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@coal
Literacy is so difficult for some. At least you admit it.
Consent
Posts
Total:
113
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@fauxlaw
You've basically had multiple people tell you you're writing nonsense, and your response is to assume that you're smarter than everyone else?
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@coal
Nope, just a wider handle on the language. I use a large vocabulary, and the language is, at times, difficult, I acknowledge. I challenge people to think outside their reading comfort zone.
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@fauxlaw
Let me refer you to r/iamverysmart.
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@coal
r/iamverysmart.
that's a reference? To what?
The Stripper
“I am a Democrat!” she declared, dancing liquid on the stage,
“My dress is Liberal through and through, and progressing head to toe.”
But we weren’t watching politic bared; we took exception on a different page.
We wanted less and less as she, undone, bared more and more.
Was that a politick sash she tossed? What does it say; what is its line?
“I’m Progressive,” it declared; the letters clear, and blue, refined.
Oh, swoon! I am a fool! Can scarcely see what Dressmaker saw,
Behind the desk, behind the dress, behind the curtain now withdrawn.
Stripped bare, the stripper danced her liquid dance; danced on
While we, undone, condoned the gestures of a dramatist.
We’re captured, one and all, tied tight as knots in her abandon.
“Don’t you know me, sirs, completely bared? I am a Socialist!”
“I am a Democrat!” she declared, dancing liquid on the stage,
“My dress is Liberal through and through, and progressing head to toe.”
But we weren’t watching politic bared; we took exception on a different page.
We wanted less and less as she, undone, bared more and more.
Was that a politick sash she tossed? What does it say; what is its line?
“I’m Progressive,” it declared; the letters clear, and blue, refined.
Oh, swoon! I am a fool! Can scarcely see what Dressmaker saw,
Behind the desk, behind the dress, behind the curtain now withdrawn.
Stripped bare, the stripper danced her liquid dance; danced on
While we, undone, condoned the gestures of a dramatist.
We’re captured, one and all, tied tight as knots in her abandon.
“Don’t you know me, sirs, completely bared? I am a Socialist!”
©2019 by fauxlaw
“I am a Democrat!” she declared, dancing liquid on the stage.
©2019 by fauxlaw
True to her nature she put the good of the many above her own:
Stripped bare, the stripper danced her liquid dance; danced on
©1986 by a strip club attendee.
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@Theweakeredge
.
" I said that you ought to do what is good, not that you are obligated to do so - you are indeed obligated to not do what is bad, but you are not necessarily obligated to do what is good. There is a distinction, and you have not considered it. "
This statement ignores basic ethics. That is, that an ought is a moral obligation that one has the ability to actually do:
"Ought implies can, in ethics, the principle according to which an agent has a moral obligation to perform a certain action only if it is possible for him or her to perform it. (https://www.britannica.com/topic/ought-implies-can)"
"As an auxiliary verb expressing duty or moral obligation (the main modern use, attested from late 12c.), it represents the past subjunctive.(https://www.etymonline.com/word/ought)"
I asked,
"Do you believe that rational beings ought to act morally?"
You said,
"yes."
If one ought to act morally, then one is obligated to act morally by definition. That means that if you define moral action as actions that bring about well-being, then any action that is in one's power to bring about well-being is morally obligatory. Therefore, your proposed third option is incoherent. You're literally saying, one is obligated to do what is good, but not obligated to do what is good, by misusing the language.
Further, by virtue of your claim of the obligation imposed by the second premise, your first premise is rendered null. Being morally obligated to prevent negative well-being is equal to being morally obligated to cause positive well-being (not doing what is bad=doing what is good), if there is a forced choice between doing and not doing, like in the original example.
Therefore, either your argument is incoherent, or it is exactly what I said.
If one is morally obligated to bring about well-being, then it only follows that it should be the most well-being possible, whatever the context.
In the original example, you claimed that the doctor is morally prohibited from harvesting the organs from the one, for the sake of the well being of the five. But because you only have enough time to do one or the other, these are the only two options: to harvest the healthy organs, or don't harvest the healthy organs. Both options represent a moral choice. You claim that one is morally prohibited from harvesting the organs on the grounds that it would produce negative well being for the healthy man. But that choice will result, with certainty, in the suffering and deaths of the five dying people, who you, as their surgeon, are responsible for. This example clearly shows that well-being is not sufficient as a standard of morality.
To avoid this problem, you claimed that numbers don't matter.
So, Let me ask you a different question.
Suppose a man has planted a nuclear bomb in a city of a million people. You know for certainty that he will tell you where it is in time to stop it only if you torture the information out of him. If you do not torture him, then a million people will certainly die.
