21 st Century will see a new cold-war between China and USA

Definition

“New Cold War” - Being clear about what this means is critical. Since my opponent called this cold war “new,” it is reasonable to assume he is alluding to the US-USSR Cold War. Thus, we ought to expect this so-called New Cold War would bear great similarities to the Old Cold War, or else calling it a Cold War wouldn’t make much sense. In other words, for US-China relations to constitute a New Cold War, said relations must bear sufficient resemblance to the Old Cold War, so as to justify the revival of the term. Of course, New and Old do not need to be identical, but they should be highly similar, or else the revival of the term would be unjustified.

It was a bipolar system of total victory or total defeat, in which neither of the main protagonists could envisage a lasting compromise with the other. The Cold War was intense, categorical, and highly dangerous: strategic nuclear weapons systems were intended to destroy the superpower opponent, even at a cost of devastating half the world.”

Bipolarity

As my quote from Odd Arne Westad made clear, the Cold War was a generally bipolar affair. It was one superpower versus the other - the free world and the communist world engaged in a decades-long struggle for dominance. However, it appears US-China relations will be conducted amidst a multipolar international system, rather than a bipolar one. I will offer three strands of evidence to support this: quotations from experts, multipolarity as measured by economic power, and multipolarity as measured by military power.

Economic interdependence - 

As Heath and Thompson point out, “China’s economy is also far more integrated with the U.S. economy (and, again, vice versa) than was ever the case in the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War.” (pg. 114) Because of this, Joseph Nye observes, we can expect an additional reason for the United States and China to restrain their hostile tendencies. Tonnesson similarly predicts that economic interdependence will deter war between the two great powers.

To put it simply: because the US and China are economically interdependent in a way the US and Soviet Union never were, there is an additional motivation for moderation and cooperation in the US-Sino relationship that the US-Soviet relationship lacked.

Combating climate change - 

CSIS has called China “a strategic partner” for the US in the fight against climate change. Given that the two countries are the greatest emitters of greenhouse gases, it should not be surprising the US and China have taken a cooperative leadership stance by jointly labeled climate change “one of the greatest threats facing humanity,” requiring the US and China “to work constructively together for the common good.” Both the United States and China can expect to suffer from climate change, thus, we can expect the two countries to cooperate in combating this transnational issue throughout the century.

In sum, we can expect the US-China relationship to be more one of rivalry than the US-Soviet relationship, which was closer to enmity. Whereas the Cold War featured an enduring and zero-sum struggle for global dominance, we can reasonably assume the United States and China will be forced to moderate their hostility in order to cooperate on certain important shared objectives, such as protecting their economic well-being and combating climate change. Basically, the US and China will be competitors and partners. Thus, the term “New Cold War” is not warranted.

1. How ought we define "New Cold War"? That is, what standard should forecasted US-Sino relations have to meet to qualify as a New Cold War?
   
2. Was the world of the Cold War a bipolar system?
   
3. Will enmity or rivalry more accurately describe US-Sino relations?
   

• US and Iran
  
• US and North Korea
  
• US and Russia
  
• China and South Korea
  
• China and India
  
• China and Taiwan
  

Created in 1961, NAM has sought to “create an independent path in world politics that would not result in member States becoming pawns in the struggles between the major powers.”

• The country should not be a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts;
  
• If a country has a bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or is a member of a regional defense pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts;
  
• If it has conceded military bases to a Foreign Power the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.
  

• Joined NAM in 1976
  
• Had obviously very close relations with Soviet Union
  

• Joined NAM in 1961
  
• Literally hosted Soviet nuclear weapons as part of the Cold War's most serious crisis
  

• Joined NAM in 1979
  
• Was instrumental in CIA support for Mujaheddin resistance to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (source, 92-93)
  
• Was a member of SEATO, a US instrument of containment policy
  

• Joined NAM in 1961
  
• Wikipedia notes the US and Saudis "allied in opposition to Communism, in support of stable oil prices, stability in the oil fields and oil shipping of the Persian Gulf, and stability in the economies of Western countries where Saudis have invested. In particular the two countries were allies against the Soviets in Afghanistan."
  

