I can recognize moral truths but I don't have moral motivation because I don't have a conscience because the empathetic/compassionate aspects to my brain are morally stunted due to the way I was born. I'm a dispassionate person to an extreme degree ... which has both its good and bad points. One of its good points is that I'm hyper-analytical because I don't have the opposite emotional side ... but one of its bad points is that I'm an amoral being. I can recognize that something I am doing is technically morally good or bad and, like I said, I can recognize moral truths, but I lack the motivation because I'm unable to care about it.
This is where I think that there can be a disconnect between recognizing moral truths on the one hand and having moral motivation on the other hand. Understanding that something is morally wrong to do is, perhaps we should say, a necessary condition for being motivated to not do that immoral thing but it is not a sufficient condition for being motivated to not do that immoral thing.
There may also be an argument for recognizing something as morally wrong perhaps not being required at all. You could easily imagine a moral nihilist who believed that nothing was morally wrong but they were also empathetic and compassionate neurologically and thereby couldn't bring themselves to eat meat once they realized the suffering it caused. They might say it wasn't wrong but they care too much about animals so they don't want to eat meat anyway. Then it would seem that merely caring subjectively is by itself a sufficient condition for not taking that immoral action even if the person doesn't recognize it as immoral. That person would be the mirror opposite to somebody like me: somebody who recognizes that some things are moral and some other things are immoral but I'm just neurologically incapable of caring about the suffering of any being besides myself. In fact, my neurological stuntedness with regards to emotion is so extreme that it's often hard for me to even care about my future self so I often focus on enjoying the moment a lot but do a lot of things that are unwise. This is why I wouldn't become a vegan even for health reasons either because I simply don't care about my future enough. For me to not eat a bacon sandwich, for instance, for purely health reasons it would have to cause me suffering today or at least in the very near future.
Anyway, I hope you find this interesting. I tend to find that deontological vegans think that it's impossible for a person like me to be an activist for veganism by debunking arguments against veganism because they see me as a hypocrite and that my actions are in themselves intrisically bad regardless of how many other people I was able to convert to veganism. On the other hand, I have found that consequentalist vegans, who are able to be dispassionate enough to not hate me too much, are able to recognize that although I myself directly do harm to animals by eating meat .... if I am able to convert several other people to veganism, or even only two people to veganism, then I'm actually overall doing more good than harm because my existence creates more vegans than non-vegans even if I myself am a non-vegan.
So, yeah, I hope you find this interesting to some degree at least.
P.S. I also have an argument against those who would claim that I was a hypocrite. I've encountered some people who say that a person who is philosophically vegan but never puts it into practice is necessarily a hypocrite. I would say that such amoral beings such as myself are an exception to that and I have an argument for that. To me it's similar to how it wouldn't be hypocritical as a non-Christian to say that Christians ought to do what Jesus would do by their own standard. The fact I don't apply that standard doesn't make me a hypocrite to say that because I'm not a Christian. Similarly, I think that all moral beings ought to be moral. But for me as an amoral being to say that can't make me a hypocrite because I'm not a moral being. And it also seems to me to be nonsensical to say that an amoral being ought to be moral. The whole point is they can't be moral because if they could then they wouldn't be an amoral being. Sure, an amoral being can take moral actions for amoral reasons ... but then it would seem to me that that is saying that there is a moral obligation for moral beings to convince amoral beings to take moral actions for non-moral reasons by appealing to the amoral being's self-interest. To say that the moral obligation was on the amoral being itself just doesn't make sense to me at all because an amoral being is precisely the sort of being whereby a moral obligation by definition can't have any force to them. Ought implies can: it makes no sense to say that you ought to do something if you can't. And, sure, amoral beings are physically capable of taking moral actions for non-moral reasons but to say that they can't take such actions for moral reasons is just another way of saying that they are morally incapable of taking such actions .... which is one reason it doesn't make much sense to say that they are obligated to do anything. It would be like saying that a dog ought not to bite somebody. Sure, it would be better if they didn't but the obligation is on the human owner with a conscience to prevent that rather than on the dog which can't be morally motivated like that.
