Instigator / Pro
6
1584
rating
30
debates
71.67%
won
Topic
#6003
It is more likely that no god* exists rather than any form of god existing.
Status
Voting
The participant that receives the most points from the voters is declared a winner.
Voting will end in:
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DD
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HH
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Parameters
- Publication date
- Last updated date
- Type
- Rated
- Number of rounds
- 4
- Time for argument
- One week
- Max argument characters
- 30,000
- Voting period
- One month
- Point system
- Multiple criterions
- Voting system
- Open
- Minimal rating
- None
Contender / Con
4
1500
rating
3
debates
33.33%
won
Description
**For Hero1000 Only**
God: a perfectly good, omnipotent and omniscient being that created the universe.
Please note that neither side has to prove that god is real or not, you just have to make a case that your side is more probable than the other.
Round 1
(FYI, this is more or less the same opening statement I used for the previous version of this debate)
Introduction
My strategy for this debate is going to be just throwing out every good argument there is for atheism and hoping at least one of them convinces the voters. That said, I apologize if this gets to be a little long, but I create this debate with the express purpose of it being very in depth, so I think the time limit and character limit will support that. One final thing before I begin, I acknowledge that the primary burden of proof rests with me. I must have sufficient evidence to prove that it is more likely God does not exist, and Con must either have sufficient evidence to prove that it is more likely that God does exist, or demonstrate that I have not provided enough evidence to support my side. With that, here we go.
The Problem of Evil
This is one of my favorite arguments for atheism. At its most basic form, it goes something like this:
Premise 1: God is all loving (this is provided in my description of God, so by agreeing to this debate, you agreed to this premise)
Premise 2: The World has Evil in it
Premise 3: An all loving God would not create a world with evil
Conclusion: An all loving God cannot exist.
That by itself is probably the most common argument against god's existence, but what makes it my favorite is all the little other arguments that branch off from it. For example, there is the problem of animal evil. God could have created all animals so that they were photosynthetic (they get their energy from the sun), but God made it specifically so that many animals must eat other animals to survive. Why would an all loving God create a world where you must commit evil to others to survive?
Many challenges to this argument say that it must be a part of his cosmic design. There must be some reason. Sometimes, the reason provided is that without some evil, you cannot have certain types of good. Eg. Without fear you can't have bravery, without challenges you can't have accomplishment etc. But if I was brave enough to save someone from a burning building, it still would have been better for there to be no fire. There would have been no property damage, so damage to me and the victims bodies, and the loved ones would have been spared the horror of seeing their family member stuck in a burning building. So, I ask you, does it make more sense that an all loving God created a world with Evil just so there could be some other kinds of good, or would he have just have created a world where there is no Evil, and you always feel positive emotions? I feel that it makes more sense to just have a perfect world.
Additionally, If he was God, then why couldn’t he have made it so we feel emotions like accomplishment, and bravery regardless of actually having done anything. Emotions are emotions, and if God is truly all powerful (within the bounds of logic), then it would make more sense to have a world where we feel these emotions constantly. I know I would prefer a world like that. But instead, God created a world with pain, and even gave us the capacity to feel pain. In that way, he literally gave us pain by making us capable of experiencing it.
And again, there is the problem of Animal suffering. Why would God make it so that some animals have to eat others to survive? I see no good coming out of this?
Because of this, I feel that it is more likely that the universe is simply indifferent to our suffering, and there is no all loving being trying to maximize our happiness.
Non-resistant Non-Believers/ Divine Hiddenness
This one is pretty simple. Why would an all loving God knowingly not reveal himself to people who are willing? A non-resistant non-believer is someone who wants to believe in God and is open to believing in God, but still has not had God reveal himself to them, and so does not believe. A perfectly loving God wouldn’t want someone like this to suffer. If a person actively wants to believe in God, and actively wants to have a personal relationship with God, then why would an all loving God deny this to them?
Theists often respond to this one by saying that God must be acting in the best interests of the person, and they don't know it, but that brings us back to my use of the word "likely" in the title.
It seems most probable (to me at least) that in order to be perfectly loving, god would want to have a personal relationship with all of his creation, especially if that creation desired one. It is possible that he is acting in some mysterious way, but I think that scenario seems to be a bit too complicated. As Occam's Razor says, the simplest explanation is often the correct one.
Another common counter to this is that non-resistant, non-believers don't actually exist, but this is nearly impossible. I am one of them. I would love for there to be a supreme being whose purpose is to maximize my happiness, but I have yet to find that being. I argue the cause of atheism with sadness. If nothing, I am motivated to find God, and yet have not. This is true of so many others.
Religious displacement
This is another relatively simple one, but it is also a very powerful one, at least I think so. Basically, If God is all loving, and loves every one of his creations equally, then why are you more likely to have a divine visit if you live in a different country. For example, Thailand is about 92% Atheist. On the other end, India has a 99% rate of people saying that they are religious when polled.
If a god existed, you would expect to find that he has revealed himself to people indiscriminately of nationality, but clearly that is not true.
Another addition to this puzzle is the variety of religions around the world. If there was an all loving god, it would make sense for him to reveal himself equally to people regardless of race and location. If that were true, you would expect all major religions to arrive at roughly the same idea. They might get some minor things different, but as we see today, to there are so many different religions with so many different beliefs. I find it hard to believe that a perfectly all loving god would allow this.
Divine Hiddenness (again, but different)
This one actually is different from my second point, but I just couldn’t think of anything better to call it.
I don’t think my opponent will object to the fact that region can cause conflict, specifically over which one is the correct one. While it is true that region only directly caused around 7% of wars, it is still a major problem that it caused any wars. And besides that even, religion one of the biggest dividing factors between us humans. If a war wasn’t directly caused by religion, then there is a good chance that the opposing sides had different majority faith systems, and this can be used by demagogues to whip the population into a frenzy of hatred.
With all of this in mind, God is clearly causing much harm by not revealing himself directly to all of us. If god were to appear before a massive gathering of us, and state clearly what religion is correct (if any), it would stop all the religious fighting. By not intervening, God is passively letting all this violence go on, and thus cannot be perfectly good.
Again, this isn’t a direct proof of anything. God may have his reasons for being so hidden, but it seems most likely that the universe is simply indifferent to our problems.
Universe Big
The title for this one is a joke, but the argument is not. Basically, why would got create such a big universe with such a big amount of empty space if we are truly the center of his attention?
Not only is the universe big and empty beyond use, it's just not suited well to us. So much of it is uninhabitable for us and completely useless. Clearly God's creation is imperfect and frankly just stupid if we are to believe it was perfectly planned out.
Now God may have some weird and incomprehensible reason for this, but it's far more likely that the universe is simply indifferent to us, and not made for us.
Conclusion
Those are some of the best arguments for atheism out there. There are some others, but I chose not to include them because they either weren’t that good, or I was too lazy. Sure, it is still a possibility that god can exist, but I believe that these arguments demonstrate that it is at least improbable.
Thank you, I yield the floor.
Thank you Moozer for accepting my request to have this debate with you. And no need to apologize for the length of the debate, I knew what I was getting into and agreed to it, asked for it even.
A perfectly good being vs An all loving God
Before I start on this topic and argument, I wish to ask a question for the sake of clarification. In the description and what we agreed to, "A perfectly good being" is one of the necessary traits to the God we are discussing, however just now you said "An all loving God", and much of your argument is centered around that premise.
Now, I would personally argue that a perfectly good God or a perfectly moral God does not necessarily have to be all loving, or even loving at all. But before I make that argument, I have to ask the clarification question. When you said perfectly good in the description, was your intention that one of the things it means is all loving would be a given fact for the sake of this debate, that I agreed that the God we're talking about is all loving? Or was that not your intention?
If it was the former, then I will own up to this misunderstanding and agree that the God we are talking about within the confines of this debate is an all loving one, and admittedly this will make my case harder. If it was the latter, then, having still agreed that the God we're talking about is a perfectly good one, I will attempt to make the argument that such a God does not have to be all loving.
The Problem of the Problem of Evil
As outlined under The Problem of Evil and Divine Hiddenness and Divine Hiddenness 2 (I will call it such for brevity's sake if there isn't an issue with that), my opponent names avoidable suffering as a disqualifier for a God that could be called Omnibenevolent. The logic goes how can a God be perfectly good if there is suffering that happens to us that he has the power to prevent and does not? That while while human beings under this premise, can still be moral even with suffering around them happening, due in part to them not being perfect, and due in part to them not having complete power. An all powerful God that can do anything, could not also be flawlessly Omnibenevolent if he allows suffering to happen, let alone so much suffering.
This argument, while making intuitive sense, suffers, to my understanding, from being reliant on assumptions:
Utilitarianism:
Among these assumptions is that Utilitarianism, or some kind of moral system that is Utilitarian-adjacent, is the correct method with which to measure and determine morality. That the more happiness gained the more moral the act, and the more suffering caused the less moral the act. Depending on how one interprets the philosophy, this can also including that which occurs from inaction.
The problem with this assumption however is that there isn't presented an argument for Utilitarianism. I would argue that, given the Pro parameters of presenting enough evidence to show that his conclusion is more likely, while Pro would not need to completely proof beyond doubt that Utilitarianism is the correct measure of morality (either partially or fully), Pro would need to not only demonstrate that it is a reasonable measurement of morality, but that alternative measurements of morality are less reasonable, not necessarily *unreasonable*, but at the very least, significantly enough less reasonable that this conclusion can be reliably reached by an intelligent enough individual.
