No. As you agreed, an observation is unintelligible unless brought under a concept. I argued that they are interdependent. Reality would only be unintelligible if our observations aren't brought under a concept, but if they are, as I propose concepts must do In order to connect with reality in their own right, then they will be intelligible.
I neither agree nor disagree. I'm reflecting your own affirmations. And reality, according to your description, is not intelligible (i.e. "brought under concept") because it opposes concept. Here, let's define reality using your cited description:
Reality - The world or the state of things as they actually exist,
as opposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them.
Would you like to change your argument that observation must be "brought under concept" in order to be intelligible? Or would you like to cite another definition of reality? Because when incorporated together, these two premises in an argument are logically inconsistent.
There are an infinite number of Concepts that can be brought about in one's mind. Until those concepts have something empirical to tie them to reality, then there is no way to differentiate them from any other figment of one's imagination.
What is a figment of one's imagination? How is it different from concept? And why must observation be brought under "a figment of one's imagination" to be intelligible?
The empirical element seperates the concepts that correspond to reality from those that don't.
How?
Like I said, physical laws are properties of matter.
No, Physical Laws incorporate properties of matter, which in and of themselves, are informed by concept. They are not properties of matter.
The fact that matter behaves consistently in controlled experiments, is the reason we can describe those properties with equations. The reason we consider those descriptions "laws" is because thet consistently make testable predictions about novel future data.
Physical laws, once again, are physical laws if and only if they can be mathematically proven. You can argue that they help make "testable predictions about novel future data" but they are defined by a sound mathematical argument, which does not require a controlled experiment.
Yes, but it has to be able to be demonstrated to be called knowledge. Otherwise, one could call any wild conjecture, "knowledge". Its important to remember that knowledge that a concept exists is not the same as knowledge that that concept is true.
And concept cannot be demonstrated independent of this yet to be described "empirical element?"
What if one were to define demonstrate as:
Oxford:
2. clearly show the existence or truth of (something) by giving proof or evidence.
and proof as:
Oxford:
1. evidence or argument establishing or helping to establish a fact or the truth of a statement.
then, wouldn't the Ontological Argument be a demonstration reflecting knowledge?
Idk, maybe? Probably.
You don't understand the construction of your own argument?