PRO has already covered in the 2018 trade dispute in R1. Still would further state that  trade deficit of 350 billion in favour of China has USA still worried and the situation would only worse and interdependence of economies will decrease. 

it will be impossible to fully separate the U.S. and Chinese economies—and still more so to cut the U.S. economy adrift from the world. Every U.S. action toward China—offensive or defensive—will therefore continue to produce a Chinese reaction that is felt by the United States. 

• China stopped recycling the West's junk, and the West just let the stuff pile up (I should note my opponent did not provide a source for this)
  
• The US pulled out of the Paris Accords
  

• Defended my definition of "New Cold War" as compared to Pro's definition
  
• Defended my contention that the Cold War was bipolar whereas US-Sino relations will take place in a multipolar world
  
• Defended my contention that US-Chinese economic interdependence is unlikely to go away, and thus constitutes a significant difference between US-Soviet and US-Sino relations
  
• Defended my contention that the US and China have a significant shared interest in combating climate change, which will serve as a source of moderation on the overall hostility level of the relationship
  

• To use the term "New Cold War," US-Sino relations ought to be highly similar to US-Soviet relations
  
• US-Sino relations will not be highly similar to US-Soviet relations, because 1) the United States and China will compete in a multipolar, rather than bipolar world 2) Due to several areas of mutual interest and cooperation, US-Sino relations will be closer to rivalry (moderated hostility) than to enmity (extreme hostility), thus distinguishing US-Sino relations from US-Soviet relations yet again
  
• As such, revival of the term "Cold War" is not appropriate in the context of 21st century relations between the United States and China
  

 a state of political hostility between countries characterized by threats, propaganda, and other measures short of open warfare.

“New Cold War” - Being clear about what this means is critical. Since my opponent called this cold war “new,” it is reasonable to assume he is alluding to the US-USSR Cold War. Thus, we ought to expect this so-called New Cold War would bear great similarities to the Old Cold War, or else calling it a Cold War wouldn’t make much sense. In other words, for US-China relations to constitute a New Cold War, said relations must bear sufficient resemblance to the Old Cold War, so as to justify the revival of the term. Of course, New and Old do not need to be identical, but they should be highly similar, or else the revival of the term would be unjustified.

Ultimately, this is a debate over how to classify US-Sino relations. But why should we give a damn about classification at all? As is the case with language in general, the purpose of classification is to precisely convey information. The clearer and more precise a classification is, the more valuable it is. For example, if someone asks you how hot it is outside, and you simply reply "hot," that would be less precise and useful than if you said "90 degrees!" As a classification becomes more precise, it becomes better at serving its purpose: conveying information.

On the metric of precision, Pro's standard is inferior to my standard. Pro defines New Cold War as political hostility short of open war. This is a horrendously imprecise definition, as the US and China both have many relationships with other countries that could fall under this definition. A few examples that should be uncontroversial:

• US and Iran
  
• US and North Korea
  
• US and Russia
  
• China and South Korea
  
• China and India
  
• China and Taiwan
  

I'm sure we could go on and on. The point is, Hostility Short of War is not a good definition, because it fails to describe the phenomenon in precise terms.

Meanwhile, my "Highly Similar" standard does require precision. Under my definition, for US-China relations to be considered a "New Cold War," said relations should be very similar to relations between the US and Soviet Union during the 20th century Cold War. If said relations were not very similar, revival of the term would be misleading and unjustified. Obviously, the two relationships do not need to be identical. As I made clear in my R1, I simply think they should share core attributes in order to merit revival of the term Cold War.

My definition of New Cold War is narrow and precise, whereas my opponent's is broad and vague. As such, we ought to prefer my classification standard.

