The Ontological Argument is Sound

thx for accepting this debate RM
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
This argument is very simple and true. If an MGB(Maximally Great Being) could exist, then an MGB would have to exist because it is maximally great. The MGB here is God. Let’s go through this argument with each premise.
First, it is certainly possible that an MGB could exist. An MGB would have to be all-knowing, all-powerful and morally perfect. However, only a maximally great being could exist instead of a maximally great pizza for example because it is an object and objects have no intrinsic value to rank it whether it is great or not. With a being who has a soul and a state of mind, we can conclude that it is maximally great. It is the greatest being ever. Next, if it is possible that an MGB exists then it has to be in a possible world. A possible world meaning any other world that includes different things that are logically coherent. A unicorn or a leprechaun exists in a possible world because it could exist. However, a Married Bachelor or a circle does not have pi as the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter.

We know an MGB could exist and is logically coherent, then it has to exist in every possible world. To illustrate this, let’s say we have 100 possible worlds. It is better to be in 56 of those 100 possible worlds than 14. It is better to be in more possible worlds than not. So, a maximally great being would have to maximally great in the fact that it exists in every possible world. Now, if God existed in every possible world, it would logically follow that God, an MGB, would exist in the actual world. Finally, if God existed in the actual world, it would exist now. God exists. God is then defined as a necessary being then. In Philosophy, there are 3 different types of beings:
1.Contingent being: A being that could exist, but may not necessarily exist (such as a unicorn) 
2. Impossible being: A being that is impossible, such as an invisible pink unicorn or a married bachelor. 
3. Necessary being: A being who exists necessarily and whose non-existence is impossible (such as numbers, logic, etc). 
God is a Necessary being because, in order to be maximally great, it has to be necessary. It is not an MGB if it is impossible to be formed or a Contingent being that could exist. Follow logically, and if an MGB could exist, which is most certainly can, then it has to exist.{1}

Through deductive and logical reasoning, God has to exist

To put this as simple as possible, step 3 is the most nonsensical and blatantly false of the overall case.

Step 3 states: 3. If a maximally great exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

If I have to even explain how ridiculous a leap in logic this is, then you probably won't understand even if I explain.

I'll let Pro try to defend it before tearing a bigger wound in step 3, in Round 2.

thx for the reply, RM

In order to be maximally great, a being must exist in every possible world. You didn't explain it and you write it off as me not understanding, this is not an argument, you have to explain it.

Let's say there are 100 possible worlds

It is greater to exist in 56 of those worlds then 55, it is greater to exist in 57 of those worlds than 56, and so on till you get the maximally great being that exists in all 100 possible worlds, this is just logic. 

This really wasn't that much of an argument

Firstly step 3 seems to be misworded, it reads: If a maximally great exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

but is meant to say 3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

Secondly, this is impossible to conclude. 

Pro is concluding that to be maximally great at all in any possible world therefore defaults the being to be omnipresent and omnipotent over all other plausible worlds. You need to understand that by 'world' Pro actually means 'reality' not just planet within a reality. We are running all possible versions of reality, so if a maximally great being exists in one possible reality, it doesn't remotely mean that the reality even is one of the realities occuring, especially not if we expand world/reality to mean the 'overall reality that all running versions of simulated reality run within'.

This maximally great being is only ever posited to be irrefutably possible in one of an infinite number of possible realities, nowhere at all does the Ontological argument explain why we should even assume all possible realities to be equally probably, nor why we should leap from the conclusion that there potentially is a being that transcends all realities if it's real, to then go 'okay therefore it's real and transcends to whichever reality this one is even if this reality is the only reality and doesn't have that being at all'.

If you can't understand how ridiculous step 3 is, you just don't comprehend logic. That's all to say. There is no way at all to leap from a 'potentially exists' conclusion to a 'definitely exists because it's possible' conclusion. 

thx, RM

It is implied already.

Yes, this makes sense and it logically follows, here is my explanation again.

Yes I already explained that:

The "reality" IS one of the realities occurring. If anything is possible and logically coherent than you can imagine it a possible world/reality. A MGB can exist so you can imagine it. A MGB is maximally Great, so it exists in every possible world. This is not a rebuttal. It is just a false statement that represent unclear understanding of what a MGB is.

Whether Possible worlds are more or less probable is not the question or really relevant to the argument. Any possible world that has any difference from this world is a possible world. No matter the probability of anything, there is no way to measure the probability of a possible world because there is no starting point of reference. To transcend any reality is simple. For example. in every possible world, Math exist. Math transcends all realities, you cant have a world without math. It's the same thing for a MGB. You need to have a world where a MBG exists if it is possible. This is where the Necessary being argument comes into play as I reiterate:

The reality with the maximally great being has to first be proven to be a running reality that is actually in existence, not just a potential reality, to then conclude that this being is transcending to realities that exclude its existence and changing the rules of them.

If the reality/realities that lack that maximally great being is/are the only real one(s) then it follows that it all falls apart at step 3.

thx, RM

The reality IS proven, Any reality can be proven to be true. It doesn't have to be in existence, it could be but it doesn't have to. The fundamental idea of a possible world is a world that could theoretically exits without any logical fallacies.If you deny the fundamental idea of a possible world with a necessary being then THAT is not understanding logic or Philosophy. There is no world or reality that lacks necessary beings, that's why it's necessary. It's like math. It HAS to exist in order for a world to exist.

My opponent dropped many points like:

I don't think RM tried very hard on this one. 2 of his arguments were lacking and he did not rebuttal any specific points. 

The Ontological Argument doesn't conclude that a maximally great being is viable, it concludes that it irrefutably exists due to being possible. It indeed does have to prove that the possible realities that contain a maximally great being are one of the real ones (if not the sole one). If the reality lacks this being, step 3 most blatantly is proven wrong but even if it has the maximally great being, step 3 asserts that this isn't necessary and thus the Ontological Argument is unsound.