Consequentialism:
Consequentialism is broader umbrella of moral philosophy (of which, Utilitarianism is one of the moral philosophy under it). Simply speaking, if the effect is bad, then the cause was bad. If the effect was good, then the cause was good. Like with Utilitarianism, this could potentially include inaction.
The problems with this assumption is largely the same as what I outlined under Utilitarianism. Under some studies, consequentialism is part of the big three in modern moral philosophy, the other two being virtue ethics and deontology. There isn't a provided argument as to why consequentialism is a more reasonable measure of morality than virtue ethics and deontology.
The source of morality
Since the birth of philosophy and religion, humanity has tirelessly searched for and debated on the answers of not just what is right and wrong, but what is the reason behind those determinations. For example, not simply asking "Is utilitarianism the correct measure of morality", but also asking "If Utilitarianism is the correct measure of morality. Why? What justifies this? And how did we reach this answer", questions that pertain to the nature of the source of morality.
I'll outline two general schools of thought behind the search for morality.
Independent Morality: One is that morality exists independent of human determination and conclusion. That what is moral or immoral, is already so as a fact in the same way that it is a fact that the gravity of the earth is 9.81 m/s(to the power 2) and that such was already the case long before we measured it and discovered this to be fact. In this case humanity can search for and try to find what is moral and immoral.
Dependent Morality: The other is that morality exists dependent on human determination and conclusion. That simply put, what humanity decides is moral is moral. That the conclusions we come to, either as individuals, or as a society, or both, is what determines what is right and wrong. It is by extension possible under this school of thought for morality to be subjective.
Humanity's morals
I would like to bring note to the fact that, in both of those cases, and probably in the cases of most other schools of thought of morality that might exist, morality is most closely connected to humanity than to any other species or anything else, for example in those two cases, morality is either searchable for mainly and pretty much exclusively by humanity, or it is determined and decided on what it is mainly and pretty much exclusively by humanity. When a lion attacks and kills a rabbit, or even if it attacks and kills a fellow man, under most, if not all philosophies and interpretations of morality, the lion is not judged to be 'evil' or 'committing sin' and we instead say that it is merely acting out in its nature. Under most if not all philosophies the entirety of the animal kingdom is viewed under this lens, that the privilege and burden of morality and immorality lies exclusively with human beings, and in many philosophies, only with adult human beings.
Now why is this the case? Why can even the most intelligent animals not be finders or determiners of morality. Well, aside from the fact that animals can not communicate with us in spoken language, I would say that it is safe to mostly conclude that this is because of the following:
Knowledge: Whatever we say about human and animal intelligence, I believe its pretty much undeniable to claim that humanity has more knowledge about the universe than the rest of the animal kingdom combined.
Wisdom: While we are not the longest living species in the world, we are almost always the ones with the most varied experiences and most questions asked. Our overall accumulated philosophical experience both on a collective and individual basis, is many times that of even the most intelligent animals.
Power: In whatever form it takes, be it military power, economic power, social power or other kinds of power, humanity is so powerful that not only is it the biggest determiner of the fate of the earth. It is the *only* determiner of the fate of the earth, and how its shaped day by day, year by year and century by century. While it might feel distasteful to link morality with power, I believe it is not that outrageous to suggest that, our moral authority as finders or determiners of right and wrong would be less if the animal kingdom had greater power than us over the affairs of the world.
A world where God exists
Imagine a world in which an omnipotent omniscient God who created the universe exists. Not necessarily one where it is an initial given that he is perfectly moral and/or all-loving, just one that is all powerful and all knowing.
I would argue that, due to the reasons outlined under Humanity's morals, God would not only far outclass us as far as moral authority is concerned, God would predate even morality itself, to such an extent that it fundamentally shifts the relation between God and morality as compared to the relation between man and morality.
God has infinite Knowledge (or as infinite as knowledge can get), there would not be a thing in the whole cosmos that God would not know about.
God has infinite Wisdom (or as infinite as wisdom can get), God will have existed since the very beginning of the universe, maybe even before that if possible, and will have observed everything that has ever happened in the universe since its creation until now, God's wisdom would infinitely exceed ours in both volume and density. And would infinitely exceed that of all the intelligent species in the universe combined.
God has infinite Power (or as infinite as power can get), God is infinitely more powerful than all living species in the universe combined.
I would argue that, because of these reasons, on top of the fact that God created the universe, time and space and matter itself and all that, God created morality itself. That for similar reasons as to how humanity ascended above animals in regards to moral authority, God is so much more infinitely above us and anything else in the universe in regards to this that, it would be less accurate to frame it as "God is moral" and more accurate to frame it as "Moral is God", or I suppose less fancifully, "Morality is what God decides it to be". In a world where God exists, God would be the final and only say in what is right and wrong. In this case morality would be entirely Independent of human determination and conclusion, because it would be entirely Dependent on God's judgement. Even so much so to the extent that morality can have different standards on God than on mankind. For example it can be that its not immoral for God to kill many in a flood but generally immoral for people to kill other people.
In a world where God exists, God is perfectly moral simply by virtue of being God.
(And if necessary, depending on the resolution of A perfectly good being vs An all loving God, I will attempt to argue that God determines what it means to be 'all loving' although that would be a more difficult argument to make)
Side note 1
Now to be clear, the entirety of A world where God exists is built around the hypothetical assumption that We live in a world where God exists is a given fact, for the sake of argument within that bullet point. It is not intended, on its own, to argue for reasons why an all powerful all knowing God exists, or is likely to exist.
What it is intended to convey is that, morality, or at least humanity's perception of morality, does not have nearly as much of a factor in the likelihood of the God* in the debate title and description existing, because:
In a world where God exists: God would already be perfectly good by virtue of being God.
In a world where God doesn't exist: All claims of who/what God is would be fairytales, and such a God, who is not actually God, would not be perfectly good.
In both cases "is God moral" can be argued to be a moot point. And by extension I would say that, such inquiries as "would a perfectly moral God have let the things in our universe happen?" have very little (if any) effect in determining the likelihood that the God* we're debating about exists.
Intelligent design
Having made my current arguments regarding morality, I will now approach the topic with a different method. This is likely an argument you and many are familiar with. The odds that our universe came about without intelligent design into the mechanics of the laws of physics needed to allow for life are so incredibly low by many scientific measurements. As an example, physicist Lee Smolin has calculated that the odds are 1 in 10(to the power 229). This finding is not meant to be evidence per se, but rather to contextualize the degree of extraordinary unlikelihood we are talking about here.
The argument goes something like this, if you saw a book with the entirety of hamlet written on it by a typewriter, which would be the more reasonable conclusion to arrive to? That it was written by human being? Or that it was written by a monkey?
*Technically* speaking, as far the definition of *possibility* is concerned, it is indeed strictly speaking *possible* that such a book was indeed accidentally written by a monkey. However, the odds of that are so incredibly and outstandingly unlikely that it is extremely unreasonable to come to such a conclusion, and far more reasonable to conclude that such a book was written by a human.
While *technically* it is possible, no matter how unlikely it is, that the universe did indeed come about the way it did without intelligent design, without a creator. I would argue that the mechanics required for a livable universe are so precise, and so unlikely to come about naturally, that it is more likely to conclude that such a universe was created by God. Even if such a God is one that we must necessarily also package with the attribute of being perfectly good, and if a I have to argue for it, all-loving.
God's Test
The reason God does not make his presence to us more obvious and more indisputable is to make the very act of believing in his existence challenging. Likewise the reason God allows other religions to be present to compete with the one-true faith (be that faith Islam, Christianity, or something else entirely) is to further add the challenge of finding what God's orders to us are. The reason God allows Satan some level of influence over us is to add to our internal struggle against sin. The reason God allows for pain and suffering caused by human evil and natural disasters in the material world is to further add to the hardships of our test. Any opportunity passed by God to make the test easier is because God did not wish to make the test easier. And any opportunity passed by God to prevent the test from being more difficult, is because God wished to make it that difficult.
To be perfectly honest, if you were to ask "why would God test us?", I could not answer you expect with guesswork and assumptions. I think if the world we live in is a world where God exists, whether that God is perfectly moral or not, we would come up short of finding out the root foundational cause for why God does what he does. Aside from what's written in the Holy book of the one true faith. (whichever Holy book and faith that may be)
Side note 2
To be clear, this is only meant to be a reasonable presentable answer as to "what is God's motivation" and to the many question that go along the lines of "Why make it more difficult for us?" and/or "Why not make it easier for us?". This is not meant to tackle the moral aspect of such motivation directly, the aspect of whether or not it is moral for God to put us through suffering and hardship. The moral aspects I instead tackled under The Problem of the Problem of Evil and The source of morality. This section is instead intended to fill in some gaps. To supplement the prior sections rather than stand purely on its own.
And while I have argued under Side note 1 that the question of morality should not decrease the likelihood that God* exists. I will still engage in that question as my argument could be incorrect.
While you might argue that a moral God would be more likely to give us a perfectly happy struggle free world than to give us God's Test, I would counter-argue that, while God's Test on its own might not display why it is more likely than what you described. The sum of my arguments, The Problem of the Problem of Evil and The source of morality explaining why a not perfect world is not immoral of God, Intelligent design explaining why it is more likely for there to be a God of some kind than no God at all. And God's Test attempting to give answers to unanswered questions. I hope that the sum of my arguments makes for a compelling case as to why it is more likely that God* exists than for there to be no God at all.
Direct responses
Here will be the shorter responses that I otherwise didn't find a place for.
It seems most probable (to me at least) that in order to be perfectly loving, god would want to have a personal relationship with all of his creation, especially if that creation desired one.
