Instigator / Pro
54
1684
rating
15
debates
100.0%
won
Topic
#1048
It is likely God exists
Status
Finished
The debate is finished. The distribution of the voting points and the winner are presented below.
Winner & statistics
After 8 votes and with 38 points ahead, the winner is...
semperfortis
Parameters
- Publication date
- Last updated date
- Type
- Standard
- Number of rounds
- 5
- Time for argument
- Two days
- Max argument characters
- 30,000
- Voting period
- One week
- Point system
- Multiple criterions
- Voting system
- Open
Contender / Con
16
1378
rating
36
debates
38.89%
won
Description
BoP is shared
Definitions:
God - the creator of the universe
Probably - 'is likely to happen or be true'
Exist - 'have objective reality or being'
Format
R1: Opening case
R2-4: Rebuttals
R5: Rebuttals with no new arguments
Round 1
Prologue
Thanks for accepting this debate.
== Aff ==
A1. Modal Ontological Argument
The Modal Ontological Argument deduces that a necessary being existing in one possible world would entail that it exists in all possible worlds.
My argument is logically formatted as follows:
A1.1
P1: If p does not entail a logical contradiction, p is metaphysically possible
P2: God does not entail a logical contradiction
C: God is metaphysically possible
A1.2
P1: If God is metaphysically possible, via modal logic it therefore exists contingently in a possible world
P2: If God exists contingently, then God exists necessarily
C: God exists necessarily
A1.3
P1: If God exists necessarily, then God exists in this world
P2: God exists necessarily
C: God exists in this world
==
A1.1 Premise One
To understand this premise, we must look at the framework of modal logic as a whole. Modal logic often categorises logical propositions with necessity or contingency. To put this in better context, our universe is currently governed by logical axioms and everything that physically exists in our universe must adhere to these logical axioms. For example, there cannot exist a square circle, as such is a logical violation. Under these axioms, our universe is arranged in a specific way, of which obeys such logical axioms. Hence, it can be deemed a possible world. Better put, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes a possible world as such:
"things, as a whole, needn't have been just as they are. Rather, things might have been different in countless ways, both trivial and profound. History, from the very beginning, could have unfolded quite other than it did in fact: the matter constituting a distant star might never have organized well enough to give light; species that survived might just as well have died off; battles won might have been lost; children born might never have been conceived and children never conceived might otherwise have been born. In any case, no matter how things had gone they would still have been part of a single, maximally inclusive, all-encompassing situation, a single world. Intuitively, then, the actual world" [1]
Furthermore, it can be concluded that our current universe could have had many different situations and outcomes which describe how our universe could have been.However, these many different renditions or 'versions' of our universe all adhere to these logical axioms. This entails that there are many different situations that the world could not have been if they are in violation of these logical axioms.
Metaphysical possibility describes how a proposition adheres to existing logical axioms and can then be esablished as a possible world in a modal framework. [2] An example of this is a world where I decided to forfeit this debate, since that isn't logically impossible would entail that the proposition is metaphysically possible and hence would exist as a possible world.
The terms 'necessary' and 'contingent' are distinct insofar as if something is 'necessary' would mean that it exists in all possible worlds, whereas if something is 'contingent' would mean that it exists in at least one possible world.
[3]
From here, this premise obviously has veracity.
A1.1 Premise Two
Per the debate description God is defined as "the creator of the universe". The universe can either exist contingently or non-contingently, but it is logically impossible for it to have both, or not have both. Hence, it is only logically possible when it is dichotomous. Per the definition of God it allows the universe to exist contingently and not violate logical axioms.
Hence, it has been demonstrated that the notion of God is not logically incoherent and is thus metaphysically possible.
-Note, I use contingency here not as in a modal logic sense, but as 'dependent on something else' [4]
A1.1 Conclusion
The conclusion logically follows from the veracity of the aforementioned premises and is therefore sound.
==
A1.2 Premise One
Again, this since the concept of God is not logically incoherent it would therefore exist contingently in a possible world.
A1.2 Premise Two
For something to exist necessarily, would mean that it exists in all possible worlds. To reasonably assert that God exists, not only contingently; but also necessarily we observe the logical proposition God exists necessarily. For this, we need to use modal syntax:
[] p = p is necessarily true
<> p = p is possibly true
¬ = not
=> = Implies
v = or
Let p be the propoisition "God exists".
