The Problems With Moral Relativism

Author: ethang5
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#31
ethang5
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@zedvictor4
Check me out.
I just asked you to sit down and shut up.

I never say "there is no god", that is what you say I say.
Yeah. You think you've found an unassailable little fortress in your "external god" silliness. I take your meaning, not your semantics.

It is you that makes the bold claims without providing proof.
And yet its you in the minority! No one owes you proof jasper. I found mine without you. Why do you need me?

Such frustration Mr Ethan...
Yeah, and after you convince the board by your childish repetition I'm frustrated, how will that help you?

You should be tucked up in bed by now with Mrs Ethan and not fretting over an insignificant web debate.
The only one fretting is you Z. You seem fixated on god to the point you come to a religion board and pretend you cause people there frustration.

I'm a theist. I'm on a religion board. If anyone should not be fretting over an insignificant web debate, its you.

I believe in God. You say you don't. Which of us should find this insignificant?

Sit down and shut up. We get you. We've heard you repeat your drone incessantly.

We aren't going to change because you are confused. No amount of repetition of your sophistry will convince us to abandon good sense

Go find a site where atheists seeking truth claim to have found it, and let us who believe discuss the topics we like. That is what a content person would do.
#32
blamonkey
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@ethang5
I buy that there are problems with the idea of moral relativism, but it seems that the objections posed here are not necessarily indicative of some contradiction in the moral principle. Is moral relativism only able to affirm the rules of a given society? I thought that moral relativism extolled the importance of considering context when deeming something moral or immoral. While law is one such factor, it is not the only one. What you describe would be a sub-sect of moral relativism known as normative relativism, which espouses the importance of a society above all else (1). Moral relativism is the principle by which we ascertain the moral value of something predicated on a particular perspective (1). If I am a proponent of equality, for example, I am able to determine that racism is morally wrong.

Problem 2 posits that an external method of gauging morality is necessary for a society to improve. I agree. One could measure the improvement in a society through a particular perspective (i.e. denying basic rights to people is flagrant abuse.) This doesn't invalidate moral relativism because a particular perspective is being adopted to justify action/inaction on remedying a social problem.

Problem 3 deals partly with religion and atheism, which I avoid on principle. 

Here is my primary qualm with moral relativism: it proposes that no one perspective is superior to another. Sure, you could measure morality based off one's own perspective, but that is the inherent flaw of the philosophical principle: some perspectives promote deleterious ideas and policies. Should the perspective of an ardent racist matter in the ongoing debate on racial equality? What about someone with little-to-no knowledge on the subject? If this is the conclusion you were driving at, I would agree with it. 

Moral Objectivity has its own bugbears too. There are hundreds of people who would disagree over the fundamental rules of the universe, and one's own perspective plays a large role into what we deem a universal truth. It's difficult to excise one's own self-serving beliefs and ideas when debating what is objectively immoral, particularly when we participate in acts that other would deem immoral. If there are moral rules, I doubt that people can conceivably understand them all. That's why debates are still surfacing about moral problems that have existed since antiquity. There are some that are plainly obvious. I mean, most people are opposed to genocide, and I would be one of them.

Absolute adherence to any idea seems to be the problem. 


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#33
ethang5
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@blamonkey
Good post.

You say, "Moral Objectivity has its own bugbears too." And then list only that many disagree with it. I don't really count that as a bugbear.

I'm not measuring how many people advocate an idea, or how strongly they do, the logical soundness of an idea is not affected or determined by absolute adherence. (we will never get absolute adherence)

But is the idea sound?


#34
zedvictor4
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@blamonkey
The evolution of the species as it were, compared to the evolution of  data within the greater society. Because It is all to easy and apparent for society to become the self, that is to say subjective, irrespective of what might be assumed to be objective.

1. And so, do you think that inherent data has evolved significantly enough to be able to effect physiological function?

2. Or have social improvements like assumed morality, only ever been defined  by conceptual collectivism?

3. But can we actually differentiate between physiology and data, given the nature of the human condition?

4. Nonetheless, in the context of a wider society and therefore also in the context of moral relativism wherein lies the collective moral judgement?