Why do you believe this?
why are you more likely to have a divine visit if you live in a different country. For example, Thailand is about 92% Atheist. On the other end, India has a 99% rate of people saying that they are religious when polled.
This seems to falsely assume that all religions and/or being religious are the result of God's divine visit. I would counter by saying that as far as false religions are concerned, there is no divine visit by God involved.
And even in world where God exists, it is most likely, if not certain, that most religions are false.
If a god existed, you would expect to find that he has revealed himself to people indiscriminately of nationality, but clearly that is not true.
There is an explanation for this in my religion as to why this is not unfair, as far as your fate in the hereafter is concerned. If a person has not been introduced to, nor had reasonable means to be introduced to the holy Quran and to Islam, then if that person were to die a non-Muslim he will be tested by God on the day of resurrection.
Another addition to this puzzle is the variety of religions around the world. If there was an all loving god, it would make sense for him to reveal himself equally to people regardless of race and location. If that were true, you would expect all major religions to arrive at roughly the same idea. They might get some minor things different, but as we see today, to there are so many different religions with so many different beliefs. I find it hard to believe that a perfectly all loving god would allow this.
I have two interpretations of this, either you are saying God directly created these religions, or you are saying God allowed many of these false religions to be made by man. And that you are criticizing this inaction as having caused the spread of misinformation.
If it is the former then I would need to ask you why you have come to this conclusion? That in a world where God exists, God must be involved directly with many religions.
If it is the latter, The Problem of the Problem of Evil and The source of morality should help outline why this 'harmful inaction' is not immoral.
Basically, why would got create such a big universe with such a big amount of empty space if we are truly the center of his attention?
Why do you believe humanity would be the center of God's attention if he existed?
Conclusion
To conclude I have a question for Pro, in regards to what you said about the burden of proof and sufficient evidence. Would you say that such a burden should be so strong that you need to prove your side the more likely better conclusion to reach beyond reasonable doubt? To such similar extents as the burden of the prosecution trying to convict a defendant of murder? Or would you say that your burden should be less heavy? I feel the former might be too much (unless maybe we go the "all-loving" God* route?) and that it was indeed your intention for it to be perceived as the latter, but I wished to ask regardless for my and the audience's benefit.
Round 2
First up, sorry for the definitions problem, that one's on me. All-loving and All-good are used so interchangeably elsewhere in philosophy that I did the same, and forgot to make the distinction. Now that you mention it, you are correct that "all-loving" is different than "all-good". I meant "all-good", and when I used the former, just know that I really meant the latter. I don't believe that All-loving must come from All-good, I simply meant them both to mean the same thing, in that God must be a perfect being. My argument still works when you take into account that it's "all-good" though, so thanks for clearing that up.
Assumptions of morality
First, I'd like to point out that while you did find a hole in my argument by showing my assumption of Utilitarianism, you never actually countered it. I'll go into more depth now on why most of my arguments were based on Utilitarian Morality, but (though I may be wrong) I think you're going to have to at least show how my assumptions were wrong, or provide better supported alternative moral system such as the ones you mentioned. I'm still pretty bad at understanding how burden of proof works, so if I'm wrong correct me please.
Moving on, I'll better explain my position on Morality. While it does appear like I based my arguments completely on Utilitarianism, that's not one hundred percent the case. I don't claim to know the absolute truth of Morality on a lot of things, so I leave that to the hypothetical God I'm arguing against. For instance, I can't claim to know if and how certain things are better than others, or lots of other seemingly subjective things. However there is one constant of morality that I can defend, and that's suffering. Suffering is inherently bad by any standard, and that's why my arguments all revolve around unnecessary suffering. I'll go into it in more detail in the next section, but for now I'll just say that there are certain definite "goods" and "bads" in the universe, and the presence of those "bads" are what rule out any omnibenevolent creator.
God sets universal morality
While you're right that God does set the universal laws of Morality, but there are certain laws of logic that even God is privy to. God cannot create a stone so heavy that even if he cannot lift it, it's a logical contradiction. God cannot create a four sided triangle, it's a logical contradiction. God cannot make 2 equal to 3, it's a logical contradiction. This seems redundant, but I promise that I'm getting somewhere.
Now, if God created universal sets of morals and has the final authority on what is good and bad, it would appear as though he transferred at least some of that knowledge to us. Like I mentioned before, God gave us the ability to feel pain, and the knowledge that pain is inherently bad. How do we know that pain and suffering are inherently bad? Because we as humans have a fundamental nature to be rid of pain, and a fundamental understanding that pain is bad.
Just as A is A, suffering is bad. They are really synonyms. God may have his own definitions for what a perfect world would be with other things, but God has transfer to us the knowledge that at least some things are inherently bad, and those are anything that we are inherently avoidant to. You can't trace the source of badness and pain back to anything, it is a universal truth in itself. There is no syllogism for it, because it is a logical given. If I tried to write one, it would look like this:
Premise 1: Pain is bad
Conclusion: Pain is bad
It comes from the definition of pain that it is bad. Just as it is an inherently quality of a square that it must have four sides, it is an inherently quality of the word "pain" that is must be bad.God may know which color is best and worst, and other forms of what is "good" in life, but as long as we humans experience suffering, we know something inherently bad about this universe too. You can't really argue that pain in itself is actually good, it's rock solid because it's a truism in itself. You can argue around it by saying it is necessary, but that's where my first round arguments come into play. I believe these have shown that though a good God is possible, it's just not the most likely explanation.
So to summarize, though I can't know every single universal truth of Morality, I know enough to know that pain is bad, and suffering is bad simply by their own nature. Pain and suffering can be necessary to a divine plan, but as shown before, that's simply not likely.
Intelligent design
I think there's a key logical leap you made in this argument, and it's one that a lot of theists often make. It's been coined the "God of the Gaps" fallacy. To understand this, think back to the times of the ancient Greeks where they had no way to explain the phenomenon of thunder and lightning. Because there was a gap in their understanding, they filled it with the God Zeus. As time went on, we learned more about how our planet really works, and we dropped the pantheons of old. What remained was one creator God who could still explain the unexplainable. However the fallacy remains the same. Just as the Greeks couldn't explain lightning, we can't explain how our universe came to be... yet.
To say that because we don't know why something happens, there must be some divine and mysterious goings-on is an argument from ignorance. It's possible that God was what created the universe, but I can think of any number of other possible explanations. A being doesn't need to be all-powerful to design the universe, so it's possible a higher (but not highest) being is what created this universe. Perhaps there was a being with the power to create the universe but to do nothing else. Clearly that being is not all-powerful, and thus is not God. Just as Lightning doesn't directly imply Zeus, a seemingly designed universe doesn't imply God as the creator. It's the same as your past argument, all you have is a theory. The next step is proving that it is a likely theory, and that's much harder to do.
It's essentially the same thing for your "Gods Test" section, so I won't make another heading for that. You have an answer to the questions I proposed, but can you show how it is likely? Do you have evidence to back it up? Until then, you have a possibility for why God allows evil to persist. I also have an answer to my proposed questions (the answer being that God doesn't exist), but I think I've done a good job of illustrating how my point is the simplest, and most rational. My answer to the proposed questions naturally follows from them, while your answers swerve around and are a lot less simple.
Direct Responses
Quick side note, I like to structure most of my rebuttals through direct Responses, so this should take up a good chunk of my current and future responses. Sorry If I repeat something I previously said, I just like to say in relation to the direct quote I'm responding too.
In a world where God exists, God would be the final and only say in what is right and wrong. In this case morality would be entirely Independent of human determination and conclusion, because it would be entirely Dependent on God's judgement.
I agree with 99% of that. God is perfect and thus can dictate what is perfect. However it would be hard to dispute that humans have some of the knowledge of what is good and bad through our emotions and experiences with the world. God knows all of what is good and bad, but we can see part of that, and we obviously see lots of bad. As stated above, because humans experience suffering, we experience indisputable and absolute "bad". It's up to you to show how it's more likely that the bad is necessary, or to somehow show how we actually don't experience anything bad.
To that extent, in another world it might be rational to submit to God's moral will, but in our world there is still some indisputable "bad". You can try and argue that suffering is not inherently bad, but that's like arguing that bad isn't inherently bad.
The argument goes something like this, if you saw a book with the entirety of hamlet written on it by a typewriter, which would be the more reasonable conclusion to arrive to? That it was written by human being? Or that it was written by a monkey?
The difference between your metaphor and reality is that hamlet automatically implies human intervention, while the universe does not. A human writing Hamlet is the most likely explanation, but there are so many explanations for the perfection of the universe (stated before) that God is only one possibility.
It seems most probable (to me at least) that in order to be perfectly loving, god would want to have a personal relationship with all of his creation, especially if that creation desired one.Why do you believe this?
Well it goes back to the problem of evil again. If someone wants and would derive pleasure from God, why would that God cause them pain by refusing it? You can argue that it works for some divine plan and that God has his mysterious reasons, but the simplest explanation is that God doesn't exist. Unless you know God's divine plan and can show me how it's more likely that is the case, I think it goes without saying that my explanation is the more likely one.
This seems to falsely assume that all religions and/or being religious are the result of God's divine visit. I would counter by saying that as far as false religions are concerned, there is no divine visit by God involved.
Though many modern followers of religions are not personally connected to the divine, the founders of those religions are. If only one religion can be right (As nearly all contradict each other on many things), then why did God only choose prophets from specific locations? Why did Moses not have an equivalent in Japan preaching the same thing, or why did God not speak to another Muhammad living in the americas? These rhetorical questions are used to demonstrate how though not impossible, it's improbable that God would only want followers from a specific region.