Are you:
A) Morally obligated to torture the man
B) Morally permitted, but not obligated, to torture the man
C) Morally prohibited from torturing the man
…?
At what point do numbers start to matter?
_____
"The well-being loss by the five could be less than the well-being gained by the one, the well-being of the five could be quantitatively similar and not be more than one instance of well-being - you are completely stripping any analysis that isn't surface level from it, and then claiming that the standard is "arbitrary" because the answer isn't what you want it to be. "
It's an arbitrary standard for the following reasons:
First, you touch upon the need to quantify well-being in making moral judgements. The very fact that this isn't actually possible to do accurately in the real world, since the consequences of a given action can rarely be accurately quantified, already makes this an impractical standard. The vast majority of moral judgements will be made on incomplete information. This limitation means that in order to discuss the philosophical assumptions of your theory, we have to account for the otherwise unknowable variables by means of thought experiments. These aren't always going to be probable or realistic in the literal sense, but they bring the core concepts into light. It's not every day that a trolley goes haywire on a track towards some people, yet that's a common thought experiment in moral philosophy.
Secondly, the idea of well-being as the standard of moral good, means that all moral decisions are completely context-dependent. This makes all morality both relative to the situation, and determined by the arbitrary whims of the moral actor.
Thirdly, the exact specifications of what exactly constitutes well-being are vague and ill-defined. It isn't clear what all elements would even be involved in calculating well-being.
You've also selected well-being as a standard for moral good with the justification that we have no option except to value our well being. But the body compels one to urinate under threat of death. Does this mean that urination should be the standard of morality?
Therefore, your standard is totally arbitrary.
_____
"You seem to think its possible to not value your own well-being, its not, literally, on an evolutionarily level - it is impossible to not value your own well-being. Literally, the fact that you flinch away from pain is proof of that"
This would be simpler to address if we knew the parameters of what constitutes well-being. However, the existence of people who commit suicide is a defeater to this proposal. You could say most people value their well being, but it's not universal. It is completely possible to not value one's own well-being.
The fact the people value something, doesn't make it morally valuable. While I agree that well-being has a place in ethics, I disagree that it is a standard.
It's also possible to value ones well-being less than the well-being of another. The fact that people value sacrifice gives it as much justification for a standard of ethics as you've provided for well-being.
Finally, how do you avoid egoism? It seems you've paved the way for it.
this statement ignores basic ethics. That is, that an ought is a moral obligation that one has the ability to actually do:"Ought implies can, in ethics, the principle according to which an agent has a moral obligation to perform a certain action only if it is possible for him or her to perform it. (https://www.britannica.com/topic/ought-implies-can)""As an auxiliary verb expressing duty or moral obligation (the main modern use, attested from late 12c.), it represents the past subjunctive.(https://www.etymonline.com/word/ought)"
eh - not necessarily - in normative ethics perhaps, but whenever we're discussing pragmatics, especially ought used causally it means different things. If you were confused by my usage just ask - I meant ought in the framework of what you should do - in regard to a position that you can do, do the opposite of, and not do - I will admit it is a tad unintuitive, but it's quite a popular interpretation in pragmatic ethics. Again, notice your sources - neither of which are professionally philosophic - let's check out a real paper shall we?
Ethics can be seen as the foundation of wonder and analytic thought. First, existentialists accept wonder and deemphasize analysis, though phenomenologists tend to be more open to wonder and analytic thinking. Logical positivists and linguistic analysts see wonder as reducible to logic. Existentialists and phenomenologists are comfortable with ethics associated with wonder and analysis. Positivists and analysts deny ethics as an irreducible field of study. Ethicists would look at wonder to see if people need drugs in order to achieve states of euphoria or peace. Additionally, ethicists would take the same view about computers and analytic method.
What I'm trying to get you to see is that there is a situation behind every hypothetical, a law that must be practically applicable in order to every actually measure ethics. For example, if we were to rule as the bible does, that every moral fault is the same, morally speaking, is absurd on it's face - as every measure we can value morals in is affects on others - that certainly isn't very logical. Let me ask you a question, is every moment you aren't donating to a child whose starving an example of moral ineptitude? I would say that you ought to help starving children - some people solve this moral conundrum by saying you just don't "ought" to help starving people. To me that presents a clear moral violation, it just happens to be that there are things that you should do, but you don't have an obligation because of practicality- even if your definition hints at that - and that's what I'm referring to.
