Abortion

Author: Benjamin

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#61
gugigor
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@Benjamin
no, we have no "moral value", but rather "moral virtue" (the ability to hold rights sacred to humanity). It is tragic if a meteor falls from the sky and kills you, but not immoral. It is cruel for another man to take an innocent's life without their permission.
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#62
Benjamin
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@gugigor
Yes, we have moral value. But obviously, only persons respect moral value.
#63
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@Benjamin
I did not feel personally attacked, so don't worry there.

Moral value is not granted on the basis of personal traits, but because you are a person. It is constant and granted exactly when a non-person-thing become a person.
I mean... the quality of being a person is a bit unclear because you're saying simultaneously that you become a person, but that there aren't personal traits that make you a person. If I might suggest a slimmed-down alternative:

Moral value is granted at the point when one becomes a person.

I'd be open to having a more in-depth discussion of what a person is, and I believe this leaves that door wide open, but my issue was limiting the discussion to human traits.
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#64
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@whiteflame
Moral value is granted at the point when one becomes a person.
I can accept that, but it misses some of the meaning.

I would like to add:
The difference between a person and a non-person is category, not simply quality or quantity.
Ensuring that even if animals have many traits we consider "personal", they are not partly granted moral value.
#65
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@Benjamin
The difference between a person and a non-person is category, not simply quality or quantity.
My issue with adding this is that it limits the discussion. You can always argue that utilization of traits is problematic, but at the end of the day, there's going to have to be some discussion of what separates a person from a non-person. If it's a category, I'd like to know what separates a category from a set of traits or even just a qualitative difference. I don't think we'll agree at this point (without extended discussion of the factors that each of us believe contributes to personhood) on what defines personhood, nor do I think that should be our aim here. If the goal is to narrow discussion, I believe we've already done that by establishing that all persons should have human rights. Getting more narrow just excludes large swaths of argumentation.
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#66
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@whiteflame
I am conflicted about whether or not to agree. You see, if the difference is quantitative or qualitative then "being a person" seems to only mean "more of ...something else...". It would be justified to critique the idea that 99% personhood is not sufficient to require 1% or moral value. This brings me back to point 2 arguments. If different persons get their value from being part of a category rather than having certain traits, then we could justly apply equal value to persons without being inconsistent. But we cannot at the same time claim that 200% "something else (like animal consciousness)" grants you moral value but having 500% "something else" does not even increase your value. I am sure you are aware of the idea that some races are less valuable than others, or the idea that different sexes have different values, etc. All of these ideas stem from a belief that our traits give us moral value instead of our category "person". So I am deterred from accepting the unchanged definition. Awaiting your response.
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#67
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@whiteflame
Limiting the debate seems not to be a problem - we are far too good at getting of track  XD
#68
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@Benjamin
You see, if the difference is quantitative or qualitative then "being a person" seems to only mean "more of ...something else...". It would be justified to critique the idea that 99% personhood is not sufficient to require 1% or moral value. This brings me back to point 2 arguments.
That's a quantitative difference, not a qualitative one. I don't see why we can't leave that on the table, but I also just generally think it's nigh impossible to distance yourself from any and all quantitative and qualitative differences.

If different persons get their value from being part of a category rather than having certain traits, then we could justly apply equal value to persons without being inconsistent.
I'm seriously just interested to understand what you mean by "category." How do we establish what is and is not part of a category without establishing that there are quantitative and/or qualitative differences between that category and other categories? What do you use if not them to isolate those that are deserving of human rights from those that are not? Without seeing that, I can't say whether this is something that's even possible to do, let alone whether it's an appropriate boundary to accept to this discussion.

Limiting the debate seems not to be a problem - we are far too good at getting of track  XD
Technically, this isn't even the debate, as far as I'm aware. It's just setting the stage for what the debate would be, or maybe narrowing in on said debate. We're definitely going off on a bit of a tangent, but like I said before, I think it's important to land solidly on this before we proceed.
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#69
Benjamin
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@whiteflame
I did some research, and I accept the idea that qualitive and quantitive differences are the basis on which you establish categories.