There is an explanation for this in my religion as to why this is not unfair, as far as your fate in the hereafter is concerned. If a person has not been introduced to, nor had reasonable means to be introduced to the holy Quran and to Islam, then if that person were to die a non-Muslim he will be tested by God on the day of resurrection.
This is a possible explanation, but is it a likely one? The simplest answer in that scenario is that God doesn't exist, because it doesn't call into question and new beings or entities, it doesn't go out of its way to explain anything, and it naturally follows from what we already know. If you can show that your explanation is really the more likely one, I'd like to hear it, but for now all you have is a possibility.
Why do you believe humanity would be the center of God's attention if he existed?
I don't it's just that there isn't any other focus in these empty areas of the universe. It's possible that there is some alien race a million light-years away that uses empty space to power their super hyperdrives, but is that likely? The most likely explanation for so much useless matter and empty space in the universe is that it wasn't created by design, but by chance.
Would you say that such a burden should be so strong that you need to prove your side the more likely better conclusion to reach beyond reasonable doubt?
Not beyond reasonable doubt necessarily, just more likely. There can still be plenty of reasonable doubt (this isn't a court case), there just has to be 49% reasonable doubt compared to 51% reasonable acceptance. Something can be not even close to certain, and still be the most likely explanation which is what I'm going for.
Conclusion
You provided many arguments which answer in some form the rhetorical questions used in my opening argument. For that, I'm extremely grateful as you did much more than a lot of my other opponents for Atheism debates (*cough* Mall *cough*). However you still only have one possible explanation. I've gone the extra step and shown how my explanation for the questions proposed is the simplest and most likely, and you have yet to do so. I'd also like to point out that BOP is shared in this debate (sorry for not mentioning in description), and you only have one section that backs up your side while the rest of your argument is countering my initial arguments.
To briefly recap my argument, though we cannot know the divine plan of an all-good God, we can observe at least part of objective morality in our daily lives and see that there are some universal "bads" that happen. I'm not claiming to know everything about morality, or to know that suffering is completely unnecessary, I'm just claiming that the most likely solution to the problem of evil is that God does not exist. God could have some weird divine plan where universal "bads" are necessary, but that's just not as likely as the simplest explanation because it doesn't logically follow from the question.
Thanks so much for putting effort and time into this debate, I hope we can keep the civil and academic nature going for the next few rounds! I yield the floor.
Thank you for the clarification, in that case God* must be perfectly good, but not necessarily all-loving. Of course you can make the argument that perfectly good = all-loving, but it would be a point of debate, not a given.
God's limits
At the start of God sets universal morality my opponent posits the limitations of God's power. And at the middle of Intelligent design he proposes the possibility of (not God) high being that could create (or aid in the creation of) the universe but not much else after that. Technically these are two different and separate points, but I felt it convenient to address them together.
Lets address the first one, In a world where God exists it is actually much more likely that God's power isn't limited by logic itself (or by anything) than for it to be limited by that. The reason being that God created time and space and matter itself. In a world where God exists, the very passage of time itself didn't exist yet in the beginning(if we can even imagine what a "beginning" is like without time), and space itself (and matter) not existing would make you wonder "where?" God would've been before he'd created everything. These are feats that I would also argue defy logic, but what is "logic" in this context? Is it what we can imagine? Or what defies the laws of the universe?
Your examples seem to fit both of these, for example a four sided triangle is something that we can not imagine, and is also something that defies the laws of the universe. However I will demonstrate why neither of these necessitates an impossibility being God. An example of a feat of power that defies the laws of the universe would be God creating the universe, matter can neither be created nor destroyed and yet in a universe where God exists, God did that and much more.
An example of a feat of power that is beyond what we can imagine is God creating a color we have never seen before, a quick demonstration for you, can you imagine a color you have never seen before in your life? You do not have to describe it or say anything about it if you wish not to, if you simply say "yes, I was able to imagine a color I never saw before" then I will believe you and move on. Until then, I will carry on with this point as if that was impossible to you, while God creating a new color is beyond our imagination, as said color is not something we can imagine until we see it for ourselves, I would hardly say that it is something which's existence would defy the laws of the universe, or would be 'beyond logic'.
A four sided triangle and two equals 3 might be things that we can not imagine and that defy reality itself, as would God being simultaneously all-powerful and being able to create a stone he can not lift. However given that neither our imagination, nor the laws of the universe, are an obstacle too much for God. I would say it, ironically speaking, far from impossible for God to do what is seemingly impossible even for God.
Technically it is still strictly speaking, a possibility, that in a world where God exists, God is limited by logic, after all, outside of the creation of the universe itself God has never (to our knowledge) defied logic the way you've described. But while it is a possibility, I would say it is an improbable one for a God that has created time and space and matter itself and many more.
Addressing the high being
Much of what I said (with some variation) applies to the high being possibility you have proposed. It would essentially go something like this. If there was a being with the power to create the universe and everything in it, including matter, time, space, etc. , then it is much more likely than not that said being is all-powerful. Your proposal would be similar to proposing that an Engineer who built a computer from scratch would be unable to modify that same computer. Technically it is possible if we imagine hard enough, but very improbable.
Universal Truth
In his rebuttal to me, my opponent talks about universal truth. And attempts to utilize this in order to propose the notion that there are some factors that are just out of even God's hand, even in a world where God exists. A key factor being that pain is bad. That it is inherently bad up to an extent that it is more likely to believe that no Gods exist, than for God* described in our debate title to exist. I however personally believe this argument has problems, and they are the following:
Immoral vs Unpleasant
My opponent uses our natural instinct to avoid pain in order to connect it to the word "bad", and then springboards off of that in order to connect it into being immoral. However, beyond what is intuitive and instinctual, there is little basis to connect unpleasant and immoral to such an extent as to consider them interchangeable, or as my opponent put it, A is A.
God's contradiction
My opponent posits that in a world where God exists, it is normal to conclude that God has transferred some of his knowledge (of morality) to us. That our natural avoidance of pain is because pain is immoral. Now while indeed it is correct to conclude that we are naturally avoidant of pain because God allowed it, this does not necessarily, or even naturally, lead to concluding that pain is immoral in God's eyes. The problem is, you are proposing (potentially) that the knowledge (of morality) God has transferred to us could contradict God's definitions of morality. This is impossible for the reasons I described under The source of morality, namely under Humanity's morals and A world where God exists. God's infinite knowledge, wisdom and power makes it impossible for him to contradict himself.
Lack of foundation
Aside from natural instincts (which I tackle under Immoral vs Unpleasant) my opponent provides little foundation for his reasoning. He claims to know enough to know that pain is bad but offers little to support this. In fact the argument of truism in itself seems to imply it shouldn't warrant a foundation.
Secular matter of debate
Even in talks, discussions, and debates about moral philosophy that are secular in nature, discussions that don't imagine a world where God exists, whether pain is fundamentally morally bad or not, is under contention and a matter of debate. Likewise its close relative consequentialism and one of its sons, utilitarianism, are also under contention and a matter of debate. Even if the world we lived in happened to be a world where God doesn't exist, "pain is (morally) bad" would be far from the (naturally implied) universal truth you claim it to be. If this notion can not establish hard to contest roots in the secular world, how can it be so hard to contest so as to even put God's judgement in question in a world where God exists?
Infinite knowledge and wisdom
The argument seems to imply that what we know something about pain for near certain given our collective experiences of it, but this does little to address how obsolete this is in comparison to God's infinite knowledge and wisdom.
Do as I say not as I Do
The argument (even my opponent's direct response to the statement I am about to show) does nothing to address my closing statement under A world where God exists, that
In this case morality would be entirely Independent of human determination and conclusion, because it would be entirely Dependent on God's judgement. Even so much so to the extent that morality can have different standards on God than on mankind.
and simply carries on with the implication that whatever applies to us must (or at least, naturally should) apply to God. At least so much so that any argument that proposes otherwise is an argument that struggles.
Difficult to explain divine plan
My opponent proposes that while a divine plan that necessitates pain could exist, such an argument would be difficult to uphold. This proposition however completely misses the point in regards to God's relation to morality. And imagines a world where morality existed prior to God and God follows it.
Moral Likelihood
My opponent concludes that, while his propositions are not necessarily indisputable fact, they are strong enough so as to merit the unlikelihood of God* existing. However, before we consider whether or not God would be perfectly Moral (in the case that he does exist), there simply is one of two statements that is true, an all-knowing all-powerful God exists, or such a God doesn't exist. And as I already concluded under Side note 1, either the latter is true and it is redundant to use morality to dispute the likelihood of God*, or the former is true and it is impossible to use morality to dispute the likelihood of God*
Filling the gaps
I understand God of the gaps, at least I hope I do enough to be able to explain why your concerns here don't ring true. And why my opening rebuttal is not quite in violation of committing this logical fallacy. While what I said might sound similar there are a few key things that make it not so:
There must be...
I never stated in my argument that God is the only possible explanation for the creation of the universe, under Intelligent design 1 (I'll call mine 1 and yours 2 for convenience sake) I merely posit that it is more likely the universe came about under an intelligent hand than otherwise. In fact I was careful to point out, such as with my hamlet example, that the alternatives, while I argued were unlikely, were possible. I do not propose that my explanation must be correct due to a lack of knowledge of alternatives, but merely that it is the most likely one (or one of the more likely ones) we are currently aware of. And it is indeed true that there is more knowledge humanity will unlock in the future, however within the confines of this debate we are dealing with what we know now.