If p is necessary, this would mean [] p. With Becker's postulate we get the logical proposition: ¬[]p => []¬p [5]. Since, I have proven God's existence to be metaphysically possible viz. possible in at least one possible world would mean that God doesn't necessarily not exist. Using the aforementioned proposition, and modus tollens, it can be concluded that God's necessary existence is true in one possible world.
A1,2 Conclusion
Hence, the conclusion logically follows from the veracity of the premises
==
A1.3 Premise One
As I have provien in A1.2, God's necessary existence is true in one possible world. However, if something is necessary in one possible world, it would logically entail that it is necessary in all possible worlds. The actual world viz. our world is a possible world, hence God exists.
A1.3 Premise Two
From A1.2.
A1.3 Conclusion
Hence, the conclusion logically follows from the premises.
==
A2 Idealism
I will use the following logical argument to affirm God's existence:
P1: Solipsism is true metaphysiically
P2: If P1, materialism is false
C1: Materialism is false
P3: If C1, dualism is false
C2: Dualism is false
P4: If C2, a mind must ground all reality
C3: A mind must ground all reality
A2 Premise One
Metaphysical solipsism is that framework that the mind is all that can be proven to exist.
In order to provide veracity for this premise, I shall assert that the mind exists mentally and has no physical existence. This is true via "Cogito ergo sum" viz. "I think; therefore, I am".[6] This was posutlated by Decartes and is indubitable. To be logically consistent, if the mind was part of the universe, i.e composed of matter or energy; be physical, it would invaildate solipsism. This would entail that the mind and the physical universe are one in the same, however under solipsism it allows for the mind to exist independent from matter and energy. Hence, solipsism is true metaphysically.
A2 Premise Two
The veracity of metaphysical solipsism inherently refutes materialism as materialism posits that even the mind can be reduced to physical processes. [7]
A2 Conclusion One
From P1 and P2.
A2 Premise Three
Substance and property dualism are relevant to this debate. I affirm both are false. Substance dualism states that the mental and the physcal are seperate substances with independent existence. [8] However, this is intuitively false, as all we perceive is only available via qualia. Substance dualism requires that the mind does not interact with reality, but having the ability to have agency and subjective choice would in turn refute substance dualism. Moreover, property dualism limits the mind to be a property of material. However, this seems very unreasonable because the mind and the physical have very different properties; mental events have subjective qualities and sensations which seem absurd to reduce to something physical. Hence, solipsism is the most likely metaphysical ontological explanation for reality and ought to be considered with veracity.
A2 Conclusion Two
From P3.
A2 Premise Four
As I have shown, metaphysical solipsism is most likely true, which entails that there is a consciousness that grounds reality. I have shown that reality is mental and it would logically entail that a mind controls it. Since reality itself is a mental product, and would require a mind to ground it, therefore there would exist a being that grounds reality acting as its creator. Thus fitting the definition of God.
A2 Conclusion Two
From P4.
==
Conclusion
I have used the Modal Ontological Argument and the Argument for Idealism to affirm the ontology of God. The Ontological Argument proved God's necessary existence which extends to our world. Moreover, the argument for idealism proved that metaphysical solopsism is most likely to be true, and thus concluding that the mental reality is all that can definitively be proven. Moreover, by definition of the mental, a mind must control over it, and thus has control over all reality, to which I have affirmed that the mind that grounds this reality is God.
Good luck to my opponent and let's begin.
I will argue against the claim that it is likely God exists.
================
=Main Argument=
My position is that the existence of God is neither likely nor unlikely. The probability of a being's existence cannot be measured.
There are two types of probability: conditional and unconditional.
Conditional probability - the probability of an event ( A ) occuring, given that another event ( B ) has already occured.
Unconditional probability - the independent chance that a single outcome results from a sample of possible outcomes.
The probability of God's existence is neither conditional nor unconditional. Because of this, the probability of God's existence cannot be measured. You can't say that God's existence is likely or unlikely. There are only three positions you can have:
- God exists. (Gnostic Theism)
- God doesn't exist. (Gnostic Atheism)
- I don't know if God exists or not. (Agnostic Athesm - I'll explain why not just agnosticism below.)
Agnostic atheism is the only rational position you can have about the existence of God. Why? There is no proof that God exists, and there also is no proof that God doesn't exist. Therefore, the only rational choice is agnostic atheism - I don't know if God exists or not, but I assume he doesn't as there is no proof that he does.
