The Interaction problem and Dualism

Author: Solaris1

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The interaction problem is a supposed problem for Dualism, the view of the mind that humans have two parts, an immaterial mind and the body
I will state it as it follows:

1-The mind and body are two separate substances, and have no shared properties

2-two substances need one shared property to interact

3-the mind and body cannot interact

However, the mind and body do clearly act. Whether you are a materialistic, Idealist or whatever, you most likely belief that your thoughts cause your actions. You need to drop either one or two. 

Two can be supported by the fact it has wide confirmation: a hammer and a nail have the property of being physical, and ideas that interact with each other have the property of being ideas. 
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@Solaris1
In  J.J.C Smart’s “Sensations and Brain Processes”, he explores the relationship between the mind and body, specifically delving into the shortcomings of the theory of Dualism. In the work of Paul  Churchland, Dualism distinguishes the mind from the body, categorizing consciousness as unable to be investigated by empirical science. Within this school of thought are a variety of sub-theories such Substance Dualism, Popular Dualism, and Property Dualism. Smart however, asserts that “there are no philosophical arguments which compel us to be dualists” .  In other words, Smart fails to see the logical reasoning behind Dualism, and instead proposes his Identity Theory of the Mind. Under this school of thought, while there is a slight distinction between mental states and brain processes, there are no non-physical properties. Although the physical properties may be vague or difficult to comprehend, they are still all physical properties.
In his attack on Churchland’s notion of Dualism, Smart states: “[the idea] that everything should be explicable in terms of physics except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable” .  Smart does not see why sensations should be granted such scientific leniency. His Identity Theory of Mind highlights the failure of Dualists to explain why sensations are not subjected to the same logical scientific expectations.
However, Smart does spend considerable time grappling with the notion of sensations. He uses the example of pain to ultimately highlight the nuances between a mental state and a brain process. An ache is a “report of a brain process”, but it is not the same as the sensation of feeling pain . Thus, his thesis does not state that a sensation can be directly translated into a brain process, but does explain that the two are inextricably correlated. Sensations and mental states can exist, just as by-products of specific brain processes.
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@FLRW
thank you for that comprehensive reply

(IFF) two things (and or two categories of things) CAN interact (THEN) they are NOT fundamentally "separate"

this also dismantles the concept of "supernatural"
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this also dismantles the concept of "supernatural"
True dat.
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@Solaris1
Spinoza also got rid of the mind-body problem by positing that Mind and Matter are the same substance except that we refer to them as being different.  His theory is called Neutral Monism. In his view, there exists something neutral that is not mental or physical rather there are natural neutral entities that make up the world. 

I find Idealism, Dualism, and Neutralism to be unpalatable fanciful thinking of mystical philosophers. Ancient and Medieval philosophers had to come up with explanations for the manifestation of the "soul" and "free-will" that they thought people possessed. However, everyone is completely clueless as to what these things really are. Thus, the philosophical discussions about them are really nonsense, but they are entertaining for a short while. 
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@CoolApe
Ancient and Medieval philosophers had to come up with explanations for the manifestation of the "soul" and "free-will" that they thought people possessed.
yep
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@Solaris1
However, the mind and body do clearly act. Whether you are a materialistic, Idealist or whatever, you most likely belief that your thoughts cause your actions. You need to drop either one or two. 
The "body" is a placeholder for "matter." So how do you know that the mind and body clearly interact? And yes, I'm asking this in light of your posit that one's thoughts causes one's actions.

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@CoolApe
Thus, the philosophical discussions about them are really nonsense, but they are entertaining for a short while.
Here Here.



A Zedku for CoolApe.

The body is,

It's functions are,

Evolved from matter,

Or so I think.
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Just to clear things up, my post is an objection to dualism. I'm not supporting it. 
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@Athias
Are you saying they don't? I wouldn't really have a proof that the mind really does interact with matter, other then that seems to be the case in everyone's experience. (Or at least mine) in my experience, and most people's they think they're thoughts cause actions. 
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Are you saying they don't?
I have yet to affirm or deny.

I wouldn't really have a proof that the mind really does interact with matter, other then that seems to be the case in everyone's experience. (Or at least mine) in my experience, and most people's they think they're thoughts cause actions. 
So, a priori?