Burden of proof
A core concept behind not just God of the gaps, but other theological logical fallacies, is that the burden of proof (And a much heavier burden than the one my opponent has in this debate) should normally lie upon those who propose God's existence, and even more so on those who would propose a God of a particular religion, and even further more so on those who would propose that God's words and holy book as morality and law.
Now to be clear, I fully agree with this notion, especially as one myself who would promote God's words as morality and law. The burden of proof in usual settings lies upon those who would propose God's existence.
However, this is no such usual setting, within the confines of this debate the burden of proof is significantly lighter, and lies within my opponent's proposition. While this does not automatically add strength to my claim, it takes away one of the key aspects of why what I presented is a fallacy.
Alternative explanations
My opponent does actually provide one alternative (to an all-powerful all-knowing God) that explains how the universe could've come about without coincidence, I address this explanation as less likely than mine earlier under Addressing the high being which is under God's limits. Aside from this there aren't other alternative explanations proposed thus far.
Simplicity and Nature
My opponent proposes simplicity and nature as viable measures to a good argument, not necessarily an airtight one, but one that my opponent proposes is better to conclude than something that is more complex and/or less natural, let's address each of these.
Occam's Razor
My opponent's argument as to what is more likely has a consistent theme of proposing the less complicated, that the simpler explanation should be the one that's picked, assuming said simpler explanation is not so incredibly unreasonable. But I believe that my opponent has made a mistake in mixing up 'complicated' with 'needlessly convoluted beyond good reason'. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that my opponent does know the difference between the two, but falsely attributes the former, rather than the later, as measure behind Occam's Razor, as well as the measure with which we should utilize in our logical conclusion of likelihoods.
Firstly, why more 'complicated' than does not fit Occam's Razor technically and definitionally as compared to more 'needlessly convoluted beyond good reason' than. It is because Occam's Razor is concerned about "the multiplication of entities beyond what is necessary", or in a different way, prefer the hypothesis that includes fewer assumptions.
Let us take for example two separate arguments, "water can exist in three states at the same time", and "Traditions should be followed because our parents are wise"
The first argument is very complex, quite frankly I just googled it and it looks like its beyond my depth, intuitively I've always concluded that water can only be solid, liquid or gas at one point, that it wouldn't be possible for it to be all three at the same time. "Water can not be all three states at the same time because the three states are different and require different temperatures" is the simpler conclusion to make, and not one that's academically unreasonable, at least not on the surface. However the necessary consideration of pressure, and the triple-point condition makes it so that the more complex and less intuitive explanation and conclusion here is not only the more likely one, but the (based on scientific fact) correct one outright.
The second argument is rather simple, because our parents are wise we should follow the customs they passed down to us. This is often the basis of tradition. The argument is incredibly simple and easy to understand, however it makes an assumption (and let us say in this instance, does nothing to support the likelihood or reason of said assumption), that our parents are wise.
I propose these two examples to demonstrate how a more complex argument can have less violations of Occam's Razor than a more complex one. Because the deciding factor is not how simple, or even how easy an argument is to follow, but rather which one makes the higher amount of unnecessary (and unreasonable) assumptions. The first argument makes no assumptions (that I am aware of) while the second does.
(Now to be clear, this should not include "for the sake of argument" and "let's say hypothetically" type of arguments, such as every time I say or imply in a world where God exists. As those do note necessarily propose the hypothetical scenario as truth or even likelihood but rather use it as a tool for an imagination exercise)
Secondly, and my opponent and the readers probably already know this but I will say it anyway, Occam's Razor is merely an intellectual tool, a useful one mind you, but only a tool never the less. Occam's Razor, even when followed correctly, is not the sole, and depending on circumstance, not even a partial measure of which conclusion is logically correct or logically more likely. The world itself is not only often complex, but even convoluted beyond what seems to be good reason. Human history contains within its records actions, events and behaviors far stranger and less believable than what is written in most fictional books.
And the same applies to the "God of the gaps" logical fallacy my opponent mentioned, it is a convenient logical tool to snuff out a theist argument's attempt at avoiding the burden of proof, but at the end of the day that is all it is, a tool. The principle itself does not decide what is write and wrong, or likely and unlikely. And not only, as I argued under Filling the gaps, does my argument not commit this fallacy, but additionally. Even in the cases that an argument violates some kind of fallacy or principle, there are so many factors to competing arguments that it violating one or two principles (even repeatedly) does not automatically disqualify it. Proposing that would ironically enough be the fallacy fallacy.
Now to be clear my opponent 'your argument is disqualified because it breaks x and y principles', we're talking about logical likelihoods this entire time. But even then I would like to commit to my narrative that there is more to a proposition's logical likelihood than one or two or slightly more specific logical principles.
Pain aversion
My opponent argues pain being (morally) bad as truism in and off itself, one of his primary arguments for this is our nature, our natural instincts, that if we experience pain to be bad then it simply is by definition.
But where did pain come from? Why do we fail pain? There are many answers, but for argument's sake I will narrow it down to two general ones. "We developed pain through evolution" and "God allowed us to have/gave us pain". (Let us say that in a scenario where God created the world through evolution it would be the latter, as in that case even though we developed pain through evolution, it would be because God allowed it, even intended (and participated) that this be the case).
In a world where God exists we have pain, both our pain receptors, as well as our feelings of anger, sadness, and other such unpleasant experiences, because God allowed it or even did it himself. However, if that is the world, then in such a world there is a 0% chance of God being even slightly immoral, because God can either rule that "causing pain is not inherently bad" or "God causing pain is not bad" and would be indisputably be morally right by virtue of being God.
In a world where God doesn't exist we have pain because they are evolutionary winning traits. We have pain receptors because creatures without pain receptors are more likely to die. We feel sadness because creatures without the ability to experience sadness are less likely to die. Ever other feature we have that connects us to this general "pain" is there because not having means a higher likelihood of dying, and consequently, a lower likelihood of passing down our genes.
"Pain is bad" is instinctual to us, not because pain is intuitively morally bad, but because it is a survival instinct. "Pain is bad" ultimately exists inside us because its an evolutionary trait. That is why it is a natural feeling for us. Now is "reproduce and raise children" a moral obligation? Sure if you already have children then raising them is a moral obligation and I would agree with that myself, but is having children, is reproduction itself a moral obligation? Even partially? Are our evolutionary traits the source (even partially) of our morality?
I find that there is little to no reason to fundamentally connect our base instincts to morality, especially given that our ability to be elevated above animals, in our moral authority as either moral judges or moral pathfinders, came from our ability to be elevated above our base instincts. In fact the further away we move from our base instincts, the richer our moral philosophy gets. This does not necessarily mean that that is morally better, or that moving further from our base instincts is fundamentally good in and off itself. However I would conclude that our base instincts have little to no bearing on morality.
And on top of that, even if it were to be argued that In a world where God doesn't exist it is not that unreasonable to make moral ties to our evolutionary traits. I would say that such argument would have little relevancy anyway due to the lack of connection between morality In a world where God exists and morality In a world where God doesn't exist for the reasons I already mentioned under Moral Likelihood and earlier under Side note 1.
The irony of simplicity and nature in this debate
is that at our simplest thinking and in our common nature, we believed in not just God, but in the God* described in the debate title. A higher number of people on earth still believe in God* than those who don't believe in (or are skeptic of) God's existence. It is simple to conclude that given this statistic it is in our simple human nature to believe in God*
Now is this my argument? Honestly no. Even if we happened to have a nature to believe in God, I would argue that is not indicative for or against God's existence. This section was simply meant to further exercise my point that nature (and simplicity) should not have inherent value in logically determining what is morally correct.
Religion/Islam
Here I will use my faith, Islam itself, as a further tool to support my argument. Bear in mind that same as God's Test this is meant to be a supplementary part that adds to a greater whole rather than being intended to stand by itself.
Testimonies of Miracles
Many have laid witness to the miracles of the prophet Muhammed and of Jesus. Now there were Moses and more of course but I mention just those two because they are the most recent so to speak. These testimonies and miracles have been both passed down and recorded well, especially in Islam's time due to the great increase in literacy it enjoyed. Now while given the regular burdens of proof of religion this might not be enough on its own. I'd say that within the confines of this argument, this might further add to the likelihood God exists in addition to the other things I've said.
The miracles of the Quran
The holy Quran is not only said to have has inside it prophecies of the future, but additionally within it was laid a challenge (to those that have not read it) to produce a verse exactly like one of the verses in it. Additionally to that among the original denomination holy books (that is not a more recent denomination like mormonism) the Quran is the only one confirmed to have been left intact in exactly the same shape it was in when the prophet Mohammed delivered God's message. So much so that even other denominations of Islam like Shia does not change anything within the holy Quran itself.
Side Note 3
This section will be a lot more lacking than I wished because I am running out of characters and energy. That doesn't make the flaw of this section lacking in substance go away, I just wanted to insert this argument sooner even if with less words than latter so you have more rounds to rebuttal it. (And honestly, so I'd be able to present more new arguments).
Direct responses 3
To that extent, in another world it might be rational to submit to God's moral will, but in our world there is still some indisputable "bad". You can try and argue that suffering is not inherently bad, but that's like arguing that bad isn't inherently bad.
What I wrote under Universal Truth addresses your claim that pain is an indisputable (moral) "bad". Aside from that, if the world we live in is a world where God exists. Then anything that God says and/or proclaims is moral fact. Human experiences (or even, the experiences of all living creatures in the universe combined) do not remotely compare to the infinite knowledge, wisdom and power of God as far as moral authority is concerned. Regardless of which world that world is, ours included. And regardless of the fact that in a world where God exists God will have created us to be this way, to have these feelings, experiences and natural instincts.