Why agnostic atheism and not just agnosticism? Because the BoP is on the theist, the person who makes the claim that God exists. Since there is no proof of God's existence, you assume that he doesn't exist, even though it's impossible to prove that God doesn't exist. You don't know if God exists or not, but you live your life as if he doesn't. That is the only rational position you can have about the existence of God.
================
So, to summarize:
P1: Probability can either be conditional or unconditional
P2: The probability of God's existance is neither conditional nor unconditional
C: The probability of God's existance cannot be measured as it doesn't exist.
P1: If the probability of God's existance cannot be measured, he either exists or doesn't exist.
P2: There if no proof that God exists, and there is no proof that God doesn't exist.
C: The only logical conclusion is - we don't know if God exists or not.
[ I will argue against the Modal Ontological Argument and Idealism in Round 2, as Round 1 is Opening Case. ]
Your floor and good luck.
Round 2
== Rebuttal ==
Probability
Con asserts that God is neither likely or unlikely, as the probability of a being's existence cannot be measured. He then professes that there are two types of probability: conditional and unconditional; none of which can apply to the existence of God.
He summarises this in the logical syllogism:
P1: Probability can either be conditional or unconditionalP2: The probability of God's existance is neither conditional nor unconditionalC: The probability of God's existance cannot be measured as it doesn't exist.
However, this is a *bare assertion*. Con posits this as a truism and supports it without any citation nor intuitive reasoning. Until Con provides rectitude of premise one and two, the syllogism is a non-sequitur viz. the argument is unsound.
Regardless, this argument is still invalid, since anything metaphysically possible can have probability of existing.
==
Con then procedes to present another syllogism:
P1: If the probability of God's existance cannot be measured, he either exists or doesn't exist.P2: There if no proof that God exists, and there is no proof that God doesn't exist.C: The only logical conclusion is - we don't know if God exists or not.
Premise one
This premise is self-refuting as Con postulates the outcome: God either exists, or He doesn't. There are two possible outcomes of this scenario. Similar to a coin flip, an event with strictly two outcomes have an unconditional probability of 50% [1]. Therefore, Con would concede that God's existence is unconditionally probable thus rendering his argument incoherent.
Premise Two
This is a bare assertion and is inherently incorrect. Proof requires either: deductive, abductive or inductive reasoning. [2] Without delving too much into the distinction, I affirm that any dichotomous, or unconditionally probable event can be 'likely' to occur. If something has a 50% chance of occuring, asserting it is likely to happen would fall under inductive reasoning and would constitute as proof.
Conclusion
Is therefore invalid.
==
Conclusion
Overall, Con's two logical syllogisms are non-sequiturs as they are presupposed by bare assertions and are ultimately self-refuting, meaning Con hasn't negated the resolution.
Over to Con.
References
=Rebuttal=
Probability
Pro asked me to provide rectitude for premise one and two. I will happily do so. Here: (https://sciencing.com/different-kinds-probability-8526104.html).
This article talks about conditional, unconditional, and subjective probability. When you claim that God is likely to exist, you are using subjective probability. This type of probability isn't based on math, but rather on personal beliefs and assumptions. While you could technically say that God's existence is likely, mathematically your claim would be illogical.
"Everything metaphysically possible has the probability of existing".
This is true. And that probability, just like Pro said, is an unconditional probability of 50%. Remember, I only disagree with the claim that God's existence is likely.
==
My second syllogism is correct. Pro uses the tossing of a coin as an analogy, and I will use it too.
P1: The probability of "Heads" is 50%. The probability of "Tails" is 50%.
P2: The coin is tossed, but we are not shown if it landed on "Heads" or "Tails".
C: The only logical conclusion can be that we don't know if it's heads or tails.
We can't say that "Heads" is likely or unlikely. We can't say that "Tails" is likely or unlikely. All we can say is that we don't know what the result was. I agree that God's existence is unconditionally probable. I disagree, however, with Pro's claim that God's existence is likely.
"If something has a 50% chance of occuring, asserting it is likely to happen would fall under inductive reasoning and would constitute as proof."
Proof - Evidence or argument establishing a fact or the truth of a statement.
The fact that something has a 50% chance of existing is not proof of its existence. All you're saying is that something may or may not exist, which is not proof.
Now, let's move on Pro's other arguments.