5. Has it become inherent, or is it only acquired and affective?

#35
blamonkey
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@ethang5
Ah, perhaps I should clarify. I meant to say that there are few instruments for measuring morality. What is the best perspective to anchor oneself to tor reach a moral conclusion? Utilitarianism? Deontology? I'd say the moral framework should match the problem at hand, but that is an inexact science. Also, finding an immutable moral truth can run the gamut of simple (i.e. it is morally wrong to commit genocide) to difficult (i.e. violent measures are permissible in the face of injustice). I can see plenty of gray area in anchoring oneself to an appropriate idea and in debating the morality of the latter issue. While violent revolutions can be justified on the basis of deposing of a virulent despot, it probably would not stand to reason that an insurrection should follow one or two policy errors, particularly if the person can be voted out democratically (predicated, of course, on reasonable election security.) Relativism would suggest that both perspectives are partly true, and I think in this case, that approximates the truth more than one side being wrong and the other being right. 

Also, I doubt that humans could possibly perceive the absolute rules of morality given culture and context. I mean, if you asked someone if it was a universal truth that homosexuals were mentally ill, you would probably get a different answer today than if you asked 40 years ago. To me, that illustrates that if there are universal truths, many of them are likely undiscovered and impossible to test because we are fettered to the status quo. 

Objectivity is a morally sound idea though, as are the problems you list on relativism. I tend to stay ambivalent on issues of philosophy though, so perhaps that taints my perspective to an extent. 

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#36
ethang5
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@blamonkey
Your POV makes sense and is mostly logically consistent.

The problem is, we often try to use moral truths as moral principles. An objective moral truth would be a principle, not a law.

All laws are based on principles. Laws themselves are situational and applied subjectively. But principles never are.

I can see plenty of gray area in anchoring oneself to an appropriate idea and in debating the morality of the latter issue. 
If one tries to use an idea as a moral principle sure. That doesn't work well.

First, we need a moral principle, not a law or idea, or human desire. Then, we need to know the 3 things about an act/actor that determine whether an act/actor is moral or not moral or amoral in a given circumstance.

Morality is determined by...
1. Intent of the actor for the action in question.
2. The relationship between the actor and the one(s) affected by the action.  And 
3. The moral authority carried by the actor at the time of his action in relation to those affected by the action.

With these, every action's moral value can be determined.
#37
zedvictor4
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@blamonkey
So?

#38
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@ethang5
"But principles never are"....can you validate this?


A moral principle is an idea.... That's the way a data construct works.

So, who's idea is the moral principle?


Variable actors = variable intent + variable relationships = variable morality or a variable moral assumption.




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#39
ethang5
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@zedvictor4
Laws themselves are situational and applied subjectively. But principlesnever are.

But principles never are"....can you validate this?
This is like asking me to validate how boys are never girls. Principles never are 
situational because they cover every situation. So laws are applied to individual situations based on the principle.

A moral principle is an idea.... That's the way a data construct works.
Data constructs are your undefined nonsense.

So, who's idea is the moral principle?
No one, if it is to be truly objective.

Variable actors = variable intent + variable relationships = variable morality or a variable moral assumption.
This is why we need a moral standard based on principle.
#40
blamonkey
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@zedvictor4
Your series of queries took a bit longer. I don't want to seem obtuse, but your diction confused me a bit. But sure, I'll bite.

1. And so, do you think that inherent data has evolved significantly enough to be able to effect physiological function?

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Data, on its own, is unable to substantively effect people in any way. 

2. Or have social improvements like assumed morality, only ever been defined  by conceptual collectivism?

To an extent, the assumed morality of an idea is governed by moral collectivism to the public at large. It wasn't until recently that homosexuality was deemed moral by the plurality of the public. So, was it moral to have homosexual relations before certain precedents were established and pro-gay attitudes were instilled in the people? I would say so, but that is a highly individualized opinion that was not informed by the majority of society but through conversations with homosexuals, my own study of the issue, and my parents (probably). That said, the public perception of a moral dilemma does contribute mostly to how many issues are thought of, including their moral quality.

3. But can we actually differentiate between physiology and data, given the nature of the human condition?

That depends on what you categorize as data. If you mean the assumed facts of human and societal development, then there great interplay between data and humans, but they are still separate. 