A human writing Hamlet is the most likely explanation, but there are so many explanations for the perfection of the universe (stated before) that God is only one possibility.
You proposed one explanation which I have currently addressed. Additionally I never claimed God to be the only possibility, merely the most likely one.
If someone wants and would derive pleasure from God, why would that God cause them pain by refusing it? You can argue that it works for some divine plan and that God has his mysterious reasons, but the simplest explanation is that God doesn't exist.
Even if we were to assume purely that the simplest explanation is the best, an equally simple explanation is that pain and pleasure has no bearing on morality. In fact I would argue that your argument for how humanity's experiences of 'universal truth' can potentially override God's moral authority even in a world where God is exists is a taller order.
Though many modern followers of religions are not personally connected to the divine, the founders of those religions are. If only one religion can be right (As nearly all contradict each other on many things), then why did God only choose prophets from specific locations? Why did Moses not have an equivalent in Japan preaching the same thing, or why did God not speak to another Muhammad living in the americas? These rhetorical questions are used to demonstrate how though not impossible, it's improbable that God would only want followers from a specific region.
While what you say feels like it makes sense, it does not change the key aspects of the conclusions I proposed under Moral Likelihood and earlier under Side note 1. (Though slightly modified to address this particular point). That either an all-powerful all-knowing God exists, and how he elected to deliver his message is justified by virtue of him being God. Or he does not exist and criticizing his methods is redundant.
And as you said, the contradictions between the religions means that, at most, only one of them is correct. This should by extension mean that, at most, only one of the founders of those religions was truly connected to the divine. (It is a bit more complicated with the Abrahamic religions, for example Islam claims that while the Bible and Torah were corrupted, Moses and Jesus were true messengers of God)
This is a possible explanation, but is it a likely one? The simplest answer in that scenario is that God doesn't exist, because it doesn't call into question and new beings or entities, it doesn't go out of its way to explain anything, and it naturally follows from what we already know. If you can show that your explanation is really the more likely one, I'd like to hear it, but for now all you have is a possibility.
I will concede that in this particular bullet point your explanation is simpler than mine. Bear in mind that as I'd already said in Side note 2 it is more about the sum of my arguments. This possibility, while perhaps a less likely part than your part, is meant to be a supplementary part of a more likely whole than your whole. And if what I said under Side note 1 (about God's absolute moral authority) holds true, then this explanation holds even less weakness and unlikelihood than it would seem to.
I don't it's just that there isn't any other focus in these empty areas of the universe. It's possible that there is some alien race a million light-years away that uses empty space to power their super hyperdrives, but is that likely? The most likely explanation for so much useless matter and empty space in the universe is that it wasn't created by design, but by chance.
Technically this contradicts your potential proposal for the possibility of a high being that is not God. Otherwise I would say that the existence of life elsewhere is not as unlikely as we think. Indeed the odds of our earth to be able hold and develop life the way it did are incredibly low. But we have billions of stars (and star systems) within thousands of galaxies within millions of superclusters within the observable universe. It's estimated we have 10 to the power 24 stars within the observable universe. And according to the drake equation the chances of life on a planet is roughly one in a million million (or one in 10 to the power 12), additionally estimating that there are 100 million worlds where life was forged.
Now to be clear, this isn't hard evidence as I hardly understand anything of the science myself. However I would still propose that this could at least unseat the intuitive unlikelihood of alien life elsewhere as the default assumption. And even within a secular viewpoint it is not at all unreasonable to conclude that alien civilization (let alone hundreds of millions of them) exist out there without needing to take God into consideration. And in a world where an all-powerful all-knowing God exists, not only will there be even less chance involve regarding our life and other potential life out there due to God's design, but additionally either God created the universe for more than just humanity or humanity is the only intelligent species but God does not require justification for making such a vast universe anyway.
Not beyond reasonable doubt necessarily, just more likely. There can still be plenty of reasonable doubt (this isn't a court case), there just has to be 49% reasonable doubt compared to 51% reasonable acceptance. Something can be not even close to certain, and still be the most likely explanation which is what I'm going for.
It was indeed as I assumed. So almost as if the voters are asked "if you were forced to bet money on which side was correct, who would you bet your money on"?
Quick side note, I like to structure most of my rebuttals through direct Responses, so this should take up a good chunk of my current and future responses. Sorry If I repeat something I previously said, I just like to say in relation to the direct quote I'm responding too.
Don't fret over it, I often do everything you mentioned here as well.
Thanks so much for putting effort and time into this debate, I hope we can keep the civil and academic nature going for the next few rounds! I yield the floor.
The feeling is mutual. I might be giving a lot of "you are wrong"s or "my opponent is wrong"s in my arguments here, but frankly speaking, all are with the caveat that I could be wrong, as I assume such is the same of you as well.
Round 3
Once again, sorry for the lack of formal structure. It helps me to just tackle your arguments directly and one at a time instead of trying to summarize them and respond in paragraph format.
Of course you can make the argument that perfectly good = all-loving, but it would be a point of debate, not a given.
Which is why I won't be attempting it.
Lets address the first one, In a world where God exists it is actually much more likely that God's power isn't limited by logic itself (or by anything) than for it to be limited by that.
Well that's not really my argument. I wouldn't say it's likely for God to be bound by the laws of logic, but a necessity. All-powerful doesn't mean what it seems like at face value, it just means all-powerful within reason.
These are feats that I would also argue defy logic
Not necessarily. It's physically impossible to create matter, and physically possible to start/stop time, but not logically impossible. God can bypass the laws of physics because he is all powerful, but bypassing a law of logic is simply impossible because it cannot be conceived of. One cannot conceive of a four sided triangle, and so it is an impossible shape.
Your examples seem to fit both of these, for example a four sided triangle is something that we can not imagine, and is also something that defies the laws of the universe.
The key difference is that it defies the laws of logic, not of physics.
An example of a feat of power that is beyond what we can imagine is God creating a color we have never seen before, a quick demonstration for you, can you imagine a color you have never seen before in your life? You do not have to describe it or say anything about it if you wish not to, if you simply say "yes, I was able to imagine a color I never saw before" then I will believe you and move on.
Well color has a natural explanation. It's our brain's way of interpreting the way light reflects off objects. Thus God being all-powerful could break the laws of physics, change how the spectrum of light works, give our eyes the capability to perceive a higher spectrum of light, and boom, knew color. However when it comes to a four sided triangle, that is supported by laws of math and logic as opposed to laws of physics. The latter is no problem to God, but even he is bound by the former.
...God is limited by logic, after all, outside of the creation of the universe itself God has never (to our knowledge) defied logic the way you've described. But while it is a possibility, I would say it is an improbable one for a God that has created time and space and matter itself and many more.
I'm a little confused now. You start off by saying that God is bound to the laws of logic, but then you say it's a possibility that he might break those laws? I never said that creating matter from thin air defies logic, it only defies physics which is much less of a problem for God.
If there was a being with the power to create the universe and everything in it, including matter, time, space, etc. , then it is much more likely than not that said being is all-powerful. Your proposal would be similar to proposing that an Engineer who built a computer from scratch would be unable to modify that same computer. Technically it is possible if we imagine hard enough, but very improbable.
My proposed being is only one of many explanations. The universe could have created itself in some way, the universe could be constant and thus not need creation, multiple beings could have worked together to create the universe, a lesser being could have created the universe and then chosen not to alter it or could have lost its power to alter it, etc. God is only one possible explanation. Possible? Sure, But likely? One explanation out of an infinite amount of possible explanations? No, it's not likely.
My opponent uses our natural instinct to avoid pain in order to connect it to the word "bad", and then springboards off of that in order to connect it into being immoral. However, beyond what is intuitive and instinctual, there is little basis to connect unpleasant and immoral to such an extent as to consider them interchangeable, or as my opponent put it, A is A.
I wouldn't necessarily say that pain is "immoral" just that it is inherently bad in itself. It may be moral for God to inflict pain or give us the capacity to feel pain, but only because God has some hidden divine plan and through the pain we get to what is truly moral. While I don't believe that is likely, it's certainly a possibility. However the reason I believe it to be unlikely is because the existence of absolute bads in our world directly implies atheism (due to the relative simplicity and naturalness of that explanation), not some roundabout way to theism. It may be moral for God to inflict pain, but it's simply not likely that that is the case.
My opponent posits that in a world where God exists, it is normal to conclude that God has transferred some of his knowledge (of morality) to us.
No, it just seems to be the case. We can't truly know what it moral or immoral in the long run, but short-term, pain = immoral. There may be justification for that pain that makes it moral in the end, but if you put pain in a vacuum, it's natural essence is that it is bad. It is part of the definition of pain that it is bad. If pain itself becomes good in its nature, then it is no longer pain, and I doubt you would argue for the total absence of pain from our world.
Aside from natural instincts (which I tackle under Immoral vs Unpleasant) my opponent provides little foundation for his reasoning. He claims to know enough to know that pain is bad but offers little to support this. In fact the argument of truism in itself seems to imply it shouldn't warrant a foundation.
Exactly. Pain by definition is bad. If it's not bad, it's not pain. Same as the raven thing. If it's not black, it's not a raven. I don't think you're going to argue for a world without pain, so the next logical step would be to argue for a world where pain is necessary, but I think I've shown well enough how that's not the most likely of scenarios.
Even if the world we lived in happened to be a world where God doesn't exist, "pain is (morally) bad" would be far from the (naturally implied) universal truth you claim it to be.