==
Modal Ontological Argument
This argument is wrong. It assumes as a fact that God's existence is possible (which is true), and then concludes that God must exist because his existence is possible. This is a non sequitur - the conclusion does not logically follow the premise. Using this argument, I could also prove that God doesn't exist:
A1
P1: If p does not entail a logical contradiction, p is metaphysically possible.
P2: God not existing does not entail a logical contradiction.
C: God not existing is metaphysically possible.
A2
P1: If God not existing is metaphysically possible, via modal logic he doesn't exist contingently in a possible world
P2: If God doesn't exist contingently, then God doesn't exist necessarily
C: God doesn't exist necessarily
A3
P1: If God doesn't exist necessarily, then God doesn't exist in this world
P2: God doesn't exist necessarily
C: God doesn't exist in this world
If you can prove the opposite using the same logic the argument uses, that argument is illogical. Anything can be proven with the Modal Ontological Argument. But we know that only one can be true - God exists or God doesn't exist. The Modal Ontological Argument can be used to prove both that God exists and that God doesn't exist. Therefore, the Modal Ontological Argument is invalid.
==
Idealism
My opponent has misunderstood Descartes' idea. Descartes meant only this: "I think, therefore I exist". He only said that because he can think about if he exists or not, he must exist [1]. All of Pro's conclusions based on that statement are non sequitur's.
Final Question
I'm not sure if Pro and I are debating the same thing. Are we debating that it is probable that God exists (50%) or that it is likely that God exists (over 50%)? Because I agree with the first claim and disagree with the second one.
Your floor.
==============================
=References=
Round 3
== Rebuttals ==
Probability
Con originally asserts that there are two types of probability conditional and unconditional. However, now he states there are three types of probability, conditional, unconditional and subjective. Con's argument is equivocating. Morever, he originally states that God's existence is not unconditionally possible, but now concedes that it is unconditionally possible.
More importantly, he sates that the claim 'God is likely to exist' uses subjective probability which isn't mathematical, but is presupposed by beliefs and assumptions and is therefore illogical. This is inherently incorrect as propositions are deemed 'likely' without mathematical proof very often. I admit that there is no mathematical proof that deems God's likeliness, insofar as a theorem -- however this does not mean it cannot be proven to be likely. For instance, take the Law of Parisomony that deems a theory a priori 'most likely', if it has less ontological commitments than the other competing theory. [1] An ontological commitment is not mathematical but metaphysical, and thus shows that a proposition needn't be contingent upon mathematical proof to be deemed likely.
Con is unjustly equating unconditional probability with likelihood. Anything that can dichotomously 'happen' or 'not happen' will have an unconditional probability of 50%. I can either be an astronaut or not be an astronaut, and thus my unconditional probility is 50%. However, if I were to have a degree in social studies my likelihood of being an astronaut is clearly not 50%. Moreover, clearly someone who has a degree in astrophysics is far 'more likely' to become an astronaut than someone who has no degree at all. This further demonstrates that likelihood is not necessarily contingent upon mathematical proof and that it does not equate unconditional probability.
Even if we were to accept these premises from Con, it would mean that nothing can be likely or unlikely. Replace 'God's existence' with anything, and from Con's logic, it is impossible to prove it. Hence, from this logic, we shouldn't make predictions about anything; the weather, the stock market etc. Therefore, Con's contention is clearly unsound.
==
Second Syllogism
Here, Con incorportates the coin analogy into his syllogism:
P1: The probability of "Heads" is 50%. The probability of "Tails" is 50%.P2: The coin is tossed, but we are not shown if it landed on "Heads" or "Tails".C: The only logical conclusion can be that we don't know if it's heads or tails.
This is unsound for the reasons the first syllogism is unsound; this would only apply to unconditional probabilities. As I have demonstrated, unconditional probabilities and likelihood aren't equatable, and thus the replacement of 'God's existence' with the coin analogy is sophistry. For example, are coin flips 'truly' a 50/50 chance - outside of unconditional probability? Theoretically, I could construct a machine that strikes a coin of a specific mass, from a specific height, with a specific force which would entail that the coin lands specfically each time. Would this scenario dictate that the actual outcome of the coin flip is 50% heads and 50% tails? No. Hence, it is not relevant.
Subsequently, Con states that my arguments do not constitue as 'proof'. As I aforementioned, the arguments I have provided; the Modal Ontological Argument and the Argument of Idealism; both act as proofs for God's existence as I have explained proof is contingent upon either: deductive, inductive or abductive reasoning.