4. Nonetheless, in the context of a wider society and therefore also in the context of moral relativism wherein lies the collective moral judgement?

The relativist might posit that societies dictate morality to an extent, but that no principle or measure of morality is supreme to another. One could anchor themselves to utilitarianism or deontology and still be considered morally right in some context. In regards to society, only normative relativism champions the idea that morality should be dictated by societal needs. However, relativism also suggests that people not chastise or denigrate societies that adopt dissimilar viewpoints as they are equally valid given the context, development, and culture of a state. 

5. Has it become inherent, or is it only acquired and affective?

Do you mean moral judgement? Well, moral development does occur in infants. Parental figures are able to imbue certain moral traits into their offspring by simply modeling behavior for their children (1). So, to an extent, people's personal ideologies are acquired. However, whether their acquired perspective can be considered "right" is an entirely separate issue. People like to stick to their beliefs, but they will go out of their way to rationalize bad behavior as if there were an invisible audience. Are people born with a moral compass? I don't know, and if we are, proving it would be difficult. 

I hope I answered your questions. I am confused what you mean by data.
https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/how_parents_influence_early_moral_development

#41
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@blamonkey
I tend to use the word data because it is short to type.

Information and/or knowledge would perhaps be more meaningful.

I'm interested in the interaction between the mass, data and function, and in the context of moral relativism, how one consequently is able to pin down morality to be something other than one of 7.6 billion different ideas.

Are we one society of 7.6 billion or are we a society of 7.6 billion individuals.

Do we have a hive mind?....is uncritical conformity possible?

The notion of spirituality as a moral or governing influence separate to the internal acquisition and manipulation of data is undoubtedly interesting, especially as  material evolution has come to a stage where we now realise that data can be formulated and utilised independently of the mass and/or collective.

Though I would still suggest that archaic interpretations of spirituality were inevitably naïve. 



#42
fauxlaw
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I've come in late on this one,. but...

Problem 1: Moral relativism suffers more than just one society's reformers, because there are more examples of a morality to be relativized than one ideal climate for climate change adherents. There are really many earth climates, on which none can agree is ideal. So goes climates, so goes relativism. One man's morals are another's relativism. Too many cooks in the kitchen.

Problem 2" I disagree that a society cannot improve its morals. I point to the Sermon on the Mount [Matthew 5 - 7, inclusive]. As a sermon, it's killer. As a political platform, it would solve, today, every single social ill we face today. Every single one of them. If only people would embrace it. As a core of what a proper society should be, there is no better platform. One does not even need to acknowledge God to make it work. As a morality, it's the best, universal "good" in existence. What can be better than loving our enemies. It's a good tactic to make friends of them. isn't that an improvement? Just because it's hard doesn't mean it cannot be done. It's just never been tried. Well, the prophet, Yoda, has a word abut that: "Do. Or Do not. There is no try." Good words. And it does not need reformation. Why mess with perfection?

Problem 3: I almost agree with Ethang on this one, and I'll agree that part of the big problems with the no-god-would-allow-suffering crowd as an excuse to declare God does not exist, and fails to recognize that just because God has omnipotent and omniscient powers does not mean He is compelled to use them. God advised Adam and Eve in Eden that there would be pain and suffering in the world, and it is not that He does not love us; He indeed loves each and every one of us. But stepping in to stop this and that reduces God to a traffic cop, and denies us our free agency, even to be stupid and cruel with one another. God told that to Adam & Eve, too. Free agency, my friends, is a valuable gift, and we have it from God even to abuse it.
#43
Envisage
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@ethang5
I'll address two.

Problem 1: Moral relativism suffers from what is known as the reformer’s dilemma. If moral relativism is true, then societies cannot have moral reformers. Why? Moral reformers are members of a society that stand outside that society’s moral code and pronounce a need for reform and change in that code. For example, Corrie ten Boom risked her life to save Jews during the Holocaust. William Wilberforce sought the abolition of slavery in the late 18th century. Martin Luther King, Jr. fought for civil rights in the U.S. If moral relativism is true, then these reformers were immoral. You see, if an act is right if and only if it is in keeping with a given society’s code, then the moral reformer himself is by definition an immoral person. Moral reformers must always be wrong because they go against the code of their society. But such a view is defective for we all know that real moral reform has taken place!