Category: a division within a system of classification [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/category]
A category in our context means that we can put all "persons" in one simple box (category) and have them all be similar in some fundamental way. However, if our division is unclear, vague or arbitrary it cannot be accepted. For example, I could say that "persons" can run faster than crabs - but that category would be stupid and not sufficient to grant moral value. So when trying to create a perfect box (category) on the basis of which we will grant moral value, it needs to fit these criteria:
  • Include everything we agree are persons (like adults)
  • Not include anything we agree is not persons (like elephants)

So I would agree to such a definition as this:

Moral value is granted at the point when one becomes a person. That point is a change in category, not simply a small change within current category.
#70
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@Benjamin
A category in our context means that we can put all "persons" in one simple box (category) and have them all be similar in some fundamental way. However, if our division is unclear, vague or arbitrary it cannot be accepted. For example, I could say that "persons" can run faster than crabs - but that category would be stupid and not sufficient to grant moral value. So when trying to create a perfect box (category) on the basis of which we will grant moral value, it needs to fit these criteria:
  • Include everything we agree are persons (like adults)
  • Not include anything we agree is not persons (like elephants)
Ah, so it's similar to the "type" so often used in evolution debates. Still kinda vague, but I can at least understand the general sentiment. It's not an aim to give it a scientific classification, but rather just trying to afford some kind of boundary in which persons fit and non-persons do not. That's fine.

Moral value is granted at the point when one becomes a person. That point is a change in category, not simply a small change within current category.
I think we've found our point of agreement.
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#71
Benjamin
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POINT 2 - CONCLUSION:

Moral value is granted at the point when one becomes a person. That point is a change in category, not simply a small change within the current category.

Without further ado, I declare this definition of moral value to be true -- until objected against in the future.


#72
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@Benjamin
A.T.
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#73
Benjamin
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@whiteflame
Let it be noted that:
  • there is a change in category that happens at some point
  • this change in category is not arbitrary or small - but fundamental  (because a "person" and a nonperson are viewed and treated as fundamentally different)
  • the term "person" is not explicitly stated to not be synonymous with "human", this is up for debate
  • By the same quality/category we grant moral value, the differences of said quality is not major between individuals - ensuring ALL "x" get equal moral value

#74
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@Benjamin
Don’t see any problems, though we’ll see where you go with it.
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#75
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@whiteflame
Very well. Let us proceed.
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#76
Benjamin
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POINT 3 - WHAT IS A PERSON?

We will try to find a moment at which a non-person-thing fundamentally changes and becomes a person.

Who wants to be the first to present their view of when this moment happens?
#77
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@Benjamin
Sure, I'll start. I don't think it's possible to define a moment for two reasons.

One, biological examination of when a new person begins to exist is always going to yield an arbitrary selection. We select traits we believe make an individual human, and then say that said stage of development has met them. Like the definition of life, which at least theoretically excludes certain bacteria and all viruses, I believe bias plays a role in our understanding of what separates one group from another.

Two, societal decisions regarding what is and is not a person will also remain arbitrary and entirely subjective. 
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#78
Benjamin
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@whiteflame
I expect it to at least not be an arbitrary decision. There should at least be a fundamental change in the organism.
#79
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@Benjamin
How do we define a "fundamental change"? Any selection we make runs into the same problem: it's an arbitrary assignment of what is and is not "fundamental." 
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#80
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@whiteflame
Fundamental: Forming a necessary base or core; of central importance. [https://www.lexico.com/definition/fundamental]

This is the oxford dictionary. The core is the basis for personhood - so all persons must have an equal or almost equal core.
#81
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@Benjamin
Answering with a dictionary definition doesn’t resolve this. Put it into context. If there is a core to what makes a person, then what composes that core, and how do you know that that is the core?

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#82
Benjamin
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@whiteflame
Without a fundamental change then a person is just a "better animal" and should not be granted moral value. Therefore, we must discuss what such a fundamental change is, please do not force me to try to put my view as the definition - we already have the official definition. In other words, go ahead and explain when the fundamental change happens and then I will present my case afterwards.



#83
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@Benjamin
I already provided my view: that there is no way to know the moment at which a fundamental change occurs. A fundamental change may happen, and I grant that it must occur, but I'm arguing that, at least currently, it is objectively unknown.
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#84
Benjamin
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@whiteflame
If we do not know when something becomes a person, then let us start by what we know:
  • No sperm cell, regardless of what stage, is a person
  • A fetus right before birth is a person
Unless there exists a "fundamental change" between the two things, the difference is arbitrary. If we cannot know when you become a person we should let the doubt benefit the fetus, since at least we know that it is a person later on. We would never kill a thing unless we were certain that it was not a person - therefore, fetuses should never be killed. But you do not condemn abortion, so I conclude that you must accept the "fundamental change". That is if you want to defend abortion as morally permissible.
#85
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@Benjamin
Here's something simple, and much less steps for you: IF something is capable of suffering, THEN it will have moral value

That is the bare bones of my ethics:

 Evidence regarding the capacity for fetal pain is limited but indicates that fetal perception of pain is unlikely before the third trimester. Little or no evidence addresses the effectiveness of direct fetal anesthetic or analgesic techniques. Similarly, limited or no data exist on the safety of such techniques for pregnant women in the context of abortion. Anesthetic techniques currently used during fetal surgery are not directly applicable to abortion procedures.

