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@rbelivb
For example, we could construct a totally arbitrary language game in which we refer to "oranges" as "apples" and vice versa. As long as we both agree on the terminology and the reality underlying it, there is no distortion of reality involved. If you ask me to pass you the orange then I would pass you the object we would otherwise refer to as an apple. To say that we "think apples are literally oranges" would be confused, and a falsehood.
What you are referring to is a dichotomous switch - all apples are now referred to as oranges. I would have no problems with this because we would still be able to define what an orange (which is now a pome fruit) and apple (now a citrus fruit). The transgender ideology is not like this - it prohibits a cogent definition of what a man and a woman is. Your scenario still allow for operable definitions.
My worldview can easily define what a man is - that is, a plethora of biological complexions, however, your position would be hard pressed to form a cogent definition of a man. I throw the question to you.I don't view definitions as preceding the use of words in some essentialist way. A definition is simply a summary that allows us to understand how a word is used, and at times our use of words might conflict with the definitions provided by dictionaries, there is nothing inherently wrong about that.
When you use the term "man", by virtue of the way in which language operates, you are referring expressing an idea or a notion which is shortened into a small collection of characters. For me, instead of "I am a being consisting of X biological complexions", I say, "I am a man". So when you use the term "man" what are you referring to?