More importantly, trade disputes can't undo the fundamental fact of economic interdependence. Because US-China economic interdependence is so deep, decoupling would be "like carrying out a difficult surgical operation," write Farrell and Newman. They call the Chinese economy "not a discrete organism that can easily be separated from the global economy but rather a Siamese twin, connected by nervous tissue, common organs, and a shared circulatory system." Thus, they conclude:

it will be impossible to fully separate the U.S. and Chinese economies—and still more so to cut the U.S. economy adrift from the world. Every U.S. action toward China—offensive or defensive—will therefore continue to produce a Chinese reaction that is felt by the United States. 

To put it simply: US-China economic interdependence is fundamentally unchangeable - our economies are simply too deeply interwoven to be extricated from one another. This mutual dependence will create mutual incentives for moderation of hostilities in the future (a point I also made, with some sources as support, in R1).

Chinese military and US military have come very close to conflict like situations in South China Sea.

In 2020, the US took a series of measures to contain China, on topics including COVID-19, Hong Kong, Taiwan, high-tech and the military. Recently, US warships have repeatedly trespassed into Chinese territorial waters around the Xisha and Nansha islands, conducted operations in the South China Sea and crossed the Taiwan Straits. In a rare move, it has deployed three aircraft carriers to the region.[1]

On the other hand, the United States has grown increasingly worried about China’s rising power and significantly strengthened its naval and air presence since 2009. U.S. aircraft sorties increased by 100 percent to about 1,500, and surface ship presence increased by 60 percent to around 1,000 ship days per year. In this context, frequent military- to-military encounters are inevitable.[2]

Chinese Defense expenditure is expected to touch upwards of 700 million USD  by the 2030s and the US at 1.3 Trillion. With Goldman Sachs estimating Chinese's economy crossing the US economy by 2027[6]. With the huge increase in defense expenditure by China the region will only destabilize with all countries neighbouring China fearing unilateral aggression by China. Which has already happened in Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Western intervention would become inevitable, as previously seen when Kuwait was invaded by forces of Saddam Hussein. 

China stopped recycling the West's junk, and the West just let the stuff pile up

Speaking of the Paris Accords, the fact that Trump pulled us out doesn't mean the US won't have a significant strategic interest in cooperating with China on climate change in the future. American interests outlast whoever is in office, and a political consensus around climate change is growing in the US. Contrary to popular perceptions, former Secretary of State Jim Baker, himself a Republican, notes that Republican Congressional leadership has "started to signal that the era of climate denialism is over. Representative Kevin McCarthy of California, the House minority leader, has warned that the GOP ignores the climate issue at its own peril, and Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the Senate majority leader, recently emphasized that the Republican Party needs climate solutions of its own." This phenomenon is not limited to political elites, either. The Pew Research Center has found strong public opinion majorities in support of strong action on climate change. For example: "Two-thirds of U.S. adults say the federal government is doing too little to reduce the effects of global climate change."

CON's own definition:Created in 1961, NAM has sought to “create an independent path in world politics that would not result in member States becoming pawns in the struggles between the major powers.

then CON states:In my view, NAM was not strong enough, focused enough, or centralized enough to be dubbed a pole.

Why would an organization be centralized and focused if their original goal was that member nations cater to their own self interest without giving in their sovereignty to the great powers.

Certainly, there are reasons for the United States and China to clash. I’m sure my opponent will do a good job of identifying all of the present and potential sources of conflict between America and China. For my part, I will focus on reasons we can expect US-China conflict to be of a less serious degree than US-Soviet conflict.

• Arab-Israel Wars - My opponent does not go into any detail to justify his claim that these wars were free from superpower influence. However, it is quite plain that the US and Soviet Union were always involved in these conflicts. For example, during the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, the US and Soviets armed their proxies in the region and even went to the brink of nuclear war (October DEFCON 3 alert) to defend their interests in the region.
  
