for now, as I don't know how else to state it.
@3ru7al, Your maximally great chair argument is actually a really good objection which I will devote a separate individual reply to... you and FLRW and zedvictor4, plus sum1hugme will get their own responses....stand by.
@ brotherdthomas, I'm not sure if your posts are serious or jocular, either way they are simply not relevant to this discussion
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@drafterman
"Except the octopus wouldn't be greater than the flea in smallness, stupidity, youth, naivete, and immorality."
You could certainly frame it this way. However none of those attributes possesed by the flea are great making properties. They're lesser making properties. So the flea is greater in lesser making properties making it not greater but lesser.
Except attributes can be contradictory. Ergo it is impossible for such a being to exist.
Can you elaborate on this? Which attributes in particular?
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@drafterman
I agree that one being can be greater in an attribute than another being.
And
But I have no idea what it means for an octopus to be greater than a flea.
Suppose the octopus was greater in ***all*** of its attributes than the flea. The octopus was greater in size, intelligence, age, wisdom, and even moral perfection. This would mean the octopus was greater than the flea. I'm stretching the analogy but you get the idea.
Now suppose we have a being that is greater in all of its attributes to any other being in existence. That's an mgb
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@drafterman
I neither agree or disagree because I have no conception of what it means for one being to be superior to another. That is why I've continually asked for you to root it in objective logical reasoning rather than what is personally self-evident to you.
Surely you don't believe all beings are equal in their attributes or modes of existence? Is an octopus not superior in intelligence to a flea? Is an elephant not superior in size to an ant?
I drew the analogy that a being who knows all things would be greater than a being who knew some things
Would you agree? Yes? No?
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@BrotherDThomas
Fair enough. I would obviously choose Yahweh because I am a Christian. However, it needs to be stated, the OA in and of itself cannot prove Christianity, just that an mgb exists.
Any deity on that list that has attributes that can be considered to exemplify maximal greatness, the OA can be used to establish. That narrows the list down.
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@drafterman
I'm not really sure I follow. To me, it just seems self evident, and therefore logical and objectively true, that a necessary being is superior to a contigent being.
Would you disagree? If so, what is your reasoning?
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@drafterman
I can't grant any premise until you define what it means for a mode of existence to be "greater" or "superior" than another.
Right so, St. Anselm's original formulation of this argument was an attempt to actually define what God is. If we think of it in terms of a food chain that's helpful.
What is the top of the "food chain" of existence? IOW, what is the greatest possible. or conceivable being?
When we answer this question some things become obvious:
What's greater, a being that knows some things or a being that knows all things? All things right?
What's greater, a being that has some power or all power? All power right?
Then we get to necessity and contigency.
A contingent being is one whose explanation for its existence is found in an outside or prior entity. You and I are contigent beings, our explanation for existence is found in a prior being or state of affairs.
A necessary being however, is a being whose existence is not explained by a prior or outside reality, but one whose existence is explained in its own nature. It exists because it is existence. Not because it was actualized by a prior cause.
Now which of these two beings would you say is greater? A being which was actualized by a prior reality? Or a being who was not actualized by a prior reality?
I think the answer would be the obvious latter
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@drafterman
I'm no historian, but as far as I know, Kant never interacted with this particular formulation of the OA because it is fairly new, having been developed by Plantinga in the 70s.
Kant's objection, again, afaik, was against Anselm's original formulation. Unless you and I are from alternate timelines, which is entirley possible.
"Either existence is one of those qualities or it is not"
The question is which **mode** of existence is greater, Contigent existence or necessary existence. Not whether having existence in and of itself is a great making property. The orginal OA depended on that, but not this one.
The first premise states that it is possible for an mgb to exist. The question then becomes what would an mgb look like.
Do you grant the first premise?
Then this falls into "God exists because I define God as something that exists" camp which is tautological. Also you haven't defined what "greater" means.
Well no. Firstly by greater I simply mean having a superior mode of being. The argument doesn't define God as something that exists de facto.
What it does say though is that IF God exists, and we define God as an Mgb, then His existence must be in the mode of necessity not contingency, because necessity is a great making property. And contigency is a lesser making property
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@drafterman
I think your objection works with St. Anselm's original argument which was based off of conceptualization.
However, I would disagree, or at least nuance your statement about existence as part of its great making properties.
The MOA hinges on the idea that a being with ***necessary *** existence is greatert than one with contigent existence. That is the main point.
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@BrotherDThomas
I'm not quite sure the selection you offered me is 100 percent relevant to this particular argument. The ontological argument is trying to establish the existence of an mgb. That's all.
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The modal ontological argument as developed by philosopher Alvin Plantinga:
1. It is possible that a maximally great being* (mgb for short) exists.
2. An mgb exists in some possible world.
3. If an mgb exists in one possible world, then an mgb exists in all possible worlds.
4. An mgb exists in the actual world.
5. Therefore God exists.
*for our purposes an mgb is defined as a being that possesses all great making properties, and lacks no great making property.
Out of all the classical theistic arguments, this one is my personal favorite. Albeit, somewhat paradoxically, although I believe it to be a sound proof , it seems to be the less convincing for many people.
I realize each premise needs expounding, hence the reason I started the thread. This thread is open for discussion to anyone. Atheists are welcomed and encouraged to comment.
Thank you
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