In summary, yes, most ethics people use the word ought and obligation interchangeably, I don't and i have a damned good reason for not.
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@Sum1hugme
1a If one ought to act morally, then one is obligated to act morally by definition. That means that if you define moral action as actions that bring about well-being, then any action that is in one's power to bring about well-being is morally obligatory. Therefore, your proposed third option is incoherent. You're literally saying, one is obligated to do what is good, but not obligated to do what is good, by misusing the language.1b Further, by virtue of your claim of the obligation imposed by the second premise, your first premise is rendered null. Being morally obligated to prevent negative well-being is equal to being morally obligated to cause positive well-being (not doing what is bad=doing what is good), if there is a forced choice between doing and not doing, like in the original example.Therefore, either your argument is incoherent, or it is exactly what I said.If one is morally obligated to bring about well-being, then it only follows that it should be the most well-being possible, whatever the context.In the original example, you claimed that the doctor is morally prohibited from harvesting the organs from the one, for the sake of the well being of the five. But because you only have enough time to do one or the other, these are the only two options: to harvest the healthy organs, or don't harvest the healthy organs. Both options represent a moral choice. You claim that one is morally prohibited from harvesting the organs on the grounds that it would produce negative well being for the healthy man. But that choice will result, with certainty, in the suffering and deaths of the five dying people, who you, as their surgeon, are responsible for. This example clearly shows that well-being is not sufficient as a standard of morality.To avoid this problem, you claimed that numbers don't matter.So, Let me ask you a different question.Suppose a man has planted a nuclear bomb in a city of a million people. You know for certainty that he will tell you where it is in time to stop it only if you torture the information out of him. If you do not torture him, then a million people will certainly die.Are you:A) Morally obligated to torture the manB) Morally permitted, but not obligated, to torture the manC) Morally prohibited from torturing the man…?At what point do numbers start to matter?_____
1a - again - that is your misunderstanding of my language, but ethical people do talk in pragmatics a lot - you can continue to mix up my use of the words. But that would be like insisting that, given the situation that I am sitting on what you would call a desk, and I say, "I am sitting on a table", and you went "No, no you aren't of course you aren't!" and then I went, "Well, tables do this or that, and desks do that or this" - essentially my definitions of a table and a desk are different from yours, so insisting that I am "misusing language" is insisting that your definition is by default correct, and you didn't do nearly enough framework to establish that.
1b Again no - there is a difference between taking food from starving people and not giving them any - you can continue to make things inordinately black and white, but you'd be mistake ethically speaking.
The last example is drastically different, you don't have all the facts of the operation - and the "bomb thing" is completely different situation - just because well-being doesn't lead to black-and-white situations does not make it "not valid standard for morals", furthermore -you changed quite a lot of that scenario, but regarldess, the fact that you don't like the outcome doesn't make it a bad standard, just that you don't understand nuance.
Again, refraining from something and doing something morally wrong are two different things - according to practicality - there are different situations with different answers. accept that not everything is black and white, or get out of ethics.
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@Sum1hugme
First, you touch upon the need to quantify well-being in making moral judgements. The very fact that this isn't actually possible to do accurately in the real world, since the consequences of a given action can rarely be accurately quantified, already makes this an impractical standard. The vast majority of moral judgements will be made on incomplete information. This limitation means that in order to discuss the philosophical assumptions of your theory, we have to account for the otherwise unknowable variables by means of thought experiments. These aren't always going to be probable or realistic in the literal sense, but they bring the core concepts into light. It's not every day that a trolley goes haywire on a track towards some people, yet that's a common thought experiment in moral philosophy.
False in total - whenever someone is kicked, you know that that typically hurts- the mere fact that you cannot precisely measure something in a way you prefer does not mean that it cannot be measured. For example, we cannot precisely measure neurology, but we can come to conclusions regarding the preponderance of the evidence. Your argument is the same that moral objectivists make - but the fact is that ethics are necessarily subjective - well-being is generalized, but it is in no way vague.
Um... every moral interaction relies on unknown information, the difference is that I admit it - we are talking about human psyche and moral values here- if you are to insist that you know everything or that you have all the info in ANY moral conundrum, then you are ignorant or dishonest. The difference is that human well-being is necessarily something that you are obligated to value, that's it, it's also something that almost every OTHER standard works on - including Kant's work bud. Yes, we account for the unknowable, but that will NEVER be a consistent moral framework. If you are trying to account for every unknowable then you are ethicing wrong, period.
Secondly, the idea of well-being as the standard of moral good, means that all moral decisions are completely context-dependent. This makes all morality both relative to the situation, and determined by the arbitrary whims of the moral actor.