• Falklands War - I found no evidence of superpower involvement in this conflict, but it could hardly be considered a "major conflict," as my opponent described his examples. Military operations lasted about 10 weeks and less than 1,000 people died. As I stated in the previous paragraph, minor wars can happen between non-superpowers in a bipolar system. The superpowers aren't the only actors in the system, they are just the most important ones.
  
• Indo-Pak Wars - It's quite easy to demonstrate that the US and Soviet Union were involved in these conflicts. For example, during the 1971 war, the US attempted to preserve its nascent rapprochement with China by going easy on Pakistan ("The Tilt," as it was known).
  

1. My "Highly Similar" standard ought to be the one we apply to the definition of "New Cold War"
   
2. US-China relations will not be highly similar to US-Soviet relations, because 1) US-China relations will best be characterized by rivalry whereas US-Soviet relations were much closer to enmity, and 2) US-Soviet relations were conducted in a bipolar world while US-China relations will be conducted in a multipolar world
   
3. Thus, use of the term "New Cold War" is not justified in forecasting US-Sino relations
   

I presume my opponent is trying to say that NAM, as I have defined it, simply cannot be expected to be centralized, thus, how can I complain about its lack of centralization? I'm not sure my opponent is correct here, but frankly, this is beside the point. If my opponent agrees that NAM isn't sufficiently centralized to control its members very well, Pro cannot claim NAM constituted a third pole during the Cold War. The real question is: was NAM sufficiently influential and organized to constitute a third pole? I will address this question later in the round.

1) In R2, I cited multiple expert sources that either a) directly criticized NAM's efficacy as an organizer of a neutral Cold War bloc, or b) indirectly discounted NAM by stating authoritatively that the Cold War was bipolar

3) My opponent hasn't provided any affirmative evidence in his favor. That is to say, he has not provided evidence that NAM acted as a third bloc - a third pole in the Cold War. He has merely accused me of nit-picking. This is particularly damaging for Pro's case because the burden of proof rests with him.

 Bipolarity does not mean there are only two actors in the system. Bipolarity simply means there are only two predominantly powerful actors in the system. Thus, bipolarity doesn't preclude minor wars being fought outside the sphere of superpower competition. Nor does it preclude smaller states from having their own interests independent of superpower competition.

 

3.Indo-Pak Wars - It's quite easy to demonstrate that the US and Soviet Union were involved in these conflicts. For example, during the 1971 war, the US attempted to preserve its nascent rapprochement with China by going easy on Pakistan ("The Tilt," as it was known).

Similarly, my opponent tried to disqualify statements from former SecState Jim Baker, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell with respect to climate change. To my understanding, Pro's logic is that only the position of the President can be taken as the country's position. There is some truth to this, but this tactic doesn't get one very far in this particular debate.

CON admits to Self-Contradiction, VOTERS must take note of it

Not only do classifications in general require specificity, but how we define US-Sino relations most definitely demands specificity. As Melvyn Leffler states with regard to reviving the phrase "Cold War": "However tempting the analogy might be as China’s influence and military strength grow, invoking it now is profoundly wrong." If we allow ourselves to think we're headed into a Cold War, we just might create one that would threaten to undermine important areas of cooperation between the US and China, including "halting climate change, fighting terrorists, and combating pandemics."

The words we use to describe US-China relations can have a self-fulfilling effect. If we convince ourselves a Cold War is coming, we are likely to adopt hostile policies that will provoke increasingly hostile relations. This would be unwise, as "the potential gains from greater tensions with China are not proportional to the risks. The risks, in fact, are much greater because the economic costs of a falling-out with China are so much greater than they were with the Soviet Union in the 1940s." The words we choose to describe US-Sino relations will help shape those relations. Thus, we need to be precise and careful with the words we choose. There is a real risk of screwing things up by lazily invoking a Cold War analogy that is inaccurate.

for US-China relations to constitute a New Cold War, said relations must bear sufficient resemblance to the Old Cold War, so as to justify the revival of the term. Of course, New and Old do not need to be identical, but they should be highly similar, or else the revival of the term would be unjustified."

gravitational fields of Jupiter and Saturn would be the greatest 2 among the planets of the Solar system, does not mean gravitational field of other planets do not exist. 