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@Athias
how do you know that the mind and body clearly interact?
well, what we call "matter" certainly leaves us with "memories"

we can presumably detect "matter" with our "minds"

this conversation is phenomenal evidence of this fact
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@3RU7AL
well, what we call "matter" certainly leaves us with "memories"
This is the primary point of my inquiry.
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@Athias
This is the primary point of my inquiry.
can you be slightly more specific ?
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@3RU7AL
can you be slightly more specific ?
It's my attempt to ascertain Solaris1's distinctions between mind and matter.

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@Solaris_01
Experience { nervous system } precedes humans acccess to thoughts { memories } regarding Spirit-1 { mind/intellect/concepts }.

Shape is geometric Meta-space pattern, i.e. shape, in of itself, has no mass, no energy, no charge etc.

However, the shape of a car ---composed of atoms, molecules etc---, affects its flow in space of atmosphere.

A car shaped like a  bullet  >>> travels more efficiently and effectively through the space of atmosphere, than does brick ||||||| with its flat square face.

Human experience leads to the accessing of  Meta-space { Spirit-1 } mind/intellect/concepts/ego.

Mind over matter is 2 fold:

..1} intellect { Meta-space } in conjunction with memories allow humans discovery new technologies to be more effecient and effective,

....2} our Meta-space beliefs, alter matter outcomes, some 10% of the time in some lab experiements ex were given blue pill and told it has calming effect, when actually it is a blank pill or a pill that is a stimulant, type exeriements.  either way, it is ourseeeming free will, directing the chemical experiences of our body/matter/material/substance/fabric.




53 days later

#17
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I don't really worry too much about the Interaction Problem anymore, though I still find it to be a challenge. It is already well accepted in philosophy, even by physicalists, that physicalists have yet to fully describe the mechanism of a purely physical definition of consciousness. Why should we treat dualists any different? The inability to fully describe the mechanism is true of dualism and physicalism, and so if one wishes to criticize dualism for having such a lack then the same criticism must be applied to the physicalists.

Furthermore, even if the mechanism is not fully understood I believe we are justified in thinking that the immaterial can have causal efficacy. This is something I hold to because I find nominalist explanation for the ontology of a hole to be wanting, instead preferring the more intuitive and common sense to the ontology (which leads to the conclusion that holes are immaterial things, even if they are ontologically parasitic to physical things). A good read would be the paper 'Holes' by Lewis and Lewis. Holes, thus, are immaterial, but yet they clearly have causal efficacy. When asking, for example, why one's boat is taking on water the answer could be the existence of a hole, thus an immaterial thing (a hole) is the sufficient cause of a physical event.

Thus, even if we lack a full understanding of the mechanism of the interaction between the immaterial mind and the material brain, I don't see it as a problem. Immaterial things (like holes) can have causal efficacy and not even physicalists can fully describe the mechanism of their theory.
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you have made a category error

a hole is not a substance

a hole is a description of a "lack of" substance
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@TheMorningsStar
Or what’s perceived to enable things to pass through/into. If a hole can contain something specific, people don’t consider it a hole.
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@3RU7AL
you have made a category error
I really recommend reading 'Holes' by Lewis and Lewis  (and the 'Holes' article on the SEP, though that is a more complex article). It is not nearly as simple as you are trying to make it out to be. Here is a link to Lewis and Lewis's article, free to read: rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil375/Lewis1.pdf

A hole is not a 'substance' if you mean it in the way it usually refers to things (as it is usually used to refer to physical things), but do holes exist? If so, what, precisely, is a hole (on an ontological level)? This is where things get tricky. If true things can be said about holes (that hole is filled, that hole is x ft deep, etc.) then it indicates that holes are things that exist (as in order for there to be true things about a hole in reality, said hole must exist in reality). Holes exist, but are made of an absence of physical things. This is strange, no? And so many that reject the naïve realism (as under naïve realism, a hole is an immaterial thing) approach to holes take the view of either redefining holes from the common sense view or deny that holes even exist.

It seems, at least to me, like you are taking the philosophical view that holes do not exist (if I am not mistaken). It certainly is a view some philosophers have adopted, but it comes with baggage as well. If you take this view then that means that 'holes' only refers to something being perforated, which means that the number of holes would chance the necessary shape predicate for the "holed" object. To quote the SEP article, "Challenge: Can a language be envisaged that contains all the necessary shape predicates? Can every hole-referring noun-phrase be de-nominalized? Compare: ‘The hole in the tooth was smaller than the dentist’s finest probe’"

