I bet this will be a truly wonderful debate. That aside,
onto my framework, observations etc.
Framework
For any topic in which US policy is decided, we should
adhere to Consequentialism, which is the philosophical idea that we judge the
actions of an actor by their overall consequences (2). This reasoning is sound
because the government’s chief purpose is to serve the people under the social
contract between the people and the government. That said, we obviously should
not neglect the need of other actors within the legislation, especially those which
are recipients of the aid. Not only is damaging the constituency of another
country harmful for US soft power, but it also prevents other nations from
helping their citizens and fulfilling their social contract.
Definitions
Foreign Military Sales – Defense acquisition program administered
through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency with final approval by the
State Department (1).
Direct Commercial Sales – Acquisition process in which a purchaser
(government) consults directly with an arms company in the US with a special
license to export weapons directly (1).
Observation
The astute reader may already recognize that the resolution
is written broadly. The reason for this is due to the resolution being a
potential NSDA topic for policy debate. In policy debate, it is expected that Pro
present a plan, (or policy, if you will,) that falls within the parameters set by
the resolution. Ergo, I offer the following policy:
Plan
The US would halt all arms sales to Saudi Arabia in both
Direct Commercial and Foreign Military sales, until the following demands are
met:
1. The complete withdrawal of military troops and technology
from Yemen
2. Saudi Arabia lifting the blockade that prevents aid to arrive in Yemen’s
ports.
Only by the approval of both Congress, and the President would this embargo be
lifted. The policy would take full effect in the next fiscal year.
To demonstrate the benefits of this plan and the gargantuan
problems that it is solving, I present the following contentions.
C1: Arms Sales Benefits
AQAP
AQAP, or Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula, is a terrorist group
that has expanded due to the militaristic quagmire that has emerged within
Yemen. Their activities, (which includes the infamous Charlie Hebdo shooting,
multiple attacks on military bases, car bombs, and seizing control of land with
force,) clearly labels them a threat not only to international security, but
also the US (3). Their ideology and calls to end Western powers also cement them
as a dangerous adversary. Despite some of its recent losses, (such as the port
city of Mukalla,) Saudi Arabia is not stopping them. In fact, the reason that
AQAP could expand is due to Saudi Arabia’s one-track mind in defeating the
Houthis, moving their military forces to best address their primary foe,
leaving a power vacuum behind that AQAP filled (4).
Surprisingly though, people wanted AQAP to stay within their
governorate because the alternative, (rule under the Houthi rebels or Hadi-led
forces,) were infinitely worse. For instance, in Mukalla, which they occupied
for over a year, AQAP has repaired broken bridges, delivered medical aid,
cancelled payroll taxes, and slowly implemented their violent version of Sharia
law (5). These lucrative benefits, (likely with the help of propaganda,) led to
one resident of Mukalla stating that:
"I prefer that al Qaeda stay here. The situation is
stable, more than any 'free' part of Yemen…" (5)
The International Crisis Group even states that AQAP even
replaced many of the homes that were lost to airstrikes from the US-Saudi air coalition
(4).
AQAP’s gentle rule facilitated a period of inordinate wealth
for the group, at one point earning approximately $2 million a day through taxes
on incoming ships as well as tariffs (5). In one year after the conflict in
Yemen started, AQAP already quadrupled its size, likely because of this
populist approach (6). The combined manpower and accumulated funds mean that AQAP
can still take control of land and maintain control for a long time, soaking up
new funds.
Meanwhile, the civil war in Yemen has killed 16,000, many of
which was because of airstrikes conducted by the Saudi-led air coalition (7). Adding
to the turmoil faced by the Yemeni people is that lack of available aid because
Saudi Arabia created a blockade that would prevent countries or NGOs from
applying needed assistance. Even though they temporarily lifted the blockade,
there are still major humanitarian issues that have yet to be addressed. Roughly
20 million Yemeni people are food insecure. Our military assistance has a
direct impact on the suffering population of Yemen. The Guardian notes that the
bomb dropped in Yemen which killed 51 people, 40 of whom were children, was
from Lockheed Martin, an American arms company (9). Moreover, our bombings of
schools, hospitals, and other vital infrastructure in the region did little to help.