A deductive argument is one that has a definitive conclusion and must always be true. For example mathematical principles e.g 2+2 = 4 is an example of deduction as the proposition is necessarily true in every possible world. [2]
An inductive argument is one where the conclusion is merely likely -- this is is primarily used in science, as even though the conclusion is not definitely true there is evidence which proves the conclusion is likely. [2]
An abductive argument is a likely conclusion based from an incomplete set of observations. An example of this is a medical diagnosis; what is the most likely diagonsis from the set of symptoms. [2]
Hence, it is clearly evident that a proposition can be likely from a set of proof.
Therefore, both of Con's syllogisms are unsound and fail to negate the resolution.
==
Con's Final Question
Con states:
I'm not sure if Pro and I are debating the same thing. Are we debating that it is probable that God exists (50%) or that it is likely that God exists (over 50%)? Because I agree with the first claim and disagree with the second one.
As I have shown, God's unconditional probability does not equate likelihood, and thus invalidates this. I have shown that by Con's logic nothing can be proven to be likely without mathematical proof (therefore deductive proof). However, this would refute almost all scientific observation which doesn't necessarily rely on deductive proof but rather inductive proof which doesn't necessarily have definitive axioms.
== Aff ==
Modal Ontological Argument
Here, Con's contention would be valid for any other being apart from 'God'. This is because I assert that God is a being with all 'positive' properties deemed by "Godels positivity operator'. Here, this argument uses Gode's defined operator 'Pos' [3]. This provides the ordering of individual by means of positive attributes, much like the way that predicates provide truth-functional assignment when applied to variables and constants.Hence, Pos(p) is true provided that the predicate 'p', is in fact, a postive attribute.
Here, I assert that God contains a positive attribute and is inherently the epitome of that attribute, and therefore must exist.
P1: 'Greatness' is a positive attribute
P2: God by definition, is the greatest
P3: Existing necessarily is greater than existing contingently
P4: If P2, then God must exist necessarily
C: God exists necessarily.
Premise One
I argue 'greatness' is inherently positive as there is no logical circumstance where greatness can be considered a negative property. Moreover, this is to be considered a positive property from the philosophical sense of pure attribution, which states that we are to understand that a predicate attributes some quality to an individual, and that the quality contains no element of privation [3].
Premise Two
God has been defined to be the creator of the universe i.e all matter, energy and space-time. All that is observable is the universe; all that has been, is, or will be is limited within the universe. Hence, it is inherently true that this would mean that God is the 'greatest' as it would have more agency, volition and power than anything we have observed or can perceive in this universe, as 'greatness' is defined as "of ability, quality, or eminence considerably above average" [4]
Premise Three
Here, I assert that existing in all possible worlds is greater than existing in at least one possible world. This is intutively true, as being impossible in one possible world implies that the entity is logically constrained, hence it logically entails that something would be greater if it were not constrained.
Premise Four
This makes logical sense, a God that is not constrained is cogently greater than a God that is constrained.
Conclusion
Logically follows from the premises.
Hence, God ought to exist necessarily, entailing that God exists in the actual world.
==
Idealism
Con states:
"My opponent has misunderstood Descartes' idea. Descartes meant only this: "I think, therefore I exist". He only said that because he can think about if he exists or not, he must exist"
I completely agree with Con and what it proves - that "he must exist". I am unsure how this invalidates the argument for idealism. Let me elaborate. That which must exist is the mind. Under metaphysical solipsism, Decartes' assertion is a priori, meaning the proposition "I exist" is metaphysically concluded without means external to the self. This means the statement is a priori and not a posteriori viz. Decartes did not conclude this from any scientific or physical observation, but did from mental observation. This ultimately proves that the 'I' in the proposition 'I exist' refers to the mind and not the physical aspects of Decartes. Hence, I am unsure why Con asserts this invalidates Idealism, as this unequivocally proves my point.
==
Conclusion
I have shown that both of Con's syllogisms are unsound as Con falsely equates uncondtional probability with likelihood. Moreover, I have supported the Ontological Argument by showing that God must necessarily exist due to His positive properties. Lastly, I posited that Con's contention with the argument for Idealism, was not a contention and actually fulfilled the crucial premise's veracity.
The resolution is affirmed.
Over to Con.