Taking the definition: "Moral relativism is the view that moral judgments are true or false only relative to some particular standpoint "

Then reformers simply change the standpoint, which in turn changes whether or not an action is moral/immoral.

Unless the current standpoint is "changing the standpoint is immoral", then there isn't an issue with reforming.

In any case, even if all the premises in this problem are correct, I don't see how it makes moral relativism any less true as a meta-ethical theory.


Problem 3: Moral relativists cannot complain about the problem of evil. The problem of evil is one of the most commonly raised objections to the existence of God. Some of the great atheists— Bertrand Russell, David Hume, H.G. Wells— concluded on the basis of the evil and suffering in the world that the God of the Bible must not exist (genocide, child abuse, suicide bombings). The common argument is that if God was all-good and all-powerful he would deal with evil. But evil exists, so God must not. The force of this objection rests upon moral evil being real and some things being objectively wrong. But such a claim is peculiar if we understand the nature of evil. Evil is a perversion of good. There can be good without evil, but not evil without good. There can be right without wrong, but not wrong unless there is first right. If morality is ultimately a matter of personal tastes, like ice cream flavor, the argument against God’s existence based on evil vanishes. If evil is real, then so is absolute good, which means moral relativism is false.

This is just flat out false, since the problem of evil can be presented as a formal reductio ad absurdum argument. For example (and this specific example is not the point, but the fact that a moral relativist can agree with the required premises to be able to make the argument.

A: God exists (assumption)
P1: If God exists, then suffering will not exist
P2: Suffering does exist
P3: Suffering does not exist (A & P1 Modus Ponens)
P4: Contradiction (P2&3), therefore A is false

A moral relativist only needs to agree with P1&2, and P1 is a conditional premise assuming a theistic worldview (thus not committing to their own, relativistic, one) is correct for the argument.
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#44
ethang5
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@Envisage
Hi Envisage! (My god is that a cool name or what?)

Then reformers simply change the standpoint, which in turn changes whether or not an action is moral/immoral.
Yes, but before the reformer changes the standpoint, the society considers it moral, and the reformer considers it immoral, hence his push for reform.

Moral reformers are members of a society that stand outside that society’s moral code and pronounce a need for reform and change in that code.

If moral relativism is true, then these reformers were immoral. You see, if an act is right if and only if it is in keeping with a given society’s code, then the moral reformer himself is by definition an immoral person.

...because he wants to change what society already considers to be moral!

Unless the current standpoint is "changing the standpoint is immoral", then there isn't an issue with reforming
The current standpoint is that the current standpoint is moral. Thus, anyone standing on the outside of that society’s moral code and pronouncing a need for reform and change in that code, is advocating immorality.

From the societies viewpoint, the reformer wants to move away from what is considered moral, towards something else. Because, according to moral relativism, only what the society considers moral, is moral.

In all respect I think your argument fails on this point.

This is just flat out false, since the problem of evil can be presented as a formal reductio ad absurdum argument.
I don't think so. Let me show you why. Remember the argument said...

The force of this objection rests upon moral evil being real and some things being objectively wrong.

Yet your argument, which denies objective good, attempts to use objective evil to make its point. That is illogical, because as the OP's argument points out...

...such a claim is peculiar if we understand the nature of evil. Evil is a perversion of good. There can be good without evil, but not evil without good. There can be right without wrong, but not wrong unless there is first right. If morality is ultimately a matter of personal tastes, like ice cream flavor, the argument against God’s existence based on evil vanishes. If evil is real, then so is absolute good, which means moral relativism is false.

A moral relativist only needs to agree with P1&2, and P1 is a conditional premise assuming a theistic worldview (thus not committing to their own, relativistic, one) is correct for the argument.
P1 is neither a correct premise, or a theistic worldview. I think your argument fails here too.