I think the problem is that I didn't define what I mean by "bad" very well. "Bad" is a quality of pain. Just like a banana needs to be yellow to be a banana, so does pain need to be bad to be pain (and yes, bananas can also be green and brown, but it's not a perfect analogy. You get what I'm going for). Now that doesn't mean that anything with pain in it is necessarily bad. Earlier today I went on a very painful hike, but because the view from the top was worth it, I did it anyways. Pain can be necessary and even moral through the plan of God. It's just not likely, because I find that the existence of universal "bads" in the world comes with an implied explanation to it, which is that God simply does not exist. You can reason that God has a master plan for pain, and that it's necessary for a moral world, but that would have to come with some reasoning as to why it's more likely than the simple explanation.
Like I said before, I don't claim to know the whole truth of morality. I do however claim to know that some things are inherently immoral or just "bad". It can be true that for the world to be perfectly moral, it must contain the immoral, but that's less likely than the world containing the immoral due to it not being designed.
The argument seems to imply that what we know something about pain for near certain given our collective experiences of it, but this does little to address how obsolete this is in comparison to God's infinite knowledge and wisdom.
Think of it this way. If God exists, then God knows everything. If God knows everything, then obviously God knows all fundamental truths of morality. He knows what is moral, and if the immoral is necessary to create the moral, well then he knows why and how to do it. But I know at least some of what is moral. I know that the pain I experience in itself is inherently bad. Pain and bring good, and it can be necessary sometimes, but if you take that pain in a vacuum, it is bad at its core. While God knows everything about morality, I know at least some of it, in that pain is (by itself) bad. I cannot know if that is necessary, or if it becomes moral in certain situations, but the knowledge that there is absolute bad in the world (as defended in my previous argument) directly implies the simplest explanation which is that God does not exist.
You used the word "unpleasant" earlier, and I like that. Because of the unpleasantness of pain, it is bad in itself. It may be good to experience that bad a little, and it may be good in the long term for us to have been unpleasant, but I just don't believe that is likely as God could have created all of us in a constant state of perpetual happiness regardless of pain or unpleasantness.
The argument (even my opponent's direct response to the statement I am about to show) does nothing to address my closing statement under A world where God exists, thatIn this case morality would be entirely Independent of human determination and conclusion, because it would be entirely Dependent on God's judgement. Even so much so to the extent that morality can have different standards on God than on mankind.and simply carries on with the implication that whatever applies to us must (or at least, naturally should) apply to God. At least so much so that any argument that proposes otherwise is an argument that struggles.
Same as before. You are correct that if God exists, morality is entirely dependent on him, and it's pretty clear that we as humans know at least some of the full truth about morality. If you'd like to argue that our interpretation of pain is wrong, and that pain in its full essence is actually good, you can do that. But even though it's possible that pain can be justified, I think it's pretty self-evident that pain itself is inherently bad.
My opponent proposes that while a divine plan that necessitates pain could exist, such an argument would be difficult to uphold. This proposition however completely misses the point in regards to God's relation to morality. And imagines a world where morality existed prior to God and God follows it.
I'm not really imagining morality as independent from God, I'm just saying that God's supposed perfect world clashes with our limited (but still correct) human understanding of morality. Another way to put it is that we as humans know some of morality, and God knows it all. God may have secret divine reasons for allowing and creating pain, but those reasons clash with our human understanding of morality (ie. pain = bad). There may be a roundabout reason for this, but the simplest solution to resolving an apparent contradiction is to check your premises:
1: God exists and is perfectly good
2: There are some bad things in the world
C: We have come to a contradiction.
You can argue that premise two is the incorrect one, but that would be difficult. So put simply, premise one is most likely to be the false one, and thus God is unlikely to exist. Another way to resolve this would be to argue that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, and that God has a divine plan where suffering is necessary, but as stated before, that's less likely that premise one being incorrect because it is more complicated, and it doesn't naturally follow.
...there simply is one of two statements that is true, an all-knowing all-powerful God exists, or such a God doesn't exist. And as I already concluded under Side note 1, either the latter is true and it is redundant to use morality to dispute the likelihood of God*, or the former is true and it is impossible to use morality to dispute the likelihood of God*
I wouldn't use that kinds of choice to represent our situation, mostly because It starts from the end. In the first scenario, you would be right no matter what your arguments were, and vice versa for my scenario. Instead try this one. If you accept that there are universal "bads" in the world then either, A: They exist because a perfectly good God put them there for a mysterious and hidden divine reason, or B: because the world was not designed by an all good creator. Option A is a lot less simple, while option B is the obvious choice when presented with evil in the world. If I hear a piano coming from the other room, is it more likely that A: someone is playing the piano, or B: my piano became sentient and started playing itself. That's not very close to the original choice, but I used it to illustrate that some options are in essence, more likely than others because they follow from the information presented. Both are possible (option B only by an act of God), but one is more simple and more likely.
Section Conclusion
Since I've finished responding to your counter-arguments to my problem of evil argument, I'll close this section quickly with a small recap of my argument, and why I believe your counter arguments fall short. Once again, I don't claim to know the full and total truth about morality, but I can see that pain and suffering are inherently bad. The existence of "bads" in a world supposedly created by an all-good God directly implies that God just doesn't exist due to simplicity. The inherent "bads" of our universe can possibly be justified or excused due to a hidden divine reason, but that is a lot less simple of an explanation. Not to say that the more complicated explanation can't be the correct one, but without any reason to believe it despite its complexity and roundabout thinking, it's more logical to go for the simpler answer.
On to intelligent design/ god of the gaps...
I never stated in my argument that God is the only possible explanation for the creation of the universe, under Intelligent design 1 (I'll call mine 1 and yours 2 for convenience sake) I merely posit that it is more likely the universe came about under an intelligent hand than otherwise.
Fair enough. I do have some problems with your argument that the universe must have been created by some intelligent creator but I don't think it's really necessary so for the sake of brevity I'll skip them. In theory though, if the universe was intelligently designed, it still doesn't imply God as the most likely scenario. If correct, your argument rules out randomness and the universe creating itself, but there are still an infinite amount of lesser and still intelligent beings that could be the creators of the universe. The greek god Zeus could have created the world, or my uncle could secretly be a lesser God in disguise, or our earth could have been created by a race of super-intelligent hamsters as a supercomputer to discover that life, the universe and everything was 42 as per "Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy". You get the point.
...I address this explanation as less likely than mine earlier under Addressing the high being which is under God's limits. Aside from this there aren't other alternative explanations proposed thus far.
In the section you cited, you used the comparison of an engineer who built a computer and not being able to fix it to represent a lesser being who created the universe. I'd say that's a false analogy. Maybe a better example would be the CEO of google. The CEO has one job, to run the company. The CEO couldn't program a new feature of google, or make sure that the tech runs all by themselves, their job is just to manage the people who do that. So it could be with the universe. There could be a being whose sole purpose is to create the universe and nothing else. There could be a group of beings who created the universe. There could be a being who lost its power or life creating the universe so that it now cannot do anything more. And even within these explanations, the nature of the deities can change giving really an infinite number of possible explanations, and of course I've shown that without any evidence to support one of these conclusions, the simplest explanation (atheism) is the most likely.
This was a short section, so I won't summarize. Next up is Simplicity and Nature
My opponent proposes simplicity and nature as viable measures to a good argument, not necessarily an airtight one,
Well sure, if there was evidence to support the complex explanation, then let's go with that. But due to humanity's lack of knowledge and evidence on this question, all explanations are really created equal in terms of evidence. When that happens, I go to the secondary measure of likelihood, simplicity. To go back to my piano example, if God sent an angel before me and told me that my piano was going to come alive and start playing itself, in the scenario where that happened, I have evidence to support conclusion B, that it's playing itself. But in the absence of that angel, it's simpler and more likely that someone is playing the piano and thus causing the piano sounds I hear.
The first argument is very complex, quite frankly I just googled it and it looks like its beyond my depth, intuitively I've always concluded that water can only be solid, liquid or gas at one point, that it wouldn't be possible for it to be all three at the same time. "Water can not be all three states at the same time because the three states are different and require different temperatures" is the simpler conclusion to make, and not one that's academically unreasonable, at least not on the surface.
Let me be clear that Occam's razor is a last resort for me. If there is scientific evidence, or any little bit of evidence to support a conclusion, then that should take precedence. However, I've yet to see hard proof for the atheism v. theism debate, so I go to my last line of defense, simplicity. As in the case of your water example, if I lived a few centuries ago I would probably not believe you, that water can exist in three states at once. I would be wrong, but from my view point of lack of evidence, It would be most rational to choose the simpler option even if it ends up being wrong. I could be wrong here, but in the absence of evidence, it's best to turn to simplicity and likelihood as a last resort.
Because the deciding factor is not how simple, or even how easy an argument is to follow, but rather which one makes the higher amount of unnecessary (and unreasonable) assumptions. The first argument makes no assumptions (that I am aware of) while the second does.
The reason that the first argument makes no assumptions is because it is based on complete evidence, and thus needs to make none. As said before, If I liked in the 1700th century then I wouldn't have the evidence, so it would be stupid to believe in that argument due to it's unnecessary assumptions. Those assumptions turned out to be real, but until there was evidence, they are still just assumptions.
When I say "complexity" that's essentially what I mean. I mean that the argument makes too many unnecessary assumptions and has too many roundabout explanations. For the second argument you provided, let's say I had no data whatsoever about whether parents were wise or not. The counter argument is that we shouldn't listen to parents because they are not wise, but that makes the same assumption, just reversed. In that case, both arguments make the same assumption so without any evidence, they are essentially equal.
