In J.J.C
Smart’s “Sensations and Brain Processes”, he explores the relationship between
the mind and body, specifically delving into the shortcomings of the theory of
Dualism. In the work of Paul Churchland, Dualism distinguishes the mind
from the body, categorizing consciousness as unable to be investigated by
empirical science.
People
who oppose dualism usually use a convenient definition of Dualism that suits their
purposes, while this allows folks like Smart and Churchland to feel they have
made their case, in the end, Dualists don’t believe in the Dualism that they
don’t believe in either.
Within this school
of thought are a variety of sub-theories such Substance Dualism, Popular
Dualism, and Property Dualism. Smart however, asserts that “there are no
philosophical arguments which compel us to be dualists”.
Yeah,
metaphysics is like that, there are no philosophical arguments that compel against
Dualism either. While the Dualism
conclusion in not logically coercive, it does provide an intellectually
satisfying way of making sense of the experiential reality of human consciousness.
In other words,
Smart fails to see the logical reasoning behind Dualism, and instead proposes
his Identity Theory of the Mind. Under this school of thought, while there is a
slight distinction between mental states and brain processes, there are no
non-physical properties. Although the physical properties may be vague or
difficult to comprehend, they are still all physical properties.
Simply
asserting that there are no non-physical properties isn’t an argument.
In his attack on Churchland’s notion of Dualism,
Smart states: “[the idea] that everything should be explicable in terms of
physics except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be frankly
unbelievable” . Smart does not see why sensations should be granted such
scientific leniency. His Identity Theory of Mind highlights the failure of
Dualists to explain why sensations are not subjected to the same logical
scientific expectations.
Smart
and Churchland both reject Dualism, I’m not sure how refuting Churchland translates
into a refutation of Dualism.
However, Smart does spend considerable time
grappling with the notion of sensations. He uses the example of pain to
ultimately highlight the nuances between a mental state and a brain process. An
ache is a “report of a brain process”, but it is not the same as the sensation
of feeling pain . Thus, his thesis does not state that a sensation can be
directly translated into a brain process, but does explain that the two are
inextricably correlated. Sensations and mental states can exist, just as
by-products of specific brain processes.
How exactly
does “sensations are a byproduct of brain processes” follow from “sensations
cannot be translated into a brain process, once again, the argument against
Dualism appears to be “presupposed” without being established logically.
Contrary
to the assertions of those who refute Dualism, most Dualists do actually have
an argument, I’ll provide my argument for Dualism next.