References
=Rebuttal=
Probability
I'll admit that I was wrong, and I equated probability with likelihood. We are debating the likelihood of God's existence, which is subjective. I thought we were discussing the mathematical probability of God's existence, which cannot be measured. I was wrong. So let's talk about likelihood.
==
Modal Ontological Argument
My opponent presents his argument in this syllogism:
P1: 'Greatness' is a positive attributeP2: God by definition, is the greatestP3: Existing necessarily is greater than existing contingentlyP4: If P2, then God must exist necessarilyC: God exists necessarily.
This argument is flawed. It assumes that just because God is, by definition, "the greatest", he must exist. It only proves that a being greater than all other beings must exist, which is true. It doesn't confirm that a creator of the universe exists, which is the definition of God according to Pro.
==
Idealism
Pro concludes that since reality is mental, there must be a mind to control it. This is false.
Reality cannot be mental. Our perception of reality is mental. There can only be one reality, since the definition of reality is "the state of things as they actually exist, as opposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them." A mental perception of reality is subjective and unrealistic. So Pro's premise is wrong.
Round 4
== Rebutals ==
Probability
Con has conceded this argument. I'm confused why Con hasn't provided another argument, since the burden of proof is shared. Now, Con cannot negate the resolution.
== Aff ==
Modal Ontological Argument
Con states:
This argument is flawed. It assumes that just because God is, by definition, "the greatest", he must exist. It only proves that a being greater than all other beings must exist, which is true. It doesn't confirm that a creator of the universe exists, which is the definition of God according to Pro.
Last round I provided evidence to support that the 'greatest being' would be the creator of the universe. I affirmed that a being that created all space-time, matter and energy would inherently be greater than its creation -- everything observable, measurable and all that has happened and will happen is limited to the scope of the universe. Hence, that which created all we can ever observe or perceive must be the greatest being. Better put, the creator of the universe is not limited to the scope of the universe.
Hence, the argument is sound, since the 'greatest being' is necessarily 'God'.
Idealism
Con rebuts:
"Reality cannot be mental. Our perception of reality is mental."
This is a bare assertion. Moreover, I commend Con to refute the evidence I provided.
Con subsequently states:
"There can only be one reality, since the definition of reality is "the state of things as they actually exist, as opposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them"
This is semantics and is a strawman of the argument itself. The argument entails that the mind is all that can necessarily be proven to exist a priori. Until the evidence I presented is refuted, the argument withstands.
Moreover, according to Con, if reality is that which actually exists and it is only "our perception" of reality that is mental, then why is our mind not incorportated into reality? If we perceive via qualia, then what is it that exists when I close my eyes, in a noiseless room with no sensation of touch, taste or smell? It is only the mind. This is what I am referring to and is what is referenced under metaphysical solipsism.
Con then contends:
"A mental perception of reality is subjective and unrealistic"
This is inherently flawed. Collectively, all humans have their own individual perception of reality, as it has been proven that the mind and the external universe exist independently. All humans would then perceive this reality through their senses. Therefore, all conclusions a posteriori were concluded by "subjective and unrealistic" perceptions of reality. Therefore, the logic Con uses to try and dismiss my argument is by his definition, subjective and unrealistic. Under metaphysical solipsism, the mind is all that can be definitively proven to exist, and any other observation a posteriori is fallible. Therefore, Con's rebuttal is circular and the argument for Idealism is upheld.
Conclusion
Hence, the resolution is maintained, as Con's rebuttal for the Ontological Argument was already explained in the previous round and his rebuttal against Idealism is a strawman of the argument's intentions.
Moreover, Con conceded his original contention, meaning he has provided no sound evidence to nullify the resolution.
=Rebuttal=
Modal Ontological Argument
Greatness is a subjective term, which is impossible to measure. Furthermore, negative greatness is also possible: someone can be a great serial killer (very good at being a serial killer), but is that a positive thing?
Pro cannot just create an imaginary deity in his head and claim that deity exists because it's "the greatest". This argument is flawed. I could argue the following using the Modal Ontological Argument:
1. It is possible that I have an infinite amount of money in the bank.
2. In some alternate world, I have an infinite amount of money in the bank.
3. An infinite amount of money is the greatest amount of money you can have.
4. Therefore, I have an infinite amount of money in my bank account.
The MOA is a non sequitur.
==
Idealism
What does Pro mean by "Our mind isn't incorporated into reality"? Consciousness is subjective and cannot be measured. But even if reality was subjective as Pro claims, this doesn't prove that it must have a creator.
