if iran keeps enriching nuclear fuel, america should bomb them

No,why would you think that

What is the civilian house fallacy?

Hamas sure does from their statements easily googled.

I'm going to have to infer from your evasiveness that you have no principles.

Why not? you infer all sorts of BS about Hamas as it is.

Isn't Hamas wanted for warcrimes?

HAH, warcrimes against Japan and Hitler doesn't count,try again alien.

I never said that,

but in WW2 where 10 million more citizens would have died if we didn't bomb them

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STRATEGIC BOMBING CAMPAIGN

Was such a ferocious effort, of which the atomic bombings were only the most exceptional instances, justified? This question must be approached with the greatest care and even trepidation given the indescribable suffering involved and the grave implications that follow from such a judgment. But the answer seems to be yes. The essential reason is that such attacks appeared to a reasonable observer then — and still seem so today, although this is subject to argument — to be materially contributing to hastening the end of a total war against an opponent that had initiated the conflict and was giving every indication that it would fight bitterly — let us say it, fanatically — to the very end, and to be doing so at a lower cost in Allied lives. Each of the components in this sentence is important, for such horrendous violence as was involved in the bombing campaign (culminating in the strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki) could not be justified for much less — for instance against an opponent waging a limited war or willing to meaningfully compromise, or if there were clear ways at a reasonable cost to end the conflict without needing to resort to such practices.

 

The first important point is that the purpose to which the bombing campaign was directed — Japan’s capitulation — was and remains an accepted and legitimate end. The reality was that the war in the Pacific was a total war that would not end without the full surrender of one of the combatants. This was not something that the Allies had conjured up but rather the type of conflict that Imperial Japan had created and cultivated throughout the struggle. Japan’s conduct, beginning with the war in China and the barbarities of which the Rape of Nanjing is only the most notorious instance and continuing with Tokyo’s initiation of the wider war in December 1941, presented every indication that Japan refused to abide by any meaningful rules or norms limiting the conflict. Not only did Tokyo begin the war with sudden and perfidious attacks, most notoriously at Pearl Harbor but also throughout East Asia and in China, but it also inflicted the most grievous treatment on prisoners of war, captive populations and enemy combatants. Japan’s behavior made clear that restraint on the part of the Allies would not be reciprocated or respected but rather disdained and, if anything, exploited. So noxious was Japan’s conduct that it was considered largely uncontroversial by the Allies that the war would be a fight to the finish and have to end with something approximating the Empire’s full surrender. The Allies’ employment of violence in pursuit of such a capitulation was therefore legitimate. A power that was so aggressive and so cruel needed to be fully defeated. It could not be reckoned with.

 

But was such bombing, even in pursuit of this legitimate end, reasonable? That is, was it reasonable for decision makers at the time to see it as meaningfully contributing to bringing about Japan’s surrender? It seems eminently clear that it was. While there is an active historical debate as to how meaningful the contribution of the bombing campaign was, there seems more than enough evidence to suggest that it did have a significant effect. Many Japanese officials after the war, including the Emperor himself, confessed that the bombing campaign played a significant role in their decision to give up. More relevantly to the moral question, it was reasonable for Allied decision makers making judgments under conditions of imperfect and incomplete information to think that it would. Few would quibble that destroying a nation’s urban and industrial infrastructure will degrade its war-making ability.

 

This is true even in light of recent scholarship indicating that the Soviet seizure of Japanese-held Manchuria and the prospect of Moscow’s joining the invasion of the Home Islands played as much, if not more, of a role in Japan’s decision to surrender as did the atomic bomb attacks. Indeed, even then it was a very close call and had to survive a coup attempt by disaffected Army elements. In other words, even with the near-apocalyptic annihilation of two of its great cities, Imperial Japan was still uncertain about surrendering. The implication of this is not, as some argue, that the United States and its allies could have dispensed with the atomic bomb strikes or the strategic bombing campaign of which they were a part. Just because these were not necessarily the primary cause of Japan’s decision to surrender (though this remains very much in dispute), does not mean they were not meaningful. No one would argue against the use of rifles or submarines or aircraft carriers because they did not singlehandedly win the war. Rather, it simply shows how much force needed to be brought to bear to compel Tokyo to give up.

 

JAPAN’S RECALCITRANCE

But, even if the bombing campaign did contribute to the pursuit of legitimate war aims, was it important or necessary enough to justify the horrendous costs to the Japanese population? To answer this question, we must recall the context. What was clear by late 1944, at the beginning of the Allied strategic bombing assault, was that Japan would not capitulate even in the face of manifest military defeat. By this point, Japan’s fleet had been effectively destroyed, its air forces humbled and its ground forces in the Pacific marooned on those islands left behind by the American island-hopping campaign.

 

if they had non atomic bombing campaigns that killed just as many people as atomic bombs, during wwii, why would it have been so wrong to just use atomic bombs instead?

WRONG, hiroshima na Nagasaki lad to the surrender and PLUS what does that have to do with anything we discussed earlier like the morality,war crimes,etc

Doesn't matter how "scared" Japan was. America couldn't afford more Soviet Satellite puppets. Truman did the right thing by shoving his nukes in the face of Stalin to the point that Stalin called off his invasion of Japan.