AQAP’s “generosity” to new recruits also plays a role in
expanding its populist message. The Foundation for Defending Democracy reports
that AQAP fighters made $400 a month, were promised a new car, and made twice
as much as Yemeni soldiers or Houthi fighters (10). Moreover, AQAP was likely
to provide goods and assistance at the tribal level, again using the lessons
they learned in Mukalla to further cement themselves as a populist force in
Yemen (10). Facing destitution, starvation, and lack of access to medical aid,
it is no wonder that recruitment continues to grow to this day.
Our military engagement is not bolstering our strategic goals
in Yemen. They are increasing the spread of terrorism and lengthening a humanitarian
crisis that affects every citizen of Yemen. Do not be mistaken, this is not
just a measure to protect the vulnerable population of Yemen. With growing
terrorist threats, we see violence spilling over and hurting our allies.
Instances such as the Charlie Hebdo shooting in France should already prove
this. Also, people are being inspired by the ideological violence and propaganda
abroad and committing atrocities at home. Recent FBI evidence concluded after
looking at 200 cases of homegrown terrorism that at least 18% were at least partly
caused by US operations in the Middle East (13). Our continuous entanglement in
the Middle East allowed terrorist organization to push the narrative of a US
that is disgusted by Islam. Michael Leiter, the director of the National
Counterterrorism Center in the US characterizes the narrative as:
“ …a blend of al-Qa‘ida inspiration, perceived victimization,
and glorification of past homegrown plotting…” (14).
C2: Limited Oversight
Over Arms Sales
Despite rules in place to prevent arms from being taken by
terrorist organizations, we still see weapons making their ways into the hands
of people who were never meant to use them. Despite markedly increasing security
standards for End User Monitoring of arms sales, there have been instances in
which the US could not track equipment transfers to Iraqi, Egyptian, or Lebanese
forces as evident by a multitude of GAO reports as well as one from Amnesty
International (15). However, I plan to focus on the sole country being
affected: Saudi Arabia. Recent evidence from the Guardian in November of 2018
suggested that military equipment was being intentionally diverted toward
groups with links to Al Qaeda and ISIS that were loyal to the Saudi regime (11).
Governments and arms companies simply turned a blind eye to these egregious
abuses of the contracts, allowing a culture of corruption and kickbacks to
fester. At least three M-raps were found in the hands of other factions even after
being bought by the Saudi coalition, and over 50,000 grenades and shells were
found in militant groups all over Yemen despite them originally being purchased
by Saudi Arabia. Instances of artillery being used by Al Qaeda insurgents were
also common (11).
Transparency of such arms purchases are becoming impossible
given the current government shutdown, lack of government workers, and general
corrupt culture that has been fostered for years in our acquisition programs. Without
needed End User monitoring, our arms could extend the conflict, killing off more
Yemeni people, and necessitating more foreign aid which totaled 1/3 of a
billion dollars in 2016 (12). Without any bolstering of our military might, the
only thing we are doing is worsening our image overseas, causing many of the
recruitment concerns that I discussed before, and allowing more Yemeni citizens
to die.
Sources
Honestly this topic is so broad and severe by how much research is required. Like how do I prove other nations will provide it if the US doesn't and how do I prove that Saudi will engineer Israel's decimation among other things if we cut them as allies? I'll post my argument in R2 even if voters hate me for it.
This required so much research to prove each point. I had a good syllogism and all, whatever. I will just post in R2.
Fine.
Please don't, it's against the rules.
So, should I vote?
I was asked to do so. I have no problem with you judging. However, I need to follow the rules that I agreed to when I made the debate.
Because he has honour.
Why am I excluded? I'm not complaining, but I'm curious.