Round 5
== Rebuttals ==
Modal Ontological Argument
Con states:
"Greatness is a subjective term, which is impossible to measure."
This is true, insofar as it is incoherent to state that X is 1.5x 'greater' than Y, unless X and Y are in the set of real numbers. However, this doesn't refute the fact that one being can be 'greater' than another, per the definition of greatness cited in the previous round. In fact it is a metaphysical truism that if everything that can be measured or objectified is limited by the universe, then the being that created the universe would be 'greater' than everything which is in in the universe, by metaphysical necessity. Hence, despite God's greatness not being attributed as an absolute value (like distances) it is deduced as a relative value (like entropy), which suffices. This is true, as aforementioned, God would be the only perceivable being that is not constrained by the scope universe and hence is the greatest.
Con reiterates the argument as such:
"1. It is possible that I have an infinite amount of money in the bank.2. In some alternate world, I have an infinite amount of money in the bank.3. An infinite amount of money is the greatest amount of money you can have.4. Therefore, I have an infinite amount of money in my bank account."
This argument is not tenable and is an unfair reflection of the MOA, because 'greatness' in this context predicates money in the bank. Although, it is true that an infinite amount of money in the bank is a 'greater' value than $10, does not imply that an infinite amount of money is greater than every metaphysical possibility imaginable. Money in any bank account has more external constraints than God does. Hence, it is not a fair comparison.
Let me iterate the argument as such, which would demonstrate the unfair replacement with 'God' and money in a bank account.
P1: The notion of God does not entail an internal constraint
P2: The notion of God does not entail any external constraints
P3: If P1 & P2, then God exists necessarily
C: God exists necessarily
C from 1,2,3 Modus Ponens.
Something is internally constrained when its essence is contradictided by logical axioms. For example, a 'round square' is an internally constrained notion. And as I have postulated, the notion of God per its definition entails no metaphysical contradiction. Moreover, a positive ontological claim may be externally constrained -- if I provide the positive claim that my glass is full of water, but there is a slice of lemon in the glass, the claim would be externally constrained as it would be impossible for the claim to have veracity, while the glass contains something that is not water. As I have stated, everything we have observed is limited to the scope of the universe, The only way for Con to have successfully refuted the argument at this point, since he conceded the metaphysical possibility of God, would be to show how God is externally constrained. Nonetheless, his only contention could have been God's 'de dicto' interpretation, and not God's 'de re' interpretation. [1] De dicto refers to any possible universe, whereas de re refers to the contingent universe i.e this universe. God is not externally constrained in this contingent universe, because the universe exists for Him to create it. Hence, if Con wanted to refute this argument he would have needed to prove that the universe as a whole, does not exist by metaphysical necessity, and there can exist contingent worlds where the universe doesn't exist.
Hence, the MOA withstands.
Idealism
Con asks:
"What does Pro mean by "Our mind isn't incorporated into reality"?"
This is a misquotation. I was asking Con this question since he said "Reality cannot be mental". So, I am very confused at what Con is actually trying to refute here. Con makes the claim that the mind and reality are serperate, I ask why the mind can't be incorporated into reality and Con misquotes and makes it seem like I was the stance affirming that our minds aren't incorporated into reality.
Con hasn't attempted to refute any of the argument at all. Instead he states:
"Consciousness is subjective and cannot be measured."
Stating that consciousess is subjective is ambiguous; each individual's rendition of consciousness is in fact subjective, but the ontological claim that consciousness exists is indubitable. So, again, I don't understand what Con's contention is here.
I feel Con has misunderstood the argument of Idealism, as he is not refuting any of the premises I have forwarded for this argument.
Summary
Overall, Con conceded his intitial case, consequently resulting in the inability to fulfill his burden of proof. Moreover, the MOA is upheld, since Con's claim that 'greatness' cannot be measured is invalid, since many objective entities have relative values. Lastly, Con misunderstands the intentions of the argument of Idealism and doesn't reference any of the evidence I have provided.
I thank my opponent for this debate.
References
I think I will concede this debate. Pro did a really good job and I think he won. Thank you.
Con(cedes)? haha
Better arguments ✔ ✗ ✗ 3 points
Better sources ✔ ✗ ✗ 2 points
Better spelling and grammar ✔ ✗ ✗ 1 point
Better conduct ✔ ✗ ✗ 1 point
Reason:Con(cedes)