The philosophy of a hole's ontological status is a very complex thing, and every view has baggage. I simply take the naïve realism approach, as it is far more intuitively powerful and follows common sense. The only baggage it comes with is that it means non-physical things exist, but Mathematical Platonism (which the majority of philosophers of mathematics agrees with due to the Indispensability Argument) already comes with that as a conclusion. If you wish to hold to a different ontology then you inherently must sacrifice the intuitive and common sense approach and make an argument while taking on the corresponding baggage to said approach (taking intuitive and common sense approaches tend to mean a significantly lessened BoP).
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@TheMorningsStar
but do holes exist?
holes do not "exist" in the same way that concrete nouns "exist"

"consciousness" is not some kind of "ultimate mystery"

"consciousness" versus "physical" is as easy to understand as software versus hardware

and beyond that, we don't need to know exactly how "consciousness" interacts with "physical"

because we know that it does, in-fact, interact

which means that by pure logic, we know beyond any doubt, that they are both aspects of one "substance"

therefore, monism
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@3RU7AL
holes do not "exist" in the same way that concrete nouns "exist"
I gave you a link to probably one of the most basic, but encompassing, papers on this topic, and instead of even trying to grasp what philosophers think (on a philosophy forum) you decide to essentially just repeat yourself without even addressing what I said.


which means that by pure logic, we know beyond any doubt, that they are both aspects of one "substance
No, we don't know this through "pure logic".

Once more I am reminded why I hate this forum. Almost no one here actually knows even 101 level philosophy, the Dunning–Kruger effect can be observed here more than almost any other philosophy forum I have ever been on.
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@TheMorningsStar
which means that by pure logic, we know beyond any doubt, that they are both aspects of one "substance"

two things that are fundamentally independent cannot interact in any way

they cannot even detect each other

therefore

(IFF) two things CAN interact (THEN) they must necessarily share some fundamental similarity

they must be part of the same system

therefore, monism
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@3RU7AL
two things that are fundamentally independent cannot interact in any way
That is the assumption you are making in order to show monism is true. If this was some undeniable fact, like you pretend it is, then substance dualism would have never been prominent and we wouldn't expect to see modern defenses of it. You are essentially taking the Interaction Problem, saying "no longer is it a question of how, let's just assert it as impossible!" then going "Wow, if we assume such interaction is impossible we conclude some form of monism!" Ya, great job there. You managed to make a circular argument that completely ignores the very first point I made in my original comment.

If this is how this conversation is going to continue then we may as well stop here, as it is just going to be a waste of time.
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@TheMorningsStar
in what (hypothetical) system do fundamentally dissimilar phenomena interact ?
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@TheMorningsStar
Time is an infinite possibility and therefore impossible to waste.

And mind is merely an expression relative to a function.

A bit like fart.
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I'm just going to leave a quote (and a quick insight comment) from the IEP and leave it at that for now,
It is useful to be reminded, however, that to be bewildered by something is not in itself to present an argument against, or even evidence against, the possibility of that thing being a matter of fact. To ask “How is it possible that . . . ?” is merely to raise a topic for discussion. And if the dualist doesn’t know or cannot say how minds and bodies interact, what follows about dualism? Nothing much. It only follows that dualists do not know everything about metaphysics. But so what? Psychologists, physicists, sociologists, and economists don’t know everything about their respective disciplines. Why should the dualist be any different? In short, dualists can argue that they should not be put on the defensive by the request for clarification about the nature and possibility of interaction or by the criticism that they have no research strategy for producing this clarification.
Essentially, asking 'how' or 'how is it possible for' the mental and physical interact does not invalidate dualism, you must provide justification in order to think such interaction cannot occur. It does certainly leave the mechanism behind dualism incomplete, but the same exact thing is true of physicalism (as I stated at the very beginning).
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@TheMorningsStar
It does certainly leave the mechanism behind dualism incomplete
that's not my claim

my claim is that "mind" and "body" very obviously interact

this really shouldn't be in dispute by either side
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@3RU7AL
my claim is that "mind" and "body" very obviously interact
Yes, and? You are also saying interaction, if the mind and body are, in fact different things (like under substance dualism), is impossible, but that is a claim/assumption on your part and is literally addressed in the quote I just provided.

You can question how such interaction is possible, but asking such a question only would show that the understanding of the mechanism behind dualism is incomplete. Unless you can justify that such interaction is impossible, then, to quote the IEP, so what?
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@TheMorningsStar
but that is a claim/assumption on your part
no, no it is not

it is very basic logic

some particles strongly interact (because they share more common properties)

some particles weakly interact (because they share fewer common properties)

neutrinos and gravity waves are examples of weak interaction