On the first part - yes! Completely relative - congratulations! You've discovered it! I'm a moral relativist. Second part, nope, its completely dependent on what the best outcome of moral good is in that situation - the mnoral actor themselves has nothing to do with it, aside from what they rule as the most moral good - and... if you're tryna to say that the fact that a moral actor can be wrong makes it invalid, you have never actually used normative ethics in reality. Finally.... no - the justification is that we value neccessarily, the bit that makes us obligated to use it as it as a standard is that unless you value other's well-being, they have no reason to value yours - more misrepresentation. on your part/
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@Sum1hugme
Your entire problem is that I don't agree with YOUR theories of ethics, guess what bud - that's how ethics work - they are necessarily relative and dependent on the situation, if you think that you CAN EVER have a black and white moral system then you are, as I said, ignorant or dishonest
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@Sum1hugme
Again, consent depends from human dignity. Consent cannot, therefore, be a first principle. It's at least a third-order.
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@coal
Yeah, I'm not claiming that it is.
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@Sum1hugme
Why should we accept consent as a first principle of morality?
Who says it’s the first principal of ethics?
Are you going to ask a mugger if you can use force on them to defend yourself?
Personally I don’t think there is a first principal in ethics. It depends on the situation.
The closest first principal of ethics I can think of is self-preservation. But that ignores various obligations you may have to put yourself on the line.
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@Theweakeredge
"Let me ask you a question, is every moment you aren't donating to a child whose starving an example of moral ineptitude?"
No, giving to the needy is an imperfect moral duty, and therefore cannot be completed in a single action.
"whenever someone is kicked, you know that that typically hurts...well-being is generalized, but it is in no way vague."
So negative well-being is pain? Are you affirming a hedonistic hypothesis of well-being based morality where pain is the bad and pleasure is the good?
“1b Again no - there is a difference between taking food from starving people and not giving them any - you can continue to make things inordinately black and white, but you'd be mistake ethically speaking.”
It’s only a difference if you 1) aren’t actually capable of giving them food, or 2) not responsible for them eating (i.e. if they were your kids, then there is no difference).
“
The last example is drastically different, you don't have all the facts of the operation - and the "bomb thing" is completely different situation - just because well-being doesn't lead to black-and-white situations does not make it "not valid standard for morals", furthermore -you changed quite a lot of that scenario, but regarldess, the fact that you don't like the outcome doesn't make it a bad standard, just that you don't understand nuance.Again, refraining from something and doing something morally wrong are two different things - according to practicality - there are different situations with different answers. accept that not everything is black and white, or get out of ethics. ”
You’ve just dodged the questions: “which of the three options/when do numbers start to matter?” Claiming that we don’t know all the facts of the operation or that the bomb dilemma is “completely different”: 1) doesn’t answer the question(s), 2) Implies that numbers do start to matter to you at some point, by virtue of it being “completely different”, and 3) contradicts your claim that you don’t need all the information to make a decision. So I’d like a direct answer please. Also, this accusation of a black and white fallacy is unfounded, as I presented three possible answers. I allowed for “morally permitted, but not obligated” as an option. You answered C, morally prohibited in the original example, which would indicate you’d probably answer C in the new example, unless numbers start to matter, then perhaps your answer would change to B, morally permitted but not obligated.
In order for you to be consistent, you will have to define well-being in a way that permits a clear, transparent discussion about it, which you have so far failed to do beyond some allusions to negative well-being being bad/pain.
It’s not difficult to justify the fact that “5>1”, or that “1,000,000>1”. You can claim that's me being ignorant, but that just completely misses the point and dodges the question.
"eh - not necessarily - in normative ethics perhaps, but whenever we're discussing pragmatics, especially ought used causally it means different things. If you were confused by my usage just ask - I meant ought in the framework of what you should do - in regard to a position that you can do, do the opposite of, and not do"
I agree with coal that the language you use matters. What is this distinction between normative ethics and pragmatics? What does that even mean? Pragmatics is typically Machiavellianism. Ethical relativism is within the domain of normative ethics, and more fundamentally, so is Consequentialism, which is what you've been advocating for. So in the only domain we are talking about, "ought" implies a moral obligation.
The statement "one is morally permitted, but not obligated to do x" is fundamentally different from the statement: "one ought to do x".