#86
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@Benjamin
If benefit of the doubt should direct our choices, then why should we assume the sperm cell, even just prior to fusion, is not worthy of personhood status? I agree that a sperm cell entirely in isolation is not a person, but the only way you can absolutely exclude it at every stage is to claim that it never achieves personhood up until the moment of fusion. I find that to be an unwarranted assertion.

Also, I generally don't like this type of argument because it basically says "if uncertain, backtrack to the point where uncertainty begins." Many would argue that uncertainty doesn't begin at fusion. I could change the first of those two scenarios to "No blastocyst is a person" and define the beginning of that uncertain period as being an embryo. Why is your range more valid than mine?
#87
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@Benjamin
Last of all to mature is the cerebral cortex, which is responsible for most of what we think of as mental life–conscious experience, voluntary actions, thinking, remembering, and feeling. It has only begun to function around the time gestation comes to an end. Premature babies show very basic electrical activity in the primary sensory regions of the cerebral cortex–those areas that perceive touch, vision, and hearing–as well as in primary motor regions of the cerebral cortex. In the last trimester, fetuses are capable of simple forms of learning, like habituating (decreasing their startle response) to a repeated auditory stimulus, such as a loud clap just outside the mother’s abdomen. Late-term fetuses also seem to learn about the sensory qualities of the womb, since several studies have shown that newborn babies respond to familiar odors (such as their own amniotic fluid) and sounds (such as a maternal heartbeat or their own mother’s voice). In spite of these rather sophisticated abilities, babies enter the world with a still-primitive cerebral cortex, and it is the gradual maturation of this complex part of the brain that explains much of their emotional and cognitive maturation in the first few years of life.


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#88
Benjamin
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@Theweakeredge
IF something is capable of suffering, THEN it will have moral value
Interesting Idea.

I see at least 3 problems:
  1. Most animals, if not all, can feel pain as well
  2. "Pain"s only purpose is to make the organism try to survive by avoiding danger. So pain in itself is not necessarily bad, but death is the real problem
  3. It supports pro-life

Why is the third point correct? 

Suffer: Experience or be subjected to (something bad or unpleasant) [https://www.lexico.com/definition/suffer]

So since all living things have the capacity to die, and dying is a bad thing, all life is capable of suffering.

If you solely mean "pain" then 1 and 2 are still true.

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#89
Benjamin
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@whiteflame
Because fusion IS a fundamental change - so regardless of whether or not another fundamental change happens afterwards we can know that sperm is not even a mammal.

You must admit that the only reason to dismiss this "fundamental change is a necessary" idea is that pro-choice has no sufficient alternative fundamental change.




If we accept the obvious fundamental change that is fusion -- then there is no uncertainty, and we can coherently and non-arbitrarily apply equal moral value to everyone.


#90
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@Benjamin
Because fusion IS a fundamental change - so regardless of whether or not another fundamental change happens afterwards we can know that sperm is not even a mammal.
A. Why is fusion a fundamental change?
B. Why is every step before fusion not a fundamental change?
C. Why does the first fundamental change have to be considered the start? Why can't subsequent steps be considered the initiating step to a new person?
D. A sperm is a mammalian cell, therefore it is (technically) a mammal. It's not an independent mammal, but neither is a zygote.

You must admit that the only reason to dismiss this "fundamental change is a necessary" idea is that pro-choice has no sufficient alternative fundamental change.
I don't admit that. I think the pro-choice view is that other fundamental changes are what is necessary to form a person. That's part of the problem I have with your argument: you're saying that this fundamental change is the fundamental change that initiates a person. Why? Because it comes before other fundamental changes that could occupy that niche?

If we accept the obvious fundamental change that is fusion -- then there is no uncertainty, and we can coherently and non-arbitrarily apply equal moral value to everyone.
Very strongly disagree. Even if I go with you on fusion being an obvious fundamental change, that doesn't make it the obvious fundamental change that initiates a person. There is uncertainty there. You are being arbitrary by designating it as the obvious fundamental change that initiates a person.