By the usual standards of classified military information, not just for basic text messaging or for grunt level communication, yes, it's insecure.
"The app’s security is viewed as fairly strong due to its robust privacy features and minimal data collection, as well as default end-to-end encryption of all messages and voice calls. The app also includes a function that deletes all messages from a conversation within a set time frame, adding an additional layer of data protection. But experts agree that it shouldn’t be used by government officials as an alternative to communicating through more secure, sanctioned government communications — which Signal is not.
...members of Trump’s Cabinet — including the vice president, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, among others — were likely using personal devices,
since in most cases, Signal cannot be downloaded onto official federal devices. This alone creates a host of cybersecurity issues.
...One of the biggest risks of using Signal is where the data can be stored.
'People can link Signal messaging to a desktop application.' he said. 'This means that Signal data is being delivered to potentially multiple desktop and laptop computers where it isn’t being stored in a phone’s secure enclave. That data is then at risk from commodity malware on the system.'"
So much as you might view this app as sufficiently trustworthy, and much as it is significantly better than a lot of other communication programs, it's not anywhere near the standard that is allowed for these kinds of discussions.
That is an incorrect analogy. Holes in dams cause bigger holes (and if not then what point were you making?).
Not what I was implying. My point was as I said it: an active willingness to make one hole in the structure (or, in this case, release more classified military information) suggests a willingness to keep doing so. This was a response to the point that they might be doing this intentionally. If so, I don't understand why anyone would assume that this is the only time they would ever engage in this.
In other words given intentionality then the fact that no operations were compromised must be seen as intentional too, perhaps explaining the short timeline. i.e. they leaked X when they knew there was no time to prevent X from happening.
So because nothing interfered with the operation, nothing could have interfered with it and it was never dangerous. Maybe. Doesn't scream "secure" to me when there's even a chance of interference or a journalist leaking pertinent information that might become important in future engagements.
In a serious intelligence conflict (with cunning players) all governments would be leaking false or inconsequential true information all the time. If you didn't then the enemy would know that those few leaks which remain were likely true.
It's like jamming, prevent them from identifying the true signal by disguising it among the false/useless ones.
My problem with this is what we know it wasn't false and we don't know if it was useless. If you want to argue that it's beneficial to do this, fine, but you're assuming a lot about how important that information was. Beyond that, I don't think it's valuable to the government to set a standard that there are active leaks in the system by creating new holes in it. Doesn't seem like that's necessary to throw other governments off the scent of other relevant information and it makes our intelligence apparatus look poorly managed, which is a problem when that's how everyone (including your own people and allies) perceive it.