You have consistently argued that one ought to do what is good, and also that one is morally prohibited from causing negative wellbeing. The (positive/negative)well being of 5 is greater than the (positive/negative)well being of 1, with all other variables accounted for. It logically follows from your model that one would be morally obligated to prevent the most negative well-being in that situation, which necessarily entails harvesting the organs of the healthy man. But you said C, morally prohibited. Therefore you contradicted your second principle concerning moral obligation and negative well being.
"In summary, yes, most ethics people use the word ought and obligation interchangeably, I don't and i have a damned good reason for not"
And you're using the language wrong. It leads to confusion to change the meaning of a well-accepted word in an established field just to suit your purposes. What you mean is morally permitted but not obligated, but it violates your moral intuitions so hard to think that harvesting a man's organs could ever be morally permitted or obligated and you violate your own standard of morality, once I can actually get you to answer the questions. And it should violate your intuitions, and I agree that the answer is C. I would even say the answer is C in the bomb example, but you can't answer the question honestly without admitting that you're using the language wrong by virtue of answering B, or by answering C, you would clearly contradict yourself since ((wellbeingx1,000,000)>(wellbeingx1)).
"every moral interaction relies on unknown information, the difference is that I admit it"
Consequentialist moral judgements rely on the unknowables of consequences. Virtue ethics and deontology do not require such appeal to unknowables to make moral decisions. Not even theological voluntarism incorporates this same adherence to a fundamentally shifty foundation.
"Second part, nope, its completely dependent on what the best outcome of moral good is in that situation - the mnoral actor themselves has nothing to do with it, aside from what they rule as the most moral good.."
You're just affirming what I already showed, that the "good" that constitutes the good consequences that you use to qualify moral action, namely wellbeing, is equally as arbitrary as any other opinion on what morality is.
"...if you're tryna to say that the fact that a moral actor can be wrong makes it invalid, you have never actually used normative ethics in reality. ""Your entire problem is that I don't agree with YOUR theories of ethics, guess what bud - that's how ethics work - they are necessarily relative and dependent on the situation, if you think that you CAN EVER have a black and white moral system then you are, as I said, ignorant or dishonest"
Thought I'd group the straw men together. I don't think you know what you mean when you say "normative ethics." Normative ethical theories are not constrained to consequentialism.
"Finally.... no - the justification is that we value neccessarily, the bit that makes us obligated to use it as it as a standard is that unless you value other's well-being, they have no reason to value yours"
This justification for the proposed obligation to prevent negative-wellbeing doesn't apply to mass murderers, or anybody who doesn't value their own wellbeing. Again, your opinion of what is moral, isn't necessarily what is moral. Your whole paradigm of reasoning about morality is fundamentally flawed.
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@Sum1hugme
You did not touch the fact that you misrepresented the definition of ought in this regard - and I don't intend to waste my time with these huge back and forths - I refuse to continue with the shotgunning. Please choose a point and we can start there.
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@Theweakeredge
What exactly is your definition of ought?
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@Fruit_Inspector
Well I subscribe to their being two - though I try to separate 'em as much as I can.
One is how SUm1hugme thinks of it - the You are morally obligated to do x - the other is the pragmatic one - you should do x, but not doing x is not necessarily wrong
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@Theweakeredge
Do you believe that Sum1's definition is ever legitimate? Or does everything fall under the second pragmatic one?
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@Fruit_Inspector
I think it is one of the definitions that are applicable - but I think that applying that definition of ought to every instance of ought is bullshit. It strips nuance.
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@Theweakeredge
"Ought to", is an auxiliary verb, meaning obligation or duty. You are using the word ought to mean, "morally permitted, but not obligated." That's a fundamentally different meaning, and therefore you should use the correct language. You're just redefining the term to mean something it doesn't mean.
To be specific, when you say "one ought to do what is good" you don't mean "one is obligated to do what is good." You do mean, "one is morally permitted, but not obligated, to do good."
But you contradict that interpretation of the definition with your second premise, which is a literal reformulation of your first premise. The second premise being: "one is morally obligated to prevent negative well-being."
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@Sum1hugme
Again - I'm using it in a way a lot of people do - I've already explained why - because guess what : words change, but more than that- no - it is not "fundamentally different" it is merely changing what was already there- adding onto it. And yes- because not doing something good is different from doing something bad - you want to strip that naunce, too bad, its there.
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@Theweakeredge
Again, saying "one ought to do x" is different from saying "one is morally permitted, but not obligated to do x." They are mutually exclusive. If you redefine "ought" to mean, "morally permitted, but not obligated" then you are contradicting your second principle. Therefore, you're either using the word wrong, or you're contradicting yourself. If you redefine the word to mean, "morally permitted, but not obligated" then you are contradicting yourself.