75 days later

#45
simplybeourselves
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To me a morally wrong action is an action that increases overall suffering in the long run. It would be awkward to always replace "You are doing something morally wrong!" with "You are increasing overall suffering in the long-run!" ... but however awkward it would be to talk like that I don't think it would leave anything out. It seems that 100% of moral wrongdoing could be explained that way. That's why, as far as I'm concerned, there's nothing more to an immoral action than that. That's why I believe in moral realism in an intuitionistic and minimalistic sort of way. It seems to me that "suffering is intrinsically bad" is just a perfectly reasonable axiom to have that seems to explain morality very well.
#46
3RU7AL
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@simplybeourselves
To me a morally wrong action is an action that increases overall suffering in the long run.
This (consequentialism) seems rather difficult to quantify.

There was a farmer who one day left his stable door ajar and his horse wandered away.

His neighbor notes, "it is a terrible thing that you forgot to secure your stable, for now you have lost your only horse."

The farmer doesn't reply.

A few days later his horse returned with a wild horse.

His neighbor is surprised and exclaims, "it is a wonderful thing that you forgot to secure your stable! Because now you have two horses!"

The farmer doesn't reply.

A week later the farmer's son is training the new horse and is thrown onto a rock and breaks his leg.

The neighbor sympathetically comments, "it is a terrible thing that you forgot to secure your stable, because now your son is lame."

The farmer doesn't reply.

The next year their king declares war and forcibly recruits all of the able bodied young men to fight.

The neighbor chuckles, "it is a wonderful thing that you forgot to secure your stable, because your son, being lame, will not have to face the horrors of battle."

The farmer doesn't reply.
#47
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@3RU7AL
That's a separate epistemic question to the ontologic question that I was addressing. Just because we may not be able to know what the overall consequences will eventually be doesn't mean that the overall consequences isn't what moral facts are all about. There are both known and unknown truths and there is no reason to suppose that all truths are even knowable ... let alone known.
#48
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@simplybeourselves
A secret, invisible, unknowable, unreliable or purposely unrevealed measure of "total suffering" is indistinguishable from "no measure".

Such a standard is of no practical use.
#49
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@3RU7AL
I didn't say that I believed in a secret, invisible, unnknowable, unreliable purposefully unrevealed measure of total suffering. And I didn't say that such a thing, that I don't believe in, wouldn't be indistinguishible, from an epistemic standpoint, from no measure.

I said that the epistemic question is a separate question. And if consequentalism is a good theory for what makes an action morally wrong then the knowability of such consequences is a separate question. You appear to be conflating two separate questions, one ontologic and one epistemic, and I'm just pointing that out. 

It's just the case that if an immoral action really is an action that leads to the outcome with the most overall suffering then even if we could never have any knowledge of such an outcome or measure it in any way whatsoever then that doesn't change the fact that it's still the case that an immoral action really is an action that leads to the outcome with the most overall suffering. 

You are conflating an unknowable truth with an untruth and those two things aren't the same. An untruth is something that isn't true whereas an uknowable truth is something that is true but we can never know it. 

Finally, you are also presuming that it's the actual consequences rather than the expected consequences that matters. And consequentialism need not assume that at all. It could very well be that ultimately it's the actual consequences that matter ontologically speaking but, as we're not omniscient, if we are to get practical about it from an epistemic standpoint then the reasonable thing to do is to focus on the expected consequences given our best evidence.

#50
3RU7AL
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@simplybeourselves
> It's just the case that if an immoral action really is an action that leads to the outcome with the most overall suffering then even if we could never have any knowledge of such an outcome or measure it in any way whatsoever then that doesn't change the fact that it's still the case that an immoral action really is an action that leads to the outcome with the most overall suffering. 

Do you believe the Bubonic plague was "bad"?

Do you believe the Bubonic plague increased or decreased "overall suffering"?
#51
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@3RU7AL
Yeah, it certainly was bad and it certainly increased overall suffering. There's clear evidence of that and the fact that we  are not able to figure out what the ultimate consequences of such a plague will be by, say, 3000 years in the future doesn't mean that we can't have a good estimate that it probably has ultimately caused more suffering than not. You don't need to have omniscience or the full absolute picture in order to have any picture at all. 

Okay , really off shopping now. I tend to respond very compulsively to stuff I disagree with.