Now let's apply this to theism vs. atheism. Both are possible, and both don't make any assumptions. However theism has unnecessary parts to it, i.e. God. Both systems account for the presence of "bad" in our world, but clearly God is not necessary for evil to exist. If there is evidence supporting theism, then it's more rational, but until we can have that, we have to go down to simplicity, and calling into question a needless being in your system makes it less simple.
Now to be clear my opponent 'your argument is disqualified because it breaks x and y principles', we're talking about logical likelihoods this entire time. But even then I would like to commit to my narrative that there is more to a proposition's logical likelihood than one or two or slightly more specific logical principles.
I didn't really use Occam's razor as the "end all" system of likelihood, so sorry if I put too much emphasis on it. The point of me using it was really just to show one way in which atheism is simpler and more likely than theism. The real bulk of my argument is in my response above where I talked about how theism invokes unnecessary beings while atheism does not. To put it simply, if there's no need for God for our world to exist, then why include him in your system? If you can answer that question, then great, but otherwise atheism remains as the simpler and more likely system.
"Pain is bad" is instinctual to us, not because pain is intuitively morally bad, but because it is a survival instinct. "Pain is bad" ultimately exists inside us because its an evolutionary trait. That is why it is a natural feeling for us.
Yes, pain exists for a reason, but it's still bad. The reason it's used evolutionarily is because it's bad. If pain was good, then it wouldn't be doing its job. You're right that it serves a greater purpose, but that just reinforced the fact that it is inherently bad. The purpose of pain is to be bad, and evolution is what makes it that way. I couldn't have put it better myself really.
I find that there is little to no reason to fundamentally connect our base instincts to morality, especially given that our ability to be elevated above animals, in our moral authority as either moral judges or moral pathfinders, came from our ability to be elevated above our base instincts. In fact the further away we move from our base instincts, the richer our moral philosophy gets.
Again, I think it's important to separate the morality I'm talking about into two different categories, morality as a whole, and morality of a specific action. Another way to put it would be long and short term morality. Pain is always morally bad in the short term. As said before, if it wasn't then it wouldn't be pain and it wouldn't be doing it's evolutionary job. Pain can be justified in the long term by a divine plan, but you know where I'm going with this. It's just not as likely. Philosophy can take our base instincts of short-term morality and try and discover long-term morality, but really only God can fully do that. It's not the job of reason to figure out if pain is bad or not, that's a given, it's an axiom of the universe. The job of philosophy is really to make things more complicated and see if we can use our basic axioms about pain to discover long-term morality on a bigger scale.
Section Summary
To sum up briefly here, God is subject to the laws of logic (which I think we already covered). Because of this, he is still subject to the universal axiom that pain is bad. If pain was not bad, it would not be pain, thus pain must always be bad. Since there is no evidence (due to lack of human knowledge) to support either claim about God's existence, we defer to whichever belief system is less needlessly complicated, more simple, and invokes the least unecessary beings of forces. That system of belief is of course, atheism.
Finally we have the Islam section...
Many have laid witness to the miracles of the prophet Muhammed and of Jesus. Now there were Moses and more of course but I mention just those two because they are the most recent so to speak. These testimonies and miracles have been both passed down and recorded well, especially in Islam's time due to the great increase in literacy it enjoyed
I didn't really expect this debate to be one that needed sources, but this claim would definitely benefit from some citing. There are so many people from long ago that we aren't really sure existed (ie. Socrates, Confucius) because the records are from after their time and by other people. And even if those people were real, we can't know if they truly spoke to God. I could claim to be a prophet today and still people wouldn't be able to verify that claim, much less from thousands of years ago.
The holy Quran is not only said to have has inside it prophecies of the future, but additionally within it was laid a challenge (to those that have not read it) to produce a verse exactly like one of the verses in it.
You didn't really follow up on this sentence. Did the prophecies come true? Has anyone been able to replicate a verse from the Quran? Sorry if I got confused, I think this just suffered from a lack of characters lol.
Again, this one is kinda too short to summarize, so I won't
Aside from that, if the world we live in is a world where God exists. Then anything that God says and/or proclaims is moral fact. Human experiences (or even, the experiences of all living creatures in the universe combined) do not remotely compare to the infinite knowledge, wisdom and power of God as far as moral authority is concerned.
Remember, God is still bound by the law of logic. There are certain universal axioms that even he cannot break. God can proclaim morality so that pain is necessary. God can proclaim morality so that you need "bads" to get to perfect morality, but since he is still bound by the laws of logic, he cannot proclaim it so that pain in it's very essence is bad. Like I said before, if pain is good, then it is no longer pain. So if God were to make pain good in and of itself, then it would no longer be pain and we would have a world without pain, and a world without pain is certainly not something we live in today. Just as God cannot make A into B, or green into red, God cannot make bad into good. He can justify the bad, but cannot change its nature.
You proposed one explanation which I have currently addressed. Additionally I never claimed God to be the only possibility, merely the most likely one.
To give a few more, the universe could have been created by a force as opposed to a being. The universe could be the matrix and the creators are hyper intelligent machines. The universe could be completely fake as per Descartes' demon. The list goes on. I think I might have missed it, but I haven't yet heard your explanation for why God is the most likely of these possibilities, so if you could restate it that would be great.
Even if we were to assume purely that the simplest explanation is the best, an equally simple explanation is that pain and pleasure has no bearing on morality.
Yes, but that's not the conclusion you have to argue for. To go from "Pain and pleasure have not bearing on Morality" to "God must have all bearing on Morality" is a leap. There could be any number of other factors besides God that have total control over Morality, and it's a logical leap to go straight to God.
And in a world where an all-powerful all-knowing God exists, not only will there be even less chance involve regarding our life and other potential life out there due to God's design, but additionally either God created the universe for more than just humanity or humanity is the only intelligent species but God does not require justification for making such a vast universe anyway.
Yes, if God was real then he wouldn't need any justification for his actions, but that doesn't change that fact that that explanation is still more convoluted. Since empty space in the universe can be explained without God, then God is an unnecessary being in explaining this, and since your explanation contains unnecessary beings, it's more needlessly convoluted and less likely.
It was indeed as I assumed. So almost as if the voters are asked "if you were forced to bet money on which side was correct, who would you bet your money on"?
Couldn't have put it better myself.
Conclusion
I've put small summaries at the end of most of the sections, so I'll do something a little different for my overall conclusion. I've always liked syllogisms as a good way of stripping down an argument to its simplest core, so I'll go ahead and put one here as an oversimplification of my argument:
P1: Pain is bad
P2: Pain exists
C1: There is bad in our world
P3: Both atheism and theism account for the presence of bad in our world
P4: Theism has more components than atheism
C2: Theism has more needless components because the existence of "bad" can be explained with fewer beings and components to a system
P5: In the absence of any evidence, the explanation with the least unnecessary components is the more likely one.
P6: Neither system has evidence
C3: In this case we should find the more likely system based on simplicity and the least unnecessary components
P7: (derived from C2): Atheism is the simpler system
P8: (derived from C3) In this case, the simpler system is the more likely one
Final Conclusion: Atheism is the more likely system to be correct
Thanks for letting me do something a little different for this part of the debate! I yield the floor.
Once again, sorry for the lack of formal structure. It helps me to just tackle your arguments directly and one at a time instead of trying to summarize them and respond in paragraph format.
There's no need to apologize for that, the structure's more so for my own benefit so that I can reference my own arguments via keywords.
Resignation
I just found out mom stole from me 5000 Egyptian pounds and I am a bit depressed, its not a lot but she'd done so much more prior and I gave her chance after chance, also this is my mom doing this to me. It's still my fault to not start writing my debate until the last day, but regardless, continuing this debate feels like dragging myself down so I would rather just not do it.
I could forfeit just the round instead, but I feel this puts my opponent in an unfair position, he'd have to choose between also forfeiting his round, an unfair expectation due to nothing he was at fault for, or choose to do his round anyway, which will unjustly leave the impression that he took advantage of my situation.
So I've decided, instead of raising that situation I will instead just fully resign from the debate whole. Besides, if Moozer is not too insulted with this resignation, I don't mind debating him again at some time either reviving/continuing this debate or doing a new one.
Some clarification
To be clear, I believe there is a great chance Moozer would've beaten me regardless. I had some counter-arguments vaguely in my head that I hadn't put into words yet, as well as some references to previous arguments I've made that already potentially counter new points Moozer raised. But that is only my short perspective for this round, there's no knowing what Moozer had prepared or what he would've said in response to my responses and so on. I just wanted to say this to make it clear that, while I still have personal conviction on my position (or else why debate it so passionately?), I believe that as far as the debate itself is concerned there is strong argument my opponent performed better even before my resignation, that it's not that likely that had I not resigned the outcome would be different.
Moozer, I apologize that this is a disappointing thing to read and a disappointing end to this debate, I would like to thank you again for accepting my request for a challenge, as well as for providing an actually engaging debate, one I felt I could learn from. Don't worry about my irl situation, I'll recover, you can call me up whenever, and if you're not too disappointed in me, I can call you up also.
Conclusion
Reader, you may feel free to read the arguments for your entertainment, but I urge you, no matter what is written and what was argued and who you feel argued better thus far, vote for my opponent.
Round 4
Don't worry about it at all. Real life always takes priority over DART, so be proud for taking time for yourself.
Thanks so much still for this opportunity to debate, I really had a lot of fun and I look forward to us debating again in the future.
Same bro, and I appreciate it.
Thank you for the comment, I am sorry to disappoint you as well.
Great start to this debate guys! This one should be fun.