For nineteen years, while its membership has doubled twice, the NAM has remained an essentially amorphous group, struggling to surmount its own internal differences and quarrels in order to identify and promote consensual concerns. It has met every three years since 1961 at Summit level (except for 1967) to debate and proclaim its views on world issues, and at lower levels in intervening years. It has never voted on any issue, maintaining a chaotic, often divisive process of reaching consensus through lengthy debate and negotiation. Often the consensi reached have been lowest common denominators. Sometimes, particularly on sensitive internecine quarrels, they have not been achievable at all.

• In the case of 1948, it's fair to say the superpowers weren't overly involved. My opponent tries to spin this as a great power conflict by calling it a major war. This depends on how we define major war. If "a lot" of people died, maybe it's major in that sense. But typically, international relations scholars refer to major wars as wars whose principle combatants are great powers. So, if my opponent had wanted the 1948 war to prove multipolarity, he should have defended the proposition that Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Egypt were great powers in the year 1948.
  
• With respect to the 1967 war, there is plenty of evidence of superpower involvement. The Johnson Administration tried to offset Soviet arms sales to the Arabs by selling weapons to the Israelis, and the US was involved in trying (and failing) to prevent war from breaking out in the region. It's just not historically accurate to act like the 1967 war was not a part of the bipolar global competition known as the Cold War.
  

• For one, he supposes that since the fighitng was intense and involved over a million people, it was a major war and thus the Cold War was multipolar. Again, the crucial question is, were any of the principle combatants a third pole in the Cold War? Just because India had a lot of troops doesn't make them a third pole. Iraq had the world's 4th-largest army before the Gulf War, but that didn't stop the US from stomping on Iraq. Sheer numbers aren't everything. International influence and army sizes aren't necessarily synonymous.
  
• Pro also tries to argue that India was a great power after the war because "the United States accepted the new balance of power and recognised India as a dominant player in South Asia." However, this claim is not properly substantiated, as the hyperlink takes us to a Wikipedia page explaining what balance of power means. It does not explain that India was "a dominant player" - or, if you prefer, a great power.
  

This debate calls on us to forecast US-Sino relations for the 21st century. Obviously, President Trump won't be President for the majority of the 21st century. Indeed, we can't know who the Presidents of the US or China will be for the majority of the century. Thus, my opponent's implicit standard - that we can't rely on any source but the highest elected officials - is simply untenable. If we're going to forecast future relations between the United States and China, we need to assess fundamental elements of that relationship. This requires us to analyze each country's enduring interests, the nature of their economic interdependence, and more. To do these things, we should turn to experts - both inside and outside the government.

internal politics of a country cannot be held into account for the country's position is all PRO states. If we want to indulge in speculation even PRO can cite articles by news media both for and against the topic. The topic is not whether PRO or CON wants  the cold war to happen obviously a cold war will not be benificial for anyone but one cannot simply ignore the symptoms and the directions the two governments are taking. Even PRO or any media publication will  not want an all out war with China but that has not deterred the Indian Government from placing fighter jets and advance attack helicopters in Ladakh to counter China. Similarly what any American or any American publication feels is irrelevant to the topic. Only US or Chinese government's actions can be taken into account. 

• "New Cold War" ought to be defined as a US-China relationship that bears significant resemblance to the US-Soviet relationship
  
• US-Sino relations will differ in key ways from the US-Soviet relationship. 1) The former will be conducted in a multipolar world whereas the latter was conducted in a bipolar world. 2) The former will be best characterized as rivalry (because hostility will be moderated by sources of cooperation), while the latter was much closer to enmity (a lack of moderation in hostility).
  
• Thus, US-Sino relations should not be dubbed a "New Cold War"