I thought over Kant's Universalism and I feel like it doesn't make sense to expect everyone in the world to follow a Maxim. Everyone has different way of acting, even if they would have the same reasoning. They would make mistakes in slightly different situations. In addition, universalism oppresses the minority as homosexuality or other unproductive acts would not be allowed. But what if we modified this to become "majority-ism"? If 75% of the world or more followed a maxim, would there be a logical contradiction? In democracies, we value the majority, but also respect the minority. With this modification, we would allow the minority to keep their rights while enforcing the majority to follow a maxim law. The flaws of universalism seem mostly fixed. Are there any problems with this idea?
Modification of Universalism -- Majority-ism
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@Theweakeredge
what do you think of this one? Arbitrarily pick 75% or more of the world at random, and consider what happens if they all follow a maxim. If it fails logically, then it is immoral. If it succeeds upon good will, then it is moral.
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@seldiora
This is practically the exact same thing.... changing the majority from 100% o 75% doesn't make it not oppressive, it just makes it less oppressive. That's the bar dude, not the goal.
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@Theweakeredge
oh. What about 50%?
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@seldiora
What about, and hot take I know, we just not use universal maxims?! They don't work! Why? Just throw it out!
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@seldiora
50% isn't a majority it's stalemate....
And the majority of Kantian philosophy is twaddle.......He was too privileged to have to worry about reality......A bit like Marx.
I would suggest that, everyone is the same but also unique...And I would further suggest that "Universalism" is either 100% or not at all.
It would be real easy peasy being paid to sit about and think up nonsense.
So my advice would be.... If such jobs exist then go for it.
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@seldiora
The principle of universalizability isn't about expecting people to accept a maxim of moral action. It's about reasoning if ones maxim for moral action contradicts itself when raised to the level of universal moral law.
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@Sum1hugme
The problem with it is that is completely disregards context. It values stealing as wrong 100% of the time, when it isn't, it regards killing as wrong 100% of the time, when it isn't.
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@Theweakeredge
The wrongness of an action is context-independent, because it's A Priori knowledge, acquired from pure inquiry. Ethical judgements always have empirical and A Priori inputs. The wrongness of an act is the a priori principle applied to a situation. Therefore, the wrongness isn't context dependent. So yes, many motives of moral action can be wrong 100% of the time
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@Sum1hugme
What is a moral action that is wrong or right 100% of the time
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@Theweakeredge
It's not about moral action being right or wrong, it's about the motive of moral action. For example, there is, to my knowledge, no motive for stealing that isn't geared towards the satisfaction of some preference. No motive for stealing can ever tell one, without qualification, what is right. Therefore, motives for stealing will always be immoral, or at best, amoral.
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@Sum1hugme
For example, there is, to my knowledge, no motive for stealing that isn't geared towards the satisfaction of some preference.
Interesting thread. I think it was easy to follow except for this quote. What do you mean by "satisfaction of some preference"?
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@MarkWebberFan
There are two motives of moral action : duty and inclination. Inclinations are always geared towards the satisfaction of some preference. For example, if there was a shopkeeper who had the opportunity to shortchange his customers but he decides not to because he'll lose business, then he is operating with the motive to satisfy the preference that his business succeed. This is a fundamentally selfish motive, and therefore, devoid of moral value. Whereas if he was to do the right thing for the sake of it being the right thing to do, in other words, doing the right thing for the right reasons, he would be acting out of a duty to the moral law. So, when he is acting from a hypothetical imperative (or a hypothetical ought), he may do the right thing, but it's for the wrong reasons. Does that help?
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@Sum1hugme
I appreciate the quick reply. I think I desperately wanted an impression on what a "preference" looks/feels like. Now that I have your shopkeeper example, I think everything looks good enough for me.